Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ABUJA1372
2003-08-12 14:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

ADVANCING THE VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES IN NIGERIA: USE

Tags:  PGOV EPET KCRM PHUM SNAR NI 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001372 

SIPDIS


DEPT FOR AF, DRL AND INL


E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2013
TAGS: PGOV EPET KCRM PHUM SNAR NI
SUBJECT: ADVANCING THE VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES IN NIGERIA: USE
OF FORCE GUIDELINES FOR POLICE AND MILITARY


REF: ABUJA


Classified by Charge d'affaires Dawn Liberi; reasons 1.5 (b)
and (d).


This is an action cable; action request for AF in para 10.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001372

SIPDIS


DEPT FOR AF, DRL AND INL


E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2013
TAGS: PGOV EPET KCRM PHUM SNAR NI
SUBJECT: ADVANCING THE VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES IN NIGERIA: USE
OF FORCE GUIDELINES FOR POLICE AND MILITARY


REF: ABUJA


Classified by Charge d'affaires Dawn Liberi; reasons 1.5 (b)
and (d).


This is an action cable; action request for AF in para 10.


1.(U) The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human rights
seek, among other things, to bring companies in the
extractive industry and governments of countries in which
these companies operate into conformity with international
human rights standards regarding the deployment and behavior
of public and private security forces.


2.(C) Our discussions with the three multinational companies
in Nigeria who are Voluntary Principles stakeholders --
ChevronTexaco, ExxonMobil and Shell -- have revealed that
none has codified use of force guidelines in either their
internal policies for Nigeria or bilateral agreements with
the GON. One company claims it has been advised against
producing use of force guidelines by its U.S.-based corporate
lawyers, who counsel that such a formal move could expose the
company to undue liabilities.


MISUSE OF FORCE
--------------


3.(C) The need for guidelines in Nigeria is evident, however.
Even when attempting to do the right thing, the Police often
are in the wrong in how they do it. Police training is poor;
(see septel for report on Policing in the Niger Delta)
however, police personnel are empowered to resort to lethal
force in situations where most other police forces would use
less drastic means. The standard weapon issued to the
average police constable is an automatic rifle, such as an
AK-47. Moreover, policemen and women have little
understanding of a "force continuum" or the principle of
applying minimum force to meet the threat faced. Little
middle ground exists between passivity and the use of extreme
force.


4.(C) In the oil-producing Delta region, improper use of
force has been frequent. Most police and army personnel are
deployed there to protect oil company interests against
threats that often emanate from the Delta communities. In an
environment where tensions and frustrations are high, the
police, army and the local populace develop a mutually
hostile view that reinforced the penchant for these security
elements to resort to excessive force. Domestic and
International Human Rights organizations have reported
extensively on the Delta and have documented many of these
cases.


5.(C) The oil companies operating in the Delta region
recognize however, sometimes reluctantly, that they must
assume partial responsibility for the behavior of the police

force deployed for their protection. Company interests
dictate this because when human rights incidents occur at the
hands of police or military assigned to oil installations, it
is the companies that receive intense negative publicity. As
a consequence, in recent discussions with Mission officers,
the companies have shown greater interest in addressing the
training needs of the police -- who most often are the first
people to encounter disgruntled members of their host
communities. In particular, they also recognize the utility
for formal commitments and adherence to use of force
guidelines by both the GON and the companies themselves.


SHELL OUT IN FRONT
--------------



6. While Shell does not have a formal agreement with the GON,
it does have a global (not Nigeria-specific) set of use of
force Guidelines. It also has developed "Rules for Guidance
in the Use of Firearms by the Police" which it has put down
on a small (3" X 5") two-sided, laminated card for
distribution to Nigerian police personnel assigned to Shell
installations. On one side are the guidelines, including
minimal force practices to handle disturbances.
Supplementing the Shell guidelines is Nigerian Police Force
Order Number 237, an internal use of force SOP, to which
police members must adhere. This Force Order 237 is
paraphrased on the other side of the Shell guidelines.


7.(C) The effort to disseminate and train Nigerian police
pursuant to the guidelines is admirable. The link to
Nigerian Police Force order Number 237, however, raises
concerns. INL/ICITAP police advisors have found Force Order
237 to be inconsistent with standards established by the
ICRC, the UN Convention on Human Rights, UN Code of Conduct
for Law Enforcement Officials, the UN Guidelines on Use of
Force, and the African Charter, all of which the GON
subscribes to. Force Order 237 allows police to use lethal
force against any "riotous" crowd of 12 or more, whether they
are armed or not. The Force Order further instructs police
personnel to shoot demonstrators below the knees and to
"neutralize group ringleaders. Although Shell did not
include these provisions in paraphrasing the Force Order, we
believe the order should not be mentioned in the Company's
guidelines.


ROADMAP AND COMMENT
--------------


8.(C) To promote adherence to the Voluntary Principles, the
Mission believes the USG should encourage the companies to
enter formal agreements with the GON or to develop internal
use of force guidelines that could be used for Nigerian
military and police personnel assigned to oil installations.
Agreements are preferred; they would allow companies to
obtain control over the security personnel deployed to their
facilities, including the right to reject personnel who have
been involved in past human rights incidents.


9.(C) After the companies have gotten on board, we would then
initiate close collaboration with top GON police and military
leaders aimed at producing formal GON commitments to the
guidelines for security forces found in the Voluntary
Principles. We should encourage the GON to revise or rewrite
Force Order 237 to eliminate its inconsistencies with several
international human rights charters and conventions. We
could provide technical assistance to accomplish this. We
are under no delusion. These reforms will be strenuously
resisted in some quarters and may take sustained efforts and
a long time to accomplish.


10.(C) Action Request: Post would like the Department's
comments on the two step approach stated in para 8 and 9.


LIBERI

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