Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ABUJA1303
2003-07-30 17:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:
NIGERIA: PLANNING FOR LIBERIA
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 001303
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2013
TAGS: PREL MOPS MASS LI NI ECOWAS
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: PLANNING FOR LIBERIA
REF: A. STATE 213493
B. ABUJA 1283
CLASSIFIED BY CDA DAWN LIBERI; REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).
C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 001303
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2013
TAGS: PREL MOPS MASS LI NI ECOWAS
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: PLANNING FOR LIBERIA
REF: A. STATE 213493
B. ABUJA 1283
CLASSIFIED BY CDA DAWN LIBERI; REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).
1. (C) According to current GON planning, the 19th
Motorized Infantry battalion (i.e. NIBATT 15 in UNAMSIL)
and the 26th Infantry battalion from Sokoto will deploy to
Monrovia. Combined manpower of the two battalions is 1,375
men. The GON had indicated a willingness to deploy OFR-
trained NIBATT 14 from Sierra Leone to Liberia based on our
request; however, apparently UNAMSIL has opposed the
redeployment of NIBATT 14 to Liberia.
2. (C) DATT discussed the Liberia deployment with Chief of
Army Staff (COAS) LTG Agwai July 29 (REF B). The COAS
could not give a definitive date for the Nigerian
deployment as their planning has not been finalized and
much of it is dependent on external factors such as
provision of logistical support and lift from prospective
international donors. However, the COAS seemed less
committed to the Nigerian general staff's previous
endorsement of a "backward planning sequence" which would
make Nigerian deployment dependent on a reliable timetable
for the follow-on deployments from fellow ECOWAS states.
3. (C) The COAS said the Nigerians would not need
uniforms, personnel equipment, basic medical support, field
kitchens or weapons. He said the GON would be able to find
enough soft-skinned vehicles for the Sokoto battalion; he
did not know the status of NIBATT 15's vehicles. He also
said the Sokoto battalion would deploy with minimal basic
load of ammunition, and would need resupply quickly once in
Liberia. The Sokoto battalion is at 90% personnel
readiness and could deploy as soon as equipment and
transport issues have been resolved. Finally, Agwai said
the GON could provide 24-30 Warsaw Pact infantry fighting
vehicles (BMPs) for Liberia but needed assistance with
transport and ammunition.
4. (C) The COAS said the Nigerian battalions would require
further donor support in the way of attack helicopters, at
least one transport helicopter for the Force Commander
(Nigerian BG Okwonko),logistics support to include
ammunition resupply in Liberia, communications, air and sea
lift for the battalion and armored personnel carriers,
ammunition for the APCs and barrier material.
5. (C) Post has been unable to raise pertinent reftel
points with ECOWAS Executive Secretary Chambas or MG Diarra
due to their prolonged absence from Abuja and presence in
Accra. Post would suggest that Embassy Accra also attempt
to raise these points with Chambas and/or Diarra if
possible. Post will continue to press ECOWAS and the GON
for a quick deployment and will report further as more
information becomes available.
LIBERI
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2013
TAGS: PREL MOPS MASS LI NI ECOWAS
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: PLANNING FOR LIBERIA
REF: A. STATE 213493
B. ABUJA 1283
CLASSIFIED BY CDA DAWN LIBERI; REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).
1. (C) According to current GON planning, the 19th
Motorized Infantry battalion (i.e. NIBATT 15 in UNAMSIL)
and the 26th Infantry battalion from Sokoto will deploy to
Monrovia. Combined manpower of the two battalions is 1,375
men. The GON had indicated a willingness to deploy OFR-
trained NIBATT 14 from Sierra Leone to Liberia based on our
request; however, apparently UNAMSIL has opposed the
redeployment of NIBATT 14 to Liberia.
2. (C) DATT discussed the Liberia deployment with Chief of
Army Staff (COAS) LTG Agwai July 29 (REF B). The COAS
could not give a definitive date for the Nigerian
deployment as their planning has not been finalized and
much of it is dependent on external factors such as
provision of logistical support and lift from prospective
international donors. However, the COAS seemed less
committed to the Nigerian general staff's previous
endorsement of a "backward planning sequence" which would
make Nigerian deployment dependent on a reliable timetable
for the follow-on deployments from fellow ECOWAS states.
3. (C) The COAS said the Nigerians would not need
uniforms, personnel equipment, basic medical support, field
kitchens or weapons. He said the GON would be able to find
enough soft-skinned vehicles for the Sokoto battalion; he
did not know the status of NIBATT 15's vehicles. He also
said the Sokoto battalion would deploy with minimal basic
load of ammunition, and would need resupply quickly once in
Liberia. The Sokoto battalion is at 90% personnel
readiness and could deploy as soon as equipment and
transport issues have been resolved. Finally, Agwai said
the GON could provide 24-30 Warsaw Pact infantry fighting
vehicles (BMPs) for Liberia but needed assistance with
transport and ammunition.
4. (C) The COAS said the Nigerian battalions would require
further donor support in the way of attack helicopters, at
least one transport helicopter for the Force Commander
(Nigerian BG Okwonko),logistics support to include
ammunition resupply in Liberia, communications, air and sea
lift for the battalion and armored personnel carriers,
ammunition for the APCs and barrier material.
5. (C) Post has been unable to raise pertinent reftel
points with ECOWAS Executive Secretary Chambas or MG Diarra
due to their prolonged absence from Abuja and presence in
Accra. Post would suggest that Embassy Accra also attempt
to raise these points with Chambas and/or Diarra if
possible. Post will continue to press ECOWAS and the GON
for a quick deployment and will report further as more
information becomes available.
LIBERI