NIGERIA: ABUBAKAR ON ECOWAS LIBERIA FORCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001246 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2013 TAGS: PREL MOPS MASS LI NI ECOWAS SUBJECT: NIGERIA: ABUBAKAR ON ECOWAS LIBERIA FORCE REF: (A) ABUJA 1210 (B) ABUJA 1211 CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER; REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During a July 12 meeting with Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Kansteiner, former Nigerian Head of State General Abdulsalaam Abubakar discussed the proposed deployment of an ECOWAS force and the establishment of a transitional government in Liberia. Abubakar said Nigerian BG Festus Okwonko had been named the Force Commander and that Nigeria could field two battalions on short notice. Abubakar said 3,000 of the desired 5,000-man force would come from ECOWAS members with Nigeria, Ghana and Mali shouldering most of the load in the beginning and Senegal possibly contributing to the force after the initial deployment. He hoped the remaining 2,000 soldiers would come from contributions from the United States, South Africa and/or Morocco. Abubakar thought that Taylor should leave Monrovia within the next one-two weeks, lest Taylor start obfuscating and the LURD resume fighting. Abubakar was also concerned that, to prevent chaos, peacekeepers should deploy before Taylor leaves. Abubakar and A/S Kansteiner discussed a Taylor departure simultaneous with the arrival of the peacekeeping force as a possible course of action. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) During a July 12 meeting with Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Walter Kansteiner, SIPDIS former Nigerian Head of State General Abudulsalaam Abubakar discussed deployment of an ECOWAS force to Liberia. Abubakar said Nigerian BG Festus Okwonko would be the Force Commander. Okwonko planned to accompany Abubakar to Accra the afternoon of July 12. (NOTE: Abubakar indicated Okwonko had served with ECOMOG forces in Liberia. He was most recently assigned to the Command and Staff College in Jaji and was formerly the Nigerian DATT in Addis Ababa. END NOTE.) ¶3. (C) Abubakar thought ECOWAS could eventually field 3,000 of a desired 5,000-man force. Nigeria, Ghana and Mali would furnish most of the troops while Senegal and others were expected to make smaller contributions once the initial force was already on the ground. Abubakar expected the remaining 2,000 to come from the United States, South Africa and Morocco. He had not yet heard whether South Africa or Morocco would participate. He indicated that ECOWAS forces would require significant logistical support from the U.S. or other donor countries. Abubakar said the Liberians wanted the U.S. to lead the mission and that it was essential to deploy forces to Monrovia immediately. ¶4. (C) A/S Kansteiner emphasized that President Bush had not yet decided whether to deploy American troops and that we were still considering the full range of policy options on Liberia - from financial assistance only to full troop deployment. A/S Kansteiner commented that, should Taylor step aside and if a decision to commit troops were taken, the quickest the U.S. could deploy would be on or about August 1. Abubakar gave a time-table of a week or two for Taylor's departure. Waiting any longer, he felt, could further destabilize the situation - Taylor might start playing tricks and the LURD would not remain bridled. Thus, it was imperative that some force get on the ground quickly. Kansteiner asked whether a quickly deployed but small ECOWAS force would be challenged by the LURD, MODEL and perhaps the GOL. Abubakar acknowledged that possibility but felt that the potential consequences of not deploying would be greater. ¶5. (C) Abubakar was dismayed that the ECOWAS Joint Verification Team (JVT) was stuck in Freetown and had not yet visited Monrovia. With UNAMSIL's refusal to provide lift for the JVT and uncertainty over Nigeria's ability to do so, it was unclear when the JVT would be deployed. A/S Kansteiner and Abubakar agreed the JVT was important for both logistical and symbolic reasons and that it must complete its mission before any ECOWAS force could go to Liberia. ¶6. (C) Responding with concern to A/S Kansteiner's assertion that Taylor's departure was a prerequisite to any possible U.S. troop deployment, Abubakar worried that anti-Taylor sentiments had grown so strong that the cease-fire might break down if a force were not deployed soon. A/S Kansteiner asked whether a simultaneous Taylor departure/U.S. troop arrival was a tenable solution; Abubakar felt this concept might present a way forward. ¶7. (C) Abubakar did not think it necessary for the peace process to address the fate of members of Taylor's cadre who also fear indictment by the Special Court for Sierra Leone. He said that extracting Taylor quickly would calm the situation and open the door to working other problems. Responding to Kansteiner's concerns about recent LURD threats against peacekeepers should any deploy before Taylor's departure, Abubakar said such statements were worrying and that he had been counseling the LURD to desist. ¶8. (C) On the transitional government, Abubakar emphasized the importance of maintaining the constitutionality of the transfer of power upon Taylor's departure. He stated that Taylor should hand power to Vice President Blah or to whomever he selects, such as Roland Massaquoi, to replace Blah as Vice President. That Vice President, in turn, should step aside in favor of an interim government by October 2003. The interim government would be charged with beginning the demobilization process and preparing for elections in October 2004. Abubakar agreed with A/S Kansteiner that the transitional government should be led by an experienced and respected civil servant. He also commented that he had told LURD and MODEL leaders they should not expect a place in the transitional government if they intend to seek office in the October 2004 election. ¶9. COMMENT: After having sat around the table for many hours with LURD and GOL representatives, Abubakar's main concern is the prompt removal of Taylor. Abubakar had gauged the LURD's patience and presciently found it to be wanting. Abubakar sensed that the cease-fire would not hold much longer if Taylor's departure remains more promissory than definite. Because he has probably spent more time recently with the LURD than anyone else, his observations are credible and should continue to inform our thinking. END COMMENT. JETER