Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ABUJA1150
2003-07-02 11:11:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:
NIGERIA: PRESIDENT OBASANJO PROPOSES REFORMS TO
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 001150
SIPDIS
CAIRO FOR POL - MAXSTADT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PINR NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: PRESIDENT OBASANJO PROPOSES REFORMS TO
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER; REASON: 1.5 (B)
and (D).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 001150
SIPDIS
CAIRO FOR POL - MAXSTADT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PINR NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: PRESIDENT OBASANJO PROPOSES REFORMS TO
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER; REASON: 1.5 (B)
and (D).
1. (U) SUMMARY: President Obasanjo appears committed to using
the first months of his new Administration to introduce key
political and economic reforms. On June 18, Obasanjo
proposed significant changes to the federal government system
and the conduct of elections. The two most salient are: (1)
the creation of new Zonal Councils, comprised of the
pertinent state governors for each of the country,s six
geopolitical zones and, (2) a possible change eliminating
popular elections for local government councils. A third,
potentially nettlesome proposal was the recommendation to
change elections from a contest between candidates to a
competition solely between political parties -- the winning
party could then choose the office holder after the election.
The three proposals, particularly the termination of local
elections, would require constitutional amendments. The poor
performance of the generally wastrel local governments made
them easy prey; many people will applaud that proposal.
However, opposition parties and numerous civil rights
activists view the proposals as intended to ensure the
continued dominance of the PDP, Obasanjo,s governing party.
END SUMMARY
--------------
OBASANJO: TAKING HIS MANDATE SERIOUSLY
--------------
2. (U) We have previously reported that President Obasanjo
won the April 19 election, albeit by materially less than the
62 percent indicated in the official results. The
irregularities surrounding the April elections (legislative,
gubernatorial, and presidential),diminished the opposition
parties, fanning embers of political tension in many areas of
the country. There was talk of mass action; there was fear
of worse.
3. (C) However, mass action has failed to materialize thus
far. Obasanjo and his team actively reached out to
traditional leaders and members of opposition parties
susceptible to influence in a successful attempt to co-opt
them. Time passed. The stridency of many opportunists began
to wane. Many left the opposition parapets, resigning
themselves to live with the reality of a massive PDP victory
at all levels. Others, tempted by the allure of office, have
crossed the carpet to the PDP. Probably gauging that he had
withstood the initial and perhaps strongest wave of
opposition criticism, Obasanjo decided it was time to act
decisively, in accordance with the clear mandate he believes
he won. He also had learned a lesson from his first
Administration. In 1999, Obasanjo got out of the starting
blocks quickly, only to allow himself to get bogged down
later in internecine party squabbles. With good reason,
Obasanjo likely reasoned the election has made him the most
dominant figure on the political landscape; thus he might as
well act like it, flexing his political muscle when required
and bringing about sweeping reforms.
4. (C) At the June 18 National Council of State meeting,
Obasanjo unveiled several bold strokes. (The Council of
State is composed of the 36 State Governors and all former
Heads of State. During most of his first term, Council
meetings were largely pro forma; little of significance
emerged from these sessions. However, this initial meeting
of his second term proved differently.) Obasanjo unveiled
proposals amending the extant federal structure and possibly
changing the process of elections in Nigeria.
--------------
LOCAL GOVERNMENT ) A CHANGE IS NEEDED
--------------
5. (C) The ineffectiveness of local government attracted most
of Obasanjo,s attention and ire at the Council of State
meeting. Established to promote grassroots democracy and
development, most local governments performed abysmally,
Obasanjo groused. Local Councils have become factories of
corruption, profligacy and often violent political
competition. Due to this dismal showing, Obasanjo and the
Governors agreed to suspend local government elections slated
for June 21. Thus, caretaker committees, formed by the
Governors after the expiry of the elected local officials,
tenure last year, will continue for at least another three
months. First-term governors will likely appoint a new batch
of local caretakers, loyal and politically supportive.
6. (C) During this ninety-day period, a technical review
committee will consider proposals regarding local
governments, including their possible elimination. Another
proposal tabled at the June 18 meeting was to end local
government elections altogether, authorize governors to
nominate Local Government Councils. A corollary proposal
would give state governors more control over money for the
local governments. (COMMENT: The suspension of the June 21
local elections had been a foregone conclusion. State
Electoral Commissions were unfunded and unprepared to conduct
elections. Most governors did not want to spend resources on
local government elections. They also were comfortable with
allowing their hand-picked appointees to remain in control at
the local level. All in all, the governors saw the proposals
on Local Councils as in their interests. The proposals would
significantly increase the governors, influence at the local
level, giving them wide discretion over selection of local
officials and the expenditure of funds. This would enhance
governors, ability to influence what happens in their states
from now and up to the 2007 elections. END COMMENT)
--------------
GOVERNORS ZONAL COUNCILS
--------------
7. (C) Creation of Zonal Councils representing the six
geo-political zones (Southwest, South-South, Southeast,
Northwest, North-Central, Northwest) was another important
proposal. The governors of each state in a particular zone
would comprise one council; chairmanship of the Council would
rotate among the governors on a yearly basis. The exact
powers of the Council would have to be defined; apparently,
the Council would derive most of its powers from those
heretofore within the province of the states but take some
arrows from the federal government,s quiver as well.
--------------
I DIDN,T VOTE FOR THAT CANDIDATE
--------------
8. (C) From the standpoint of democratic expression, the most
worrisome proposal dealt with the conduct of the election.
Ostensibly to curtail electoral corruption by insulating
individual candidates from having to forage for campaign
funds, a recommendation was put forward to eliminate
individual candidates in future elections. Instead of the
electorate choosing between contesting candidates from
different parties, only the parties would contest. The
winning party could then wait until after the election to
name the individual office holder.
--------------
COMMENT
--------------
9. (C) The election in Anambra State presaged this
recommendation. After the Electoral Commission announced a
slate of PDP winners for the National Assembly, the PDP
national office substituted an entirely new list of
candidates. One of the justifications for the switch was
that the populace voted for the party, not individual
candidates. Thus, the party had the right of candidate
substitution even after the election. Sadly, the Electoral
Commission acquiesced in this. In this instance, corruption
and image problems were not the reasons for the switch.
Political competition within the PDP was responsible. The
original slate of candidates was aligned with Vice-President
Atiku; the influential Uba brothers of Anambra (Andy Uba is
one of President Obasanjo,s closest Special Assistants and
is married to one of the First Lady,s relatives) sponsored
the second group of PDP candidates. The Anambra episode
merely provides an inkling of how this proposal could be
abused.
--------------
NATIONAL CONFERENCE
--------------
10. (C) The proposed changes would require amendments to the
Constitution. The Presidency recently has been signaling a
newfound interest in a National Conference to discuss these
and perhaps other issues. This represents an about-face by
Obasanjo. Obasanjo previously opposed the idea of a National
Conference, apprehensive that it would acquire an unstoppable
momentum and would treat issues like confederation or
succession. The current proposal would entail a 150-member
Conference, most of whom presumably would be selected by the
Presidency. While appearing to extend a hand to advocates of
a National Conference, this approach, by letting Obasanjo
choose the delegation, would allow him to influence the
Conference and its outcomes. (COMMENT: The idea for a
national conference had been promoted by many Southern
politicians, particularly the Yoruba political elite.
Apparently, Obasanjo promised to support the notion of a
conference in exchange for the support of Afenifere, the
pre-eminent Yoruba socio-political organization. Now
Obasanjo appears to be following through on his promise, but
according to his own terms which might not be Afenifere,s.
END COMMENT)
--------------
THE OPPOSITION CRIES TRICKERY
--------------
11. (C) The opposition had little nice to say about the
Council of State proposals. Almost all opposition political
parties issued critical statements. Most criticism centered
around the decision to suspend the June 21 local government
elections and perhaps do away with local elections entirely.
Opposition figures called it an open assault against the
Constitution. The more virulent oppositionists tagged it as
the first link of a long concatenation, ultimately leading to
a constitutional amendment that would allow the President and
governors to seek third terms. With the PDP holding
super-majorities in the National Assembly and controlling
more than two-thirds of the 36 states (the PDP has 28
governors),amending the national Constitution has been
reduced from a solemn undertaking to mostly an intra-party
affair, these critics complain.
12. (C) Politicians from the traditional core of Northern
politics, the Kaduna-Kano-Sokoto triangle, see the Zonal
Council and National Conference as inimical. First,
institutionalization of the Zonal Councils would further
split the North. The proposal would lend further relevance
to the independence of the Northeast and North Central. This
greater identity could only be bought at the expense of the
Northwest,s influence over these other regions. Second,
most Northerners inherently shy away from the idea of a
National Conference. The resource poor North is afraid that
Southerners will focus on the issue of greater local autonomy
and control of local resources. Consequently, Northerners
are wary that Obasanjo will use the specter of a National
Conference as leverage to get them to acquiesce in his
proposals if he would suspend the idea of a conference.
--------------
COMMENT
--------------
13. (C) Rolling out these proposals was perhaps a canny move
by Obasanjo. He signaled that squabbling over the elections
was a thing of the past for him; he was now focussing on
governance. By publicizing these proposals, he also hoped to
shift the political debate. Now his critics have to expend
some of their sparse political capital responding to these
proposals. The more he makes them respond to what he is
doing on policy, the less time they have to lambast the
elections. Moreover, constant, unrelenting complaining will
undermine their credibility, making them look shrill in the
public eye.
14. (C) However, Obasanjo,s move may have risks. Given
their poor performance, local government councils have few
defenders. However, that may not be sufficient rationale to
scrap local elections. After all, neither the federal
government nor state governments performed admirably or even
up to expectations. Local government, like the other tiers
of government, must improve. However, reposing more power in
state governors or doing away with elections does not seem
like the answer. The cure, greater consolidation of power in
the gubernatorial mansions and in the Presidential Villa,
seems more harmful to long-term democracy than the alleged
disease.
15. (C) Additionally, tampering with the constitution can be
a tempting political morsel. Allegations that President
Obasanjo is fishing to perpetuate his Presidency beyond a
second term are heretofore unsubstantiated and highly
questionable. However, the danger exists that office holders
might seek to enact amendments as well as laws stacking the
electoral deck in their favor for the future. It was telling
that Obasanjo did not consult widely in drafting his
proposals. His behavior suggests a politician who believes
he is popular and that his opposition is powerless. The
latter belief is much more accurate than the former. While
he may have accurately measured his foes, weaknesses,
Obasanjo should be careful about taking too many political
risks, too soon. Right now the opposition is off balance and
he is taking advantage of its weakness. Yet self-delusion
about the size and strength of his mandate can lead to
political mistakes. While he may believe he has vast support
and can do as he pleases, Obasanjo,s weak popularity among
many average Nigerians could still be a rallying point for
the opposition if he is seen as making too many bad moves,
too quickly.
JETER
SIPDIS
CAIRO FOR POL - MAXSTADT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PINR NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: PRESIDENT OBASANJO PROPOSES REFORMS TO
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER; REASON: 1.5 (B)
and (D).
1. (U) SUMMARY: President Obasanjo appears committed to using
the first months of his new Administration to introduce key
political and economic reforms. On June 18, Obasanjo
proposed significant changes to the federal government system
and the conduct of elections. The two most salient are: (1)
the creation of new Zonal Councils, comprised of the
pertinent state governors for each of the country,s six
geopolitical zones and, (2) a possible change eliminating
popular elections for local government councils. A third,
potentially nettlesome proposal was the recommendation to
change elections from a contest between candidates to a
competition solely between political parties -- the winning
party could then choose the office holder after the election.
The three proposals, particularly the termination of local
elections, would require constitutional amendments. The poor
performance of the generally wastrel local governments made
them easy prey; many people will applaud that proposal.
However, opposition parties and numerous civil rights
activists view the proposals as intended to ensure the
continued dominance of the PDP, Obasanjo,s governing party.
END SUMMARY
--------------
OBASANJO: TAKING HIS MANDATE SERIOUSLY
--------------
2. (U) We have previously reported that President Obasanjo
won the April 19 election, albeit by materially less than the
62 percent indicated in the official results. The
irregularities surrounding the April elections (legislative,
gubernatorial, and presidential),diminished the opposition
parties, fanning embers of political tension in many areas of
the country. There was talk of mass action; there was fear
of worse.
3. (C) However, mass action has failed to materialize thus
far. Obasanjo and his team actively reached out to
traditional leaders and members of opposition parties
susceptible to influence in a successful attempt to co-opt
them. Time passed. The stridency of many opportunists began
to wane. Many left the opposition parapets, resigning
themselves to live with the reality of a massive PDP victory
at all levels. Others, tempted by the allure of office, have
crossed the carpet to the PDP. Probably gauging that he had
withstood the initial and perhaps strongest wave of
opposition criticism, Obasanjo decided it was time to act
decisively, in accordance with the clear mandate he believes
he won. He also had learned a lesson from his first
Administration. In 1999, Obasanjo got out of the starting
blocks quickly, only to allow himself to get bogged down
later in internecine party squabbles. With good reason,
Obasanjo likely reasoned the election has made him the most
dominant figure on the political landscape; thus he might as
well act like it, flexing his political muscle when required
and bringing about sweeping reforms.
4. (C) At the June 18 National Council of State meeting,
Obasanjo unveiled several bold strokes. (The Council of
State is composed of the 36 State Governors and all former
Heads of State. During most of his first term, Council
meetings were largely pro forma; little of significance
emerged from these sessions. However, this initial meeting
of his second term proved differently.) Obasanjo unveiled
proposals amending the extant federal structure and possibly
changing the process of elections in Nigeria.
--------------
LOCAL GOVERNMENT ) A CHANGE IS NEEDED
--------------
5. (C) The ineffectiveness of local government attracted most
of Obasanjo,s attention and ire at the Council of State
meeting. Established to promote grassroots democracy and
development, most local governments performed abysmally,
Obasanjo groused. Local Councils have become factories of
corruption, profligacy and often violent political
competition. Due to this dismal showing, Obasanjo and the
Governors agreed to suspend local government elections slated
for June 21. Thus, caretaker committees, formed by the
Governors after the expiry of the elected local officials,
tenure last year, will continue for at least another three
months. First-term governors will likely appoint a new batch
of local caretakers, loyal and politically supportive.
6. (C) During this ninety-day period, a technical review
committee will consider proposals regarding local
governments, including their possible elimination. Another
proposal tabled at the June 18 meeting was to end local
government elections altogether, authorize governors to
nominate Local Government Councils. A corollary proposal
would give state governors more control over money for the
local governments. (COMMENT: The suspension of the June 21
local elections had been a foregone conclusion. State
Electoral Commissions were unfunded and unprepared to conduct
elections. Most governors did not want to spend resources on
local government elections. They also were comfortable with
allowing their hand-picked appointees to remain in control at
the local level. All in all, the governors saw the proposals
on Local Councils as in their interests. The proposals would
significantly increase the governors, influence at the local
level, giving them wide discretion over selection of local
officials and the expenditure of funds. This would enhance
governors, ability to influence what happens in their states
from now and up to the 2007 elections. END COMMENT)
--------------
GOVERNORS ZONAL COUNCILS
--------------
7. (C) Creation of Zonal Councils representing the six
geo-political zones (Southwest, South-South, Southeast,
Northwest, North-Central, Northwest) was another important
proposal. The governors of each state in a particular zone
would comprise one council; chairmanship of the Council would
rotate among the governors on a yearly basis. The exact
powers of the Council would have to be defined; apparently,
the Council would derive most of its powers from those
heretofore within the province of the states but take some
arrows from the federal government,s quiver as well.
--------------
I DIDN,T VOTE FOR THAT CANDIDATE
--------------
8. (C) From the standpoint of democratic expression, the most
worrisome proposal dealt with the conduct of the election.
Ostensibly to curtail electoral corruption by insulating
individual candidates from having to forage for campaign
funds, a recommendation was put forward to eliminate
individual candidates in future elections. Instead of the
electorate choosing between contesting candidates from
different parties, only the parties would contest. The
winning party could then wait until after the election to
name the individual office holder.
--------------
COMMENT
--------------
9. (C) The election in Anambra State presaged this
recommendation. After the Electoral Commission announced a
slate of PDP winners for the National Assembly, the PDP
national office substituted an entirely new list of
candidates. One of the justifications for the switch was
that the populace voted for the party, not individual
candidates. Thus, the party had the right of candidate
substitution even after the election. Sadly, the Electoral
Commission acquiesced in this. In this instance, corruption
and image problems were not the reasons for the switch.
Political competition within the PDP was responsible. The
original slate of candidates was aligned with Vice-President
Atiku; the influential Uba brothers of Anambra (Andy Uba is
one of President Obasanjo,s closest Special Assistants and
is married to one of the First Lady,s relatives) sponsored
the second group of PDP candidates. The Anambra episode
merely provides an inkling of how this proposal could be
abused.
--------------
NATIONAL CONFERENCE
--------------
10. (C) The proposed changes would require amendments to the
Constitution. The Presidency recently has been signaling a
newfound interest in a National Conference to discuss these
and perhaps other issues. This represents an about-face by
Obasanjo. Obasanjo previously opposed the idea of a National
Conference, apprehensive that it would acquire an unstoppable
momentum and would treat issues like confederation or
succession. The current proposal would entail a 150-member
Conference, most of whom presumably would be selected by the
Presidency. While appearing to extend a hand to advocates of
a National Conference, this approach, by letting Obasanjo
choose the delegation, would allow him to influence the
Conference and its outcomes. (COMMENT: The idea for a
national conference had been promoted by many Southern
politicians, particularly the Yoruba political elite.
Apparently, Obasanjo promised to support the notion of a
conference in exchange for the support of Afenifere, the
pre-eminent Yoruba socio-political organization. Now
Obasanjo appears to be following through on his promise, but
according to his own terms which might not be Afenifere,s.
END COMMENT)
--------------
THE OPPOSITION CRIES TRICKERY
--------------
11. (C) The opposition had little nice to say about the
Council of State proposals. Almost all opposition political
parties issued critical statements. Most criticism centered
around the decision to suspend the June 21 local government
elections and perhaps do away with local elections entirely.
Opposition figures called it an open assault against the
Constitution. The more virulent oppositionists tagged it as
the first link of a long concatenation, ultimately leading to
a constitutional amendment that would allow the President and
governors to seek third terms. With the PDP holding
super-majorities in the National Assembly and controlling
more than two-thirds of the 36 states (the PDP has 28
governors),amending the national Constitution has been
reduced from a solemn undertaking to mostly an intra-party
affair, these critics complain.
12. (C) Politicians from the traditional core of Northern
politics, the Kaduna-Kano-Sokoto triangle, see the Zonal
Council and National Conference as inimical. First,
institutionalization of the Zonal Councils would further
split the North. The proposal would lend further relevance
to the independence of the Northeast and North Central. This
greater identity could only be bought at the expense of the
Northwest,s influence over these other regions. Second,
most Northerners inherently shy away from the idea of a
National Conference. The resource poor North is afraid that
Southerners will focus on the issue of greater local autonomy
and control of local resources. Consequently, Northerners
are wary that Obasanjo will use the specter of a National
Conference as leverage to get them to acquiesce in his
proposals if he would suspend the idea of a conference.
--------------
COMMENT
--------------
13. (C) Rolling out these proposals was perhaps a canny move
by Obasanjo. He signaled that squabbling over the elections
was a thing of the past for him; he was now focussing on
governance. By publicizing these proposals, he also hoped to
shift the political debate. Now his critics have to expend
some of their sparse political capital responding to these
proposals. The more he makes them respond to what he is
doing on policy, the less time they have to lambast the
elections. Moreover, constant, unrelenting complaining will
undermine their credibility, making them look shrill in the
public eye.
14. (C) However, Obasanjo,s move may have risks. Given
their poor performance, local government councils have few
defenders. However, that may not be sufficient rationale to
scrap local elections. After all, neither the federal
government nor state governments performed admirably or even
up to expectations. Local government, like the other tiers
of government, must improve. However, reposing more power in
state governors or doing away with elections does not seem
like the answer. The cure, greater consolidation of power in
the gubernatorial mansions and in the Presidential Villa,
seems more harmful to long-term democracy than the alleged
disease.
15. (C) Additionally, tampering with the constitution can be
a tempting political morsel. Allegations that President
Obasanjo is fishing to perpetuate his Presidency beyond a
second term are heretofore unsubstantiated and highly
questionable. However, the danger exists that office holders
might seek to enact amendments as well as laws stacking the
electoral deck in their favor for the future. It was telling
that Obasanjo did not consult widely in drafting his
proposals. His behavior suggests a politician who believes
he is popular and that his opposition is powerless. The
latter belief is much more accurate than the former. While
he may have accurately measured his foes, weaknesses,
Obasanjo should be careful about taking too many political
risks, too soon. Right now the opposition is off balance and
he is taking advantage of its weakness. Yet self-delusion
about the size and strength of his mandate can lead to
political mistakes. While he may believe he has vast support
and can do as he pleases, Obasanjo,s weak popularity among
many average Nigerians could still be a rallying point for
the opposition if he is seen as making too many bad moves,
too quickly.
JETER