Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ABUDHABI3565
2003-07-30 13:51:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

POLITICAL ISLAM COUNTRY SNAPSHOT: UAE

Tags:  KISL PREL PHUM TC 
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Diana T Fritz 03/21/2007 12:09:58 PM From DB/Inbox: Search Results

Cable 
Text: 
 
 
SECRET

SIPDIS
TELEGRAM July 30, 2003


To: No Action Addressee 

Action: Unknown 

From: AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI (ABU DHABI 3565 - PRIORITY) 

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, KISL 

Captions: None 

Subject: POLITICAL ISLAM COUNTRY SNAPSHOT: UAE 

Ref: None 
_________________________________________________________________
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 03565

SIPDIS
CXABU:
 ACTION: POL 
 INFO: RSO AMB DCM P/M ECON 

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMB: MWAHBA
DRAFTED: POL: MMMENARD
CLEARED: CGD: JDAVIS; A/DCM: KVANDEVATE; ECON: OJOHN

VZCZCADI815
PP RUEHC RUEHDE RUEHVV
DE RUEHAD #3565/01 2111351
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 301351Z JUL 03
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1115
INFO RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 3314
RUEHVV/ISLAMIC CONFERENCE COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 003565 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/ARP

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/13
TAGS: KISL PREL PHUM TC
SUBJECT: POLITICAL ISLAM COUNTRY SNAPSHOT: UAE

REF: A) STATE 205815 D) ABU DHABI 2715

B) 02 ABU DHABI 3436 E) 02 ABU DHABI 5813
C) 02 ABU DHABI 2548 F) ABU DHABI 2107

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 003565 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/ARP NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/13 TAGS: KISL PREL PHUM TC SUBJECT: POLITICAL ISLAM COUNTRY SNAPSHOT: UAE REF: A) STATE 205815 D) ABU DHABI 2715 B) 02 ABU DHABI 3436 E) 02 ABU DHABI 5813 C) 02 ABU DHABI 2548 F) ABU DHABI 2107 ¶1. (U) Classified by Ambassador Marcelle M. Wahba for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). ¶2. (U) This message has been coordinated with AmConsul Dubai. ¶3. (S/NF) SUMMARY: There is little sign of an active political Islamic movement in the UAE, primarily as a result of the UAEG's support and promotion of a moderate practice of Islam and the underdeveloped political structure of the UAE (no political parties or political opposition). There are a number of groups here with a religious agenda, the vast majority of which follow a moderate practice of Islam in line with UAEG policy. The UAEG has used both carrots, e.g., religious education, and sticks, e.g., preemptive steps to check those it perceives to be under Islamist influence. The small number of Islamic groups here do not appear to engage in activities that meet the definition of political Islam. The several organizations with an Islamist bent thus far have not collided with that policy, in part as a result of their active monitoring by the UAEG. Given the situation on the ground here, we believe that a continued low-profile approach which reinforces the moderation espoused by the UAEG will best serve both our short-term and long-term interests. END SUMMARY. UAEG Promotes Moderate Practice of Islam -------------- ¶4. (U) The UAEG espouses and supports in practice a moderate interpretation of Islam (Ref B),the official religion of the UAE. Virtually all of the country's citizens (less than 20 percent of the total population) are Muslims, with approximately 85 percent followers of Sunni Islam and the remaining 15 percent followers of Shi'a Islam. We estimate that approximately 55 percent of the expatriate population are Muslim. Expatriates are predominantly from South and Southeast Asia, but there are also a substantial number of expatriate Arabs. ¶5. (U) The UAEG promotes the moderate practice of Islam in a number of different ways. The Ministry of Justice, Islamic Affairs, and Awqaf operates as the central federal regulatory authority for Muslim imams and mosques and distributes weekly guidance on religious sermons to mosques and imams, b
oth Sunni and Shi'a. Emirate-level Departments of Islamic Affairs also provide oversight over mosques and imams. The Government ensures that clergy do not deviate frequently or significantly from approved topics in their sermons and monitors all sermons for political content. In June 2003, the UAEG initiated a public religious education campaign to promote a better understanding of Islam, including a one-year training course for 166 imams (Ref D). UAEG Efforts to Thwart Islamic Extremism -------------- ¶6. (C) After 9/11, the UAE senior leadership launched a comprehensive top-down internal security review to assess the impact of extremist thought and elements on UAE society. The UAEG closely scrutinized the activities of the UAE's mosques, schools, academic institutions, charities and NGOs. The UAEG also rounded up about 160 people suspected of ties to extremist groups for questioning. As part of this review, the UAEG passed comprehensive anti-money laundering legislation, initiated tighter controls on funds transferred into and out of the country, assessed the country's charities and NGOs, and took steps to eliminate cash fundraising at mosques and channel all charitable giving through government- regulated relief organizations. (Ref C) ¶7. (S/NF) In an effort to reduce the influence of Islamists in the educational and judicial systems, in 2002 the UAEG either transferred or early retired around 60-70 educators and government officials thought to be affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. Although they were much more moderate than Islamists elsewhere in the Gulf and in Egypt and were not/not considered extremist in their views, some of those sidelined are well known for their conservative philosophy. The UAEG has demonstrated zero tolerance for the Muslim Brotherhood in the UAE, whose ultimate goal it believes to be regime change and total imposition of Shari'a law. (Ref E) The small number of "Islamist" intellectuals in the UAE have been sidelined. The UAEG continues to monitor those groups and individuals deemed to be Islamist and/or affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. (Ref F) ¶8. (C) Although Islamic studies are mandatory in all public schools (UAEG-supported schools for primarily citizen children) and in private schools for Muslim children, the UAEG has worked to ensure that the study of Islam is not overemphasized in the educational systems. There is high-level concern about extremist influence on school curricula. After 9/11, the UAEG ramped up its revision of the K-12 public school curriculum and is gradually replacing the large number of expatriate Arab public school teachers with Emirati nationals, over whom the UAEG has better control. (Ref C) Political Islam -- Slim to No Presence in the UAE -------------- -------------- ¶9. (U) The Government has been generally successful in achieving its goal of a tolerant society. While citizens regard the country as a Muslim nation that should respect Muslim sensibilities, and the majority of them are observant Muslims, society as a whole places a high value on respect for others and on Islamic traditions of tolerance. Citizens occasionally express concern regarding the influence on Emirati society by the country's foreign majority. However, in general, citizens are familiar with foreign societies, believe that they can best balance foreign influence by supporting and strengthening indigenous cultural traditions, and do not advocate for legislation or government based on Islamic principles. ¶10. (U) There are no elected institutions, no political parties in the UAE and no political opposition to the UAEG. There is also a clear absence of widespread pressure for opening up the system here. (Refs B, C) There is an acknowledged Salafi (highly conservative and Wahhabi-influenced) presence in the UAE, although there is as yet no identifiable Islamist political movement in the UAE. (Ref B) ¶11. (C) As a Muslim country, the UAE hosts a number of NGOs in the UAE that have religious components as well as social, educational, cultural and charitable ones. NGOs here are funded in whole or part by the UAEG, an effective mechanism of control, and do not generally receive funding from foreign sources. Foreign funding, if received, is closely scrutinized by the authorities. If/when these groups express anti-American sentiment, it is almost invariably on grounds of U.S. foreign policy rather than religious grounds. ¶12. (C/NF) Most groups with religious components may sponsor Quranic instruction courses and religious workshops and lectures on Islam and require/encourage their members to maintain and uphold Islamic traditions and values. Examples: --Dar Al-Bir Society (org. 1979),Dubai --Women's Union Association (org. 1973),Sharjah --Umm Al-Quwain Woman's Society (org. 1974),UAQ --Fujairah Welfare Association (org. 1987),Fujairah --Nahda Woman's Association (org. 1979),Ras Al- Khaimah Available information indicates that these groups support a moderate view of Islam in line with UAEG policy, have domestic agendas, and do not advocate an Islamic government based on Shari'a law. Based on available information, we believe that these groups would engage in a democratic/pluralistic process and do/would respect the rights of others as well as the principle of alternance of government. Accordingly, these groups would fall into category D as described in Ref A para. 4. ¶13. (C/NF) Several NGOs are public proponents of Islamic legislation or governance based on Islamic principles. Available information indicates that these groups practice a moderate interpretation of Islam in line with UAEG policy and would be willing to engage in a democratic, pluralistic process. We do not have information to conclude that these groups would not respect the rights of non-Islamists, secularists and/or minorities. Accordingly, these groups would fall into category D as described in Ref A para. 4: --Reform Society (org. 1994),Dubai --Jurists Association (org. 1980),Sharjah --Umm Al-Moumineen Women's Association (org. 1974), Ajman --Social Guidance Association (org. 1981),Ajman ¶14. (C/NF) We have little information on the following two groups; however, they publicly acknowledge one of their aims as working against influences that have a negative impact on their society. We have no information to suggest that these two organizations are anti-democratic and anti- pluralistic. Based on their public acknowledgements, however, it appears that, if in the unlikely event they obtained full political power, they might not respect the rights of non-Islamists, secularists, and/or minorities. Accordingly, these groups would fall into category C as described in Ref A para. 4: --Al Muntada Al Islami (org. 1996),Sharjah --Irshad and Tawjih (org. 1983),Ras Al-Khaimah Comment -------------- ¶15. (C/NF) Under the leadership of President Zayed, the UAE has practiced a policy of tolerance and moderation. Our regular engagement with the NGO community -- in a low-key manner and not in an overtly political context -- confirms that the UAEG has largely been successful in this regard. The UAEG has taken affirmative and preemptive action, without USG prompting, to ensure that Islamic extremism does not take root in their country. We expect that the UAEG's zero-tolerance policy, applied in a thus far relatively non-repressive manner, will do much to prevent political Islam from raising its head here. As discussed in Ref C, our behind-the-scenes partnership with the Emiratis has worked in both sides' favor, and we believe that in the UAE, a continued low-profile, positive reinforcement approach will serve our short-term as well as long-term interests in this regard. WAHBA

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