S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 000310

SIPDIS

DAMASCUS PLEASE PASS A/S BURNS FROM AMBASSADOR WAHBA
STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/NGA, NEA/ARP AND PMAT
NSC FOR ABRAMS AND CLARKE
CENTCOM FOR POLAD AMBASSADOR LITT
CENTAF FOR GENERAL MOSELEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/20/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM KWMN PTER IR IZ TC
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR A/S BURNS 1/21-22
VISIT TO THE UAE


1. (U) Classified by Ambassador Marcelle M. Wahba,
Reasons 1.5 (B) and (D).

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SUMMARY
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2. (S) Assistant Secretary Burns: I look forward to
welcoming you back to the UAE. Your schedule is taking
shape, with meetings requested with President Zayid Bin
Sultan Al-Nahyan and Chief of Staff Muhammad bin Zayid Al-
Nahyan (MBZ). MFA Minstate Hamdan will meet with you on the
margins of the President's meeting. Dubai Crown Prince and
UAE Defense Minister Muhammad Bin Rashid Al-Maktoum (MBR)
has told me that he plans to attend the President's meeting.


3. (S) For our Iraq contingency planning, the Emiratis have
agreed to a significant plus up of refueling and
reconnaissance assets at Al-Dhafra Air Base and have offered
up Jebel Ali port and Fujairah airport and seaport for
logistical support. We are engaged in a serious dialogue on
upgrading protection for our forces, particularly at the
civilian facilities used by the U.S. Navy. The Emiratis
continue to express nervousness about the shape and feel of
a post-Saddam Iraq, with their nightmare scenario being a
Balkanized state(s) with the Shi'a soundly in control of the
south. Seeking to balance their interests and keep their
options open during a transition period, the leadership --
in an ill-timed move -- has decided to upgrade diplomatic
ties with Iraq (see septel). We are moving forward on the
ambitious checklist of items identified at November's
bilateral dialogue launch. MBZ will likely raise
releasability issues, particularly as they pertain to the
UAE's requests for the ATACMs and the Predator. You should
expect very tough talk from Zayid on our Israel-Palestine
policy; he is reportedly very disillusioned. END SUMMARY.

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IRAQ PLANNING
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4. (S) The Emiratis have been accommodating of our
deployment requests for an Iraq contingency. They have
unblinkingly agreed to a plus-up to 20 KC-10 refueling
aircraft (equivalent to 40 KC-135s), in addition to an
increase to 10 U-2 aircraft and one Global Hawk at Al-Dhafra
Air Base in Abu Dhabi (in contrast to our OEF presence of 5
KC-10s, 3 U-2s and the GH). Our current posture at Al-
Dhafra is 11 KC-10s and 6 U-2s, with a base population of
just under 1,000 Air Force personnel. The Emiratis have
also offered up Al-Minhad Air Base in Dubai and use of Jebel
Ali port and Fujairah airport and seaport for logistical
support and port calls. While they have not said "no" to
the use of civilian airports, UAE leaders have indicated
this would be a difficult decision due to visibility and
force protection issues. They have asked that we defer
consideration of the use of these facilities unless and
until we have immediate, identifiable needs that cannot be
met elsewhere in theater. Following the aborted attack on
U.S. forces at Fujairah airport in November, the Emiratis
have significantly beefed up their own security at that
facility and have agreed to discussions on how to upgrade
force protection for our ships and sailors in that emirate
and Dubai.

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IRAQ DAY AFTER CONCERNS CONTINUE
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5. (S) The leadership has also been working closely with us
on the day after scenario, offering insights and
intelligence leads based on their assets in Iraq. They are
unquestionably concerned about what they perceive as a lack
of U.S. planning for a post-Saddam Iraq and have repeatedly
expressed fears about the possible empowerment of Iraq's
Shi'a majority. This is very much tied to their concerns
about how events in Iraq will influence the domestic
situation in Iran. The Emiratis worry that Khatami and the
moderates will be swept aside by the clerical hardliners.
Looking westward, UAE leaders are equally alarmed about
increased instability in Saudi Arabia and what they believe
is the very real prospect that Israeli PM Sharon will use
this opportunity to wreak havoc in the territories. All in
all, this small, extremely wealthy Gulf shaykhdom envisages
rough seas in the months ahead.

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ILL-TIMED UPGRADE OF DIP TIES WITH IRAQ
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6. (S) Seeking to balance their interests and keep their
options open during a transition period, the UAEG has
decided to upgrade its diplomatic relationship with Iraq to
the level of Ambassador. The newly arrived Iraqi envoy
presented a copy of his credentials to Hamdan on 1/18. In a
subsequent conversation, Hamdan told me the matter had been
decided six months ago, that the Iraqi Ambassador (who had
previously served in Manama) had been highly spoken of by
the Bahrainis, was not a "pure Ba'athist" and was in fact,
someone the Emiratis envisioned as being of use in a post-
Saddam scenario. On the economic front, subsequent to
NAVCENT's 1/15 challenge to an Iraq-bound ferry, I have
pressed the leadership both in Abu Dhabi and Dubai to stop
allowing the passenger ferries between Dubai and Basra to
ship cargo to Iraq.

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BILAT DIALOGUE CHECKLIST ITEMS
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7. (S) As you know, the bilateral dialogue has initiated an
ambitious checklist of items for both sides. Foremost for
MBZ is releasability issues pertaining to UAE requests for
the ATACM 1As and the Predator. He is likely to engage you
on the UAE's need for these systems, based on the
vulnerability posed by the UAE's proximity to Iran (and its
aggressive acquisition of WMD technology). We continue to
press upon MBZ and Hamdan, in particular, the need to move
forward on the export controls front and to highlight the
connection between UAE commitment to the EXBS process and
releasability issues. Another item on the dialogue
checklist is the trafficking in persons problem. We are set
to welcome a G/TIP visit late this week and are actively
engaged with the Emiratis. Hamdan staked much of his
personal prestige -- and incurred a great deal of criticism
from the old tribal boys network -- on the institution of
tougher penalties for those involved in the trafficking of
young boys in the camel jockey business. He will likely ask
for your engagement on moving the UAE from Tier III to Tier
II in this year's report.

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INTERNAL REFORMS ONGOING, QUIETLY
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8. (S) One of the post 9/11 lessons learned here has been
the need to scrub the UAE's educational system and curb the
influence of the Islamists in the country's primary,
secondary and post-secondary schools as well as in the
judiciary. The quiet sidelining of over 150 Islamists in
the Ministries of Education and Justice as well as at UAE
University continues. The leadership -- at the most senior
level, including CP Khalifa, MBZ, MBR and Hamdan -- is
involved in this very sensitive operation. Their focus is
not just on immediate security concerns but has included
broader consideration of longer-term threats to the UAE's
traditional tolerance. They are very aware that some of the
challenges facing the region today can be attributed to the
failure of other states to act soon enough to stop Islamists
from entrenching themselves in the educational system, from
which they have exercised undue negative influence over
entire generations of students.

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NO SURPRISES ON UAE VIEWS OF U.S. ISRAEL-PALESTINE POLICY
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9. (S) As always, you can expect tough talk from Zayid on
our Israel-Palestine policy. Trusted contacts have told us
that, during the November visit of the French Defense
Minister, Zayid was strongly critical of what he viewed as
our excessively accommodating posture toward the Israelis
and Sharon. Perhaps the most apparent signal of UAE despair
with our policy is that it is rarely raised in official
meetings anymore (in stark contrast to a year ago when it
featured prominently in our discussions). The UAE continues
its robust humanitarian assistance program to the
Palestinians, including the rebuilding of Jenin refugee camp
and the reconstruction of homes bulldozed by Israeli forces
in Gaza.

WAHBA