C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 002966

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/ARP AND NEA/PPD

NSC FOR PETER THEROUX

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/16/13
TAGS: PREL PGOV TC
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR PRESSES UAEG ON ZAYID
CENTER

REF: A) Abu Dhabi 2236 (081254Z MAY 03)
B) 02 Abu Dhabi 4712


1. (U) Classified by Ambassador Marcelle M. Wahba
for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D).


2. (C) SUMMARY: The Ambassador has repeatedly
engaged the senior UAEG leadership on the need to
make substantive changes at the controversial Abu
Dhabi-based, Arab League-affiliated and UAEG-funded
Zayid Center for Coordination and Follow-Up. The
Ambassador's most recent engagement was on June 11,
when she separately raised the issue with MFA
Minstate Hamdan bin Zayid, de facto Defense
Minister Muhammad bin Zayid (MbZ) and Ahmed Juma'a
Al-Zaabi, the Chief of Staff to Abu Dhabi Crown
Prince Khalifa bin Zayid. She had previously
raised it in May and on several occasions over the
last year or so (Ref A). The Emiratis have assured
her they will take action against the Center,
including a turnover in administration and a change
in the Center's name (presumably to remove any
direct connection to Shaykh Zayid). In the short
term, steps have been taken to clean up the
website, including the removal of most of the anti-
semitic language and the placement of a disclaimer
noting that the views expressed by Center speakers
do not reflect the views of the Center, the Arab
League or the UAEG.


3. (C) The Ambassador's senior interlocutors have
cautioned that the long-term changes may well take
time because of internal Al-Nahyan family dynamics.
The Center's patron, erstwhile Deputy Prime
Minister Sultan bin Zayid, is Shaykh Zayid's second
eldest son. Any move against Sultan by his younger
half-brothers MbZ and Hamdan would be viewed as an
outright power play. Thus the difficult task of
managing Sultan and cleaning up the offensive Zayid
Center has fallen on the shoulders of Zayid's
eldest son (and Sultan's older half-brother), Crown
Prince Khalifa. We believe that Khalifa will do
the right thing. The Ambassador will continue to
follow-up vigorously with Khalifa to ensure that
prompt and effective action is taken, as has been
promised. END SUMMARY.

A ZAYID CENTER PRIMER

--------------


4. (C) The Ambassador continues to engage the
senior Emirati leadership on the need to make
substantive changes at the Abu Dhabi-based Zayid
Center for Coordination and Follow-Up, a UAEG-
funded "think-tank" affiliated with the Arab
League. As reported Ref A, the Ambassador first
raised concerns about the Center's activities with
MFA Minstate Shaykh Hamdan bin Zayid Al-Nahyan in
2002, following the Center's arrangement of an
offensive series of lectures and the release of
publications containing noxious material about
Judaism. Hamdan agreed that the Center had crossed
the line and noted that it did not reflect the
views of the UAEG. However, he explained the
difficulty in affecting change given the fact that
Center's sponsor was Zayid's second eldest son and
Hamdan's older half-brother, erstwhile UAE Deputy
Prime Minister Shaykh Sultan bin Zayid Al-Nahyan.


5. (C) In May of 2003, the Embassy's Public Affairs
Office was contacted by Harvard University's
Divinity School seeking information about
connections between the UAEG and the Center.
Several students at the Divinity School, noting the
Center's intolerance, had protested Harvard's
decision to accept a generous gift from UAE
President Zayid to establish a chair for Islamic
Religious Studies. The Ambassador drew this issue
to the attention of Shaykh Hamdan, highlighting the
active damage the Center was doing to Shaykh
Zayid's reputation. She pressed the UAEG to take
action before Harvard felt compelled to reject
Shaykh Zayid's offer of a chair. Hamdan promised
to take the matter to Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Shaykh
Khalifa bin Zayid Al-Nahyan and asked the
Ambassador to put her request in writing.

6. (C) The Ambassador followed-up with a three-page
letter outlining the USG's concerns with the Zayid
Center, including material contained on its website
and the Center's highly questionable choice of
speakers. She noted that while the UAEG may
maintain that the Center does not speak for Shaykh
Zayid or the government, "that distinction is
neither understood nor appreciated...many in the
U.S. take the view that if a government wholly or
partially funds an organization, that government is
responsible for the organization's behavior."

PLUS CA CHANGE... PLUS CA RESTE LA MEME
--------------


7. (C) On May 6, Hamdan reported to the Ambassador
that Shaykh Khalifa agreed on the need to make
changes at the Zayid Center. He said one option
was to move it from under Sultan's sponsorship and
place it under the supervision of the President's
Office. We also learned from a ZCCF employee that
orders had been issued to remove anti-semitic
references from the website. Embassy officers
began monitoring the Center's website on a regular
basis. We noted that much of the more offensive
material (though not all) was in fact removed and
that a caveat has been placed on summaries of
lectures placed on the website, explaining that
"the views expressed...are solely those of the
speaker and do not necessarily reflect the views of
the Centre (sic), the position of the League of
Arab States, or the official policies of the
government of the United Arab Emirates." However,
the website maintained one reference to a "Zionist
media conspiracy."


8. (C) The Embassy continued through the month of
May to prod the UAEG to make changes at the Center.
The Ambassador raised the issue with Armed Forces
Chief of Staff Muhammad bin Zayid Al-Nahyan (MbZ)
on the margins of his May 19-22 visit to the United
States. The DCM also raised it with Shaykh Mansour
bin Zayid, the Director of Shaykh Zayid's office.
Both agreed on the need for action.

ONCE MORE INTO THE BREACH
--------------


9. (C) Following her return from consultations in
Washington, the Ambassador used the opportunity of
a 5/31 meeting with Hamdan to ask what actions had
been taken at the Center. Hamdan, who had also
just returned to the UAE from a trip to Morocco,
promised to get back to the Ambassador. In a 6/11
meeting with Hamdan, the Ambassador raised the
Center again, noting the continuing negative
attention it was garnering in Washington and
drawing Hamdan's attention to the offensive
material still on the website. She also discussed
it with MbZ in a meeting later the same day. Both
Hamdan and MbZ indicated that the decision lay with
Crown Prince Khalifa.


10. (C) Late in the evening on 6/11, the Ambassador
telephoned Khalifa's Chief of Staff, Ahmed Juma'a
Al-Zaabi in Paris where Khalifa was on an official
state visit. Al-Zaabi, who was fully briefed on
the issue, said that the Crown Prince was very much
concerned and understood the damage inflicted on
the UAE's reputation by the Zayid Center. Al-Zaabi
said the Crown Prince would take action when he
returns to the UAE (at the end of June). In
response to the Ambassador's query as to what
specific actions would be taken, Al-Zaabi said the
administration would be changed and the Center's
name would be altered (presumably to remove any
reference to Shaykh Zayid). He also noted that
Khalifa planned to discuss the issue personally
with his younger half-brother and Deputy Prime
Minister Sultan.

NOW FOR THE REST OF THE STORY...
--------------

11. (C) At the heart of the UAEG's apparent
reluctance to take immediate steps against the
Zayid Center is filial tension in the Al-Nahyan
ruling family. The Center's sponsor -- as noted
above -- is Deputy Prime Minister Sultan bin Zayid,
Shaykh Zayid's second eldest son. Sultan is no
stranger to personal controversy, linked to his on-
again, off-again drug and alcohol addictions (see
Ref B). Sultan's direct competition in the
succession line-up is Zayid's third eldest son and
for many years our primary interlocutor, Chief of
Staff Muhammad bin Zayid (MbZ). It is widely
assumed that with Zayid's passing and Khalifa's
assumption of the Abu Dhabi ruler and UAE President
titles, MbZ will move into the Abu Dhabi Crown
Prince slot and Sultan will be given the largely
ceremonial role of Deputy Ruler. MbZ and his full
brothers effectively manage the critical
governmental portfolios -- i.e. defense, foreign
affairs, intelligence and information. Despite his
current job title and not insignificant ties to
some Abu Dhabi tribes, Sultan's actual value-added
in governance terms is minimal; he sometimes
oversees the weekly cabinet meeting and from time
to time greets and sees off visitors.


12. (C) Nevertheless, for the sake of the family's
honor and dignity, as well as the fact that a
public brouhaha involving Sultan would upset the
elderly Zayid, Sultan's half-brothers will not move
against him. Furthermore, as MbZ noted to the
Ambassador, any move regarding the Zayid Center
orchestrated by MbZ or his full brothers --
including Hamdan -- would likely be seen in
domestic political terms as an unprincipled power-
play to move Sultan out of the line of succession,
something that would not redound to the longer term
benefit of MbZ or his brothers.


13. (C) Thus the difficult task of managing Sultan,
and cleaning up the offensive Zayid Center, has
fallen squarely on the shoulders of his elder half-
brother, Crown Prince Khalifa. We believe that
Khalifa will do the right thing, despite the
embarrassment entailed in a face-to-face
confrontation with Sultan. The Ambassador will
continue to follow-up vigorously with Khalifa to
ensure that he begins to take to take effective
action to restructure the Zayid Center.

WAHBA