UAEG OFFICIALS OFFER PERSPECTIVES ON WHY THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABU DHABI 001946 SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/RA, DRL AND EB/CBA STATE PASS OPIC/OPIC INTERNATIONAL POLICY DEPARTMENT FOR VIRGINIA GREEN AND CONSTANCE SHINN AMEMBASSY TUNIS HOLD FOR FSI: OLIVER JOHN USDOC FOR 4530/ITA/MAC/ONE/DGUGLIELMI, 4520/ITA/MAC/ONE/CLOUSTAUNAU, 4500/ITA/MAC/DAS/WILLIAMSON, 3131/CS/OIO/ANESA E.O. 12958: DECL 04/21/2008 TAGS: ELAB PREL PHUM PGOV SOCI CVIS TC SUBJECT: UAEG OFFICIALS OFFER PERSPECTIVES ON WHY THE AMNESTY FAILED REF: ABU DHABI 1634 ¶1. (U) Classified by DCM Richard A. Albright reasons 1.5 (B) and (D). ¶2. (C) In a conversation with the DCM on April 21, UAE Labor Minister Matar Humaid Al-Tayer noted that the final number of amnesty seekers would be approximately 50,000 -- significantly lower than the expected 200,000-250,000. (See reftel). Al-Tayer said the fact that so few illegal workers were seeking to leave without penalty reflected well on labor conditions in the UAE. (Note: In a separate conversation, Labor Undersecretary Dr. Khalid Al-Khazraji, told Econoff that he never expected the amnesty to succeed. After the first amnesty ended in 1996, expatriates realized that the UAEG was not serious about enforcing labor and immigration laws. Many workers who took the amnesty regularized their status and returned to the UAE while those who did nothing suffered no penalties. Expatriate workers understand they will suffer no adverse consequences by not applying -- if they apply, they will have to leave. If they don't apply and are caught by law enforcement (an unlikely event),they will not have the resources to pay the penalties anyway and they will get a free ticket home via deportation. Pursuing a criminal case is difficult because the Ministry lacks the resources to prosecute each violator. End note.) ¶3. (SBU) Al-Tayer explained that the amnesty was implemented to assist workers who had been deceptively brought to the UAE under false pretenses to return home. He described a common scenario where an Emirati national would establish what appeared to be a legitimate business receiving Ministry of Labor approval to recruit foreign workers. The national would then hire a recruiter to find expatriates who would be required to pay 5,000-15,000 dirhams for a work visa depending on the length of the contract and how much the worker expected to earn in the UAE. These fees are split between the (usually South Asian) recruiters and the Emirati employer. If the Emirati company failed -- or was bogus -- the Emirati had already made his money; if employees here were not paid or lost their jobs, he would not be overly concerned. The workers, however, who often had borrowed heavily to pay recruitment fees, could not afford to leave the country, and would thus seek whatever employment -- legal or otherwise -- that they could find. The amnesty was enacted to aid these types of workers in returning home, but Al-Tayer stated that once workers arrived, most "liked it here," found other employment and did not want to leave. ¶4. (C) Comment: Al Tayer's and Al Khazraji's remarks essentially mirror each other in their explanation for why the amnesty has failed -- Al Tayer notes that expatriates "like it here" though it would be more accurate to state that they have more opportunities here than at home (especially for laborers); Al Khazraji points out that expatriates have nothing to gain by applying for amnesty. Since workers have greater job opportunities in the UAE than their native land, and no fear of law enforcement, there is no reason to apply for amnesty. End comment. Wahba