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Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ABUDHABI1826
2003-04-15 11:34:00
SECRET
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

UAE SIGNS UP FOR CORE GROUP ON IRAQ

Tags:   EAID  EFIN  PREL  ECON  PGOV  IZ  TC 
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Diana T Fritz  05/24/2007 04:30:33 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Search Results

Cable 
Text:                                                                      
                                                                           
      
SECRET

SIPDIS
TELEGRAM                                           April 15, 2003


To:       No Action Addressee                                    

Action:   Unknown                                                

From:     AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI (ABU DHABI 1826 - UNKNOWN)         

TAGS:     EAID, EFIN, PREL, ECON, PGOV                           

Captions: None                                                   

Subject:  UAE SIGNS UP FOR CORE GROUP ON IRAQ STABILIZATION AND  
          RECONSTRUCTION                                         

Ref:      None                                                   
_________________________________________________________________
S E C R E T        ABU DHABI 01826

SIPDIS
CXABU:
    ACTION: ECON 
    INFO:   P/M DCM POL AMB 
Laser1:
    INFO:   FCS 

DISSEMINATION: ECON
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMB:MMWAHBA
DRAFTED: ECON:TEWILLIAMS
CLEARED: DCM:RAALBRIGHT, POL:STW

VZCZCADI470
OO RUEHC RHEFDIA RUEKJCS RUEKJCS RUCJACC RUEHZM
RHEHNSC RUEAIIA RUEHLO RUEHMD RUEHBY RUEHKO
DE RUEHAD #1826 1051134
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 151134Z APR 03
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9446
INFO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5/UNMA// IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OSD/NESA// IMMEDIATE
RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ3/CCJ4/CCJ5// IMMEDIATE
RUEHZM/GCC COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0642
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 0071
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0102
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0264
						S E C R E T ABU DHABI 001826 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/NGA AND NEA/ARP

STATE ALSO FOR PRM/ANE

CENTCOM FOR POLAD AMBASSADOR LITT

NSC FOR ABRAMS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/13
TAGS: EAID EFIN PREL ECON PGOV IZ TC
SUBJECT: UAE SIGNS UP FOR CORE GROUP ON IRAQ
STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION

REF: A) ABU DHABI 1667, B) STATE 80809,
C) ABU DHABI 1508

S E C R E T ABU DHABI 001826

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/NGA AND NEA/ARP

STATE ALSO FOR PRM/ANE

CENTCOM FOR POLAD AMBASSADOR LITT

NSC FOR ABRAMS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/13
TAGS: EAID EFIN PREL ECON PGOV IZ TC
SUBJECT: UAE SIGNS UP FOR CORE GROUP ON IRAQ
STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION

REF: A) ABU DHABI 1667, B) STATE 80809,
C) ABU DHABI 1508


1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR MARCELLE M. WAHBA
FOR REASONS 1.5 (B,D).


2. (S) MFA Minstate Hamdan bin Zayid told the
Ambassador 4/16 that the Cabinet had approved UAE
participation in the "core group" for Iraq
stabilization and reconstruction outlined ref b.
Shaykh Hamdan noted that the UAE -- with a modern,
diversified economy -- sees itself as a good role
model for Iraq and hopes to be able to play a
significant role in Iraq reconstruction. To that
end, the UAEG has established, under Hamdan's
authority, an interagency committee (comprising the
agencies responsible for energy, transportation,
commerce, telecommunications, electricity and
agriculture) to promote UAE involvement in the
rebuilding of Iraq. The MFA Minstate added that
the UAE hopes it will be considered a "preferred
partner" in those activities, since the Emirates
has solid expertise to offer and may carry less
political baggage with the Iraqis than other Arab
states. Shaykh Hamdan requested more information
regarding the role of the "core group" and what
precisely will be expected of the UAEG.


3. (S) Comment: It appears the Emiratis may see
participation in the core group through the lens of
burnishing their own credentials as a "preferred
partner" for Iraq reconstruction -- with the
attendant contracts and associated business
activity it is hoped such status will bring. We
would note that the UAE has never demanded any
explicit quid pro quo for its support for Operation
Iraqi Freedom, but there is clearly an unstated
assumption on their part that we will look
favorably upon them as contracts are awarded.
Given their sustained support for the coalition
effort, and their world-class expertise
(particularly in the telecommunications, civil
aviation, petroleum sectors and shipping), we hope
that opportunities will present themselves for the
Emiratis to play the sort of role that they desire.
Their influence on an emergent Iraqi government can
only be positive.

Wahba