TERRORIST FINANCING: CONCERNS REGARDING HUMAN APPEAL INTERNATIONAL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 001700



SIPDIS



NOFORN



STATE FOR EB - TONY WAYNE, NEA/FO - LAROCCO AND

CROCKER, NEA/ARP - JONES AND HEFFERNAN, NEA/RA -

PSUTPHIN, EB/ESC/ESP -GGLASS, S/CT - CBLACK AND

FOX, AND IO/PHO -APEREZ



TREASURY FOR OGC - DAUFHAUSER, DAS FOR TERRORISM

AND VIOLENT CRIMES (JZARATE),AND TERRORIST

FINANCING TASK FORCE

TREASURY PASS OFAC FOR NEWCOMB



E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/13

TAGS: EFIN, PTER, ETTC, ECON, TC

SUBJECT: TERRORIST FINANCING: CONCERNS REGARDING

HUMAN APPEAL INTERNATIONAL



REF: A) SARAJEVO 1028, B) ABU DHABI 1490,



C) STATE 79970



1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR MARCELLE M. WAHBA

FOR REASONS 1.5 (B,D).



2. (S/NF) Post read with interest ref A reporting

concerning Human Appeal International (HAI). We

were unclear, however, as to the sourcing of the

information. Some factual inaccuracies, for

example, the assertion in para. three of ref A,

that the Muslim Brotherhood has been designated by

the USG as a Middle East terrorist organization,

suggest that some of this information, may be of

questionable provenance. With reference to the HAI

employee currently being detained, we would note

that one bad employee does not make an entire

organization male fide. ORCA at post has not been

able to confirm the substance of these allegations;

we therefore would very much appreciate

clarification with regard to the origin of this

information. We also request that the Department

forward to us (via intel channels if necessary) the

case summary regarding HAI.



3. (S/NF) HAI is the third-largest charitable

organization in the UAE. It is federally

registered and licensed (via the Ministry of Labor

and Social Affairs) and is reportedly closely

connected to the ruling family of Ajman emirate,

where the organization is based. As noted in ref

B, we have seen no evidence to suggest that the

leadership of HAI is male fide (i.e., actively and

knowingly operating in support of terrorist

groups). If such information were available and

compelling, we strongly believe that the UAE

authorities would act promptly but quietly to

replace the charity's management and stop any

support for terrorist groups.



4. (S/NF) Previous actions by HAI and the UAEG in

response to our concerns regarding support for

Chechen groups demonstrates the willingness of the

charity itself, and the government of the UAE, to

act to prevent abuse. Our previous quiet

representations led to the UAEG intervening quietly

with HAI. As a result of those approaches, HAI

stopped funding those Chechen groups of concern to

us -- although we would note that, from the Emirati

perspective, our view with regard to which Chechen

groups were or were not involved in "terrorist"

activity has tended to fluctuate over time. The

UAE Central Bank Governor has frequently pointed to

the HAI/Chechen issue, noting that the USG had

initially not opposed support to these groups, but

later changed position. The Governor has suggested

that post facto condemnation by the USG regarding

alleged support for "terrorist groups" in Chechnya

would have greater resonance if our own thinking

regarding these groups had been consistent over

time.



5. (S/NF) Clearly, there are sensitivities here

about charities, and about HAI in particular given

the previous imbroglio over aid to Chechen groups.

The key point to be emphasized is that the UAE has

been an invaluable ally in the war against

terrorism and terrorist financing. The UAE has

been instrumental in the capture of a number of

senior Al-Qaida operatives and that cooperation is

ongoing. The UAE also continues to freeze more

than two million USD belonging to the Al-Barakat

organization, and has provided literally tens of

thousands of pages of bank records and other

documents -- including orginals when necessary --

that are crucial to the Moussaoui trial and to our

ongoing investigation into the 9/11 case. With the

capture of a top Al-Qaida 9/11 financier during the

raid on Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, we anticipate that

there will be more requests that we will need to

make of the UAE as we trace AQ's financial flows --

the Central Bank Governor has indicated that he

will welcome those inquiries. To needlessly

antagonize the UAEG by publicly embarrassing them

via listing of HAI -- even if it is only listing of

branch offices -- strikes us as potentially highly

counter-productive. That such a listing might be

made on the basis of inaccurate information would

undermine our ability to work constructively with

the Central Bank and the UAEG more broadly.



6. (S/NF) As noted above, the UAEG has given

every sign of being prepared to act against groups

quickly and decisively -- once credible information

is provided. In the post-9/11 environment, the UAE

permitted, for example, the vetting of the Muhammad

Bin Rashid Charitable Foundation in Dubai by a USG

team (which found no evidence of wrong-doing; our

intel proved inaccurate). The MbR Foundation is

directly associated with the de facto ruler of

Dubai, so a willigness to open its books to us

represented a real leap of faith on the part of the

UAEG -- but also a strong commitment to making sure

that UAE funds were not being misused. Based upon

our experience here, we believe that if we have a

compelling case, we should go to the Emiratis at

the political level and enlist their support for a

thorough vetting of the organization. But listing

HAI as a terrorist organization based on

unsupported assertions of links to a cast of

terrorist organizations will not help us address

any problems which may exist. It is essential that

we see the basis of every assertion and the case

summary on which these listing recommendations are

being made. This is likely to achieve both a

thorough investigation and effective measures to

address any problem.



Wahba