Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ABUDHABI1668
2003-04-07 14:06:00
SECRET
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:
UAE EXPECTS CLOSED-DOOR "DAY AFTER"
how-tonull Diana T Fritz 05/24/2007 04:35:51 PM From DB/Inbox: Search Results Cable Text: SECRET SIPDIS TELEGRAM April 07, 2003 To: No Action Addressee Action: Unknown From: AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI (ABU DHABI 1668 - UNKNOWN) TAGS: EAID, EFIN, ECON, PREL Captions: None Subject: UAE EXPECTS CLOSED-DOOR "DAY AFTER" DISCUSSION AT GCC FM MEETING Ref: None _________________________________________________________________ S E C R E T ABU DHABI 01668 SIPDIS CXABU: ACTION: POL INFO: RSO AMB DCM P/M ECON DISSEMINATION: POL CHARGE: PROG APPROVED: AMB:MMWAHBA DRAFTED: POL:STWILLIAMS CLEARED: DCM:RAALBRIGHT VZCZCADI126 OO RUEHC RUCNRAQ RUEHLO RUEHMD RUEHBY RUEHKO RHEHNSC RUEAIIA RHEFDIA RUEKJCS RUEKJCS RUCJACC DE RUEHAD #1668 0971406 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 071406Z APR 03 FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9299 INFO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5/UNMA// IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OSD/NESA// IMMEDIATE RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ3/CCJ4/CCJ5// IMMEDIATE RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0634 RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 0070 RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0101 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0263
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 001668
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/NGA AND NEA/ARP
CENTCOM FOR POLAD AMBASSADOR LITT
NSC FOR ABRAMS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/7/13
TAGS: EAID EFIN ECON PREL IZ TC
SUBJECT: UAE EXPECTS CLOSED-DOOR "DAY AFTER"
DISCUSSION AT GCC FM MEETING
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 001668
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/NGA AND NEA/ARP
CENTCOM FOR POLAD AMBASSADOR LITT
NSC FOR ABRAMS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/7/13
TAGS: EAID EFIN ECON PREL IZ TC
SUBJECT: UAE EXPECTS CLOSED-DOOR "DAY AFTER"
DISCUSSION AT GCC FM MEETING
1. (U) Classified by Ambassador Marcelle M. Wahba
for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D).
2. (S) In conversations on April 5 and April 6 with
the Ambassador, UAE Armed Forces Chief of Staff LTG
Shaykh Muhammad bin Zayid Al-Nahyan and MFA Minstate
Shaykh Hamdan bin Zayid both expected that the GCC
Foreign Ministers would broach the Iraq "day after"
issue but that there would be no public commentary
on the discussion. As for GCC participation in any
post-conflict peacekeeping operations, Hamdan said
he expected an invitation to be extended -- either
to the Arab League or the GCC -- by an Iraqi entity,
such as the Iraqi Interim Authority. This would be
more palatable than a USG/coalition invitation, in
his view.
3. (S) Addressing overall day after concerns, Hamdan
advised that we reach out to the Iraqi tribes and
clans who would put forward their leaders to
participate in the Interim Authority. Above all,
Hamdan emphasized that the Iraqis need to be seen as
choosing their leaders. This cannot be a USG-
engineered process, at least not overtly. If those
put forward are seen to have been imposed by the
USG, we will only feed further anti-American
extremism. Hamdan recognized the need for the U.S.
to play a strong role in post-conflict security and
maintenance of the peace but noted the importance of
having a public Iraqi face to these efforts.
WAHBA
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/NGA AND NEA/ARP
CENTCOM FOR POLAD AMBASSADOR LITT
NSC FOR ABRAMS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/7/13
TAGS: EAID EFIN ECON PREL IZ TC
SUBJECT: UAE EXPECTS CLOSED-DOOR "DAY AFTER"
DISCUSSION AT GCC FM MEETING
1. (U) Classified by Ambassador Marcelle M. Wahba
for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D).
2. (S) In conversations on April 5 and April 6 with
the Ambassador, UAE Armed Forces Chief of Staff LTG
Shaykh Muhammad bin Zayid Al-Nahyan and MFA Minstate
Shaykh Hamdan bin Zayid both expected that the GCC
Foreign Ministers would broach the Iraq "day after"
issue but that there would be no public commentary
on the discussion. As for GCC participation in any
post-conflict peacekeeping operations, Hamdan said
he expected an invitation to be extended -- either
to the Arab League or the GCC -- by an Iraqi entity,
such as the Iraqi Interim Authority. This would be
more palatable than a USG/coalition invitation, in
his view.
3. (S) Addressing overall day after concerns, Hamdan
advised that we reach out to the Iraqi tribes and
clans who would put forward their leaders to
participate in the Interim Authority. Above all,
Hamdan emphasized that the Iraqis need to be seen as
choosing their leaders. This cannot be a USG-
engineered process, at least not overtly. If those
put forward are seen to have been imposed by the
USG, we will only feed further anti-American
extremism. Hamdan recognized the need for the U.S.
to play a strong role in post-conflict security and
maintenance of the peace but noted the importance of
having a public Iraqi face to these efforts.
WAHBA