CERRO LA MOLE RADAR--STILL AN UNREQUITED PACT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEGUCIGALPA 003350 SIPDIS STATE FOR D, T, PM, WHA/PPC, WHA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2012 TAGS: PREL PGOV MASS MARR HO SUBJECT: CERRO LA MOLE RADAR--STILL AN UNREQUITED PACT REF: TEGUCIGALPA 01780 Classified By: PolChief Francisco Palmieri, Reasons 1.5(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) SUMMARY: Post reiterates the U.S. national interests in fulfilling its obligations under the 1993 agreement with the GOH regarding the maintenance of the radar located at Cerro La Mole. The U.S. agreed to pay 75% of all maintenance costs up to a limit of $400,000 per year, while the GOH agreed to pay 25% of the maintenance costs. To date, the U.S. has paid nothing under the agreement, while the GOH has paid for all maintenance costs in excess of $800,000. Post recommends that the U.S. honor the spirit of the agreement by either replacing it with a TPS-78 solid state version or with another TPS-70, or repair the existing one. In the wake of the rapid Honduran accession to an Article 98 agreement, the ongoing failure of the U.S. to fulfill its legal obligations under the agreement is creating doubt about the U.S.'s commitment to international agreements at the very time we are urging further Honduran cooperation. END SUMMARY. -------------- THE AGREEMENT -------------- ¶2. (U) In 1993 the U.S. and the GOH signed a Memorandum of Understanding for the Expansion of the Radar Located in Cerro La Mole in the Caribbean Basin Radar Network (MOU). The purpose of the MOU was to reaffirm the cooperation of the two governments in the international battle against narcotics trafficking by expanding the radar capability of the region as set forth in the Caribbean Basin Radar Network agreement (CBRN) signed by the U.S. and the GOH April 7, 1989. The MOU was designed to integrate the Cerro La Mole radar ("the radar") into the operations of the CBRN. ¶3. (U) The core provisions that are relevant to this recommendation are as follows (NOTE: A more complete summary of the core provisions of the MOU are found in Ref A. END NOTE.): -The costs of operations and maintenance of the radar are to be borne by the GOH. -The U.S. will have unrestricted access to the data from the radar except in the case of a Honduran national emergency. -The U.S. will provide spare parts support and technical assistance valued at a maximum of $400,000 per year, with the GOH responsible for no less than 25 percent of the total spare parts/technical assistance costs each year. 
 -The MOU is effective until April 7, 2009. -------------- THE PROBLEMS OF NON-COMPLIANCE -------------- ¶4. (C) There are a number of emerging diplomatic problems due to the U.S.'s failure to comply with the MOU. The U.S. has paid nothing under the terms of the MOU, while the GOH has paid more than $800,000 in an attempt to maintain the radar. This is a source of tension between the Honduran Armed Forces (HOAF) and the U.S. military personnel stationed in Honduras. Moreover, the situation has become a diplomatic problem. We understand that President Maduro had considered raising it during the postponed visit of Secretary Powell in October. Ref A outlines the effects of the strained relations that U.S. non-compliance has caused. It is difficult to ignore the GOH's argument that the agreement was entered into between two sovereign nations, and that the U.S. has a legal and moral obligation to abide by its terms. ¶5. (C) The GOH is also raising the ante over the issue of non-compliance. Political and military relations are becoming more and more bogged down with discussions about the future of the MOU. In a recent meeting between Ambassador Palmer and Minister of Defense Fred Breve (MOD),when the Ambassador discussed U.S. security assistance concerns, the MOD responded by mentioning the U.S. failure to comply with the MOU. During the Conference of the Chiefs of the American Air Forces, Colonel Ramos (Commander of the Honduran Air Force),pressed General Jumper (Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force) for his support. All political and military VIPs that visit Honduras must field questions about our non-compliance. MOD Breve raised it with WHA A/S Reich in August when the A/S visited Honduras. The situation has become increasingly embarrassing for post and actually hampers productivity due to the amount of time all mission military elements must spend responding to HOAF questions. Compliance with the MOU would permit all country team elements to focus on more important U.S. interests and priorities in Honduras, such as working on counterterrorism and counterdrug training for the HOAF, obtaining MOD support for counterterrorism treaties languishing in Congress and designation of a GOH counterterrorism coordinator. -------------- APPRECIATION FOR ARTICLE 98 -------------- ¶6. (C) The GOH recently signed an Article 98 agreement, despite pressure from other Latin American countries to decline. Honduras was the first Central American country to sign Article 98, and the Hondurans remain staunch supporters. Post believes that the GOH should receive a tangible sign of U.S. appreciation for signing the Article 98 agreement. At the recent USSOUTHCOM Security Assistance Conference (MILGP Commanders' Conference),Brigadier General Vincent Brooks, Deputy Director, Pol Mil Affairs, WHEM, from Joint Staff J-5 stated that our new approach would be the "carrot and the stick"--in other words, the U.S. will help those countries that sign Article 98 agreements and cut aid to those that do not. The radar issue is the U.S.'s chance to demonstrate that we will assist countries that support us on Article 98. At the same conference, representatives from State and Defense stated that U.S. interests are best served when each country can best protect its own sovereignty. The radar at Cerro La Mole would enable Honduras to become a "full partner" in the counterdrug and counterterrorism fights, better protect its own sovereignty and allow for more complete control of its airspace. -------------- --- SUPPORT FOR COUNTERDRUG/COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS -------------- --- ¶7. (U) More and more frequently, Honduran waters and air space are used by narcotraffickers for transshipment of drugs from Colombia to the U.S. and of illegal arms back to Colombia. Stopping this flow of arms to Colombian terrorist groups is a direct and measurable contribution to the global war on terrorism. The U.S. regularly asks the GOH to assist in the war against drugs. The GOH has made a number of strides in its counterdrug operations. The Honduran Air Force has begun to fly intercept missions, and maintains two F-5s on fifteen-minute alert to scramble on counterdrug flights. Additionally, the Honduran Navy has returned at least two patrol vessels to deep water service on the north coast. Honduras continues to grow as a transshipment zone for illicit drugs, and the National Police are now having some success in interdicting overland shipments. An operational TPS-70 at Cerro La Mole would allow the GOH to become more fully engaged in regional counterdrug efforts, since it would give Honduras the ability to track and pass information to other governments in the region. Drug traffickers are increasingly exploiting the known hole in the Cental American radar network to fly through the Cerro La Mole radar coverage of the Honduras-Nicaragua-El Salvador border areas. ¶8. (U) Currently, the TPS-70 is non-operational and, therefore, provides no intelligence directly to the U.S. It is part of SOUTHCOM's radar architecture, meaning it is tied directly into our radar network. A functional radar system at Cerro La Mole would directly provide the U.S. a much better view of Central America's illicit flights (specifically, it would provide the U.S. with a means to differentiate between friendly and unfriendly tracks provided by the Relocatable Over the Horizon Radar (ROTHR) system)--thus, buttresses the U.S. in its war against drugs. -------------- REGIONAL STABILITY -------------- ¶9. (U) U.S. compliance with the MOU would ultimately translate into increased regional stability by providing Honduras with an increased capability for maintaining its sovereignty. Due to the geographical coverage of the radar, it would provide advance warning of aggression against Honduras, and thus provide a strong (yet peaceful) deterrent to hostile military actions. This would serve to reduce misunderstandings between the Central American countries. It would also enhance identification of illicit flights skirting the Honduras-Nicaragua-El Salvador border areas. This has become a serious problem because none of the three countries can encroach on a 10-mile buffer zone along the borders under terms of multi-national agreements. A functioning TPS-70 may lead to agreements among the three countries for better cooperation in the buffer zones. -------------- HOAF EXPENDITURES -------------- ¶10. (SBU) During the last nine years, the GOH has spent more than $800,000 to maintain the radar, but has lost the battle in keeping it operational. -------------- ANSWERS TO OPPOSING ARGUMENTS -------------- ¶11. (C) There is stated DOD/SOLIC opposition to support for this radar. This mission contends the following--the Hondurans are paying their fair share (paragraphs 4 and 10); and, Cerro La Mole is now needed to improve radar collection on a growing number of illicit drug flights that exploit the Honduras-Nicaragua-El Salvador window (paragraphs 7 and 9). ¶12. (C) We ask DOD/SOLIC to reconsider its previous position and find a way to identify funds for this radar. It is not just the right thing to do, it is the smart thing to do to advance multiple U.S. interests in Central America. -------------- POST'S RECOMMENDATION -------------- ¶13. (C) Post recommends that the U.S. should immediately begin honoring the MOU by either replacing the radar with a solid state version (TPS-78) or with another TPS-70 transferred from counterdrug programs. This should be done because we agreed to do so, to support counternarcotics efforts in the region, and as a tangible sign of U.S. appreciation to Honduras for its prompt signing of Article 98 (the first in Central America). ¶14. (C) In the alternative, the U.S. could repair the radar to operational status. However, the radar is an older 300-series radar, and this approach may not be cost effective. Cost of replacement or repairs should be evaluated to determine the most economical solution. Moreover, post recommends that, pursuant to the MOU, the radar be left in the control of the GOH, with all outputs made available to the U.S. PIERCE