C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 006075

SIPDIS

DEPT. FOR IO, IO/UNP, IO/SHA, DRL, DRL/MA AND EUR/WE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2012
TAGS: PHUM PREL IT LY UNAUS
SUBJECT: CHR-59 LIBYAN CHAIRMANSHIP: TRYING TO CONVINCE THE
ITALIANS OF OUR POSITION BEFORE THE GENEVA JAN 20 MEETING

REF: ROME 6002

CLASSIFIED BY: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR THOMAS COUNTRYMAN FOR REASO
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 ROME 06075 191749Z
NS 1.5 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: AS PART OF OUR EFFORT TO GET THE GOI TO
RECONSIDER ITS POSITION ON LIBYA'S CANDIDACY FOR THE CHR-59
CHAIRMANSHIP, POL MC REITERATED THE USG RESERVATIONS ABOUT A
LIBYAN CHR CHAIRMANSHIP, URGED ITALY TO JOIN THE WEOG
CONSENSUS TO ISSUE A LETTER OF CONCERN ABOUT LIBYA'S
CANDIDACY, AND STRESSED TO MFA OFFICIALS THE NEED TO WORK
CLOSELY WITH US TO AVOID A WORST-CASE OUTCOME IN GENEVA ON
JAN 20. THE ITALIANS UNDERSTOOD OUR CONCERNS WELL AND
PROMISED TO FACTOR OUR MESSAGE INTO ITS CONSIDERATION OF THE
WEOG'S APPROACH. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) ON DEC 19, POL MC AND POLOFF MET WITH FRANCESCO
CERULLI, THE MFA'S DEPUTY DG FOR MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS. POL
MC FIRST REITERATED THE USG CONCERNS ABOUT THE CHAIRMANSHIP
OF A COUNTRY LIKE LIBYA, A SERIOUS VIOLATOR OF UN
RESOLUTIONS, TO THE CHR-59 AND HOW SUCH A CHAIRMANSHIP WOULD
FURTHER TARNISH THE CREDIBILITY OF THE CHR. POL MC ADDED
THAT THE ELECTION OF LIBYA TO SUCH A POSITION IS ALSO A
DOMESTIC CONCERN OF OURS SINCE IT WOULD SET BACK THE STEADILY
INCREASING LEVEL OF CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE UN SYSTEM.


3. (C) POL MC THEN EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT WITH THE LETTER
SENT LAST WEEK BY THE WEOG TO THE AFRICAN GROUP REGARDING THE
LIBYAN CANDIDACY AND DESCRIBED IT AS "LOWER THAN THE LOWEST
COMMON DENOMINATOR." (NOTE: THE LETTER ONLY STATED THAT
THERE WAS NO CONSENSUS IN THE WEOG AND THAT THE CANDIDACY
ISSUE WAS STILL BEING DISCUSSED. END NOTE.) POL MC THEN
URGED CERULLI TO WORK MORE CONSTRUCTIVELY WITHIN THE WEOG TO
MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT EXPRESSING THE CONCERNS WE HAVE ABOUT
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 ROME 06075 191749Z
LIBYA'S CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE CHR-59.


4. (C) POL MC PRESENTED CERULLI WITH THE "LOSE, LOSE, LOSE
SITUATION" WE SHOULD ALL TRY TO AVOID: NO EXPRESSION OF
CONCERN FROM THE WEOG (WHICH THE USG DOES NOT WANT,) A VOTE
(WHICH THE GOI DOES NOT WANT) AND HARMING THE US DOMESTIC
SUPPORT NEEDED TO COLLABORATE FULLY WITH THE GOI ON OTHER
MORE IMPORTANT MATTERS RELATING TO THE UN AND LIBYA SUCH AS,
FOR INSTANCE, THE LIBYAN UNSC CANDIDACY (WHICH NEITHER THE
USG NOR THE GOI WOULD WANT.) POL MC FINALLY URGED CERULLI TO
WORK TOGETHER TO REACH A SITUATION WHICH, EVEN IF NOT PERFECT
FOR ALL SIDES, WOULD BETTER SERVE THE CREDIBILITY OF THE CHR,
AND THE INTERESTS OF BOTH THE USG AND THE GOI.


5. (C) COMMENT: THE ITALIANS UNDERSTAND WELL OUR RESERVATIONS
ABOUT A LIBYAN CHR-59 CHAIRMANSHIP. HOWEVER, THE INCLUSION
OF THE CHR CHAIR IN A PACKAGE OF "REGULARIZATION" MEASURES
OFFERED DURING PM BERLUSCONI'S OCTOBER VISIT TO TRIPLOI
SEVERELY LIMITS ITALIAN ROOM FOR MANEUVER. CERULLI HAD
NOTHING NEW TO SAY, BUT WE WILL KEEP PUSHING FOR THE GOI TO
SHOW MORE FLEXIBILITY IN GENEVA. END COMMENT.
SEMBLER

CONFIDENTIAL

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2002ROME06075 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL