Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
02ROME5624
2002-11-19 14:48:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rome
Cable title:  

ITALY ON ZIMBABWE, SUDAN, SOMALIA, ERITREA, COTE D'IVOIRE, AND ETHIOPIA

Tags:  PREL PINR ZI SU SO ER IV ET IT 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 005624 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR INR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2007
TAGS: PREL PINR ZI SU SO ER IV ET PINR ZI SU SO ER IV ET IT ITPREL
SUBJECT: ITALY ON ZIMBABWE, SUDAN, SOMALIA, ERITREA, COTE
D'IVOIRE, AND ETHIOPIA


CLASSIFIED BY: POL M C TOM COUNTRYMAN FOR REASON 1.5 (D)

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 ROME 05624 01 OF 02 191607Z
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 005624 SIPDIS STATE FOR INR E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2007 TAGS: PREL PINR ZI SU SO ER IV ET PINR ZI SU SO ER IV ET IT ITPREL SUBJECT: ITALY ON ZIMBABWE, SUDAN, SOMALIA, ERITREA, COTE D'IVOIRE, AND ETHIOPIA CLASSIFIED BY: POL M C TOM COUNTRYMAN FOR REASON 1.5 (D) CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 02 ROME 05624 01 OF 02 191607Z ¶1. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION CABLE. SEE PARA 7. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY: ON NOVEMBER 14, MFA DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR AFRICA BRUNO CABRAS GAVE A READOUT OF THE EU-SADC MEETING, WHICH FOCUSED ON ZIMBABWE AND MADE NO PROGRESS; REQUESTED THAT THE SUDAN "TROIKA" BE EXPANDED TO INCLUDE THE GOI; ARGUED FOR GREATER INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE SOMALIA PEACE PROCESS; SHARED CONCERNS ABOUT THE IMPACT OF THE IVOIRIAN CRISIS ON THE REGION; AND ASKED FOR EMBASSY ASSISTANCE IN ARRANGING A CONTRACTOR TO TRANSPORT THE ETHIOPIAN AXUM OBELISK HOME. END SUMMARY. -------------- -------------- EU-SADC: NO REAL DIALOGUE, JUST THEATRE ON ZIMBABWE -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) POLMINCOUNS MET WITH MFA DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR AFRICA BRUNO CABRAS (AT THE DG'S REQUEST) NOVEMBER 14 FOR AN OVERVIEW ON AFRICA DEVELOPMENTS. CABRAS OPENED WITH A READOUT ON THE RECENT EU MEETING WITH THE SOUTHERN AFRICA DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC) IN MAPUTO. CABRAS NOTED THAT THE ZIMBABWE ISSUE "CAST A SHADOW" ON THE MEETING THAT LIMITED ITS SUCCESS. THE GOZ REFUSED A TEXT THAT COULD HAVE ESTABLISHED AN EU-SADC TASK FORCE TO WORK ON A SOLUTION TO ZIMBABWE'S CRISIS, BECAUSE IT WAS "AN INTERNAL AFFAIR." CABRAS REMARKED, "THERE WAS NO REAL DIALOGUE, JUST THEATRICAL PRESENTATION. IT DOESN'T AUGUR WELL FOR THE 28 NOVEMBER MINISTERIAL IN OUAGADOUGOU, WHICH WILL PREPARE FOR THE EU-OAU (EU-AU) SUMMIT IN COPENHAGEN NEXT APRIL." ¶4. (C) CABRAS CONTINUED THAT THE EU HAD NO PROSPECTS OR CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 03 ROME 05624 01 OF 02 191607Z IDEAS ON ZIMBABWE. THE SITUATION WAS BLOCKED BUT NOT NECESSARILY WORSENING, EU STATES BELIEVED. WHETHER TO INVITE ZIMBABWE TO THE MEETING HAD BEEN DEBATED IN THE EU UNTIL THE LAST MINUTE, WITH SOUTHERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES FAVORING THE ISSUANCE OF THE INVITATION SO AS TO ASSURE CONTINUED EU-SADC DIALOGUE. SOUTHERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES OPPOSED EXCLUSIONS AND SANCTIONS AGAINST ANY SADC MEMBER. -------------- SHORING UP CAPACITY IN SUDAN -------------- ¶5. (C) CABRAS NOTED THAT THE GOI WAS INCREASING ITS C
APACITY IN SUDAN BY SENDING A COLONEL TO JOIN THE ITALIAN POLITICAL ADVISOR IN THE NUBA MOUNTAINS CEASE-FIRE MONITORING UNIT. CABRAS SAID THAT THE INFORMAL TROIKA -- NORWAY, THE US, AND THE UK -- WAS ACTIVE IN BOTH NEW YORK AND GENEVA ON HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS AND APPEALS TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, AND ITALY WOULD "LIKE TO GET IN ON THAT." BOTH THE SUDANESE GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION WERE MORE COMFORTABLE WHEN THE GOI WAS INVOLVED. -------------- CEASE-FIRE OBSERVERS FOR SOMALIA -------------- ¶6. (C) CABRAS UNDERLINED THE NEED FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO HELP SOLVE THE SOMALI PROBLEM. WAHHABISM IMPORTED ALONG WITH SAUDI FINANCING FOR NGOS IS "SLOWLY BUT SURELY" AFFECTING SOMALIA. "IF WE ABANDON SOMALIA," HE SAID, "IT WILL BECOME A SAFE HAVEN FOR TERRORISTS." HE ADDED THAT CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 04 ROME 05624 01 OF 02 191607Z THE SOMALIS HAD RESPONDED WELL TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE INITIATIVE AND WERE "GENUINELY INTERESTED." IN ORDER TO INCREASE ITS PRESENCE IN SOMALIA, THE GOI HAD SENT TO ELDORET AMB. GIACCOMELE, A FORMER AMBASSADOR TO SOMALIA. IN ADDITION, THE GOI WAS WORKING WITH THE EU TO OBTAIN FINANCING FOR ADDITIONAL EXPERTS FOR SOMALIA AND EXPECTED TO BE SUCCESSFUL. CABRAS ALSO BELIEVED IT NECESSARY TO SEND CEASE-FIRE OBSERVERS TO SOMALIA, PERHAPS FIFTY OR SIXTY PEOPLE FROM AFRICAN COUNTRIES. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE WERE "MANY PROBLEMS" SUCH AS SECURITY THAT WOULD NEED TO BE ADDRESSED BEFORE SUCH PEACEKEEPERS COULD BE DEPLOYED. HE CHARACTERIZED VIOLATIONS OF THE SOMALI CEASE-FIRE DECLARATION AS "VERY LIMITED" AND "OVERCOME NOW." -------------- ERITREA LOOKING FOR TROUBLE -------------- ¶7. (C) MEANWHILE, THE UNITED STATES COULD TALK WITH ETHIOPIA OR ERITREA ABOUT SOMALIA. CABRAS EXPRESSED INTEREST IN THE INTERNAL STABILITY OF ERITREA. ACTION REQUEST: POST HAS FOUND BRIEFINGS TO THE GOI BY TDY REGIONAL INTEL ANALYSTS TO BE EXTREMELY USEFUL TO BOTH SIDES. REQUEST THAT DEPARTMENT DISPATCH ONE TO TWO HORN OF AFRICA INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS FROM INR OR THE IC FOR EXCHANGES WITH THE GOI CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PTO5417 PAGE 01 ROME 05624 02 OF 02 191607Z ACTION INR-00 INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AF-00 AID-00 INL-00 USNW-00 DINT-00 DODE-00 DOTE-00 SRPP-00 DS-00 EAP-00 EB-00 EUR-00 FAAE-00 FBIE-00 VC-00 H-01 TEDE-00 L-00 VCE-00 AC-01 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIG-03 OMB-01 PA-00 PM-00 PRS-00 ACE-00 P-00 SP-00 IRM-00 SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-00 DRL-02 G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 SWCI-00 /008W -------------- 0B311F 191622Z /38 R 191448Z NOV 02 FM AMEMBASSY ROME TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6988 INFO IGAD COLLECTIVE AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN AMEMBASSY HARARE CIA WASHDC C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 ROME 005624 SIPDIS STATE FOR INR E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2007 TAGS: PREL PINR ZI SU SO ER IV ET PINR ZI SU SO ER IV ET IT ITPREL SUBJECT: ITALY ON ZIMBABWE, SUDAN, SOMALIA, ERITREA, COTE D'IVOIRE, AND ETHIOPIA SERVICES AND THE MFA. END ACTION REQUEST. CABRAS NOTED THAT YEMEN, ETHIOPIA, AND SUDAN HAD "GANGED UP" AGAINST ERITREA. CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 02 ROME 05624 02 OF 02 191607Z FURTHERMORE, THE ERITREAN DELEGATION FELT SIDELINED AT MACHAKOS. THESE TENSIONS WERE VERY DANGEROUS, BECAUSE THEY COULD DISRUPT THREE REGIONAL PEACE PROCESSES. CABRAS CHARACTERIZED ERITREA AS "LOOKING FOR TROUBLE." HE ASKED WHETHER THE UNITED STATES WOULD EXTEND MILITARY COOPERATION TO ASMARA. WE EXPLAINED THAT OUR POLICY WAS NO EXPANSION OF COOPERATION UNTIL HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES WERE ADDRESSED. CABRAS ADDED THAT PRESIDENT ISAIAS OF ETHIOPIA HAD RECENTLY WRITTEN TO THE DANISH EU PRESIDENCY TO SAY THAT ETHIOPIA WAS READY FOR DIALOGUE, HOPEFULLY PERMANENT DIALOGUE. -------------- --- CRISIS IN COTE D'IVOIRE COURTS REGIONAL DISASTER -------------- --- ¶8. (C) AS THE KEY STATE IN WEST AFRICA AND AN IMMIGRANT MAGNET, COTE D'IVOIRE WAS IMPORTANT TO THE FUTURE OF AFRICA. "WHAT HAS HAPPENED IS THE WORST THING THAT COULD HAVE HAPPENED TO AFRICA," CABRAS OPINED. IT WAS A VERY COMPLEX AND DANGEROUS SITUATION, WITH NO SOLUTION IN SIGHT, WHICH COULD DEGENERATE INTO A REGIONAL CRISIS OF SERIOUS PROPORTIONS. NOTING THAT FRANCE HAD OVER 25,000 NATIONALS THERE, CABRAS OBSERVED THAT FRANCE WAS DOING THE ESSENTIAL JOB OF MANNING THE BORDERS OF THE TWO CONFLICT ZONES AND PROTECTING FOREIGNERS. HOWEVER, BOTH SIDES PERCEIVED FRANCE AS BEING SELF-INTERESTED, SO IT WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO SERVE AS A MEDIATOR. CABRAS WANTED THE EU TO TAKE A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN NEGOTIATIONS, AND JOINT CANADIAN-EU-US DEMARCHES AND CONSULTATIONS HAD ALREADY BEEN CARRIED OUT. ¶9. (C) CABRAS SAID THE SITUATION COULD EASILY BECOME A CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 03 ROME 05624 02 OF 02 191607Z DISASTER AFFECTING THE ECONOMY OF THE ENTIRE REGION BECAUSE OF ABIDJAN'S IMPORTANCE AS A REGIONAL SEAPORT. THE REBELS HAD A FOLLOWING AND MILITARY STRENGTH IN THE NORTH AND WEST. ECOWAS COULD PROVIDE A WAY OUT WITH EFFECTIVE INTERVENTION OR MEDIATION, BUT IF IT FAILED, THE RESULT WOULD BE EITHER CIVIL WAR OR PARTITION. ¶10. (C) ASKED IF THE GOI HAD ANY PARTICULAR INFLUENCE ON PRESIDENT GBAGBO, GIVEN THAT HE WAS IN ROME WHEN THE COUP ATTEMPT TOOK PLACE, CABRAS SAID YES. THE GOI HAD TOLD GBAGBO NOT TO GIVE IN TO ETHNIC OR REGIONAL PREJUDICE (IMPLICITLY CRITICIZING HIS MILITARY'S MOVES TO PURGE ALL OFFICERS FROM A NORTHERN ETHNIC GROUP AND TO DESTROY THE RESIDENCES OF BURKINABE IMMIGRANTS). HOWEVER, THE MILITARY HAD DEFEATED THE COUP ATTEMPT AND KEPT GBAGBO IN POWER, A FACT THAT MIGHT "CONSTRAIN" HIS "GOOD INTENTIONS" TO KEEP IT IN CHECK. -------------- HOW TO GET THE AXUM OBELISK BACK TO ETHIOPIA -------------- ¶11. (C) HAVING FINALLY AGREED -- NOT ONLY IN THEORY BUT ALSO IN PRACTICE -- TO RETURN THE AXUM OBELISK THAT WAS TAKEN TO ITALY BY THE FASCISTS IN 1937, THE GOI IS FACING VERY COMPLICATED TRANSPORT ISSUES. THE OBELISK WILL BE CUT INTO PIECES AND FLOWN DIRECTLY TO AXUM TO AVOID THE JARRING OVERLAND ROUTE THAT WOULD BE NECESSARY IF IT WERE SHIPPED BACK. BECAUSE THE AXUM AIRPORT IS LIMITED, THE GOI IS CONSIDERING THE USE OF C5A GALAXY AND/OR C17 AIRPLANES FOR TWO LOADS (68 AND 86 TONS). CABRAS ASKED IF POST KNEW OF A CIVILIAN CONTRACTOR FOR THESE TYPES OF PLANES. CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 04 ROME 05624 02 OF 02 191607Z SEMBLER CONFIDENTIAL > 2002ROME05624 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL

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