DELIVERY OF PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO PM BERLUSCONI

S E C R E T ROME 005599

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2012
TAGS: PREL IT EUN ITALIAN POLITICS
SUBJECT: DELIVERY OF PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO PM BERLUSCONI

REF: WHITE HOUSE 150626ZNOV02

CLASSIFIED BY: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION EMIL SKODON, REASON 1.5 (D)


1. (S) AMBASSADOR, ACCOMPANIED BY DCM, MET WITH PM BERLUSCONI
AT CIAMPINO AIRPORT LATE EVENING OF 15 NOVEMBER TO DELIVER
PRESIDENT BUSH'S MESSAGE ON THE PRAGUE NATO SUMMIT AND TO
DISCUSS OTHER ISSUES (SEPTEL). BERLUSCONI WAS MAKING A SHORT
SECRET

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TRANSIT STOP AT CIAMPINO ON THE WAY TO HIS HOME IN SARDINIA
FROM AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO SKOPJE. BERLUSCONI'S DIPLOMATIC
ADVISOR CASTELLANETA AND CHIEF OF STAFF VALENTINI WERE ALSO
PRESENT.


2. (S) BERLUSCONI DESCRIBED THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO
SUPPORT THE NATO CANDIDACY OF SEVEN ASPIRANT COUNTRIES AS
"GOOD NEWS," AND SAID HE WAS IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT.
REFERRING TO THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN INITIATIVE SUMMIT FROM
WHICH HE HAD JUST COME, BERLUSCONI OBSERVED THAT ALL OF THE
NON-NATO COUNTRIES AT THE SUMMIT WANTED TO BE IN NATO
SOMEDAY. IT WAS CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT IT WOULD BE A LONG ROAD
FOR MANY, SUCH AS MACEDONIA, GIVEN THEIR LOW LEVEL OF
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. BERLUSCONI ALSO PICKED UP ON (AND
APPRECIATED) THAT PORTION OF THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER WHICH
COMMENDED HIM FOR REJECTING PROPOSED CUTS IN GOI DEFENSE
SPENDING, COMMENTING THAT HE WANTED TO INCREASE DEFENSE
SPENDING LEVELS IF HE COULD, NOT JUST MAINTAIN THEM.


3. (S) AMBASSADOR BRIEFED DEFMIN MARTINO ON CONTENTS OF THE
PRESIDENT'S LETTER THE FOLLOWING DAY, SATURDAY THE 16TH, IN A
CONVERSATION AT THE AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE. DCM WAS ALSO
PRESENT. MARTINO WELCOMED THE NEWS OF THE PRESIDENT'S
DECISION ON THE SEVEN ASPIRANT COUNTRIES. REGARDING DEFENSE
SPENDING LEVELS, MARTINO SAID HE HAD FOUGHT HARD AGAINST
PROPOSED DEFENSE CUTS IN THIS YEAR'S GOI BUDGET SUBMISSION,
AND HE WOULD CONTINUE TO LOOK FOR INCREASED SPENDING OVER THE
NEXT FIVE YEARS TO MEET NATO CAPABILITY COMMITMENTS.


4. (S) THE DEFMIN NOTED THAT HE HAD AGREED TO FOUR OF THE
FIVE SPECIFIC CAPABILITY PRIORITIES FOR ITALY PROPOSED BY
SECRET

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LORD ROBERTSON, BUT COULD NOT SIGN UP TO THE GOI SPENDING
MORE ON STRATEGIC AIRLIFT SINCE CURRENT GOI ASSETS (PRIMARILY
C-130J'S) WERE SUFFICIENT. IN FACT, MARTINO SAID, STRATEGIC
LIFT WAS ABOUT THE ONLY AREA WHERE THE MOD DID NOT NEED TO
SPEND MORE. WHEN MORE LIFT ASSETS WERE NEEDED, THE GOI COULD
RENT ANTONOV'S AS IT HAD IN THE PAST. MARTINO OBSERVED THAT
IF YOU ONLY USE A CAR A FEW TIMES A YEAR, IT MAKES SENSE TO
RENT INSTEAD OF TO BUY; AS FAR AS HE WAS CONCERNED, THE SAME
PRINCIPLE APPLIED TO ADDITIONAL AIRLIFT ASSETS. NOTING THAT
GERMAN CHANCELLOR SCHROEDER WAS SEEKING TO SPEAK WITH PM
BERLUSCONI ABOUT NATO CAPABILITIES, MARTINO SHARED HIS
SUSPICION THAT SCHROEDER INTENDED TO PUSH BERLUSCONI TO
REVERSE THE GOI DECISION NOT TO BUY A-400'S, IN ORDER TO TAKE
THE PRESSURE OFF GERMANY TO PURCHASE MORE. MARTINO WONDERED
ALOUD IF SAVING THE A-400 PROGRAM MIGHT BE THE REAL MOTIVE
BEHIND LORD ROBERTSON'S PITCH TO THE GOI TO ACQUIRE MORE
AIRLIFT CAPABILITY.
SKODON

SECRET

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2002ROME05599 - Classification: SECRET