A/S RADEMAKER'S ITALY CONSULTATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 004887 SIPDIS FOR A/S RADEMAKER E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2012 TAGS: PARM PREL PREL PREL IT CBW ITPARM CBW ITPARM CBW SUBJECT: A/S RADEMAKER'S ITALY CONSULTATIONS REF: A. SECSTATE 179633 ¶B. SECSTATE 183733 CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 02 ROME 04887 01 OF 03 080737Z CLASSIFIED BY: A/S FOR ARMS CONTROL STEPHEN RADEMAKER FOR REASONS 1.5 ( B) AND (D) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) ITALIAN MFA ARMS CONTROL EXPERTS, MEETING WITH A/S RADEMAKER ON SEPTEMBER 25, WELCOMED THE NEW US POSITION ON THE 5TH BWC REVCON. AFTER RECEIVING CLARIFICATION OF THE PHILOSOPHY UNDERLYING THE US APPROACH TO THE BWC, AND NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR SKEPTICISM THAT THE NAM WOULD ACCEPT AN AGREED WESTERN GROUP POSITION, ITALY PROMISED TO WORK TOWARD ONE IN NEW YORK. US UNWILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE DID NOT SIT WELL, HOWEVER, AND ITALY REMAINS SKEPTICAL THAT THE BWC CAN BE STRENGTHENED WITHOUT SOME SORT OF VERIFICATION REGIME. THE MFA'S LEAD ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATOR TOLD A/S RADEMAKER THAT A 10 MINUTE MEETING AT THE NOVEMBER 11 REVCON WOULD BE DISASTROUS FROM A PUBLIC RELATIONS PERSPECTIVE. MFA POLITICAL DIRECTOR ARAGONA SAID THE WG SHOULD WORK TOWARD A COMMON POSITION IF FOR NO OTHER REASON THAN TO INSURE THAT THE ONUS OF FAILURE AT THE REVCON WOULD NOT FALL ON IT. HE ASSURED THE A/S THAT ITALY'S BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE US WOULD IN NO WAY BE DAMAGED BY DIFFERENCES OVER THE BWC. ¶2. (C) ON CTBT, ITALY WILL CONTINUE ITS PUSH FOR UNIVERSALIZATION AND BELIEVES THAT US NON-RATIFICATION GIVES PAKISTAN AND INDIA AN EXCELLENT EXCUSE FOR NOT JOINING THE NPT. ITALY IS COMMITTED TO REINVIGORATING THE OPCW AND WANTS THE 2003 CWC REVCON TO FOCUS EXCLUSIVELY ON EVALUATING ITS CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 03 ROME 04887 01 OF 03 080737Z WORK RATHER THAN OPENING UP A REVIEW OF THE CONVENTION. ESPECIALLY AFTER THE NATO-RUSSIA SUMMIT, ITALY BELIEVES THE ALLIES SHOULD BE MORE SENSITIVE TO RUSSIA'S VIEWS ON CFE. THE RUSSIANS WILL NOT MOVE UNTIL THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT THE POLITICAL WILL TO RATIFY THE ADAPTED TREATY EXISTS, ONE ITALIAN OFFICIAL ARGUED. END SUMMARY. -------------- PARTICIPANTS -------------- ¶3. (C) ON SEPTEMBER 25, A/S RADEMAKER MET WITH MINISTER CARLO TREZZA, MFA COORDINATOR FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT. TREZZA WAS ACCOMPANIED BY MINISTER ALESSANDRO CEVESE, DIRECTOR OF THE MFA ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT OFFICE, AND COUNSELOR PAOLO CUCULI, A MEMBER OF CEVESE'S STAFF. POL-MIL COUNSELOR ROBBINS AND POLOFF (NOTETAKER) ALSO PARTICIPATED. FOLLOWING THE CONSULTATIONS, A/S RADEMAKER MET BRIEFLY WITH MFA DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS (ALSO POLITICAL DIRECTOR),GIANCARLO ARAGONA. -------------- BWC 5TH REVCON - GRASPING OPPORTUNITY -------------- ¶4. (C) A/S RADEMAKER BEGAN THE DISCUSSION BY CONVEYING REF (B) POINTS. IN DOING SO, HE STRESSED THAT THE US IS NOT OPEN TO NEGOTIATION, BUT WILL CONSIDER PROPOSALS IN THE HOPE THAT A COMMON WESTERN GROUP POSITION CAN BE AGREED. IN THAT VEIN, THE A/S LEFT NO ROOM FOR DOUBT THAT THE US EXPECTED WG MEMBERS TO STAND BY AN AGREED POSITION THROUGHOUT THE REVIEW CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 04 ROME 04887 01 OF 03 080737Z PROCESS. HE REFERRED HIS INTERLOCUTORS TO THE NINE ELEMENTS OF THE 2001 US PAPER FOR IDEAS ON WHAT IS ACCEPTABLE. NEVERTHELESS, THE US RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CALL FOR A SHORT MEETING ON NOVEMBER 11 IF THIS NEW WAY FORWARD SPUTTERS OR OTHERWISE RUNS UP AGAINST US REDLINES. ¶5. (C) TREZZA EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE GESTURE, BUT SAID HE WANTED TO BETTER UNDERSTAND THE PHILOSOPHY UNDERLYING THE US APPROACH TO THE BWC BEFORE MOVING INTO SPECIFICS. VERIFICATION, TREZZA SUGGESTED, HAS ALWAYS BEEN AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF ARMS CONTROL TREATIES. INDEED, ITALY HAS ALWAYS INSISTED ON IT. RESPONDING TO TREZZA'S CONCERN THAT "US SKEPTICISM TOWARD THE VALUE OF INSPECTIONS AND VERIFICATION APPEARS TO BE GROWING," A/S RADEMAKER RESPONDED THAT THE US COMMITMENT TO A ROBUST OPCW AND IAEA ENFORCEMENT ROLE SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO DISPROVE THAT IDEA. ¶6. (C) SATISFIED THAT VERIFICATION IS STILL A CORE CONCEPT IN THE US APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL, TREZZA ASKED WHY THE BWC STANDS OUT AS AN EXCEPTION. A/S RADEMAKER EXPLAINED THAT BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS ARE UNIQUE; BIO-DEFENSE WORK--ALLOWED UNDER THE BWC--IS INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM PROHIBITED OFFENSIVE WORK. THE LAWFULNESS OF SUCH ACTIVITY TURNS ON INTENT, WHICH IS NOT READILY SUSCEPTIBLE TO VERIFICATION. MOREOVER, THE BIOTECH SECTOR IN THE UNITED STATES HAS A POWERFUL INTEREST CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4105 PAGE 01 ROME 04887 02 OF 03 080738Z ACTION AC-01 INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AID-00 AMAD-00 CIAE-00 COME-00 INL-00 DOEE-00 PERC-00 SRPP-00 DS-00 EUR-00 VC-00 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 L-00 VCE-00 M-00 NRRC-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OES-01 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-00 PM-00 PRS-00 ACE-00 P-00 SCT-00 SP-00 IRM-00 SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00 SSD-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-00 DRL-02 G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 /008W -------------- F33A8D 080738Z /38 P 080701Z OCT 02 FM AMEMBASSY ROME TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6209 INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE USMISSION GENEVA USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA USMISSION USUN NEW YORK SECDEF WASHDC C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 ROME 004887 SIPDIS FOR A/S RADEMAKER E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2012 TAGS: PARM PREL PREL PREL IT CBW ITPARM CBW ITPARM CBW SUBJECT: A/S RADEMAKER'S ITALY CONSULTATIONS IN PROTECTING AGAINST INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE. CEVESE ALLOWED THAT THIS LATTER CONCERN HAD ALSO BEEN RAISED BY ITALIAN CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 02 ROME 04887 02 OF 03 080738Z INDUSTRY. ¶7. (C) TREZZA AVERRED THAT ALL MAJOR MULTILATERAL ARMS CONTROL TREATIES TO DATE HAVE BEEN BASED ON DEALS. CAN WE AVOID COMPROMISING OVER THE BWC, HE ASKED? EXACTLY, A/S RADEMAKER RESPONDED, WE PROBABLY COULD NOT; THIS IS WHY THE US IS OPPOSED TO THE PROTOCOL. ADVANCED INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS WOULD HAVE TO GIVE SOMETHING TO THE NAM IN EXCHANGE FOR AN UNVERIFIABLE PROTOCOL -- A VERY BAD BARGAIN INDEED. ¶8. (C) MOVING PAST THEOLOGY, TREZZA FIRST DISMISSED THE NOTION OF HOLDING A "10 MINUTE SESSION" AS LACKING IN CREDIBILITY. WE WILL BE SUBJECT TO CRITICISM FROM THE PRESS AND FROM PUBLIC OPINION IF WE GO DOWN THAT ROAD, HE ARGUED, ADDING THAT THE WESTERN GROUP WOULD APPEAR TO BE ON THE DEFENSIVE IF IT SHOWS UP IN GENEVA UNPREPARED TO DISCUSS SUBSTANCE. ITALY ALSO BELIEVES THAT "NAMING NAMES" IS PROBLEMATIC. IT IS NOT OPPOSED TO BEING EXPLICIT IF CALLING COUNTRIES ON THE CARPET CAN BE DONE THROUGH AN AGREED INSTRUMENT, BUT DOES NOT VIEW UNILATERAL STATEMENTS AS CONSTRUCTIVE. ¶9. (C) IN TERMS OF ARRIVING AT A COMMON POSITION, WESTERN STATES HAVE ALWAYS DEFENDED THE POSITION OF VERIFICATION, ACCORDING TO TREZZA, WHO ADDED, "IT WILL BE RATHER EMBARRASSING TO REVERSE THIS POSITION SIMPLY BECAUSE THE US DOES NOT AGREE." CEVESE WAS FLUMMOXED BY THE US "TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT" APPROACH AND WAS CLEARLY CONCERNED THAT THE US DELEGATION IN NEW YORK FOR THE FIRST COMMITTEE SESSION CANNOT NEGOTIATE. NEVERTHELESS, HE PROMISED THE A/S THAT ITALY WOULD EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF ARRIVING AT A COMMON CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 03 ROME 04887 02 OF 03 080738Z POSITION. CEVESE SAID THAT IF THE US COULD NOT BE MOVED TO SHOW EVEN MORE FLEXIBILITY, IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL TO PROVE THAT THE BWC IS IMPORTANT EVEN WITHOUT A VERIFICATION MECHANISM. A REALISTIC FOLLOW UP PROCESS AT THE EXPERT LEVEL IS NEEDED, HE ARGUED. CEVESE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO CREATE A MECHANISM WITHIN THE BWC TO FURTHER THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NATIONAL LEGISLATION. ¶10. (C) CUCULI RAISED SEVERAL TECHNICAL ISSUES. ITALY UNDERSTANDS THAT ROUTINE VISITS COULD ENDANGER INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, BUT LIMITING INSPECTIONS TO SEVERE VIOLATIONS MIGHT BE LESS HARMFUL. EXPOSING VIOLATORS IS THE CRUX OF THE MATTER AND BWC ARTICLE 6 PROCEDURES HAVE NOT WORKED. ITALY IS CONFIDENT THAT THE US, FRANCE, AND THE UK WILL NOT PLAY THE VETO CARD IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, BUT IS LESS SANGUINE ABOUT RUSSIA AND CHINA. IF WE REJECT A NEW VERIFICATION REGIME DO WE REALLY WANT TO RELY ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION? THE CASE OF CUBA, WHICH HAS TOUGH LEGISLATION ON THE BOOKS, SHOULD BE INSTRUCTIVE, CUCULI ARGUED. ITALY SUPPORTS THE PROTOCOL BECAUSE THE BWC DOES NOT PROVIDE ENOUGH PROTECTION. ¶11. (C) THE US IS NOT PERSUADED THAT OTHER STATES SHARE OUR SKEPTICISM ON INSPECTIONS, A/S RADEMAKER RESPONDED, WHICH IS WHY THE US HAS LIMITED ITSELF TO ARTICLE V UNDER THE BWC. THE US POSITION IS THAT THE BWC IS UNVERIFIABLE; TO TRY AND MAKE IT SO IS TECHNICALLY IMPOSSIBLE. -------------- CTBT - STILL PERPLEXED -------------- CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 04 ROME 04887 02 OF 03 080738Z ¶12. (C) CEVESE SAID ITALY BELIEVES THE CTBT WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT DETERRENCE MECHANISM, ESPECIALLY BECAUSE IT IS POSSIBLE TO DETECT WHETHER NUCLEAR TESTING IS BEING CONDUCTED. ITALY STRONGLY SUPPORTS UNIVERSALIZING THE CTBT AND IS "DEMARCHING EVERYONE" ON THE SUBJECT. CEVESE INSINUATED THAT US NON-RATIFICATION IS AN IMPEDIMENT TO ARMS CONTROL IN SOUTHWEST ASIA. WHY SHOULD INDIA AND PAKISTAN RATIFY IF THEY KNOW FULL WELL THAT THE US HAS NO INTENTION OF DOING SO? AT THE 2000 NPT REVCON ALL STATES PARTIES AGREED THAT THE CTBT WAS A CRUCIAL COMPONENT OF A SUCCESSFUL NPT. WITH A FUNCTIONING CTBT IT MIGHT EVEN BE POSSIBLE BRING INDIA AND PAKISTAN INTO THE NPT, CEVESE ARGUED. ¶13. (C) IN RESPONSE, A/S RADEMAKER ASSURED CEVESE THAT THE US SHARES ITALY'S CONCERNS ABOUT INDIA AND PAKISTAN, ALTHOUGH IT DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT STRIPPING AWAY PRETEXTS WILL CONVINCE EITHER COUNTRY TO JOIN THE NPT. THE US SUPPORTS A FISSILE MATERIAL CUTOFF TREATY (FMCT) IN PART AS A MEANS OF ADDRESSING THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM IN SOUTHWEST ASIA. -------------- CWC -- FOCUS ON OPCW -------------- CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4106 PAGE 01 ROME 04887 03 OF 03 080738Z ACTION AC-01 INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AID-00 AMAD-00 CIAE-00 COME-00 INL-00 DOEE-00 PERC-00 SRPP-00 DS-00 EUR-00 VC-00 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 L-00 VCE-00 M-00 NRRC-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OES-01 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-00 PM-00 PRS-00 ACE-00 P-00 SCT-00 SP-00 IRM-00 SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00 SSD-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-00 DRL-02 G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 /008W -------------- F33A92 080738Z /38 P 080701Z OCT 02 FM AMEMBASSY ROME TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6210 INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE USMISSION GENEVA USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA USMISSION USUN NEW YORK SECDEF WASHDC C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 ROME 004887 SIPDIS FOR A/S RADEMAKER E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2012 TAGS: PARM PREL PREL PREL IT CBW ITPARM CBW ITPARM CBW SUBJECT: A/S RADEMAKER'S ITALY CONSULTATIONS ¶14. (C) ITALY IS COMMITTED TO TURNING AROUND OPCW, IN PARTICULAR REESTABLISHING A ROBUST VERIFICATION SYSTEM. AT CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 02 ROME 04887 03 OF 03 080738Z THE 2003 CWC REVCON NEXT YEAR THE FOCUS SHOULD BE ON ASSESSING THE OPCW, NOT THE CONVENTION ITSELF. IT IS NOT TIME TO MODIFY THE CWC, CEVESE ASSERTED. ITALY WANTS TO AVOID GIVING THE NAM AN OPPORTUNITY TO OPEN DISCUSSION OF THE CONVENTION AS SUCH, AND EXPECTS CHINA TO HONOR ITS PRINCIPLES. CEVESE ALSO RAISED THE ISSUE OF THIRD COUNTRY CHALLENGES, AND SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO MILITARY VESSELS IN ITALIAN WATERS. HE ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE US POSITION. A/S RADEMAKER AGREED TO CHECK ON SPECIFICS. -------------- CFE -- WINKING AT RUSSIA -------------- ¶15. (C) ITALY EXPECTED THAT SOMETHING IMPORTANT WOULD HAVE CHANGED IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE NATO-RUSSIA SUMMIT. WE SHOULD TRY TO BE MORE POSITIVE AND TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION RUSSIAN CONCERNS, CEVESE SUGGESTED. THE ARGUMENT THAT THE ADAPTED TREATY CANNOT ENTER INTO FORCE UNTIL GEORGIA AND MOLDOVA RATIFY IT IS FALLACIOUS, BECAUSE "ALL CONCERNED" KNOW THAT PRESSURE FROM NATO MEMBERS WILL BRING THEM AROUND. WE NEED TO DEMONSTRATE TO RUSSIA THAT THERE IS POLITICAL WILL BEHIND RATIFICATION BEFORE MOSCOW WILL INITIATE ITS OWN PROCESS, CEVESE SAID. ITALY, HOWEVER, REJECTS ANY LINKAGE BETWEEN ENLARGEMENT AND RATIFICATION BY THE BALTIC STATES. A/S RADEMAKER INFORMED CEVESE THAT THE US POSITION IS STRAIGHTFORWARD: RUSSIA FIRST NEEDS TO IMPLEMENT FULLY ITS ISTANBUL COMMITMENTS. HE URGED CEVESE TO CONSIDER THE HARMFUL EFFECTS IF NATO SOLIDARITY ON THIS CORE ISSUE DISINTEGRATES. CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 03 ROME 04887 03 OF 03 080738Z -------------- LANDMINES -------------- ¶16. (C) CEVESE ASKED IF ITALY COULD EXPECT ANY FORTHCOMING CHANGE IN THE US POSITION ON THE OTTAWA CONVENTION. A/S RADEMAKER SAID THAT WHILE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION WOULD NOT REVERSE THE US POSITION, LANDMINE POLICY WAS UNDER REVIEW AND ITALY WOULD PROBABLY LIKE THE CONCLUSIONS THAT SHOULD BE RELEASED SOON. -------------- ARAGONA MEETING -------------- ¶17. (C) DG FOR MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS ARAGONA TOLD A/S RADEMAKER THAT THE US APPROACH TO THE BWC PROTOCOL CAUSES ITALY CONCERN. NEVERTHELESS, AFTER LISTENING TO A/S RADEMAKER'S REVIEW OF THE NEW US POSITION, HE DIRECTED CEVESE TO MAKE AN EFFORT TO ARRIVE AT A COMMON POSITION. ARAGONA ALLOWED THAT DESPITE THE LONG ODDS OF GETTING AN EVENTUAL AGREEMENT WITH THE NAM, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE WG PRESENT A UNITED FRONT SO THE ONUS OF FAILURE WILL NOT FALL ON ITS SHOULDERS. NEVERTHELESS, HE WAS UNEASY ABOUT THE US NOTION THAT A COMMON POSITION MUST BE CAST IN STONE BECAUSE THIS WILL MAKE CONDUCTING NEGOTIATIONS DIFFICULT. ARAGONA REASSURED A/S RADEMAKER THAT ITALY'S CURRENT DIFFERENCES WITH THE US OVER THE BWC WILL NOT AFFECT BILATERAL RELATIONS. INDEED, ITALY WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO SAFEGUARD AND STRENGTHEN THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP. CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 04 ROME 04887 03 OF 03 080738Z ¶18. (U) THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN CLEARED BY A/S RADEMAKER. SEMBLER CONFIDENTIAL > 2002ROME04887 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL