Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
02ROME4887
2002-10-08 07:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rome
Cable title:
A/S RADEMAKER'S ITALY CONSULTATIONS
how-toThis record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 004887
SIPDIS
FOR A/S RADEMAKER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2012
TAGS: PARM PREL PREL PREL IT CBW ITPARM CBW ITPARM CBW
SUBJECT: A/S RADEMAKER'S ITALY CONSULTATIONS
REF: A. SECSTATE 179633
B. SECSTATE 183733
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 ROME 04887 01 OF 03 080737Z
CLASSIFIED BY: A/S FOR ARMS CONTROL STEPHEN RADEMAKER FOR REASONS 1.5 (
B) AND (D)
---------
SUMMARY
---------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 004887
SIPDIS
FOR A/S RADEMAKER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2012
TAGS: PARM PREL PREL PREL ITALY'>IT CBW ITPARM CBW ITPARM CBW
SUBJECT: A/S RADEMAKER'S ITALY CONSULTATIONS
REF: A. SECSTATE 179633
B. SECSTATE 183733
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 ROME 04887 01 OF 03 080737Z
CLASSIFIED BY: A/S FOR ARMS CONTROL STEPHEN RADEMAKER FOR REASONS 1.5 (
B) AND (D)
--------------
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (C) ITALIAN MFA ARMS CONTROL EXPERTS, MEETING WITH A/S
RADEMAKER ON SEPTEMBER 25, WELCOMED THE NEW US POSITION ON
THE 5TH BWC REVCON. AFTER RECEIVING CLARIFICATION OF THE
PHILOSOPHY UNDERLYING THE US APPROACH TO THE BWC, AND
NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR SKEPTICISM THAT THE NAM WOULD ACCEPT AN
AGREED WESTERN GROUP POSITION, ITALY PROMISED TO WORK TOWARD
ONE IN NEW YORK. US UNWILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE DID NOT SIT
WELL, HOWEVER, AND ITALY REMAINS SKEPTICAL THAT THE BWC CAN
BE STRENGTHENED WITHOUT SOME SORT OF VERIFICATION REGIME.
THE MFA'S LEAD ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATOR TOLD A/S RADEMAKER
THAT A 10 MINUTE MEETING AT THE NOVEMBER 11 REVCON WOULD BE
DISASTROUS FROM A PUBLIC RELATIONS PERSPECTIVE. MFA
POLITICAL DIRECTOR ARAGONA SAID THE WG SHOULD WORK TOWARD A
COMMON POSITION IF FOR NO OTHER REASON THAN TO INSURE THAT
THE ONUS OF FAILURE AT THE REVCON WOULD NOT FALL ON IT. HE
ASSURED THE A/S THAT ITALY'S BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE US
WOULD IN NO WAY BE DAMAGED BY DIFFERENCES OVER THE BWC.
2. (C) ON CTBT, ITALY WILL CONTINUE ITS PUSH FOR
UNIVERSALIZATION AND BELIEVES THAT US NON-RATIFICATION GIVES
PAKISTAN AND INDIA AN EXCELLENT EXCUSE FOR NOT JOINING THE
NPT. ITALY IS COMMITTED TO REINVIGORATING THE OPCW AND WANTS
THE 2003 CWC REVCON TO FOCUS EXCLUSIVELY ON EVALUATING ITS
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 ROME 04887 01 OF 03 080737Z
WORK RATHER THAN OPENING UP A REVIEW OF THE CONVENTION.
ESPECIALLY AFTER THE NATO-RUSSIA SUMMIT, ITALY BELIEVES THE
ALLIES SHOULD BE MORE SENSITIVE TO RUSSIA'S VIEWS ON CFE.
THE RUSSIANS WILL NOT MOVE UNTIL THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT THE
POLITICAL WILL TO RATIFY THE ADAPTED TREATY EXISTS, ONE
ITALIAN OFFICIAL ARGUED. END SUMMARY.
--------------
PARTICIPANTS
--------------
3. (C) ON SEPTEMBER 25, A/S RADEMAKER MET WITH MINISTER
CARLO TREZZA, MFA COORDINATOR FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND
DISARMAMENT. TREZZA WAS ACCOMPANIED BY MINISTER ALESSANDRO
CEVESE, DIRECTOR OF THE MFA ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
OFFICE, AND COUNSELOR PAOLO CUCULI, A MEMBER OF CEVESE'S
STAFF. POL-MIL COUNSELOR ROBBINS AND POLOFF (NOTETAKER) ALSO
PARTICIPATED. FOLLOWING THE CONSULTATIONS, A/S RADEMAKER MET
BRIEFLY WITH MFA DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS
(ALSO POLITICAL DIRECTOR),GIANCARLO ARAGONA.
--------------
BWC 5TH REVCON - GRASPING OPPORTUNITY
--------------
4. (C) A/S RADEMAKER BEGAN THE DISCUSSION BY CONVEYING REF
(B) POINTS. IN DOING SO, HE STRESSED THAT THE US IS NOT OPEN
TO NEGOTIATION, BUT WILL CONSIDER PROPOSALS IN THE HOPE THAT
A COMMON WESTERN GROUP POSITION CAN BE AGREED. IN THAT VEIN,
THE A/S LEFT NO ROOM FOR DOUBT THAT THE US EXPECTED WG
MEMBERS TO STAND BY AN AGREED POSITION THROUGHOUT THE REVIEW
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 ROME 04887 01 OF 03 080737Z
PROCESS. HE REFERRED HIS INTERLOCUTORS TO THE NINE ELEMENTS
OF THE 2001 US PAPER FOR IDEAS ON WHAT IS ACCEPTABLE.
NEVERTHELESS, THE US RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CALL FOR A SHORT
MEETING ON NOVEMBER 11 IF THIS NEW WAY FORWARD SPUTTERS OR
OTHERWISE RUNS UP AGAINST US REDLINES.
5. (C) TREZZA EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE GESTURE, BUT
SAID HE WANTED TO BETTER UNDERSTAND THE PHILOSOPHY UNDERLYING
THE US APPROACH TO THE BWC BEFORE MOVING INTO SPECIFICS.
VERIFICATION, TREZZA SUGGESTED, HAS ALWAYS BEEN AN ESSENTIAL
ELEMENT OF ARMS CONTROL TREATIES. INDEED, ITALY HAS ALWAYS
INSISTED ON IT. RESPONDING TO TREZZA'S CONCERN THAT "US
SKEPTICISM TOWARD THE VALUE OF INSPECTIONS AND VERIFICATION
APPEARS TO BE GROWING," A/S RADEMAKER RESPONDED THAT THE US
COMMITMENT TO A ROBUST OPCW AND IAEA ENFORCEMENT ROLE SHOULD
BE SUFFICIENT TO DISPROVE THAT IDEA.
6. (C) SATISFIED THAT VERIFICATION IS STILL A CORE CONCEPT
IN THE US APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL, TREZZA ASKED WHY THE BWC
STANDS OUT AS AN EXCEPTION. A/S RADEMAKER EXPLAINED THAT
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS ARE UNIQUE; BIO-DEFENSE WORK--ALLOWED
UNDER THE BWC--IS INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM PROHIBITED OFFENSIVE
WORK. THE LAWFULNESS OF SUCH ACTIVITY TURNS ON INTENT, WHICH
IS NOT READILY SUSCEPTIBLE TO VERIFICATION. MOREOVER, THE
BIOTECH SECTOR IN THE UNITED STATES HAS A POWERFUL INTEREST
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4105
PAGE 01 ROME 04887 02 OF 03 080738Z
ACTION AC-01
INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AID-00 AMAD-00 CIAE-00 COME-00 INL-00
DOEE-00 PERC-00 SRPP-00 DS-00 EUR-00 VC-00 H-01
TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 L-00 VCE-00 M-00 NRRC-00
NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OES-01 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-00 PM-00
PRS-00 ACE-00 P-00 SCT-00 SP-00 IRM-00 SS-00
TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00 SSD-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-00
DRL-02 G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 /008W
-------------- F33A8D 080738Z /38
P 080701Z OCT 02
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6209
INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 ROME 004887
SIPDIS
FOR A/S RADEMAKER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2012
TAGS: PARM PREL PREL PREL IT CBW ITPARM CBW ITPARM CBW
SUBJECT: A/S RADEMAKER'S ITALY CONSULTATIONS
IN PROTECTING AGAINST INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE. CEVESE ALLOWED
THAT THIS LATTER CONCERN HAD ALSO BEEN RAISED BY ITALIAN
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 ROME 04887 02 OF 03 080738Z
INDUSTRY.
7. (C) TREZZA AVERRED THAT ALL MAJOR MULTILATERAL ARMS
CONTROL TREATIES TO DATE HAVE BEEN BASED ON DEALS. CAN WE
AVOID COMPROMISING OVER THE BWC, HE ASKED? EXACTLY, A/S
RADEMAKER RESPONDED, WE PROBABLY COULD NOT; THIS IS WHY THE
US IS OPPOSED TO THE PROTOCOL. ADVANCED INDUSTRIALIZED
NATIONS WOULD HAVE TO GIVE SOMETHING TO THE NAM IN EXCHANGE
FOR AN UNVERIFIABLE PROTOCOL -- A VERY BAD BARGAIN INDEED.
8. (C) MOVING PAST THEOLOGY, TREZZA FIRST DISMISSED THE
NOTION OF HOLDING A "10 MINUTE SESSION" AS LACKING IN
CREDIBILITY. WE WILL BE SUBJECT TO CRITICISM FROM THE PRESS
AND FROM PUBLIC OPINION IF WE GO DOWN THAT ROAD, HE ARGUED,
ADDING THAT THE WESTERN GROUP WOULD APPEAR TO BE ON THE
DEFENSIVE IF IT SHOWS UP IN GENEVA UNPREPARED TO DISCUSS
SUBSTANCE. ITALY ALSO BELIEVES THAT "NAMING NAMES" IS
PROBLEMATIC. IT IS NOT OPPOSED TO BEING EXPLICIT IF CALLING
COUNTRIES ON THE CARPET CAN BE DONE THROUGH AN AGREED
INSTRUMENT, BUT DOES NOT VIEW UNILATERAL STATEMENTS AS
CONSTRUCTIVE.
9. (C) IN TERMS OF ARRIVING AT A COMMON POSITION, WESTERN
STATES HAVE ALWAYS DEFENDED THE POSITION OF VERIFICATION,
ACCORDING TO TREZZA, WHO ADDED, "IT WILL BE RATHER
EMBARRASSING TO REVERSE THIS POSITION SIMPLY BECAUSE THE US
DOES NOT AGREE." CEVESE WAS FLUMMOXED BY THE US "TAKE IT OR
LEAVE IT" APPROACH AND WAS CLEARLY CONCERNED THAT THE US
DELEGATION IN NEW YORK FOR THE FIRST COMMITTEE SESSION CANNOT
NEGOTIATE. NEVERTHELESS, HE PROMISED THE A/S THAT ITALY
WOULD EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF ARRIVING AT A COMMON
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 ROME 04887 02 OF 03 080738Z
POSITION. CEVESE SAID THAT IF THE US COULD NOT BE MOVED TO
SHOW EVEN MORE FLEXIBILITY, IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL TO PROVE
THAT THE BWC IS IMPORTANT EVEN WITHOUT A VERIFICATION
MECHANISM. A REALISTIC FOLLOW UP PROCESS AT THE EXPERT LEVEL
IS NEEDED, HE ARGUED. CEVESE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE
USEFUL TO CREATE A MECHANISM WITHIN THE BWC TO FURTHER THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF NATIONAL LEGISLATION.
10. (C) CUCULI RAISED SEVERAL TECHNICAL ISSUES. ITALY
UNDERSTANDS THAT ROUTINE VISITS COULD ENDANGER INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS, BUT LIMITING INSPECTIONS TO SEVERE
VIOLATIONS MIGHT BE LESS HARMFUL. EXPOSING VIOLATORS IS THE
CRUX OF THE MATTER AND BWC ARTICLE 6 PROCEDURES HAVE NOT
WORKED. ITALY IS CONFIDENT THAT THE US, FRANCE, AND THE UK
WILL NOT PLAY THE VETO CARD IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, BUT
IS LESS SANGUINE ABOUT RUSSIA AND CHINA. IF WE REJECT A NEW
VERIFICATION REGIME DO WE REALLY WANT TO RELY ON NATIONAL
LEGISLATION? THE CASE OF CUBA, WHICH HAS TOUGH LEGISLATION
ON THE BOOKS, SHOULD BE INSTRUCTIVE, CUCULI ARGUED. ITALY
SUPPORTS THE PROTOCOL BECAUSE THE BWC DOES NOT PROVIDE ENOUGH
PROTECTION.
11. (C) THE US IS NOT PERSUADED THAT OTHER STATES SHARE OUR
SKEPTICISM ON INSPECTIONS, A/S RADEMAKER RESPONDED, WHICH IS
WHY THE US HAS LIMITED ITSELF TO ARTICLE V UNDER THE BWC.
THE US POSITION IS THAT THE BWC IS UNVERIFIABLE; TO TRY AND
MAKE IT SO IS TECHNICALLY IMPOSSIBLE.
--------------
CTBT - STILL PERPLEXED
--------------
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 ROME 04887 02 OF 03 080738Z
12. (C) CEVESE SAID ITALY BELIEVES THE CTBT WOULD BE AN
IMPORTANT DETERRENCE MECHANISM, ESPECIALLY BECAUSE IT IS
POSSIBLE TO DETECT WHETHER NUCLEAR TESTING IS BEING
CONDUCTED. ITALY STRONGLY SUPPORTS UNIVERSALIZING THE CTBT
AND IS "DEMARCHING EVERYONE" ON THE SUBJECT. CEVESE
INSINUATED THAT US NON-RATIFICATION IS AN IMPEDIMENT TO ARMS
CONTROL IN SOUTHWEST ASIA. WHY SHOULD INDIA AND PAKISTAN
RATIFY IF THEY KNOW FULL WELL THAT THE US HAS NO INTENTION OF
DOING SO? AT THE 2000 NPT REVCON ALL STATES PARTIES AGREED
THAT THE CTBT WAS A CRUCIAL COMPONENT OF A SUCCESSFUL NPT.
WITH A FUNCTIONING CTBT IT MIGHT EVEN BE POSSIBLE BRING INDIA
AND PAKISTAN INTO THE NPT, CEVESE ARGUED.
13. (C) IN RESPONSE, A/S RADEMAKER ASSURED CEVESE THAT THE
US SHARES ITALY'S CONCERNS ABOUT INDIA AND PAKISTAN, ALTHOUGH
IT DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT STRIPPING AWAY PRETEXTS WILL
CONVINCE EITHER COUNTRY TO JOIN THE NPT. THE US SUPPORTS A
FISSILE MATERIAL CUTOFF TREATY (FMCT) IN PART AS A MEANS OF
ADDRESSING THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM IN SOUTHWEST ASIA.
--------------
CWC -- FOCUS ON OPCW
--------------
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4106
PAGE 01 ROME 04887 03 OF 03 080738Z
ACTION AC-01
INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AID-00 AMAD-00 CIAE-00 COME-00 INL-00
DOEE-00 PERC-00 SRPP-00 DS-00 EUR-00 VC-00 H-01
TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 L-00 VCE-00 M-00 NRRC-00
NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OES-01 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-00 PM-00
PRS-00 ACE-00 P-00 SCT-00 SP-00 IRM-00 SS-00
TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00 SSD-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-00
DRL-02 G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 /008W
-------------- F33A92 080738Z /38
P 080701Z OCT 02
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6210
INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 ROME 004887
SIPDIS
FOR A/S RADEMAKER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2012
TAGS: PARM PREL PREL PREL IT CBW ITPARM CBW ITPARM CBW
SUBJECT: A/S RADEMAKER'S ITALY CONSULTATIONS
14. (C) ITALY IS COMMITTED TO TURNING AROUND OPCW, IN
PARTICULAR REESTABLISHING A ROBUST VERIFICATION SYSTEM. AT
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 ROME 04887 03 OF 03 080738Z
THE 2003 CWC REVCON NEXT YEAR THE FOCUS SHOULD BE ON
ASSESSING THE OPCW, NOT THE CONVENTION ITSELF. IT IS NOT
TIME TO MODIFY THE CWC, CEVESE ASSERTED. ITALY WANTS TO
AVOID GIVING THE NAM AN OPPORTUNITY TO OPEN DISCUSSION OF THE
CONVENTION AS SUCH, AND EXPECTS CHINA TO HONOR ITS
PRINCIPLES. CEVESE ALSO RAISED THE ISSUE OF THIRD COUNTRY
CHALLENGES, AND SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO MILITARY VESSELS IN
ITALIAN WATERS. HE ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE US
POSITION. A/S RADEMAKER AGREED TO CHECK ON SPECIFICS.
--------------
CFE -- WINKING AT RUSSIA
--------------
15. (C) ITALY EXPECTED THAT SOMETHING IMPORTANT WOULD HAVE
CHANGED IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE NATO-RUSSIA SUMMIT. WE
SHOULD TRY TO BE MORE POSITIVE AND TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION
RUSSIAN CONCERNS, CEVESE SUGGESTED. THE ARGUMENT THAT THE
ADAPTED TREATY CANNOT ENTER INTO FORCE UNTIL GEORGIA AND
MOLDOVA RATIFY IT IS FALLACIOUS, BECAUSE "ALL CONCERNED" KNOW
THAT PRESSURE FROM NATO MEMBERS WILL BRING THEM AROUND. WE
NEED TO DEMONSTRATE TO RUSSIA THAT THERE IS POLITICAL WILL
BEHIND RATIFICATION BEFORE MOSCOW WILL INITIATE ITS OWN
PROCESS, CEVESE SAID. ITALY, HOWEVER, REJECTS ANY LINKAGE
BETWEEN ENLARGEMENT AND RATIFICATION BY THE BALTIC STATES.
A/S RADEMAKER INFORMED CEVESE THAT THE US POSITION IS
STRAIGHTFORWARD: RUSSIA FIRST NEEDS TO IMPLEMENT FULLY ITS
ISTANBUL COMMITMENTS. HE URGED CEVESE TO CONSIDER THE
HARMFUL EFFECTS IF NATO SOLIDARITY ON THIS CORE ISSUE
DISINTEGRATES.
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 ROME 04887 03 OF 03 080738Z
--------------
LANDMINES
--------------
16. (C) CEVESE ASKED IF ITALY COULD EXPECT ANY FORTHCOMING
CHANGE IN THE US POSITION ON THE OTTAWA CONVENTION. A/S
RADEMAKER SAID THAT WHILE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION WOULD NOT
REVERSE THE US POSITION, LANDMINE POLICY WAS UNDER REVIEW AND
ITALY WOULD PROBABLY LIKE THE CONCLUSIONS THAT SHOULD BE
RELEASED SOON.
--------------
ARAGONA MEETING
--------------
17. (C) DG FOR MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS ARAGONA TOLD A/S
RADEMAKER THAT THE US APPROACH TO THE BWC PROTOCOL CAUSES
ITALY CONCERN. NEVERTHELESS, AFTER LISTENING TO A/S
RADEMAKER'S REVIEW OF THE NEW US POSITION, HE DIRECTED CEVESE
TO MAKE AN EFFORT TO ARRIVE AT A COMMON POSITION. ARAGONA
ALLOWED THAT DESPITE THE LONG ODDS OF GETTING AN EVENTUAL
AGREEMENT WITH THE NAM, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE WG PRESENT A
UNITED FRONT SO THE ONUS OF FAILURE WILL NOT FALL ON ITS
SHOULDERS. NEVERTHELESS, HE WAS UNEASY ABOUT THE US NOTION
THAT A COMMON POSITION MUST BE CAST IN STONE BECAUSE THIS
WILL MAKE CONDUCTING NEGOTIATIONS DIFFICULT. ARAGONA
REASSURED A/S RADEMAKER THAT ITALY'S CURRENT DIFFERENCES WITH
THE US OVER THE BWC WILL NOT AFFECT BILATERAL RELATIONS.
INDEED, ITALY WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO SAFEGUARD AND
STRENGTHEN THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP.
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 ROME 04887 03 OF 03 080738Z
18. (U) THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN CLEARED BY A/S RADEMAKER.
SEMBLER
CONFIDENTIAL
>
2002ROME04887 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
SIPDIS
FOR A/S RADEMAKER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2012
TAGS: PARM PREL PREL PREL ITALY'>IT CBW ITPARM CBW ITPARM CBW
SUBJECT: A/S RADEMAKER'S ITALY CONSULTATIONS
REF: A. SECSTATE 179633
B. SECSTATE 183733
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 ROME 04887 01 OF 03 080737Z
CLASSIFIED BY: A/S FOR ARMS CONTROL STEPHEN RADEMAKER FOR REASONS 1.5 (
B) AND (D)
--------------
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (C) ITALIAN MFA ARMS CONTROL EXPERTS, MEETING WITH A/S
RADEMAKER ON SEPTEMBER 25, WELCOMED THE NEW US POSITION ON
THE 5TH BWC REVCON. AFTER RECEIVING CLARIFICATION OF THE
PHILOSOPHY UNDERLYING THE US APPROACH TO THE BWC, AND
NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR SKEPTICISM THAT THE NAM WOULD ACCEPT AN
AGREED WESTERN GROUP POSITION, ITALY PROMISED TO WORK TOWARD
ONE IN NEW YORK. US UNWILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE DID NOT SIT
WELL, HOWEVER, AND ITALY REMAINS SKEPTICAL THAT THE BWC CAN
BE STRENGTHENED WITHOUT SOME SORT OF VERIFICATION REGIME.
THE MFA'S LEAD ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATOR TOLD A/S RADEMAKER
THAT A 10 MINUTE MEETING AT THE NOVEMBER 11 REVCON WOULD BE
DISASTROUS FROM A PUBLIC RELATIONS PERSPECTIVE. MFA
POLITICAL DIRECTOR ARAGONA SAID THE WG SHOULD WORK TOWARD A
COMMON POSITION IF FOR NO OTHER REASON THAN TO INSURE THAT
THE ONUS OF FAILURE AT THE REVCON WOULD NOT FALL ON IT. HE
ASSURED THE A/S THAT ITALY'S BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE US
WOULD IN NO WAY BE DAMAGED BY DIFFERENCES OVER THE BWC.
2. (C) ON CTBT, ITALY WILL CONTINUE ITS PUSH FOR
UNIVERSALIZATION AND BELIEVES THAT US NON-RATIFICATION GIVES
PAKISTAN AND INDIA AN EXCELLENT EXCUSE FOR NOT JOINING THE
NPT. ITALY IS COMMITTED TO REINVIGORATING THE OPCW AND WANTS
THE 2003 CWC REVCON TO FOCUS EXCLUSIVELY ON EVALUATING ITS
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 ROME 04887 01 OF 03 080737Z
WORK RATHER THAN OPENING UP A REVIEW OF THE CONVENTION.
ESPECIALLY AFTER THE NATO-RUSSIA SUMMIT, ITALY BELIEVES THE
ALLIES SHOULD BE MORE SENSITIVE TO RUSSIA'S VIEWS ON CFE.
THE RUSSIANS WILL NOT MOVE UNTIL THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT THE
POLITICAL WILL TO RATIFY THE ADAPTED TREATY EXISTS, ONE
ITALIAN OFFICIAL ARGUED. END SUMMARY.
--------------
PARTICIPANTS
--------------
3. (C) ON SEPTEMBER 25, A/S RADEMAKER MET WITH MINISTER
CARLO TREZZA, MFA COORDINATOR FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND
DISARMAMENT. TREZZA WAS ACCOMPANIED BY MINISTER ALESSANDRO
CEVESE, DIRECTOR OF THE MFA ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
OFFICE, AND COUNSELOR PAOLO CUCULI, A MEMBER OF CEVESE'S
STAFF. POL-MIL COUNSELOR ROBBINS AND POLOFF (NOTETAKER) ALSO
PARTICIPATED. FOLLOWING THE CONSULTATIONS, A/S RADEMAKER MET
BRIEFLY WITH MFA DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS
(ALSO POLITICAL DIRECTOR),GIANCARLO ARAGONA.
--------------
BWC 5TH REVCON - GRASPING OPPORTUNITY
--------------
4. (C) A/S RADEMAKER BEGAN THE DISCUSSION BY CONVEYING REF
(B) POINTS. IN DOING SO, HE STRESSED THAT THE US IS NOT OPEN
TO NEGOTIATION, BUT WILL CONSIDER PROPOSALS IN THE HOPE THAT
A COMMON WESTERN GROUP POSITION CAN BE AGREED. IN THAT VEIN,
THE A/S LEFT NO ROOM FOR DOUBT THAT THE US EXPECTED WG
MEMBERS TO STAND BY AN AGREED POSITION THROUGHOUT THE REVIEW
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 ROME 04887 01 OF 03 080737Z
PROCESS. HE REFERRED HIS INTERLOCUTORS TO THE NINE ELEMENTS
OF THE 2001 US PAPER FOR IDEAS ON WHAT IS ACCEPTABLE.
NEVERTHELESS, THE US RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CALL FOR A SHORT
MEETING ON NOVEMBER 11 IF THIS NEW WAY FORWARD SPUTTERS OR
OTHERWISE RUNS UP AGAINST US REDLINES.
5. (C) TREZZA EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE GESTURE, BUT
SAID HE WANTED TO BETTER UNDERSTAND THE PHILOSOPHY UNDERLYING
THE US APPROACH TO THE BWC BEFORE MOVING INTO SPECIFICS.
VERIFICATION, TREZZA SUGGESTED, HAS ALWAYS BEEN AN ESSENTIAL
ELEMENT OF ARMS CONTROL TREATIES. INDEED, ITALY HAS ALWAYS
INSISTED ON IT. RESPONDING TO TREZZA'S CONCERN THAT "US
SKEPTICISM TOWARD THE VALUE OF INSPECTIONS AND VERIFICATION
APPEARS TO BE GROWING," A/S RADEMAKER RESPONDED THAT THE US
COMMITMENT TO A ROBUST OPCW AND IAEA ENFORCEMENT ROLE SHOULD
BE SUFFICIENT TO DISPROVE THAT IDEA.
6. (C) SATISFIED THAT VERIFICATION IS STILL A CORE CONCEPT
IN THE US APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL, TREZZA ASKED WHY THE BWC
STANDS OUT AS AN EXCEPTION. A/S RADEMAKER EXPLAINED THAT
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS ARE UNIQUE; BIO-DEFENSE WORK--ALLOWED
UNDER THE BWC--IS INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM PROHIBITED OFFENSIVE
WORK. THE LAWFULNESS OF SUCH ACTIVITY TURNS ON INTENT, WHICH
IS NOT READILY SUSCEPTIBLE TO VERIFICATION. MOREOVER, THE
BIOTECH SECTOR IN THE UNITED STATES HAS A POWERFUL INTEREST
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4105
PAGE 01 ROME 04887 02 OF 03 080738Z
ACTION AC-01
INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AID-00 AMAD-00 CIAE-00 COME-00 INL-00
DOEE-00 PERC-00 SRPP-00 DS-00 EUR-00 VC-00 H-01
TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 L-00 VCE-00 M-00 NRRC-00
NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OES-01 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-00 PM-00
PRS-00 ACE-00 P-00 SCT-00 SP-00 IRM-00 SS-00
TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00 SSD-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-00
DRL-02 G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 /008W
-------------- F33A8D 080738Z /38
P 080701Z OCT 02
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6209
INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 ROME 004887
SIPDIS
FOR A/S RADEMAKER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2012
TAGS: PARM PREL PREL PREL IT CBW ITPARM CBW ITPARM CBW
SUBJECT: A/S RADEMAKER'S ITALY CONSULTATIONS
IN PROTECTING AGAINST INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE. CEVESE ALLOWED
THAT THIS LATTER CONCERN HAD ALSO BEEN RAISED BY ITALIAN
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 ROME 04887 02 OF 03 080738Z
INDUSTRY.
7. (C) TREZZA AVERRED THAT ALL MAJOR MULTILATERAL ARMS
CONTROL TREATIES TO DATE HAVE BEEN BASED ON DEALS. CAN WE
AVOID COMPROMISING OVER THE BWC, HE ASKED? EXACTLY, A/S
RADEMAKER RESPONDED, WE PROBABLY COULD NOT; THIS IS WHY THE
US IS OPPOSED TO THE PROTOCOL. ADVANCED INDUSTRIALIZED
NATIONS WOULD HAVE TO GIVE SOMETHING TO THE NAM IN EXCHANGE
FOR AN UNVERIFIABLE PROTOCOL -- A VERY BAD BARGAIN INDEED.
8. (C) MOVING PAST THEOLOGY, TREZZA FIRST DISMISSED THE
NOTION OF HOLDING A "10 MINUTE SESSION" AS LACKING IN
CREDIBILITY. WE WILL BE SUBJECT TO CRITICISM FROM THE PRESS
AND FROM PUBLIC OPINION IF WE GO DOWN THAT ROAD, HE ARGUED,
ADDING THAT THE WESTERN GROUP WOULD APPEAR TO BE ON THE
DEFENSIVE IF IT SHOWS UP IN GENEVA UNPREPARED TO DISCUSS
SUBSTANCE. ITALY ALSO BELIEVES THAT "NAMING NAMES" IS
PROBLEMATIC. IT IS NOT OPPOSED TO BEING EXPLICIT IF CALLING
COUNTRIES ON THE CARPET CAN BE DONE THROUGH AN AGREED
INSTRUMENT, BUT DOES NOT VIEW UNILATERAL STATEMENTS AS
CONSTRUCTIVE.
9. (C) IN TERMS OF ARRIVING AT A COMMON POSITION, WESTERN
STATES HAVE ALWAYS DEFENDED THE POSITION OF VERIFICATION,
ACCORDING TO TREZZA, WHO ADDED, "IT WILL BE RATHER
EMBARRASSING TO REVERSE THIS POSITION SIMPLY BECAUSE THE US
DOES NOT AGREE." CEVESE WAS FLUMMOXED BY THE US "TAKE IT OR
LEAVE IT" APPROACH AND WAS CLEARLY CONCERNED THAT THE US
DELEGATION IN NEW YORK FOR THE FIRST COMMITTEE SESSION CANNOT
NEGOTIATE. NEVERTHELESS, HE PROMISED THE A/S THAT ITALY
WOULD EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF ARRIVING AT A COMMON
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POSITION. CEVESE SAID THAT IF THE US COULD NOT BE MOVED TO
SHOW EVEN MORE FLEXIBILITY, IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL TO PROVE
THAT THE BWC IS IMPORTANT EVEN WITHOUT A VERIFICATION
MECHANISM. A REALISTIC FOLLOW UP PROCESS AT THE EXPERT LEVEL
IS NEEDED, HE ARGUED. CEVESE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE
USEFUL TO CREATE A MECHANISM WITHIN THE BWC TO FURTHER THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF NATIONAL LEGISLATION.
10. (C) CUCULI RAISED SEVERAL TECHNICAL ISSUES. ITALY
UNDERSTANDS THAT ROUTINE VISITS COULD ENDANGER INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS, BUT LIMITING INSPECTIONS TO SEVERE
VIOLATIONS MIGHT BE LESS HARMFUL. EXPOSING VIOLATORS IS THE
CRUX OF THE MATTER AND BWC ARTICLE 6 PROCEDURES HAVE NOT
WORKED. ITALY IS CONFIDENT THAT THE US, FRANCE, AND THE UK
WILL NOT PLAY THE VETO CARD IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, BUT
IS LESS SANGUINE ABOUT RUSSIA AND CHINA. IF WE REJECT A NEW
VERIFICATION REGIME DO WE REALLY WANT TO RELY ON NATIONAL
LEGISLATION? THE CASE OF CUBA, WHICH HAS TOUGH LEGISLATION
ON THE BOOKS, SHOULD BE INSTRUCTIVE, CUCULI ARGUED. ITALY
SUPPORTS THE PROTOCOL BECAUSE THE BWC DOES NOT PROVIDE ENOUGH
PROTECTION.
11. (C) THE US IS NOT PERSUADED THAT OTHER STATES SHARE OUR
SKEPTICISM ON INSPECTIONS, A/S RADEMAKER RESPONDED, WHICH IS
WHY THE US HAS LIMITED ITSELF TO ARTICLE V UNDER THE BWC.
THE US POSITION IS THAT THE BWC IS UNVERIFIABLE; TO TRY AND
MAKE IT SO IS TECHNICALLY IMPOSSIBLE.
--------------
CTBT - STILL PERPLEXED
--------------
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12. (C) CEVESE SAID ITALY BELIEVES THE CTBT WOULD BE AN
IMPORTANT DETERRENCE MECHANISM, ESPECIALLY BECAUSE IT IS
POSSIBLE TO DETECT WHETHER NUCLEAR TESTING IS BEING
CONDUCTED. ITALY STRONGLY SUPPORTS UNIVERSALIZING THE CTBT
AND IS "DEMARCHING EVERYONE" ON THE SUBJECT. CEVESE
INSINUATED THAT US NON-RATIFICATION IS AN IMPEDIMENT TO ARMS
CONTROL IN SOUTHWEST ASIA. WHY SHOULD INDIA AND PAKISTAN
RATIFY IF THEY KNOW FULL WELL THAT THE US HAS NO INTENTION OF
DOING SO? AT THE 2000 NPT REVCON ALL STATES PARTIES AGREED
THAT THE CTBT WAS A CRUCIAL COMPONENT OF A SUCCESSFUL NPT.
WITH A FUNCTIONING CTBT IT MIGHT EVEN BE POSSIBLE BRING INDIA
AND PAKISTAN INTO THE NPT, CEVESE ARGUED.
13. (C) IN RESPONSE, A/S RADEMAKER ASSURED CEVESE THAT THE
US SHARES ITALY'S CONCERNS ABOUT INDIA AND PAKISTAN, ALTHOUGH
IT DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT STRIPPING AWAY PRETEXTS WILL
CONVINCE EITHER COUNTRY TO JOIN THE NPT. THE US SUPPORTS A
FISSILE MATERIAL CUTOFF TREATY (FMCT) IN PART AS A MEANS OF
ADDRESSING THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM IN SOUTHWEST ASIA.
--------------
CWC -- FOCUS ON OPCW
--------------
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4106
PAGE 01 ROME 04887 03 OF 03 080738Z
ACTION AC-01
INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AID-00 AMAD-00 CIAE-00 COME-00 INL-00
DOEE-00 PERC-00 SRPP-00 DS-00 EUR-00 VC-00 H-01
TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 L-00 VCE-00 M-00 NRRC-00
NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OES-01 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-00 PM-00
PRS-00 ACE-00 P-00 SCT-00 SP-00 IRM-00 SS-00
TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00 SSD-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-00
DRL-02 G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 /008W
-------------- F33A92 080738Z /38
P 080701Z OCT 02
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6210
INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 ROME 004887
SIPDIS
FOR A/S RADEMAKER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2012
TAGS: PARM PREL PREL PREL IT CBW ITPARM CBW ITPARM CBW
SUBJECT: A/S RADEMAKER'S ITALY CONSULTATIONS
14. (C) ITALY IS COMMITTED TO TURNING AROUND OPCW, IN
PARTICULAR REESTABLISHING A ROBUST VERIFICATION SYSTEM. AT
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PAGE 02 ROME 04887 03 OF 03 080738Z
THE 2003 CWC REVCON NEXT YEAR THE FOCUS SHOULD BE ON
ASSESSING THE OPCW, NOT THE CONVENTION ITSELF. IT IS NOT
TIME TO MODIFY THE CWC, CEVESE ASSERTED. ITALY WANTS TO
AVOID GIVING THE NAM AN OPPORTUNITY TO OPEN DISCUSSION OF THE
CONVENTION AS SUCH, AND EXPECTS CHINA TO HONOR ITS
PRINCIPLES. CEVESE ALSO RAISED THE ISSUE OF THIRD COUNTRY
CHALLENGES, AND SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO MILITARY VESSELS IN
ITALIAN WATERS. HE ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE US
POSITION. A/S RADEMAKER AGREED TO CHECK ON SPECIFICS.
--------------
CFE -- WINKING AT RUSSIA
--------------
15. (C) ITALY EXPECTED THAT SOMETHING IMPORTANT WOULD HAVE
CHANGED IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE NATO-RUSSIA SUMMIT. WE
SHOULD TRY TO BE MORE POSITIVE AND TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION
RUSSIAN CONCERNS, CEVESE SUGGESTED. THE ARGUMENT THAT THE
ADAPTED TREATY CANNOT ENTER INTO FORCE UNTIL GEORGIA AND
MOLDOVA RATIFY IT IS FALLACIOUS, BECAUSE "ALL CONCERNED" KNOW
THAT PRESSURE FROM NATO MEMBERS WILL BRING THEM AROUND. WE
NEED TO DEMONSTRATE TO RUSSIA THAT THERE IS POLITICAL WILL
BEHIND RATIFICATION BEFORE MOSCOW WILL INITIATE ITS OWN
PROCESS, CEVESE SAID. ITALY, HOWEVER, REJECTS ANY LINKAGE
BETWEEN ENLARGEMENT AND RATIFICATION BY THE BALTIC STATES.
A/S RADEMAKER INFORMED CEVESE THAT THE US POSITION IS
STRAIGHTFORWARD: RUSSIA FIRST NEEDS TO IMPLEMENT FULLY ITS
ISTANBUL COMMITMENTS. HE URGED CEVESE TO CONSIDER THE
HARMFUL EFFECTS IF NATO SOLIDARITY ON THIS CORE ISSUE
DISINTEGRATES.
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PAGE 03 ROME 04887 03 OF 03 080738Z
--------------
LANDMINES
--------------
16. (C) CEVESE ASKED IF ITALY COULD EXPECT ANY FORTHCOMING
CHANGE IN THE US POSITION ON THE OTTAWA CONVENTION. A/S
RADEMAKER SAID THAT WHILE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION WOULD NOT
REVERSE THE US POSITION, LANDMINE POLICY WAS UNDER REVIEW AND
ITALY WOULD PROBABLY LIKE THE CONCLUSIONS THAT SHOULD BE
RELEASED SOON.
--------------
ARAGONA MEETING
--------------
17. (C) DG FOR MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS ARAGONA TOLD A/S
RADEMAKER THAT THE US APPROACH TO THE BWC PROTOCOL CAUSES
ITALY CONCERN. NEVERTHELESS, AFTER LISTENING TO A/S
RADEMAKER'S REVIEW OF THE NEW US POSITION, HE DIRECTED CEVESE
TO MAKE AN EFFORT TO ARRIVE AT A COMMON POSITION. ARAGONA
ALLOWED THAT DESPITE THE LONG ODDS OF GETTING AN EVENTUAL
AGREEMENT WITH THE NAM, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE WG PRESENT A
UNITED FRONT SO THE ONUS OF FAILURE WILL NOT FALL ON ITS
SHOULDERS. NEVERTHELESS, HE WAS UNEASY ABOUT THE US NOTION
THAT A COMMON POSITION MUST BE CAST IN STONE BECAUSE THIS
WILL MAKE CONDUCTING NEGOTIATIONS DIFFICULT. ARAGONA
REASSURED A/S RADEMAKER THAT ITALY'S CURRENT DIFFERENCES WITH
THE US OVER THE BWC WILL NOT AFFECT BILATERAL RELATIONS.
INDEED, ITALY WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO SAFEGUARD AND
STRENGTHEN THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP.
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PAGE 04 ROME 04887 03 OF 03 080738Z
18. (U) THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN CLEARED BY A/S RADEMAKER.
SEMBLER
CONFIDENTIAL
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2002ROME04887 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL