WAR AND PEACE IN KAREN STATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 001616 SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV CINCPAC FOR FPA E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2012 TAGS: PREL PHUM BM SUBJECT: WAR AND PEACE IN KAREN STATE Classified By: COM CARMEN M. MARTINEZ FOR REASON 1.5(D). ¶1. (U) Summary: In a recent visit to the small border town of Myawaddy in eastern Karen State, Poloff found some residual conflict between regime forces and Karen National Union (KNU) forces. Although the KNU appears to have been reduced to hit and run, guerilla-type attacks, the rugged mountain terrain has thwarted regime efforts to gain total control of the area. The border with Thailand in this area of Karen State appeared quite porous with Burmese workers and small shipments of goods moving back and forth to Thailand, mostly outside official channels. Aside from the township of Myawaddy, which is closely tied to the Thai economy, the areas in this part of Burma are suffering badly from the continued fighting and failed economic and social programs of the SPDC. While the local population complained bitterly about the regime there was little evidence of support for the KNU's continued raids, which disrupt commercial activities. The NLD was reorganizing in several towns we visited and its leaders said it has more support than ever due to the failed policies of the SPDC. End Summary. The Road Less Traveled..... ¶2. (U) Poloff traveled by car from Rangoon to the eastern Karen State border town of Myawaddy from November 19-21. This was the first time in recent years that the SPDC had allowed a foreigner other than International Committee for the Red Cross staff to travel to Myawaddy from Rangoon. (Ironically, foreigners can freely enter Myawaddy from the Thailand side of the border between the hours 6 a.m. and 6 p.m.) The drive took a bone rattling 13 hours over two days to cover just 290 miles. Thamanya Sayadaw ¶3. (U) The venerable Buddhist Abbot Thamanya Sayadaw is a vocal, if slightly eccentric, advocate of political change in Burma living near the town of Hpa'an. Besides seeing to the upgrading of local roads, the Sayadaw provides protection and support for a growing community of followers near his monastery. The Sayadaw's community appeared to be thriving; businesses were active, homes were wooden instead of thatch, and there were more cars, trucks, and motorcycles than in towns nearer to Bago, thanks to contributions from around Burma which the Sayadaw has funneled back into his community. We were told that while the SPDC does not approve of the Sayadaw's politics (Aung San Suu Kyi's first trip from Rangoon after her May 6 release was to see him) they grudgingly accept his community activities because he is so popular with the people. ¶4. (U) Given the fractious political situation in Burma and the lack of government funding for public projects, the Sayadaw appears to have carved out a small but healthy patch of civil society. In many ways, he is the epitome of a Buddhist saint -- a source of grace and charity for his people, who in turn accept his claims of semi-divine status. The people, in any case, work hard and share in the benefits of a functioning community. ¶6. (U) The abysmal condition of the rest of the roads from Bago to Hpa'an (at some points it was easier taking the ox cart path than to stay on the road) was indicative of the generally backward conditions in the area outside the Thamanya's safety net. While the economy is agrarian, it appears to be limited to small-scale subsistence farming. In one area there were remnants of what once must have been large rubber plantations. Now, families harvest the rubber independently, cure the sheets of rubber in front of their huts, and sell them for about fifty cents a piece. The only industries visible along the route were a palm oil plant, a sugar mill near Hpa'an and several rock quarries. Burma Army and DKBA Attempt to Control the Border ¶7. (U) Leaving Hpa'an on the road to Myawaddy, the frequency of Burma Army encampments and Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) patrols increased significantly. The DKBA, a group which rebelled from the largely Christian KNU and reached a cease-fire agreement with the SPDC in the late 1990's, has continued to attract young Karen Buddhists who are looking for action. There are an estimated 5,000 DKBA troops in Myawaddy alone and the organization reportedly controls most of the economic activity in the corridor from Thailand to Hpa'an. The DKBA's relative wealth was evident as they were typically seen in new Ford and Toyota double cab trucks carrying five to twelve DKBA "soldiers" in the back. The DKBA soldiers' morale was visibly higher than the Burma Army troops, who generally looked sullen and underfed, but it did not appear that discipline was high. Relations between DKBA and Burmese Army troops appeared good, though they did not mix forces or appear to socialize together. We followed one DKBA soldier on a motorcycle who was handing out money to Burmese soldiers posted along the road. He told Poloff that he was providing "tea money," amounting to about fifty cents, to each of soldiers "just to help them out." ¶8. (U) DKBA and Burma Army troops were in evidence from a checkpoint 30 miles west of the Thai border onward. As the road climbed through the jungle, two or three Burma Army soldiers were stationed every few hundred yards. There were signs warning of mines along the roadside and bridges were closely guarded and encircled with two sets of bamboo fences, presumably to deter KNU attacks on the bridges. The Burma Army had several outposts on the road, each with double layers of bamboo fencing that could be closed once traffic had passed. The army troops stationed on the mountain were dug-in and remained mostly out of sight. We were told by various sources that there were KNU attacks every week or two, mainly by snipers on army troops or ambushes of DKBA vehicles on the main road, in addition to skirmishes in the jungle. There were also reportedly villages in the area, even within Myawaddy township, that still supported the KNU in spite of the government's decade long effort to quash them. Myawaddy - Almost Heaven..... ¶9. (U) On the outskirts of Myawaddy a long line of buses and trucks queued on the road to process through a checkpoint. When Poloff arrived at the checkpoint, officials demanded to know why he was there and then attempted to search the vehicle. Once cooler heads prevailed the officials backed down, but it was clear that the intimidation level for normal travelers was quite high. On the return trip through this checkpoint the following morning, there were approximately fifty to sixty heavily laden trucks and buses waiting for inspection before their journey over the mountain range. ¶10. (U) Once in the town of Myawaddy, the heavy military presence of the mountain pass and checkpoints gave way to a thriving commercial center more closely linked to the economy in Thailand than in Burma. In fact, the residents and merchants used the Thai baht instead of the Burmese kyat in all transactions. Also, virtually everyone, even bicycle trishaw drivers, carried a Thai cellular telephone. Ironically, with landlines to Rangoon down or of such poor quality that calls were almost impossible, the cellular phones made it easier to call Singapore from Myawaddy than to call Rangoon (international rates to Burma are extremely high). ¶11. (U) There were also many more new vehicles in Myawaddy than in areas further inside Burma. Locals explained that the DKBA controls vehicle imports into Myawaddy but the vehicles cannot be registered with the Burmese government or taken past Myawaddy (although this appears to be loosely enforced, as we saw many DKBA in new trucks and motorcycles on the road to Hpa'an). The prices for these vehicles were one-tenth the price of similar vehicles in Rangoon where imports are tightly controlled by the SPDC. One source estimated that of the 1,000 vehicles in Myawaddy only 50 were registered with the Burmese government. These fifty, however, were said to be the only ones allowed to transit freely to Thailand. Thus, they generated a lot of income for their owners by transiting goods and people across the border. ¶12. (U) Although Burmese immigration officials prohibited Poloff and two accompanying local staff from crossing "the friendship bridge" into Thailand ("we cannot allow it without instructions from higher authorities"),other Burmese were allowed to cross for a fee of about fifty cents. Just under the bridge, right in front of a Burma Army bunkered machine gun nest, there was an active trade in illegal crossings by boys with inner tubes willing to paddle passengers across the shallow river for a few pennies. The border is quite porous in Karen State, with the Burma Army controlling the two "official" crossing points, Myawaddy and Three Pagodas Pass, while the DKBA controls five other "major" crossings. The KNU or others control many smaller crossings. Thus, we were told, when the Burmese government closed the border earlier this year, it diminished the flow of people and goods at official crossings but most of the traffic just shifted to other crossing points. ¶13. (U) Poloff attempted to visit the SPDC reception center for the repatriation of Burmese migrants from Thailand but was blocked from the facility first by an armed soldier, then by a military intelligence (MI) officer. The only information the MI officer was willing to share about the facility was that it continued to process repatriations even while the border was closed and that most returning migrants spend only one night at the center before being transferred to Hpa'an for additional processing. NLD On the Rise ¶14. (C) Poloff met with NLD leaders in Hpa'an, Kawkareik, and Myawaddy, all of whom were rebuilding their party organizations and believed that the NLD enjoyed more popular support now than in 1990. They all said that while most people are still afraid to openly support the NLD, frustration with SPDC policies and the economy is very high and the people want change. In Hpa'an and Myawaddy, the leaders said that MI was aware of their reorganization activities and was not blocking them (although harassment of their families and business activities continued.) ¶15. (C) In Kawkareik, the NLD leader said that he did not think MI was aware of his reorganization activities but that they would be now that we had visited (MI was closely monitoring the entire trip). He said that this was fine, he wanted to tell MI the truth and he did not fear their reaction. In 1998, he had closed the NLD office under pressure from MI because "we thought they were going to kill us." Recently, he said he senses that MI, at least in his town, no longer wants the conflict and is doing the minimum to follow up on orders from Rangoon. Poloff asked that he try to get word to NLD headquarters if he was wrong and there was any retribution based on Poloff's visit (the same message was conveyed to each NLD leader visited). Thus far we have received no reports of problems. ¶16. (C) Asked if the local population supported the KNU in its fight against the SPDC, the NLD leaders opined that while the people despise the regime, they also are tired of the fighting that disrupts their lives. They said only a small percentage of the population still actively supports the KNU while the majority want peaceful change through NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi. Asked if the DKBA would support the NLD if it there were free elections, the NLD leaders said it might. They noted that DKBA support for the SPDC is based only on the economic concessions it receives; otherwise it too condemns SPDC policies. The NLD leaders felt that if the DKBA had a choice it would join hands with the NLD. Martinez