C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000673

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2012
TAGS: PGOV PREL RW
SUBJECT: THE KABILA GOVERNMENT: THESE ARE TOUGH TIMES

CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR AUBREY HOOKS FOR REASONS 1/5 B/D.


SUMMARY
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1. (C) THE GOVERNMENT OF JOSEPH KABILA FEELS MUCH PUT UPON
THESE DAYS AND FRUSTRATED THAT IT HAS FEW OPTIONS TO EXERCISE
IN TERMS OF SHAPING THE WORLD AROUND IT. IT IS FEELING THE
PRESSURE OF OTHER ELEMENTS IN THE INTER-CONGOLESE DIALOG
(ICD) FOR WHICH IT WAS ILL PREPARED, IT HAS BEEN HUMILIATED
IN MOLIRO, ITS ALLIES ARE GIVING TEPID SUPPORT AS THEY PURSUE
THEIR OWN INTERESTS, AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY REMAINS
RESERVED. KABILA VALUES USG APPROVAL AND ENCOURAGEMENT, AND
THAT GIVES US SOME LIMITED LEVERAGE TO INFLUENCE HIM TO
CONTINUE REFORMS TO TO GRAPPLE WITH TOUGH DECISIONS HE NEEDS
TO MAKE. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) THE FRACTURED OPPOSITION -- ARMED REBEL GROUPS,
POLITICAL PARTIES, AND CIVIL SOCIETY -- ARE UNITED ON ONE
BASIC POINT: THEY WANT A SLICE OF THE PIE IN KINSHASA. THE
ARMED GROUPS CONTROL AROUND FIFTY PERCENT OF THE COUNTRY, BUT
THEY DO NOT CONTROL KINSHASA AND THEY DO NOT HAVE THE THIN
VENEER OF LEGITIMACY THAT THE INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION
ACCORDS TO KABILA. THE POLITICAL PARTIES AND CIVIC GROUPS
ARE HUNGRY AND JUST WANT IN.


3. (C) UNFORTUNATELY, THE KABILA GOVERNMENT HAS ILL
PREPARED ITSELF FOR THE ICD IN SUN CITY. THE GOVERNMENT, TO
ITS CREDIT, DID MAKE SOME OVERTURES TO JEAN-PIERRE BEMBA OF
THE MLC. THE FACT THAT THESE OVERTURES HAVE NOT BORNE MUCH
FRUIT IS AS MUCH DUE TO THE UNBRIDLED AMBITIONS OF BEMBA AS
IT IS TO THE HALF-HEARTED NATURE OF KABILA'S EFFORTS.
ONUSUMBA OF THE RCD, VERY MUCH UNDER RWANDA'S THUMB, IS
BASICALLY BEYOND THE PALE AND WOULD ONLY BE COURTED AS AN
ALLY BY KABILA AS A VERY LAST RESORT. HOWEVER, THE
GOVERNMENT MADE ONLY SPORADIC EFFORTS TO REACH OUT TO CIVIL
SOCIETY AND POLITICAL PARTIES. THE GOVERNMENT DID MANAGE TO
PERSUADE MASIRE TO ENLARGE THE POLITICAL PARTY CONTINGENT TO
INCLUDE SOME POLITICAL FIGURES COOPTED BY THE GOVERNMENT, BUT
ONLY AT THE COST OF ANTAGONIZING WHAT PASSES AS THE POLITICAL
CLASS IN KINSHASA.


4. (C) THE KABILA GOVERNMENT IS HAVING TROUBLE COMING TO
GRIPS WITH THE IDEA OF SHARING POWER. CERTAINLY, LAURENT
KABILA NEVER CAME TO GRIPS WITH THAT CONCEPT. JOSEPH HAS
COME TO THAT CONCLUSION ONLY RELUCTANTLY AND AT GREAT
RESISTANCE WITHIN HIS OWN CAMP, BUT SEEMS TO HAVE GIVEN
LITTLE THOUGHT

AS TO HOW TO APPROACH THE NEGOTIATIONS OTHER
THAN TRYING TO PUT HIS OWN POSITION AS PRESIDENT OFF LIMITS.
CONVERSATIONS WITH KABILA AND FOREIGN MINISTER OKITUNDU (THE
HEAD OF THE GOVERNMENT DELEGATION IN SUN CITY) INDICATE THAT
THE GOVERNMENT CAME UP WITH HARD-LINE OPENING POSITIONS AND,
DEPENDING ON THE REACTIONS, WILL THEN ADJUST THOSE POSITIONS.
IT HAS GIVEN LITTLE THOUGHT TO FALLBACK POSITIONS, LET ALONE
DEVELOPING AN ACTIVE STRATEGY TO GUIDE THE INEVITABLE
COMPROMISES THAT MUST EMERGE AT THE ICD.


5. (C) THE GOVERNMENT MADE TACTICAL ERRORS IN WALKING OUT
OF THE ICD BOTH IN ADDIS ABABA AND IN SUN CITY. KABILA AND
OKITUNDU ARE AWARE THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IS
QUESTIONING THE GOVERNNENT'S COMMITMENT TO THE DIALOG.


MOLIRO HUMILIATION


6. (C) THE FALL OF MOLIRO, A SMALL BUT STRATEGIC PORT ON
LAKE TANGANYIKA, ON MARCH 16 TO RCD FORCES HAS BEEN A PAINFUL
HUMILIATION TO THE GOVERNMENT. BUT EVEN IN THE CASE OF
MOLIRO, THE GOVERNMENT GARNERS LITTLE SYMPATHY AS THE WRONGED
PARTY. THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT DECLARE MOLIRO AS A NEW
DEFENSIVE POSITION IN THE HARARE SUB-ACCORDS AND THUS WAS IN
VIOLATION OF THE LUSAKA ACCORDS. FURTHERMORE, THE GOVERNMENT
HAD BEEN GUILTY OF USING MOLIRO AS A BASE FOR SUPPLYING
MAI-MAI AND HUTU MILITIAMEN AND FOR HARRASSING RCD AND
RWANDAN FORCES NORTH ALONG THE LAKE SHORE, SOMETHING WHICH
THE GOVERNMENT CONSISTENTLY DENIED.


NO MILITARY OPTION


7. (C) THE HUMILIATION DOES NOT STOP WITH THE FALL OF
MOLIRO. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ARE FOND OF REPEATING THAT
GOVERNMENT FORCES WERE NOT DEFEATED ON THE BATTLE FIELD,
ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE MANAGED TO LOSE FIFTY PERCENT OF THE
COUNTY. THAT IS DUE IN PART TO THE FACT THAT THE CONGOLESE
ARMED FORCES (FAC) IS BY AND LARGE A RAGTAG ARMY MORE GIVEN
TO FLIGHT THAN TO FIGHT. ALLIES ZIMBABWE AND ANGOLA SEEM
LITTLE INCLINED TO GET MORE DEEPLY INVOLVED IN CONGO EXCEPT
TO PROTECT THEIR OWN INTERESTS. THE GOVERNMENT REALIZES THAT
TODAY IT HAS LITTLE TO NO MILITARY OPTION TO EXERCISE, SHOULD
POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS FAIL.


UNDER APPRECIATED


8. (C) JOSEPH KABILA IS PUZZLED THAT HIS EFFORTS ARE NOT
FULLY APPRECIATED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. HIS
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS HAVE BEEN MET WITH MILD
ENCOURAGEMENT, BUT HE HAS NOT BEEN EMBRACED BY THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN THE SENSE OF DIRECT ASSISTANCE TO
THE GOVERNMENT. THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK ARE THE MOST
RESPONSIVE, BUT EVEN THERE HE IS HAVING GREAT DIFFICULTY
MEETING THEIR MINIMAL STANDARDS THAT WILL LEAD TO ASSISTANCE
IN THE SHORT TERM. KABILA'S EFFORTS AT DDRRR HAVE EARNED HIM
AS MUCH CRITICISM AS THEY HAVE CREDIT. NO DOUBT IT TOOK
GREAT EFFORT ON HIS PART TO OVERCOME THE OBJECTIONS OF
MINISTER OF PUBLIC SECURITY KONGOLO AND OTHERS IN CANTONING
1,800 (AND NOT THE 3,000 HE FIRST ANNOUNCED) IN KAMINA, BUT
THE DELAYING TACTICS OF HIS GOVERNMENT AND THE FLIRTING WITH
THE RWANDAN OPPOSITION GROUP FDLR PRECLUDED A POSITIVE
REACTION FROM RWANDA. EVEN HIS PROPOSAL TO THE UN SECURITY
COUNCIL TO FORM A COMMISSION TO MOVE DDRRR FORWARD AROUSED
LITTLE INTEREST.


POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE USG


9. (C) THE KABILA GOVERNMENT APPEARS BUFFETED BY EVENTS
WITH NO COHERENT STRATEGIC VISION OF HOW TO SHAPE THE
POLITICAL TRANSITION IN CONGO. KABILA NEEDS AND WANTS USG
APPROVAL AND ENCOURAGEMENT, ALTHOUGH HE WOULD PREFER THAT
BOTH TAKE ON MORE CONCRETE FORM IN TERMS OF ASSISTANCE AND
COOPERATION. WE THEREFORE HAVE SOME (ALBEIT LIMITED)
LEVERAGE TO INFLUENCE HIM TO CONTINUE REFORMS AND TO GRAPPLE
WITH AT LEAST SOME OF THE TOUGH DECISIONS FACING HIM, HELPING
HIM TO UNDERSTAND THAT, WHILE THE ICD MAY NOT BE A VERY
COMFORTABLE FIT, LIKE CINDERELLA, HE HAS TO SQUEEZE HIS FOOT
INTO THE DIALOG SHOE IF HE IS GOING TO GET CONGO BACK ON
TRACK.

HOOKS