KOIRALA COMEBACK? IMPLICATIONS OF (YET ANOTHER)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000710 SIPDIS STATE FOR SA/INS NEW DELHI PLEASE PASS A/S ROCCA E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2012 TAGS: PGOV PTER NP GON SUBJECT: KOIRALA COMEBACK? IMPLICATIONS OF (YET ANOTHER) CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT REF: A. (A) KATHMANDU 0707 (NOTAL) ¶B. (B) KATHMANDU 0672 ¶C. (C) STATE 67794 ¶D. (D) 01 KATHMANDU 1603 Classified By: AMB. MICHAEL E. MALINOWSKI ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Refs A and B reported apparent efforts by former Prime Minister and Nepali Congress Party President Girija Prasad Koirala to oust current Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba and regain the post of prime minister--which he has held five times in Nepal's twelve years of democracy--yet again. This message contains additional information on the Koirala campaign and our assessment of what another Koirala administration could mean for domestic political stability. End summary. -------------- SIEGE MENTALITY -------------- ¶2. (C) Supporters of former Prime Minister and Nepali Congress (NC) Party President Girija Prasad Koirala, who is stepping up his campaign to replace current Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba (Refs A and B),are indicating that the five-time former PM may be planning a move to oust his rival in the near future. In an April 9 meeting with poloffs, Sujata Koirala, G.P.'s only child, hinted that a decision would be made after her father and she return from an April 14-18 visit to India, where he expects to meet with (unnamed) Indian officials. (Note: The Indian Ambassador to Nepal confirmed the visit and told the British Ambassador the Indian Government will tell Koirala to stand down.) While emphasizing that the decision on who leads Nepal is for Nepalis to decide, poloffs hinted back to Sujata Koirala that a change of government at the present could only further erode Nepal's stability and undermine the GON's ability to address the insurgency and other pressing national issues. ¶3. (C) Sujata, a philanthropist and aspiring politician who earned a reputation for corruption during her father's previous administration, charged that the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) and the King are in league against her father, and are propping up Deuba because he is more easily manipulated than her father would be by "anti-democratic" forces. She predicted the NC Central Committee will soon expel Communications Minister Jaya Prakash Gupta for publicly supporting Army Chief Rana's controversial remarks about past Nepali Congress leaders (Ref B). She accused the RNA of harassing and even killing Koirala supporters in the field. Deuba, on the other hand, has completely cut off dialogue with the Koirala faction in his party. When a NC MP from Kalikot turned to Deuba to ask for assistance for his beleaguered, Maoist-affected district, she said Deuba peremptorily "threw him out" of his office because of his affiliation to the Koirala camp. To add to their woes, Koirala supporters are also being targeted by Maoists, she claimed, alleging the insurgents specifically ask Nepali Congress cadres if they are Koirala men or Deuba men. If they respond with the former, they are attacked. (Note: This we strongly doubt and have not heard elsewhere. End note.) Her father is not interested in regaining the prime minister's chair, she asserted, but what can he do when democracy is so threatened and district party leaders and MPs are "crying" for him to return to power? When poloff asked about her father's relationship with the RNA and Palace during his last administration, she brushed off the question. -------------- LIKELY PALACE, RNA REACTIONS -------------- ¶4. (S) Koirala has been chipping away at Deuba's support within his own faction-riven party since his term began in July; it appears that by now Koirala might well have won over enough MPs to win a vote of no confidence. Opposition party leaders are unlikely to protest or interrupt their rivals' self-destructiveness, discerning as always, in the NC's recurrent internal crises, potential opportunity to take the prime ministership back from the Nepali Congress. The general public, long inured to the self-absorbed infighting of their political leaders and frequent flip-flops in government, can probably be counted on to accept Koirala's re-emergence with relative indifference. Maoist reaction to another Koirala administration is difficult to determine; it seems unlikely, however, to produce an environment any more conducive to dialogue than in his previous tenures. The Maoists almost surely welcome continual infighting within the NC Party and among the various parties in Parliament. We and other donors have been quietly letting the Koirala camp know that we regard a change in government at this crucial juncture as ill advised (Ref A). ¶5. (S) The other two figures in the national equation, however--the Palace and the RNA--do not favor a Koirala comeback. Koirala enjoyed particularly stormy relations with the RNA during his last term in office, and he has made no secret since of his displeasure with the military. Chief of SIPDIS Army Staff Rana's public comments criticizing the past 12 years of political leadership (Ref B) made pointed implicit references to Koirala, who served as Prime Minister for more than half of that time. Koirala, on the other hand, regards the RNA's refusal to engage the Maoists in Rolpa last July (Ref D)--and King Gyanendra's reported refusal to support his request that the RNA do so--as evidence of a Palace-Army conspiracy against him. ¶6. (S) The RNA, understandably, views the fiasco at Rolpa differently and blames Koirala for having forced the military into a no-win situation without the legal and Constitutional cover of emergency powers. Our military contacts have made it clear that they do not trust Koirala and would not like to see him back in power again. While always taking care to emphasize to us their respect for the Constitution and democracy, our military interlocutors have also frequently expressed frustration at what they view as the civilian leadership's mismanagement of the crisis. Should Koirala re-insert himself as Prime Minister, we don't anticipate a coup, but the mutual mistrust between the former PM and the military would surely complicate--and could undermine--RNA efforts to counter the insurgency under the state of emergency. The Maoists, of course, would welcome this development. ¶7. (S) In private conversations with the Ambassador, King Gyanendra has made the same points--respect for democracy but impatience with its inept leadership--as Rana. But the King, who has generally maintained a public posture of aloofness from domestic politics, is letting it be known behind the scenes that he is comfortable with Deuba but would not welcome G.P.'s return. Many observers view Army Chief Rana's public remarks criticizing years of Koirala's leadership (Ref B)--which must surely have been vetted by the Palace beforehand--as a not-so-veiled royal admonition to the former PM. The King is obviously trying to head off what he sees as a potential crisis before it happens. Koirala understands the message--his supporters allude freely to his strained relations with the Palace. ¶8. (S) We remain hopeful that Koirala will have the good sense not to pursue his agenda at this time in the face of obvious opposition from both the military and the Palace. Advice from the one potential ally he apparently thinks he has left--India--could prove critical in persuading him to desist. But whether or not Koirala decides to follow through, his constant conniving distracts Deuba and his embattled Cabinet from devoting their full attention to the other threat at hand--the Maoists. MALINOWSKI