Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
02KATHMANDU1890
2002-09-27 12:37:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

NEPALI ARMY'S EVOLVING APPROACH TO HUMAN RIGHTS

Tags:  PHUM MCAP PTER NP 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KATHMANDU 001890 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS
LONDON FOR POL - RIEDEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2012
TAGS: PHUM MCAP PTER NP
SUBJECT: NEPALI ARMY'S EVOLVING APPROACH TO HUMAN RIGHTS

REF: A. (A) KATHMANDU 1372


B. (B) KATHMANDU 1118

C. (C) KATHMANDU 1191

D. (D) KATHMANDU 1465

Classified By: POL PMAHONEY. REASON: 1.5 (B,D).

-------
SUMMARY
--------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KATHMANDU 001890

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS
LONDON FOR POL - RIEDEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2012
TAGS: PHUM MCAP PTER NEPAL'>NP
SUBJECT: NEPALI ARMY'S EVOLVING APPROACH TO HUMAN RIGHTS

REF: A. (A) KATHMANDU 1372


B. (B) KATHMANDU 1118

C. (C) KATHMANDU 1191

D. (D) KATHMANDU 1465

Classified By: POL PMAHONEY. REASON: 1.5 (B,D).

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In the ten months it has been mobilized against
Maoist insurgents, the Royal NEPAL Army (RNA) has had to
change from a ceremonial, parade-ground army, occasionally
deployed in UN Peacekeeping Operations, to a combat-ready
fighting force, expected to counter and overcome an enemy who
uses guerrilla tactics and outright terrorism to advance its
aims. Among the many tools RNA troops and their leadership
lacked when called into action were adequate human rights
training and mechanisms to investigate allegations of
violations. The RNA leadership initially appeared reluctant
to address such allegations, but has since developed a unit
within the office of its Judge Advocate General to review
complaints. The quality and adequacy of these investigations
are yet to be proven. In the meantime, the Embassy is
providing training to help improve soldiers' awareness of
human rights in the field and best practices in conducting
investigations of violations. The Embassy believes remaining
engaged with the RNA through a sustained dialogue on human
rights is the best way to ensure that respect for human
rights in institutionalized during the Army's difficult
transition from a parade-ground army to a capable fighting
force. End summary.

--------------
FROM THE PARADE GROUND TO THE TRENCHES
--------------


2. (SBU) During the first five years of NEPAL's six-year-old
Maoist insurgency, the Royal NEPAL Army (RNA),under the
technical command of the country's constitutional monarch,
remained in its barracks, emerging only to take part in
ceremonial Palace functions or to participate in sought-after
UN Peacekeeping missions. The brunt of the Maoists'
anti-government wrath at that time was largely borne by the
civilian police, more than 500 of whom were killed by the
insurgents in the first five years of the conflict. During
those years, individual police were guilty of a number of
human rights violations against rural populations in

conflict-affected areas, the most sensational being the
infamous Kilo Sera To operation in 1998, in which numerous
suspects were killed, tortured and arrested.


3. (SBU) The RNA's role changed virtually overnight November
23 when Maoists, who had unilaterally broken a four-month
ceasefire just a day before, attacked an army barracks,
killing 11 soldiers and their commanding officer. By
November 26, King Gyanendra, the RNA's Supreme Commander, had
declared a state of emergency which suspended nearly all
civil rights guaranteed by the Constitution and mobilized the
RNA against the insurgents. Since then, more than 200 RNA
soldiers have died in the conflict.


4. (SBU) Most NEPALis, weary of the insurgency, welcomed
the deployment of the RNA, which was widely perceived as more
professional, better disciplined, and better equipped than
the police. The Army's close association with the
Palace--which had previously also remained largely aloof from
the conflict--helped foster that perception. Sanguine
predictions from the beleaguered population that the Army
would finish off the insurgents within a few months were
common.


5. (C) But in many ways the RNA was, at the time,
particularly ill suited to counter a guerrilla insurgency.
Despite the ongoing conflict--and the obvious possibility
that the RNA might one day be mobilized--the military budget
had been slashed over successive years. Their weapons,
uniforms, and boots may have looked nice on a parade ground
but proved unable to withstand battle conditions in difficult
terrain. The RNA leadership, most of whom are members of the
elite Chhetri caste of the King, had spent most of their
relatively comfortable careers to date insulated from public
criticism of their performance. Becoming suddenly
accountable to a civilian government and a public with
inflated expectations was not a comfortable transition.
Their officers--generally also from the higher castes--tended
to be aloof from lower-caste speaking ethnic minorities who
predominate in Maoist-affected areas, making it difficult for
them to gain popular support or to exploit local intelligence
assets.

--------------
MAOISTS WAGE DIRTY WAR
--------------


6. (SBU) Since the RNA's deployment, the operational tempo
on both sides has increased dramatically. Of the 5,353
NEPALis who have been killed in the insurgency since it began
in February 1996, more than half (3,055) have died since the
beginning of 2002 alone. The Maoists have recently stepped
up their campaign of terror against innocent civilians, most
likely in an effort to discourage participation in national
elections in November. In the first two weeks of September,
the insurgents killed more civilians than they had in any
single month of 2002. Nor have the Maoists relented in their
attacks against the security forces, killing more than 100
policemen and soldiers in two separate, mass attacks
September 7 and 8.


7. (U) The Maoists' use of brutal tactics against their
targets, many of whom are civilian, is undeniable. They have
murdered teachers, local political workers, and simple
farmers by decapitation, slashing them with knives, and
beating them to death, sometimes torturing their victims
before killing them. They have dragooned countless unwilling
villagers into their ranks, using many, including children,
as human shields. They bomb residential, commercial and
government edifices without prior warning, and have made a
practice of destroying rural infrastructure--bridges, roads,
micro-hydroelectric schemes, drinking water projects, schools
and health posts--leaving thousands without electricity,
water, or access to the outside world. They launch human
wave attacks to overrun fixed positions, and have summarily
executed those who are wounded or surrender to them. They
wreak revenge on police and soldiers by assassinating members
of their family.

-------------- --
ACCOUNTABILITY DIFFICULT UNDER STATE OF EMERGENCY
-------------- --------------


8. (C) The high operational tempo; the lack of appropriate
equipment, adequate manpower, and sufficient training; the
pressures of having to negotiate remote, often inaccessible
terrain; the difficulty of distinguishing friend from foe in
a domestic insurgency; the ineffectiveness of civilian
government in conflict-affected areas; the brutality of
Maoist tactics--all of these factors undoubtedly complicate
the RNA's mission. The state of emergency, which remained in
near-continuous operation from November 26-August 28, was
intended to help mitigate the difficult circumstances under
which the RNA found itself required to operate. (Note: Some
critics contend the RNA leadership made deployment
conditional upon the declaration of a state of emergency. We
have no proof that the RNA made such a demand, but have heard
its leadership assert that the state of emergency makes their
job easier. End note.)


9. (C) The state of emergency, which was initially ratified
by the now-defunct Parliament in February, suspended all
constitutionally guaranteed civil rights except the right to
habeas corpus. Most important, the emergency granted the
police, paramilitary Armed Police Force, and Army broad
powers to search without a warrant and to detain suspects
without charge for 90 days (with the possibility of another
90-day extension). The ordinance did not explicitly require
the security forces to maintain a log of individuals taken
into custody, nor did it make provision for notification of
the families of detainees--let alone visits by family or
legal counsel. (The ICRC is routinely told by the RNA that
the military does not have any detainees--even though Embassy
personnel have seen some detainees during visits to
barracks.)



10. (SBU) Restrictions on free press--both as a result of
self-censorship and the suspension of the right to
information--also cloud the situation. The press corps,
often legitimately afraid of venturing into conflict-affected
areas, generally rely upon verbatim Ministry of Defense press
releases for information. The bulk of these press releases
offer a one-line report of the killing of one or two Maoists
without further clarification of the nature of the
engagement, the identity of the Maoists, or whether any
security forces were killed or injured. (The exceptions, of
course, are accounts of major engagements, where press
coverage is more extensive.) The overwhelming majority of
those killed in the conflict this year--75 percent--are those
described as Maoists in Ministry of Defense press releases.
(Note: Official accounts of Maoist dead in large engagements
are generally unreliable. Wherever conflicting numbers have
been offered, we have consistently recorded the more
conservative estimate. According to the Government's
official tally, the Maoist death toll is much higher. End
note.) At a May 28 battle at Khara, Rukum, the RNA
officially claimed 300 Maoists were killed--but none wounded
or taken prisoner. The Ministry of Defense has reported at
least 260 separate incidents since January in which a single
Maoist was killed by security forces with no further
reporting on other Maoists injured or taken prisoner in the
incident, or the nature of the engagement. It thus remains
unclear exactuly under what circumstances these 260
individuals died. However, when poloff asked RNA officers
why so many individual Maoists were getting killed with no
corresponding reporting of a battle or engagement, the
officers explained that most were "shot while trying to
escape."


11. (C) The RNA's overarching suspicion of most human
rights organizations as overly sympathetic to the Maoists
limits the Army's interaction with these groups. Many of
these organizations are equally suspicious of the RNA. One
NGO that treats victims of torture regardless of political
affiliation has had to cease operations in some areas, its
director says, because of Army pressure. The National Human
Rights Commission, the ostensibly autonomous constitutional
body with responsibility for investigating violations, is
highly politicized and largely dysfunctional. (As noted Ref
D, we believe the National Human Rights Commission is deeply
flawed.) With the expiration of the terms of local
government officials in July, one last source of independent
information in some of these remote areas has dried up. The
combination of these factors--limited press coverage, a weak
civil society, and the absence now of any independently
elected political leadership at either the national or local
levels--has left NEPAL with an inadequate system of checks
and balances to the near-unlimited right of security forces
to detain and question. Under such conditions--where all we
may ever have is a one-source allegation of an abuse--it is
especially difficult to determine the credibility of either
version.

--------------
RNA HUMAN RIGHTS CELL
--------------


12. (C) In July the RNA announced the formation of a human
rights cell under the direction of the Judge Advocate General
(Ref A) to review the results of investigations into alleged
violations. According to JAG Brig. Gen. B.A. Sharma, who
heads the cell, the unit has received no complaints thus far
of extra-judicial killings. Instead, most inquiries focus on
determining the whereabouts of suspects believed to be in RNA
custody. Since the RNA maintains no central log of detainees
and because suspects often refuse to reveal their true names,
Sharma said, it is difficult to determine whether the missing
people are indeed in RNA custody. Sometimes detainees do not
want it known they are in RNA custody for fear of Maoist
retaliation against their family, he suggested. Sometimes
the RNA has to keep prisoners at its barracks because local
jails are full. The RNA still has to fix the procedures for
determining the whereabouts of detainees; as of now his unit
simply asks the local commander if the person in question is
in his custody. The Army is now starting to notify the Chief
District Officer (the senior civil servant in the district)
of the names of individuals in its custody. Sharma said he
has advised commanders to notify the families of detainees of
their whereabouts and their welfare.


13. (C) Poloff asked about any other pending
investigations, including the promised inquiry into the death
in custody of Kancha Dongol March 15 (Ref C). That
investigation is underway; its likely outcome, according to
the major spearheading the inquiry, is a finding that Dongol
(who sustained six gun shots and whose body showed evidence
of torture) made a grab for one of his captors' guns. An
investigation into the November 30 killings of five villagers
in Rolpa, who were shot from an RNA helicopter, had revealed
that the aircraft had been fired on first. Poloff asked
about the May 1 shootings of six men in Sindhupalchowk (Ref
B),noting recent coverage of the event in a London
newspaper. Sharma replied that an inquiry had revealed that
the six men had fired on RNA soldiers--a version that differs
significantly from that offered Ref B by both the CDO and the
local police commander. Poloff asked about the June 29
killings by the RNA of four suspected Maoists in Ramite
Khola, Morang. According to a report from a local NGO, the
four men were kept handcuffed on display in the public market
for part of the day and then taken near a school where they
were shot. Sharma said he was unaware of the incident and
would look into it.

--------------
SIGNS OF PROGRESS
--------------


14. (C) The RNA leadership has on numerous occasions assured
us of its willingness to respect international human rights
standards and has agreed to accept training for its troops
and officers on the topic. Although all soldiers are
educated on Rules of Engagement and are aware that they
should not torture or kill suspects, the exigencies of the
situation necessitated deployment without adequate training
on human rights during conflict, the officers have explained.
The RNA's top leadership is well aware of the negative
effect human rights violations would have on our expanding
military-to-military relationship and related security
assistance--as well as on ther own forces' good order and
discipline. Nonetheless, they clearly view the dirty-war
tactics of their Maoist adversaries as a mitigating factor,
making compliance with human rights standards difficult.


15. (C) Despite this attitude, we are seeing some
significant progress. The reactivation of a Joint Combined
Exercise and Training (JCET) program after a five-year hiatus
has intensified our human rights dialogue with the RNA. We
(and the British) pressed the RNA to develop the independent
human rights cell so formed in July. (Previously all
complaints were investigated by the commander of the suspect
unit himself.) While the quality and breadth of the
investigations undertaken by this unit remain to be seen, the
RNA's willingness to accept training in this area is a
reassuring sign. The UK government is examining the
possibility of detailing a British army officer to the unit
to assist it in its early stages. In addition, 14 RNA
officers, at the rank of Colonel and above, attended a
September 25-26 workshop on the Law of Armed Conflict, with
training jointly offered by representatives of the ICRC and
the USG's Defense Institute of International Legal Studies.

16. (C) Without other independent organs like the media and
human rights groups operating in conflict-ridden areas, it is
difficult either to corroborate or refute the RNA's version
of events, or to gather "credible evidence" of violations
that amounts to much more than allegations. The absence of
checks and balances during the state of emergency, which
expired August 28, allowed the RNA to operate with a certain
degree of impunity. That said, the RNA is now developing,
like so much else in its repertoire, rules to implement the
human rights standards it knows it must inculcate in its
soldiers. Progress, especially initially, has been rocky but
is showing some improvement. To the extent possible, it is
important to remain engaged with the RNA, via our ongoing
dialogue on human rights, as it begins this important
process.

HALE