NEPAL'S KING SAYS NOT YET TIME TO INTERVENE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001781 SIPDIS STATE FOR SA/INS LONDON FOR POL - RIEDEL E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2012 TAGS: PGOV PREL NP GON SUBJECT: NEPAL'S KING SAYS NOT YET TIME TO INTERVENE REF: A. (A) KATHMANDU 1772 ¶B. (B) KATHMANDU 1762 ¶C. (C) 120813Z SEP 02 ¶D. (D) STATE 175352 Classified By: POL PMAHONEY. REASON: 1.5 (B,D). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In a September 12 meeting, King Gyanendra assured the Ambassador that he would not use his constitutional authority to intervene in the government unless he gains public national consensus on the move from all mainstream political parties and unless all other constitutional remedies were exhausted. That time has not yet arrived. He emphasized that he would take such action only to preserve, rather than undermine, democracy. Given the fractiousness and self-interest that motivates many political leaders, the King's refusal to act unless he has full public national consensus is wise. End summary. -------------- NOT YET TIME FOR ACTION -------------- ¶2. (U) On the evening of September 12, at the Palace's request the Ambassador called on King Gyanendra. Ambassador opened the meeting by giving the King the text of President Bush's message of thanks for Government of Nepal (GON) support in the global campaign against terrorism (Ref C). The King was quite pleased by the letter and asked the Ambassador to convey his thanks to the White House. ¶3. (C) The King asked for the Ambassador's assessment of the state of affairs in Nepal. The Ambassador described the situation as dire and expressed sympathy for the victims of recent Maoist attacks. He noted that during his meeting with Prime Minister Deuba earlier in the day (Ref A) the PM had seemed worried for several reasons, including recent Maoist successes in the field, ongoing intra-party strife, rumors of corruption surrounding his closest advisors, and fear that he may have lost the confidence of the King. The King acknowledged that Deuba is under significant pressure, adding that he had met the PM just the day before. ¶4. (C) Many people are claiming that "I'll do something" to intervene, the King acknowledged, adding that numerous individuals across the political spectrum had come to see him recently to ask him to act. He emphasized that any action he would take would be to preserve democracy, not to undermine it. He plans to do nothing, however, until all existing constitutional remedies are exhausted. That point has not yet been reached. Despite the obvious problems that are making elections appear less and less feasible, the King assured the Ambassador that he will not act unless he obtains public consensus from all the major political parties to support such action. So far, no one has been willing to say anything in public, he noted. "They want me to act on my own" so that they criticize the move later if it suits their political aims. -------------- CONSENSUS GOVERNMENT ENVISIONED -------------- ¶5. (C) Should the King obtain such national consensus and invoke his constitutional authority to intervene, the Ambassador asked, what might an interim government look like? The King replied that he envisions a national consensus government, with representation from all political parties. With the support of such national consensus, even the Maoists might be invited to participate, provided they laid down their arms first. Contrary to current rumors--and the PM's own fears (Ref A)--the King said he had no particular person in mind to head such a government. Instead, the person should be chosen by the leaders of all the political parties to ensure national consensus. ¶6. (C) Ambassador delivered Ref D talking points, emphasizing that elections should be pursued if at all possible, and stressing that any action taken by the King should be done in strict accord with constitutional provisions and supported by broad political consensus. The King agreed that he should first seek advice from the Supreme Court before taking any action. (Note: According to the British Ambassador, who met the King one hour earlier, the King disagreed when the UK Ambassador made the same point, reportedly arguing that he had no need to consult the Court. The British Ambassador's talking points for his meeting with the King were virtually identical to ours. End note.) He noted again that he did not contemplate action soon, but said that people should not be surprised if they wake up one morning and read about it in the newspapers. -------------- PM SHOULD CLEAN HOUSE FIRST -------------- ¶7. (C) The King described the Prime Minister as "overly concerned." The only words of caution he has given Deuba so far is that "he should be clean." The Ambassador pointed out that many of the most powerful and influential members of the PM's cabinet are also those tainted by corruption, and suggested that Deuba may be reluctant to alienate them. The King said he had assured Deuba if he cleans up his Cabinet, he could guarantee that the (ostensibly autonomous) anti-corruption commission would defer investigating the ousted ministers for a year. The Prime Minister is a good man, the King reflected, but he seems to be poorly advised. He needs to plan more ahead. Instead, he is too narrowly focused on intra-party power struggles. He has not thought ahead, for example, on what he will do if the Election Commission decides not to award his faction use of the Nepali Congress Party symbol during elections. The PM's wife, Arzu Deuba, could be a source of good advice for him, the King concluded. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) The King is clearly considering taking action, but is wisely waiting for broad-based and public cover before doing so. A tacit consensus seems to be mounting that the elections cannot be held for security reasons, and royal intervention could provide a face-saving way out for politicos unwilling to risk life and limb on the campaign trail. But if the leaders of various political parties have decided among themselves that elections are not feasible and are hoping for the King to give them a way, they will have to come together publicly to ask him to do so. If elections indeed cannot be held, a national consensus government, headed by a person chosen by all mainstream political parties, may be the best interim option available. MALINOWSKI