SPECULATON BUILDS FOR POSSIBLE ROYAL INTERVENTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KATHMANDU 001762 SIPDIS STATE FOR SA/INS LONDON FOR POL - RIEDEL E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2012 TAGS: PGOV PREL NP GON SUBJECT: SPECULATON BUILDS FOR POSSIBLE ROYAL INTERVENTION REF: A. (A) KATHMANDU 0740 ¶B. (B) KATHMANDU 1008 ¶C. (C) KATHMANDU 1316 ¶D. (D) KATHMANDU 1748 Classified By: POL PMAHONEY. REASON: 1.5 (B,D). -------------- SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST -------------- ¶1. (C) The Embassy believes that King Gyanendra is now actively considering use of his Constitutional authority to dismiss the current government, appoint an interim government, and postpone general elections scheduled for November 13. The King's decision is likely shaped by numerous factors, including the deteriorating security situation and declining confidence in Prime Minister Deuba and his troubled Cabinet. The King will probably weigh reactions from foreign allies important to Nepal, such as the U.S., UK, Japan, India, and China, before making a final decision. We believe that the King may elicit USG reaction during a September 12 meeting (arranged at the request of the Palace) with the Ambassador. The Ambassador is also meeting with the Prime Minister the morning of September 12, where the same subject may arise. Department is requested to review suggested Para 13 talking points on this subject and convey any changes to Embassy by COB September 11. End summary and action request. -------------- ELECTION PREPARATIONS: PLODDING AT BEST -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Since the May 22 dissolution of Parliament, preparations for mid-term national elections, scheduled for November 13, have proceeded haltingly at best. Campaigning has been hindered by the unpredictable security situation, as well as by the bitter fight between rival factions of Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba's own Nepali Congress Party. Despite frequent suggestions from within the government, the security forces, political parties, and NGOs that voting will be held in staggered phases across the country to minimize the security risk, the Election Commission has yet to announce such a schedule. (Note: We have just heard the schedule may be out before the end of the week. End note.) Many sources point to the Commission's continued failure to publish an election schedule--as well as its apparent procrastination in deciding which rival Nepali Congress faction is legitimate--as evidence of increasing uncertainty that polls can be held by the November 13 date. ¶3. (SBU) Overshadowing any preparation for elections is the very real threat of Maoist violence directed against candidates, voters, and election officials. Maoist insurgents have pledged to disrupt the elections, and the sharp, recent surge in violence has demonstrated their apparently undiminished ability to do so. Attacks against local-level mainstream political cadre are increasing. A human rights activist who recently held public programs in Syangja and Pyuthan Districts told us that local Maoists were poised to disrupt the programs until they learned the topic was human rights, rather than elections. (One Maoist cadre reportedly told the organizer, "We're not against human rights. We're just against free and fair elections.") A former MP who flew into Gorkha District to inspect damage to a bridge said he was immediately surrounded by armed Maoists upon landing. Once the Maoists learned he was not there to promote the elections, however, they let him continue his visit. -------------- DEUBA'S DECLINING STOCK -------------- ¶4. (C) Despite this grim scenario, Prime Minister Deuba claims to be as committed as ever to beginning elections--even if only partial elections--by November 13. Sources close to the PM indicate that he feels he has staked his credibility as a leader on keeping to the November 13 deadline--however unrealistic it may be. Elections held on this date run a substantial risk of being flawed, incomplete, and marred by violence. If he is unable to hold elections by that date, he has told the British DCM, he will step down. ¶5. (C) Deuba's insistence on holding the elections, viewed against the backdrop of mounting security concerns both within and outside of Kathmandu, may do little to promote public confidence in his judgment. For many observers, ugly intra-party feuds and petty partisan squabbling seem to have commanded most of the PM's attention over the past few months, rather than more pressing matters of general national concern, such as the insurgency or the troubled economy. Recent corruption scandals sparked by the widely applauded new anti-corruption bill have spotligthed a variety of pulic officials, including one of his closest advisors (Ref D),and have focused popular dissatisfaction on the widely perceived lack of good governance in successive governments since the restoration of democracy 12 years ago. -------------- DECLINING OPTIONS -------------- ¶6. (C) Ref C outlined three possible scenarios after the dissolution of Parliament: a) flawed and/or partial elections beginning o/a November 13; b) indefinite postponement of the elections, pending improvements in the security situation; and c) royal intervention under Clause 127 of the Constitution. Given the sharp deterioration in the security climate since the summer and given Deuba's reported unwillingness to postpone elections, the Embassy finds increasing evidence that royal intervention is under active consideration. (Comment: Clause 127 grants the King broad authority to "issue necessary Orders to remove (any) difficulty" that may arise in the implementiation of the Constitution. The language is sufficiently vague to appear to give the King ample latitude to take any steps he deems necessary--possibly including the dissolution of a sitting government--to restore order. End comment.) Many observers believe that if elections do begin by November 13, the Constitution may be interpreted as requiring the current government to step down. (Note: This last is subject to judicial interpretation. The Constitution contains no specific provision for what happens in the event elections are not held on time. End note.) ¶7. (C) The military, motivated by increasing concerns about its ability to provide security for elections, may also be advising the King to take action to defer the November 13 polling date. The Election Commission has revised an earlier estimate of polling places needed for the election upward from 7,000 to 10,000. One high-ranking military officer said privately that the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) would be hard pressed to provide adequate security for so many additional polling places. The main public line of the RNA to us and others, however, is that the military will be ready and able to provide security. ¶8. (C) The King had previously told the Ambassador that he agreed to Deuba's request to dissolve Parliament contingent upon the PM's formation of a smaller, more capable Cabinet, free from chronic political in-fighting and committed to tackling corruption (Ref B). The ongoing inner Nepali Congress Party squable between Deuba and Party President Koirala has kept the Prime Minister from acting on the King's request, however. Instead, the PM has clung to his allies that remain in the Cabinet, the seniormost member of which is now deeply embroiled in a corruption scandal himself. Palace sources have told the Japanese embassy that Deuba's position is growing increasingly "weaker." The King, through his advisors (Ref C),has also intimated in the past that he was considering using Clause 127 to postpone elections until the security situation improves and form an interim government focused on addressing the nation's most pressing problems. Over the past week, speculation among a variety of well-placed sources that the King may be ready to act has become louder. Sepculation regarding the composition of such an interim government (alternatively described as multi-partisan, non-partisan technocrats, or some combination of the two) also abounds. Today's rumors include former Prime Minister Chand or former Prime Minister and former Leader of the Opposition Madhav Nepal to head a new government. (Comment: Chand, who served as Prime Minister three times previously and who is associated with the old and discredited panchatat system would be hard for many Nepalis to swallow. Nepal heads the major opposition party, but the Nepali Congress Party had a majority in the Parliament that was dismissed in May. Thus the choice of either could be problematic. End comment.) ¶9. (C) A reliable source close to the King has told us that the King would want the major political parties to come to him with the suggestion that he bless an interim government. On September 10 a military advisor to the King told DATT that the King is contemplating invoking his authority under Clause 127, but would consult with the U.S., UK, and Japan before doing so (septel IIR). On September 11 the Palace notified the Ambassador that the King wishes to meet him the evening of September 12. He also will be meeting with the British Ambassador that same day (at British request, however). We expect the King to elicit USG reaction to invocation of Clause 127 during this meeting. (Note: The Ambassador and the British Ambassador are also scheduled to meet the Prime Minister the morning of September 12. We expect the same topic may arise during the meeting with the Prime Minister as well. End note.) -------------- CONSTITUTIONALITY, CONSENSUS ARE KEY -------------- ¶10. (C) Recent Maoist success in staging large-scale attacks against the Army and police in different parts of the country, combined with a series of bomb explosions in the heart of Kathmandu, have made the GON's ability to hold free and fair elections more questionable than ever. Holding elections in the current environment seems certain to put voters, candidates, and election officers at significant risk. Maoist intimidation, moreover, will doubtless depress voter turn-out substantially. In some areas, it remains doubtful that polling can take place outside of district headquarters. Elections held under such circumstances are almost certain to be flawed, undermining the legitimacy of any government so elected. Should the current government postpone elections, however, Deuba's personal credibility--and possible motives of self-interest in postponing facing disgruntled voters in the polls--could be questioned. ¶11. (C) Of the three possible scenarios outlined in Para 6 above, royal intervention under Clause 127 of the Constitution may be the most practical, provided three factors are observed. First, the intervention should be performed in strict accordance with the (admittedly broad) provisions of the Constitution. Second, the King should attempt to obtain multi-partisan national consensus for such action. Third, the King should emphasize that his intervention is a temporary measure, necessitated by the critical security situation confronting the country, and announce a date for elections as soon as possible, preferably within one year. ¶12. (C) In previous conversations with the Ambassador, the King has emphasized his commitment to democracy (Refs A and B). We have no reason to believe he is dissembling. Although public suspicions about his possible role in his late brother's death have substantially subsided, we believe that the King remains sensitive to this early popular mistrust and will work hard to avoid re-igniting it. He is perceived to be above partisan politics, and may thus be the only national figure capable of uniting the fractious mainstream parties to develop a strategy to address the root causes of the insurgency and, perhaps ultimately, a strategy for possible future negotiations with the Maoists. -------------- SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS -------------- ¶13. (C) Embassy requests Department clearance by COB September 11 on the talking points below in the event that the subject of royal intervention is raised in the Ambassador's September 12 meetings with the Prime Minister and the King. Begin suggested talking points: --The security climate raises significant doubt that free and fair elections can be safely held according to the stipulated schedule. --Any action taken by the King to intervene should be done in strict accord with the Constitution. --We suggest seeking advice from the Supreme Court before taking such action. --The King should emphasize the temporary nature of the intervention, perhaps by appending a future date for national elections. --Multi-partisan consensus on royal intervention will be crucial to the success of this action. End text of suggested talking points. MALINOWSKI