C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 001741

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS AND DS/OP/NEA
STATE ALSO PASS USAID/DCHA/OFDA
MANILA FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA
LONDON FOR POL - RIEDEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2012
TAGS: PTER ASEC PGOV NP
SUBJECT: MAOISTS STAGE MAJOR ATTACKS IN EAST AND WEST

REF: A. (A) KATHMANDU 1693

B. (B) KATHMANDU 1674

C. (C) KATHMANDU 1589

D. (D) KATHMANDU 0379

Classified By: Amb. Malinowski. Reason: 1.5(B,D).

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SUMMARY
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1. (SBU) In their largest actions against the security
forces since the onset of the monsoon in May, late September
7 Maoist insurgents attacked a police post in a remote area
of eastern Sindhuli District, about 100 km southeast of
Kathmandu, and the local government headquarters in
Arghakanchi District, about 200 km southwest of Kathmandu,
late September 8. At least 90 police and 17 soldiers have
been killed in both attacks. Royal Nepal Army (RNA) soldiers
pursued and and have engaged Maoists fleeing northwest after
the attack in Arghakhanchi. As of COB September 9, fighting
between the RNA and Maoists was continuing on the border
between Arghakhanchi and Pyuthan Districts. The success and
scale of both operations, which occurred almost exactly 24
hours but more than 300 km apart, indicate that the Maoists
likely used the monsoon lull from June to August to
consolidate and reorganize their forces after losses incurred
in May. The twin attacks will force Prime Minister Deuba to
consider possible re-imposition of the state of emergency,
which expired August 28. End summary.

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POLICE POST IN EAST OVERRUN . . .
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2. (U) In the early morning hours of September 8, Maoist
insurgents attacked a remote police post in Bhiman, Sindhuli
District, approximately 100 km southeast of Kathmandu. At
least 49 policemen (out of a total force of 73) were killed
and 22 wounded. The remaining two policemen were reported
missing. The Nepali press reported six bodies of suspected
Maoist guerrillas were found in the vicinity of the police
post.


3. (SBU) The attack began about 11:45 p.m. the night of
September 7. Many of the more senior policemen killed were

reportedly shot at close range in the head, indicating that
they may have surrendered before being executed. As in
previous attacks on remote installations, the insurgents cut
down trees to barricade roads and prevent reinforcements from
reaching the site. Unlike previous attacks on police posts,
however, in which the Maoists looted most of the weapons from
their fallen enemy, many of the dead policemen's .303 Enfield
rifles were found still lying near their bodies.

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. . . AND DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS IN WEST
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4. (SBU) At about 11:30 p.m. the night of September 8,
insurgents attacked the district headquarters in
Arghakhanchi, about 200 km southwest of Kathmandu, hitting
the police headquarters first. Radio communications with the
district were cut almost immediately thereafter, complicating
the flow of information from the site. Fighting continued
for about five hours thereafter. A total of 161 regular
police, 30 members of the paramilitary Armed Police Force
(APF), and 50 soldiers of the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) were
stationed at the headquarters. Initial reports indicate 32
policemen, 9 members of the APF, and 17 RNA soldiers were
killed in the attack. An additional 22 policemen, including
the highest-ranking officer in the district, 2 members of the
APF, and 4 soldiers were wounded.

5. (SBU) An RNA helicopter was unable to reach the site
until approximately nine hours after the battle began,
reportedly because of adverse weather conditions. One of the
helicpoter crew said that he observed a number of local
government offices in flames, as well as many bodies
scattered on the ground. The Chief District Officer, the
ranking civil servant in the district, was in Kathmandu at
the time of the attack. Initial reports list the Assistant
Chief District Officer as missing. There were no other
reports of potential civilian casualties.

6. (C) According to a source at RNA Headquarters, unlike
the attack in Sindhuli, the insurgents succeeded in stealing
a significant number of weapons from both the police
headquarters and from the military barracks. RNA
reinforcements are pursuing Maoist combatants, who are headed
northwest toward the border with the neighboring district of
Pyuthan. As of COB September 9, fighting was continuing on
the Arghakhanchi-Pyuthan border, under the direction of the
commander of the 3rd Brigade.

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MORE PRE-BANDH VIOLENCE
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7. (SBU) Before the twin attacks on Sindhuli and
Arghakhanchi, Maoists continued their campaign of violence in
apparent preparation for their self-proclaimed general
strike, or "bandh," September 16, by destroying local
government offices in two districts near Kathmandu. A total
of nine Village Development Committee (VDC) offices and
several health posts were destroyed over the past week in
Kavre District, which is about 25 km southeast of Kathmandu.
On September 7 armed Maoists destroyed eight VDC buildings in
Sindhupalchowk District, about 45 km northeast of Kathmandu,
and another two VDC buildings in Tehrathum District in the
far-eastern part of the country.

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INDIAN COOPERATION
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8. (C) On September 8 Nepal's Ambassador to India Bekh
Thapa confirmed to the Ambassador that the Indian government
had handed over to Nepali authorities Bamdev Chhetri, the
Secretary of the banned Indian-Nepal Unity Society. Chhetri

SIPDIS
was reportedly arrested in Delhi. Thapa said Chhetri had
been under surveillance by the Indian authorities for some
time before his arrest. According to Nepali police sources,
following his arrest in Delhi Chhetri was turned over to
Indian border police, who then turned him over to police in
Nepalganj, in southwestern Nepal, where the RNA took custody
of him. Chhetri is the highest-ranking Maoist turned over to
Nepali authorities by the Indian government.

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COMMENT
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9. (C) The operation in Arghakhanchi is the first attack on
a district headquarters since February, when the Maoists
launched a devastating assault in Achham, in far-western
Nepal, that leveled the capital (Ref D). The attacks in
Sindhuli and Arghakhanchi mark the first resumption of the
Maoists' classic tactic--large-scale, nighttime attacks on
fixed positions held by the security forces--since May, right
before the onset of the monsoon. With the monsoon now over,
most observers were expecting a resumption of hostilities
from the Maoists. Over the past few weeks RNA sources have
told us their intelligence had indications of preparations
for a major Maoist attack in the east (Ref C). We had not
heard, however, of indications of a two-pronged attack--just
one day apart--in separate parts of the country. The success
of these two operations indicates that the Maoists, however
bruised and battered they may have been by a series of
defeats in May and June, still command sufficient resources
and manpower and have adequate communications capability to
launch two near-simultaneous attacks over wide distances in
different parts of the country. Although the RNA is engaging
the Maoists on the Pyuthan-Arghakhanchi border, the fact that
the government did not see these attacks coming--in spite of
its purported intelligence reports--and that the security
forces were unable to repulse them will do little to instill
public confidence in in the ability of the RNA and police to
protect the general population from Maoist violence before
and during the September 16 bandh and November 13 general
elections. The Prime Minister, whose attention has been
distracted from the conflict by intra-party political
wrangling, will now have to refocus on the security situation
in the country, including possible re-imposition of the state
of emergency, which expired August 28.
MALINOWSKI