Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
02HANOI528
2002-03-07 10:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Hanoi
Cable title:  

VIETNAM'S CENTRAL HIGHLANDS: WHAT DID WE

Tags:  PREF PHUM PREL PGOV PINS SOCI VM CB ETMIN HUMANR RELFREE 
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071004Z Mar 02

 2002HANOI00528 - CONFIDENTIAL
 
 
 
 CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2038

PAGE 01 HANOI 00528 01 OF 02 071026Z 
ACTION EAP-00 

INFO LOG-00 NP-00 ACQ-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 SRPP-00 DS-00 
 FBIE-00 VC-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 VCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 
 SS-00 DSCC-00 PRM-00 DRL-02 NFAT-00 SAS-00 /002W
 ------------------70C626 071026Z /38 
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5712
INFO AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE 
NSC WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HANOI 000528 

SIPDIS

DEPT. FOR EAP/BCLTV, DRL/IRF, PRM (P.LEWIS)

E.O. 12958: DECLASS 3/8/12
TAGS: PREF PHUM PREL PGOV PINS SOCI VM CB ETMIN HUMANR RELFREE
SUBJECT: VIETNAM'S CENTRAL HIGHLANDS: WHAT DID WE
LEARN?

REF: A) HO CHI MINH CITY 00201, 00202, 00203

B) HO CHI MINH CITY 00039

CLASSIFIED BY: EMI LYNN YAMAUCHI, CONSUL GENERAL,
REASON 1.5(D)
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 HANOI 00528 01 OF 02 071026Z

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HANOI 000528 SIPDIS DEPT. FOR EAP/BCLTV, DRL/IRF, PRM (P.LEWIS) E.O. 12958: DECLASS 3/8/12 TAGS: PREF PHUM PREL PGOV PINS SOCI VM CB ETMIN HUMANR RELFREE SUBJECT: VIETNAM'S CENTRAL HIGHLANDS: WHAT DID WE LEARN? REF: A) HO CHI MINH CITY 00201, 00202, 00203 B) HO CHI MINH CITY 00039 CLASSIFIED BY: EMI LYNN YAMAUCHI, CONSUL GENERAL, REASON 1.5(D) CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 02 HANOI 00528 01 OF 02 071026Z ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: DURING A 2.5-DAY VISIT TO DAK LAK, GIA LAI, AND KON TUM PROVINCES, CONGENOFFS MET WITH MONTAGNARD RETURNEES FROM CAMBODIA AND WITH PROVINCIAL PEOPLE'S COMMITTEES. REFTELS A ARE THE DETAILED ACCOUNTS. THESE ARE OUR CONCLUSIONS. ECONOMIC HARDSHIP AND LAND DISPUTES SEEM TO BE THE PRIMARY REASONS WHY THIS GROUP OF RETURNEES HAD LEFT. WE FOUND THE PROVINCIAL AUTHORITIES WELL-INTENTIONED ABOUT PROVIDING MATERIAL SUPPORT TO THEIR RETURNEES, BUT WORRIED ABOUT RESOURCES FOR THE LONG-TERM. THERE WAS NO ATMOSPHERE OF OVERT FEAR OR REPRESSION IN THE THREE VILLAGES WE VISITED, NOR DID ANY RETURNEES CLAIM PHYSICAL MISTREATMENT AT THE HANDS OF VIETNAMESE AUTHORITIES. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) ECONOMICS, NOT RELIGION: UNLIKE MANY OF THOSE ETHNIC MINORITIES WHO FLED VIETNAM DURING SPRING 2001, WE BELIEVE THE RETURNEES WE MET LEFT PRIMARILY FOR ECONOMIC REASONS. THEY GREW COFFEE, COTTON, CORN, AND CASSAVA, CROPS WHOSE PRICES HAD DIPPED OR WHICH WERE NOT BIG MONEYMAKERS TO BEGIN WITH. THE CHAIRMAN OF DAK LAK'S COMMITTEE ON RELIGION ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE HAD BEEN COMPLAINTS ABOUT ECONOMIC HARDSHIP IN THE VILLAGES. ¶3. (C) SOME VILLAGE LAND ALLOCATIONS WERE ON THE SMALL SIDE - GIVEN LARGE FAMILY SIZE (5.5 CHILDREN AMONG ETHNIC MINORITIES IN KON TUM). WE HEARD ABOUT ONE SPECIFIC LAND DISPUTE INVOLVING ETHNIC MINORITIES - AS PLAINTIFFS, DEFENDANTS, AND CORRUPT LOCAL OFFICIALS. CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 03 HANOI 00528 01 OF 02 071026Z ETHNIC MINORITY VILLAGE AND COMMUNE LEADERS "SOLD" LAND BELONGING TO ANOTHER VILLAGER WITHOUT HIS PERMISSION, AND ISSUED LAND-USE CERTIFICATES TO THE NEW ETHNIC MINORITY OWNERS. ACCORDING TO THE VILLAGER'S WIFE, HE LEFT FOR CAMBODIA WHEN HIS SECOND PETITION FOR A HEARING HAD GONE UNANSWERED. ¶4. (SBU) WE DO NOT BELIEVE RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION WAS THE REASON THESE VILLAGERS LEFT VIETNAM. MOST OF THE VILLAGERS WE MET DURING THE TRIP WERE PROTESTANTS (NOT PARTICULARLY SURPRISING BECAUSE ETHNIC MINORIT
IES COMPRISE A SIZEABLE PERCENTAGE OF PROTESTANT AND CATHOLIC BELIEVERS IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS),WHO PRACTICED THEIR FAITH IN VARYING DEGREES. THE RETURNEES ANSWERED OUR QUESTIONS ABOUT RELIGION MATTER-OF-FACTLY AND CALMLY. RESIDENTS OF ONE VILLAGE TOOK CONGENOFFS TO THEIR WORSHIP HOUSE. ALL OF THE PROTESTANT RETURNEES WE SPOKE TO SAID THEY WERE ALLOWED TO PRACTICE THEIR FAITH, WITH ONE EXCEPTION. ¶5. (C) ONE RETURNEE SAID THAT IT WAS "DIFFICULT" FOR HIM TO PRACTICE HIS FAITH BOTH BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE AND AFTER HIS RETURN FROM CAMBODIA, BUT HE DID NOT/COULD NOT GIVE US FURTHER DETAILS. ¶6. (SBU) ARE THE RETURNEES/VILLAGERS AFRAID?: WE DID NOT DETECT OVERT FEAR AMONG THE VILLAGERS. SOME TENSION AND CONFUSION AMONG THE RETURNEES, PERHAPS, AS THEY WERE NOT CERTAIN WHY THEIR VILLAGE CHIEFS WERE SUMMONING THEM TO MEETINGS. WE SAW NO UNIFORMED MILITARY OR SECURITY IN THE VILLAGES, AND PEOPLE WERE CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 04 HANOI 00528 01 OF 02 071026Z NOT LOOKING BACK OVER THEIR SHOULDERS AS THEY SPOKE WITH US. IN THE CASE OF THE GIA LAI RETURNEES, THEY HAD BARELY BEEN BACK IN THEIR VILLAGES FOR 18 HOURS, BEFORE THEY HAD TO PACK UP GAIN TO COME MEET WITH US. ¶7. (C) WE LOOKED FOR ANY SIGNS OF BEATINGS (LIMPS, BRUISES, ETC.) ESPECIALLY ON ANY RETURNEES WHO WERE WEARING SHORT-SLEEVED SHIRTS OR SHORTS. WE DID NOT SEE ANY. THE ONLY VILLAGERS WHO CLAIMED PHYSICAL ABUSE WERE THOSE WHO SAID THEY HAD BEEN BEATEN IN THE CAMBODIAN CAMP BY OTHER ETHNIC MINORITY REFUGEES, WHO DID NOT WANT THEM TO RETURN TO VIETNAM. ¶8. (SBU) WHAT ABOUT THE ROLE OF PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL OFFICIALS?: THE PROVINCIAL PEOPLE'S COMMITTEES CONSIDER THEMSELVES KINGS OF THE HILL IN THEIR PROVINCES. IT WAS ONLY WITH PERSISTENT PRESSURE FROM THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT THAT THEY AGREED TO MEET WITH US. IN THE WORDS OF ONE COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN, "EVEN IF THE FOREIGN MINISTER HIMSELF CALLED ME, I STILL CALL THE SHOTS." THIS CHAIRMAN DID, IN THE END, AGREE TO CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2039 PAGE 01 HANOI 00528 02 OF 02 071026Z ACTION EAP-00 INFO LOG-00 NP-00 ACQ-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 SRPP-00 DS-00 FBIE-00 VC-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 VCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 SS-00 DSCC-00 PRM-00 DRL-02 NFAT-00 SAS-00 /002W -------------- 70C63C 071026Z /38 O 071004Z MAR 02 FM AMEMBASSY HANOI TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5713 INFO AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH PRIORITY AMEMBASSY BANGKOK AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE NSC WASHDC USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 HANOI 000528 SIPDIS DEPT. FOR EAP/BCLTV, DRL/IRF, PRM (P.LEWIS) MEET WITH US. THIS AND OTHER STATEMENTS LEAD US TO BELIEVE THAT PROVINCIAL, DISTRICT, COMMUNE AND VILLAGE-LEVEL LEADERS PLAY A PIVOTAL ROLE IN HOW RETURNEES ARE TREATED - REGARDLESS OF INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE GVN. CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 02 HANOI 00528 02 OF 02 071026Z ¶9. (SBU) PROVINCIAL AUTHORITIES INSISTED ON THEIR GOOD INTENTIONS IN DEALING WITH ETHNIC MINORITY ISSUES. THE CHAIRMAN OF DAK LAK'S COMMITTEE ON RELIGION ACKNOWLEDGED THAT WHILE ETHNIC MINORITY POLICIES HAD GOOD INTENTIONS, IMPLEMENTATION VARIED, AND IN SOME INSTANCES "WAS NOT COMPLETE." THAT IS AN UNDERSTATEMENT. WE DO NOT SEE HOW PROVINCIAL AUTHORITIES ON DOWN (WITH A VERY SMALL TAX BASE - NO LARGE CORPORATIONS TO TAX, NEXT TO NO FDI, AND ETHNIC MINORITY POPULATIONS MOSTLY EXEMPT FROM TAXES) CAN LONG SUSTAIN THE SPECIAL ETHNIC MINORITY PROGRAMS THEY OPERATE, LET ALONE IMPROVE THEIR STANDARD OF LIVING. CURRENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS RUN THE GAMUT FROM MICRO- LENDING TO SUSPENDING PAYMENTS ON LOANS TO OUTRIGHT DONATIONS OF RICE, CLOTHING, SEEDS, AND CASH. ¶10. (C) LOCAL AUTHORITIES COMPLAINED ABOUT HOW THE ETHNIC MINORITIES SPENT THE CASH ON "BOOZE AND BIKES", BUT THEIR REAL WORRY WAS ELSEWHERE. AT LEAST TWO COMMUNE AND PROVINCIAL-LEVEL OFFICIALS SAID THEY DID NOT KNOW IF THEY COULD CONTINUE TO SUPPORT RETURNEE FAMILIES IF THEIR FIELDS WERE NOT PLANTED BEFORE THE RAINY SEASON BEGINS. HAVING SEEN THE HARDSCRABBLE EXISTENCE IN THESE VILLAGES, THAT RINGS TRUE. ¶11. (U) DAK LAK, GIA LAI, AND KON TUM PROVINCES ARE AMONG THE POOREST IN VIETNAM. DESPITE THE WONDERS OF ELECTRICITY, TELEVISION, AND MOTORBIKES, THE VILLAGES WE VISITED SEEM CUT OFF FROM EACH OTHER. THEIR LIVES ARE CIRCUMSCRIBED BY "60 METERS", IN THE WORDS OF ONE CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 03 HANOI 00528 02 OF 02 071026Z VILLAGE CHIEF. ¶12. (C) THE EDUCATION LEVEL AMONG THE RETURNEES WE MET WAS ANYWHERE FROM ZERO TO FOURTH GRADE. THESE ARE NOT STUPID PEOPLE, BUT THEIR SENSE OF TIME AND SPACE IS VERY DIFFERENT FROM OURS. THEIR ABILITY TO UNDERSTAND CONDITIONAL OR HYPOTHETICAL SITUATIONS IS ALMOST NON- EXISTENT. OR AT LEAST NON-EXISTENT IN THE VIETNAMESE LANGUAGE. LIKEWISE THEIR ABILITY TO ANALYZE OR ANSWER "WHY". SOME QUESTIONS HAD TO BE REPEATED, REFINED, AND REDUCED TO THE MINIMUM. ¶13. (C) HOW USEFUL ARE THESE TRIPS TO THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS?: WE BELIEVE THESE TRIPS - EVEN WITHOUT COMPLETE ACCESS OR PRIVACY - ARE WORTHWHILE. WE ACTUALLY SEE CONDITIONS IN THE VILLAGE, INTERACT WITH RESIDENTS, AND EXPERIENCE THE REMOTENESS/ISOLATION THAT CHARACTERIZE THEIR LIVES. THIS GIVES US THE CONTEXT IN WHICH TO JUDGE THE VARIOUS STORIES, RUMORS, AND RHETORIC WE HEAR. HOWEVER, OUR ABILITY TO ASSESS THE VERACITY OF THE INFORMATION WE OBTAIN IS LIMITED, GIVEN THE CIRCUMSTANCES DESCRIBED IN REFTELS A. THEREFORE WE PREFER TO RELY ON THE "FRIENDS OF FRIENDS" WHO TRAVEL DOWN FROM THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS THREE OR FOUR TIMES A YEAR - OR ON MINORITY CONTACTS IN HCMC WHO HEAR THINGS FROM THEIR FAMILIES. ¶14. (U) WHAT ARE THE NEXT STEPS?: IF THE GVN AGREES TO MEET WITH US, AMBASSADOR AND CONGEN PLAN TO TRAVEL TO THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS OVER EASTER. BURGHARDT CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 04 HANOI 00528 02 OF 02 071026Z CONFIDENTIAL

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