"WIN US OVER"

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HANOI 002272 SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/12 TAGS: PREL EAID ETRD MARR VM CVR SUBJECT: "WIN US OVER" CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 02 HANOI 02272 01 OF 02 181057Z REF: A. HANOI 2202 (NOTAL) B. HANOI 2259 - C. HANOI 2260 C. HANOI 2261 ¶1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR RAYMOND BURGHARDT, REASON: 1.5 (D) ¶2. (C) AMBASSADOR'S SCHEDULED SEPTEMBER 17 MEETING TO DISCUSS CHINA (REF A) WITH VICE FOREIGN MINISTER LE VAN BANG (FORMERLY AMBASSADOR TO U.S., AND NOW RESPONSIBLE FOR NORTHEAST ASIA) WAS UNAVOIDABLY DIVERTED INTO A DISCUSSION OF PRESSING BILATERAL ISSUES (REFS C-D). ¶3. (C) BANG CAME PREPARED WITH SOME THOUGHTS ON THE US-VIETNAM BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. READING FROM THREE PAGES OF PRINTED NOTES, HE URGED THAT THE U.S. DO MORE TO "BUILD TRUST," OFFERING THE FOLLOWING SUGGESTIONS: -- MORE HIGH LEVEL MEETINGS, HOWEVER SHORT, SUCH AS THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S RECENT CALL ON DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF AN UPCOMING TALK (EVEN TEN MINUTES) BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER PHAN VAN KHAI AT APEC; -- CONTINUE DIALOGUES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND POLITICAL ISSUES, AREAS OF ONGOING DISAGREEMENTS; -- ESTABLISH A DISPUTE SETTLEMENT BODY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENT (AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT THE EXISTING BTA-RELATED MECHANISM ALREADY PROVIDES A GOOD FORUM FOR THIS); -- AVOID LETTING CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES SUCH AS ETHNIC MINORITIES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM BE "PROMINENT" IN BILATERAL RELATIONS, BUT INSTEAD SEEK CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 03 HANOI 02272 01 OF 02 181057Z WAYS TO SOLVE DISAGREEMENTS "CONSTRUCTIVELY, NOT AT THE EXPENSE OF THE RELATIONSHIP." ¶4. (C) VFM BANG EMPHASIZED THAT "FRANKLY, YOU MUST HAVE A WAY TO WIN OVER VIETNAM" IN A MANNER THAT WOULD BE "CONDUCIVE TO US POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA." (HE USED THE SAME PHRASEOLOGY IN A CONVERSATION WITH THE DCM AT POST'S 9/11 CEREMONY, WHERE HE ALSO SAID THAT VIETNAM WANTS TO BE "WITH" THE U.S.) HE WELCOMED US INTEREST IN A "STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP" BETWEEN THE U.S. AND VIETNAM, AND REITERATED A NEED TO SOLVE SENSITIVE ISSUES "QUIETLY." HE OFFERED THANKS FOR US AID PROGRAMS, ESPECIALLY RELATED TO LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM, AND EXPRESSED INTEREST IN VIETNAM'S INCLUSION IN THE MILLENIUM CHALLENGE FUND. AMBASSADOR NOTED OTHER US HUMANITARIAN AID PROGRAMS AS WELL, AND DESCRIBED US FRUSTRATION AT DIFFICULTIES IN 
INCREASING AID IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS. VFM BANG RETORTED THAT "SOMETIMES NOT TO HELP IS TO HELP." ¶5. (C) VFM BANG DESCRIBED BURGEONING RELATIONS ELSEWHERE, POINTING TO COMMUNIST PARTY GENERAL SECRETARY NONG DUC MANH'S OCTOBER TRIP TO JAPAN, A SIPDIS "GOOD VISIT" BY DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN TAN DUNG TO SOUTH KOREA RECENTLY, "GOOD RELATIONS" WITH TAIWAN (NOW INCLUDING "65,000 SONS-IN-LAW"),"FRIENDLY" RELATIONS WITH CHINA, AND EXPANDED TIES WITHIN ASEAN AND IN ASEM. HE STRESSED THAT VIETNAM ALSO "VERY MUCH WANTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS" WITH THE U.S. TO A "HIGHER LEVEL," AND ASKED FOR AMBASSADOR'S PERSONAL HELP IN ACHIEVING THIS. HE URGED THAT VIETNAM AND THE U.S. CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 04 HANOI 02272 01 OF 02 181057Z WORK TOGETHER TOWARD IMPROVING THE STABILITY OF THE WHOLE REGION, EVEN FARTHER AFIELD SUCH AS THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND CHINA. ¶6. (C) AMBASSADOR EXPRESSED AGREEMENT WITH THIS GOAL, NOTING EFFORTS TO ARRANGE HIGH LEVEL TRIPS IN BOTH DIRECTIONS, AND TO UTILIZE THESE MEETINGS TO RAISE THE LEVEL OF DISCUSSION. VFM BANG NOTED THAT, WHILE THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND MFA WERE OF SIMILAR MINDS ON THIS GOAL, IT WAS IMPORTANT TO CONVINCE OTHER DEPARTMENTS -- NOTABLY THE PENTAGON AND THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (MND) -- OF THE DESIRABILITY OF SUCH TIES. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE "ENVIRONMENT WAS NOT CONDUCIVE" FOR FALL 2002 VISIT TO THE U.S. BY DEFENSE MINISTER TRA, URGING THE U.S. INSTEAD TO "BUILD UP" MILITARY-TO- MILITARY TIES FIRST. AMBASSADOR RECOUNTED EXISTING FORMS OF MILITARY COOPERATION SUCH AS IN MEDICAL RESEARCH, AS WELL AS ONGOING TALKS ON FUTURE SHIP VISITS. (NOTE: THE LAST CONVERSATION BETWEEN DATT AND MND REGARDING MINISTER TRA'S TRIP INDICATED THAT HE WAS STILL HOPING TO TRAVEL TO THE U.S. IN THE LATE NOVEMBER/EARLY DECEMBER TIMEFRAME. END NOTE) ¶7. (C) COMMENT: VFM BANG RETAINS A PROPRIETARY INTEREST IN US-VIETNAM RELATIONS, GIVEN HIS PERSONAL CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PTQ6873 PAGE 01 HANOI 02272 02 OF 02 181058Z ACTION EAP-00 INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AID-00 AIT-03 ACQ-00 CEA-01 CIAE-00 COME-00 CTME-00 DOEE-00 SRPP-00 DS-00 EB-00 EXIM-01 E-00 FBIE-00 VC-00 FRB-00 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 ITC-01 L-00 VCE-00 AC-01 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OES-01 OMB-01 OPIC-01 PA-00 PM-00 PRS-00 ACE-00 P-00 SP-00 SSO-00 STR-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-00 DRL-02 G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 /013W -------------- E909EB 181058Z /38 R 181049Z SEP 02 FM AMEMBASSY HANOI TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7584 INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH AMEMBASSY SEOUL AMEMBASSY TOKYO AIT TAIPEI 0703 SECDEF WASHDC USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 HANOI 002272 SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 02 HANOI 02272 02 OF 02 181058Z ROLE OVER THE PAST DECADE IN SHEPHERDING THIS RELATIONSHIP. HE IS LIKELY DISTURBED AT THE POSSIBILITY THAT US-VIETNAM TIES ARE FAILING TO KEEP PACE WITH THE SOMETIMES OVERWHELMING DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS OF NORTHEAST ASIAN STATES, AS WELL AS THE LARGER ECONOMIC AND ASSISTANCE ROLES JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA, AND TAIWAN PLAY HERE. WE AGREE WITH HIS ASSESSMENT THAT IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE USG NOT ONLY TO DO MORE BILATERALLY, BUT ALSO TO BE SEEN AS DOING MORE HERE. THIS IS A TOUGH TASK IN A COUNTRY WHERE THE MEDIA IS SO CONTROLLED, OFTEN INDEED BY ELEMENTS OF THE CPV AND GVN NOT ESPECIALLY INCLINED TO BE FAVORABLE TOWARD THE US. DAS DALEY'S VISIT, THE PROBABLE OCTOBER POLITICAL DIALOGUE, HOPEFULLY A PRESIDENTIAL PHOTO OP AT APEC WITH THE PM, AND THE POSSIBLE DECEMBER VISIT HERE BY THE MARINE CORPS COMMANDANT OFFER SOME SHORT-TERM BOOSTS TO THE VISIBILITY OF OUR BILATERAL TIES. BUT, AS BANG ACKNOWLEDGED, PROGRESS WILL CONTINUE TO BE SLOWED BY LEADERSHIP ELEMENTS WHO ARE LESS ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT US-VIETNAM TIES THAN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. SOME OF THESE PEOPLE -- IN THE MILITARY, PUBLIC SECURITY, AND PROPAGANDA FIELDS, FOR EXAMPLE -- MAY ALSO BE MORE RECEPTIVE TO BEIJING THAN BANG (REF A). BURGHARDT CONFIDENTIAL