C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HANOI 001290

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV, EAP/CM, AND EAP/RSP-TC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/07
TAGS: PREL PINS CM VM CVR APEC
SUBJECT: VIETNAM, THE PRC, AND TAIWAN
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1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR RAYMOND BURGHARDT,
REASON: 1.5 (D).


2. (C) SUMMARY. VIETNAM HAS HAD AN OFTEN-TORTUOUS
HISTORY WITH CHINA, INCLUDING WITH THE PRC, AND IS
AWARE OF THE DISPARITY OF THE IMPORTANCE WITH WHICH THE
TWO COUNTRIES VIEW ONE ANOTHER. MANY HERE MINIMIZE
ACKNOWLEDGING THE PRC AS A POLITICAL OR ECONOMIC MODEL
(ALTHOUGH IT IS). RELATIONS WITH BOTH BEIJING AND
TAIPEI ARE NOW BACK ON TRACK. THE SOUTH CHINA SEA IS
SEEN AS VIETNAM'S GREATEST EXTERNAL SECURITY THREAT, IF
NO LONGER AN IMMINENT ONE. VIETNAM WATCHES WITH
INTEREST AND CONCERN EVENTS IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT,
RECOGNIZING THE POTENTIAL FOR REGIONAL INSTABILITY THAT
WOULD AFFECT VIETNAM. WHILE FORMALLY COMMITTED TO A
POLICY OF "ONE CHINA," VIETNAMESE LEADERS PROBABLY DO
NOT CARE DEEPLY ABOUT WHETHER REUNIFICATION EVER TAKES
PLACE, AS LONG AS THE TWO SIDES CONTINUE TO IMPROVE
RELATIONS WITH EACH OTHER AND WITH VIETNAM. SEPTEL
WILL EXAMINE ECONOMIC AND OTHER RELATIONS. END
SUMMARY.


3. (C) VIETNAM'S SHORT-, MID-, AND LONG-TERM
INTERESTS ARE HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON AN INCREASINGLY
COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PRC, ON AVOIDANCE OF
TERRITORIAL CONFLICTS WITH THE PRC IN THE SOUTH CHINA
SEA AND THE LAND BORDER, AND ON PEACE AND PROSPERITY ON
BOTH SIDES OF THE TAIWAN STRAIT. YET ONLY A DECADE
AGO, THE GVN WAS BARELY ON SPEAKING TERMS WITH THE PRC,
GIVEN LINGERING ENMITY OVER THE 1979 BORDER WAR AND
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STAUNCH DISAGREEMENT OVER VIETNAM'S OCCUPATION OF
CAMBODIA. IN THAT SAME ERA, THE GVN HAD ONLY FLEDGLING
UNOFFICIAL TIES WITH TAIWAN, NOW PROBABLY VIETNAM'S
LARGEST INVESTOR. (TAIWAN DID NOT OPEN ITS
"UNOFFICIAL" OFFICE HERE UNTIL 1993; ITS TIMING
PROBABLY HAD SOME CONNECTION WITH THE EXPECTED LIFTING
OF THE US TRADE EMBARGO.) CHINA SCHOLARS HERE HAVE
SAID THAT IT NEVER OCCURRED TO HANOI TO SEEK DIPLOMATIC
RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN DURING THE NADIR OF VIETNAM/PRC

RELATIONS IN THE 1980'S, NOR EVEN TO COURT UNOFFICIAL
TIES UNTIL SEVERAL YEARS AFTER THE DOI MOI PERIOD
BEGAN.

HISTORY HURTS
--------------


4. (C) VIETNAMESE FREELY ADMIT THE PERVASIVE
SOCIETAL, CULTURAL, AND LINGUISTIC INFLUENCE OF CHINA'S
THOUSAND-YEAR OCCUPATION OF THE NORTHERN PARTS OF WHAT
IS NOW VIETNAM. OFFICIAL HISTORIES, HOWEVER, ALSO TEND
TO HIGHLIGHT THE VALIANT AND EVENTUALLY SUCCESSFUL
VIETNAMESE EFFORTS TO WARD OFF CHINESE AGGRESSIONS,
BOTH IN THE "REGAINING" OF INDEPENDENCE IN THE MID-
TENTH CENTURY A.D. AND IN SUBSEQUENT CHINESE INVASIONS
THROUGH THE 15TH CENTURY. MANY VIETNAMESE TALK ABOUT
THIS HISTORY AS IF IT WERE FRESH IN THEIR MEMORIES
RATHER THAN EVENTS FROM VIETNAM'S SOMEWHAT MYSTIC PAST;
IT WOULD APPEAR THAT A THINLY VEILED RESENTMENT OF THE
BIG DRAGON TO THE NORTH IS DELIBERATELY INCULCATED IN
VIETNAMESE STUDENTS. THE SLIGHTS AND MISFORTUNES
SUFFERED AT THE HANDS OF THE CHINESE PLAY WELL INTO
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VIETNAM'S NOTABLE VICTIM MENTALITY, WHICH ALSO
EVIDENCES ITSELF WHEN TALKING ABOUT FRENCH COLONIALISM
AND THE "AMERICAN WAR."


5. (C) IN MORE RECENT HISTORY, VIETNAMESE ARE OFTEN
PRICKLY WHEN PEOPLE MAKE COMPARISONS BETWEEN THE PRC'S
SUCCESSFUL MODERNIZATION SINCE 1978 AND VIETNAM'S STILL
MORE MODEST DOI MOI SINCE 1986. THEY ARE CORRECT IN
ASSERTING THAT VIETNAM'S OWN COURSE IS TAILORED TO ITS
UNIQUE NATIONA CHARACTERISTICS, WHILE NONETHELESS
EXPRESSING ADMIRATION FOR THE PRC'S SUCCESSES. THEY
WILL ADMI PRIVATELY TO WATCHING CLOSELY POLICY DEBATES
WIHIN THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY (CCP) -- MOST
REENTLY, ON THE TENDENTIOUS TOPIC OF ADMISSION INTO
THE PARTY OF CAPITALISTS -- AND THERE IS LITTLE IF ANY
DOUBT THAT DOI MOI WAS INITIALLY GRAFTED FAILY
DIRECTLY FROM DENG XIAOPING'S EARLIEST REFORM. YET
DENGIST THEORIES AND THOUGHT -- MUCH LESSMAOIST
WRITINGS -- RECEIVE SCANT ATTENTION IN
IETNAMESE IDEOLOGICAL TRAINING (STILL A MUST FOR
HIGHER EDUCATION AS WELL AS FOR ADVANCEMENT WITHIN HE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4141

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ACTION EAP-00

INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AF-00 AIT-03 ACQ-00 CIAE-00 PERC-00
DS-00 FBIE-00 VC-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 VCE-00 NSAE-00
EPAE-00 DSCC-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 /003W
-------------- B16459 210848Z /38
R 210705Z MAY 02
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6535
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AIT TAIPEI 0690
SECDEF WASHDC
DIA WASHDC
AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
AMCONSUL SHENYANG
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 HANOI 001290

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV, EAP/CM, AND EAP/RSP-TC


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PAGE 02 HANOI 01290 02 OF 03 210840Z
CIVIL SERVICE). THE FOCUS REMAINS INSTEAD HEAVILY ON A
COMBINATION OF TRADITIONAL MARXIST/LENINIST THEORY AND
HO CHI MINH THOUGHT.

FELLOW TRAVELERS OF TWO SORTS
--------------


6. (C) SINCE RELATIONS WITH THE PRC HAVE IMPROVED IN
THE 1990'S, VIETNAM HAS HIGHLIGHTED THE SOLIDARITY OF
SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AS A MAJOR FACTOR IN THE NOW CLOSER
TIES BETWEEN BEIJING AND HANOI. THERE ARE A STEADY
STREAM OF PARTY AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN BOTH
DIRECTIONS, AND IT WAS NOT SURPRISING THAT THE PRC WAS
ONE OF THE FIRST COUNTRIES THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY OF VIETNAM (CPV), NONG DUC MANH,
VISITED AFTER TAKING OFFICE IN 2001. (WE HAVE HEARD OF
NO PLANS FOR HIM TO VISIT THE UNITED STATES, FOR
EXAMPLE, DESPITE THE 2001 ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE US-
VIETNAM BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENT.) ONE VIETNAMESE
CHINA EXPERT NOTED THAT VIETNAM'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
PRC IS "MOSTLY IMPORTANT ON A POLITICAL LEVEL," SINCE
ECONOMIC AND TRADE TIES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES ARE
FAR MORE MODEST THAN WITH THE U.S. OR JAPAN. BEIJING'S
AMBASSADOR HERE, NOW ON HIS THIRD TOUR IN VIETNAM AND A
HANOI UNIVERSITY GRADUATE, MAY BE THE MOST FLUENT
VIETNAMESE SPEAKER IN THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS.


7. (C) YET AS THE VIETNAMESE HAVE TURNED MORE TO A
MARKET-STYLE ECONOMY, HANOI HAS ALSO BEEN KEEN TO COURT
TAIWAN AND TAIWANESE INVESTORS. IT NOW MAINTAINS A
LARGE AND SURPRISINGLY ACTIVE "UNOFFICIAL" OFFICE IN
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TAIPEI, HEADED BY A SENIOR FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICER.
IN ADDITION TO TRADE WORK, THE ELEVEN VIETNAMESE
EMPLOYEES AT THE OFFICE ARE PARTICIPANTS AT CHINA-
WATCHING ACTIVITIES AT TAIWAN "GOVERNMENT-RUN" THINK
TANKS. THE TAIPEI ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL OFFICE (TECO)
IN HANOI IS MUCH SMALLER, AND WITH NO FLUENT VIETNAMESE
SPEAKERS ON ITS STAFF, BUT OBSERVERS HAVE NOTED THE
AGGRESSIVENESS OF TECO STAFF IN SEEKING CONTACTS AND
INFORMATION HERE. THE DIRECTOR WHO LEFT EARLIER THIS
YEAR HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN THE HEAD OF TAIWAN'S MILITARY
INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT. THE TAIWAN TRADE MINISTER,
ACCOMPANIED BY A LARGE ENTOURAGE OF BUSINESS LEADERS,
USUALLY VISITS VIETNAM EVERY YEAR.

THREAT LEVEL
--------------


8. (C) ACCORDING TO ONE VIETNAMESE ACADEMIC
SPECIALIZING IN CHINA STUDIES, "THE US AND VIETNAM ARE
THE TWO COUNTRIES THAT ARE MOST CONCERNED WITH CHINA."
(IN CONTRAST, VIETNAM IS PROBABLY NOT EVEN IN THE TOP
FIVE OR TEN OF BEIJING'S CONCERNS, THEY ADMIT.)
DESPITE THE SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION OF THEIR LAND BORDER
DEMARCATION IN 1999, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TONKIN GULF
MARITIME BORDER AGREEMENT HAS BEEN DELAYED BY
DIFFICULTIES IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON FISHING RIGHTS.
BOTH THE LAND AND MARITIME AGREEMENTS GENERATED
LEADERSHIP CONTROVERSY HERE, POSSIBLY CONTRIBUTING TO
LE KHA PHIEU'S EARLY REMOVAL AS PARTY LEADER LAST YEAR.
THE AGREEMENTS ARE FAVORITE TARGETS OF CRITICISM BY
OVERSEAS VIETNAMESE AND SOME INTERNAL ACTIVISTS.
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ACCORDING TO OFFICIAL CHINA WATCHERS HERE, CONFLICTING
CLAIMS IN WHAT THE VIETNAMESE REFER TO AS THE "EAST
SEA" -- COMMONLY KNOWN ELSEWHERE AS THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
-- REMAINS THE "BIGGEST SECURITY PROBLEM" FOR VIETNAM.
ONE OBSERVER CLAIMED THAT "YOU CAN'T SAY IT WILL NEVER
BE RESOLVED," WHILE ADMITTING THAT SUCCESS IN THIS
ENDEAVOR MIGHT WELL NOT TAKE PLACE IN HIS LIFETIME.


9. (C) ANOTHER ACADEMIC POINTED TO THE INHERENT
DIFFICULTIES IN SEEKING RESOLUTION EVEN IN AN ASEAN
FRAMEWORK, AS NOW SEEMS TO BE THE HOPE. SOME OBSERVERS
-- BUT NOT MANY -- HAVE OPINED THAT US OR JAPANESE
INVOLVEMENT IN THIS ISSUE COULD SPEED ITS RESOLUTION.
IN ANY EVENT, FEW CHINA WATCHERS HERE PUT THE RISK OF
ARMED CONFLICT OVER THE EAST SEA AS HIGH, AND NOW
(UNLIKE SEVERAL YEARS AGO) ASSUME THAT BEIJING AND
HANOI WOULD NOT ALLOW ISOLATED INCIDENTS AS MIGHT TAKE
PLACE TO ESCALATE INTO LARGER CONFLICT OR JEOPARDIZE
BILATERAL TIES.

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ACTION EAP-00

INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AF-00 AIT-03 ACQ-00 CIAE-00 DS-00
FBIE-00 VC-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 VCE-00 NSAE-00 IRM-00
DSCC-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 /003W
-------------- B1645D 210848Z /38
R 210705Z MAY 02
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6536
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AIT TAIPEI 0691
SECDEF WASHDC
DIA WASHDC
AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
AMCONSUL SHENYANG
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 HANOI 001290

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV, EAP/CM, AND EAP/RSP-TC

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10. (C) WHILE CLOSELY WATCHING THE SITUATION IN THE
TAIWAN STRAIT, CHINA EXPERTS IN VIETNAM RATE THE THREAT
LEVEL TO VIETNAM AS FAR LOWER THAN THE EAST SEA ISSUE.
THEY ACKNOWLEDGE, HOWEVER, THAT ANY TENSIONS OR
CONFLICT IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT WOULD NECESSARILY AFFECT
SHIPPING IN THE REGION, AND HENCE VIETNAM'S ABILITY TO
PURSUE EXPORT-LED GROWTH.

ONE CHINA -- DO WE CARE?
--------------


11. (C) WHILE REGULARLY AND OPENLY EXPRESSING SUPPORT
FOR "ONE CHINA," VIETNAM PROBABLY DOES NOT CARE DEEPLY
ABOUT WHETHER OR WHEN THE TWO SIDES REUNIFY, AS LONG AS
THEY AVOID OPEN CONFLICT, CONTINUE THE IMPROVEMENT OF
TIES WITH EACH OTHER -- AND WITH VIETNAM -- AND DO NOT
POSE A THREAT TO REGIONAL TRADE AND SECURITY. MOST
OBSERVERS HERE SEE THE PRC AS BEING INCREASINGLY
"FLEXIBLE" IN ITS APPROACH TO TAIWAN. SOME, HOWEVER,
EXPRESS GROWING DOUBT THAT THE YOUNGER GENERATION OF
MAINLANDERS HAS THE SAME ZEAL FOR REUNIFICATION AS
THEIR ELDERS.


12. (C) GVN POLICY ADVISERS CLAIM THAT VIETNAMESE
LEADERS NEVER OFFER OPINIONS TO BEIJING OR TAIPEI ABOUT
REUNIFICATION (DESPITE VIETNAM'S EXPERIENCE WITH ITS
OWN REUNIFICATION). CHINA WATCHERS HERE SO FAR DO NOT
EXPECT ANY SURPRISES ON TAIWAN POLICY -- OR OTHER
POLICIES -- IN BEIJING EVEN AFTER PRESIDENT JIANG ZEMIN
STEPS DOWN; THEY USUALLY STRESS WHAT THEY SEE AS THE
COLLECTIVE PRC AND CCP LEADERSHIP, WHICH MITIGATES
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AGAINST BOLD OR EXTREME MEASURES. (FEW WOULD DARE
OPENLY DRAW THE NATURAL COMPARISON WITH VIETNAM'S OWN
LEADERSHIP, HOWEVER.)

PROGNOSIS: GOOD
--------------


13. (C) FEW STORM CLOUDS (OTHER THAN THE DIMINISHING
PROSPECT OF SOUTH CHINA SEA CONFLICT) APPEAR ON THE
HORIZON IN HANOI'S RELATIONS WITH BEIJING AND TAIPEI.
THE PRC'S GROWING RELATIONSHIP WITH ASEAN IS SEEN HERE
AS A PLUS, AS IS THE PARTICIPATION OF BEIJING, TAIPEI,
AND HANOI IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION
FORUM. INCREASED FLOWS INTO VIETNAM OF CHINESE
TOURISTS, BUSINESSPEOPLE, AND INVESTORS AND EXCHANGES
OF OFFICIALS (OR NON-OFFICIALS, AS THE CASE MAY BE WITH
TAIWAN) NOT ONLY IMPROVE VIETNAMESE BILATERAL TIES WITH
EACH BUT ALSO BUTTRESS THE OVERALL TREND IN VIETNAMESE
FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1990 OF DIVERSIFICATION AND
MULTILATERALIZATION. BUT WE SHOULD NOT EXPECT THE
VIETNAMESE TO LET DOWN THEIR GUARD ENTIRELY OVER THE
LONG-TERM ASPIRATIONS OR DESIGNS OF THEIR LOOMING
NEIGHBOR TO THE NORTH.
BURGHARDT

CONFIDENTIAL