Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
02COLOMBO2163
2002-11-21 09:19:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

WHAT THE PM WILL RAISE WITH YOU IN OSLO

Tags:  PREL EAID PGOV CE LTTE 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L COLOMBO 002163 

SIPDIS

FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROCCA FROM
AMBASSADOR WILLS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2012
TAGS: PREL EAID PGOV CE LTTE
SUBJECT: WHAT THE PM WILL RAISE WITH YOU IN OSLO


Classified By: AMBASSADOR E. ASHLEY WILLS. REASONS 1.5 B, D.

C O N F I D E N T I A L COLOMBO 002163

SIPDIS

FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROCCA FROM
AMBASSADOR WILLS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2012
TAGS: PREL EAID PGOV CE LTTE
SUBJECT: WHAT THE PM WILL RAISE WITH YOU IN OSLO


Classified By: AMBASSADOR E. ASHLEY WILLS. REASONS 1.5 B, D.


1. (C) I saw PM Wickremesinghe three times this week, twice
at social events and most recently today together with Deputy
USTR Huntsman, who is here for the first official meeting on
trade issues since the TIFA was signed in July. (Ambassador
Huntsman's visit, by the way, is going extremely well, as we
will report by septel.) On all three occasions, Ranil and I
had brief exchanges about what he intends to raise with you
in Oslo.


2. (C) Aggregating his responses, it seems he wants to thank
you for your personal involvement in and support of his
government's attempt to end the civil conflict through
negotiations. It means a lot to him, he said, that you will
be attending the Oslo meeting. He added that he would
mention his appreciation of the various USG-sponsored
assessments that have been carried out in recent months, in
particular those involving the Peace Corps, USAID and
Treasury programs and the three teams from DOD. In the
latter connection, he said that peace is the target but his
military's preparedness is a key factor in the equation as
well. "We don't want to return to fighting, that's for sure,
but the LTTE must perceive that our military is not weak."
He elaborated that this is why US assistance to Sri Lanka's
military forces, mainly in the form of training, education
and other mil-mil contacts, is so important. He also
expressed his hope that "modest" equipment sales -- mainly
relating to maritime surveillance and interdiction -- would
be forthcoming too.


3. (C) I replied that his agenda sounded fine to me, but
added that I hoped he would not put too much emphasis on
equipment sales. These might or might not be possible, I
said, but it is clear that we see our greatest value added in
the military field in mil-mil engagement programs relating to
training and education. Bottom line: he probably will raise
equipment sales with you but not forcefully, as it were.


4. (C) Ranil's mood is very positive as he approaches Oslo.
He and his Cabinet colleagues have got our message that they
should not have high expectation about the money likely to be
pledged. The important thing, we and other donors here
stressed, is our political support of the process. (Indeed,
GL Peiris told the media 11/19 that the GSL never expected
many new financial pledges at Oslo and that it now refers to
the event not as a donors' conference but as a "peace
support" one.)


5. (c) The GSL seems to be coming to the view that the LTTE
means it this time. Various ministers I have spoken with
lately have been somewhat less dubious about the Tigers'
intentions. (GL Peiris is utterly convinced that the LTTE is
for real, an enthusiasm that is not shared by his Cabinet
colleagues, and that I too find unwarranted.) But they all
stress how important it is for us and others in the
international community to remain steadfast in reminding the
LTTE that its behavior is being closely observed and that it
has yet to be declarative in renouncing violence and the idea
of Tamil Eelam and in embracing the idea of genuine
democracy.


6. (C) In one of our brief exchanges this week, I asked
Ranil what he thought of the PA's harsh statement last week
alleging bias on the part of the Norwegians and softness on
the part of the US and the UK regarding the LTTE. He replied
that it showed just how unhappy President Kumaratunga is
about the positive trend of events. He did not reckon that
the statement would have a major impact or that it meant that
the PA could not be worked with. In this regard, he said he
will brief the President privately when he returns from Oslo.

WILLS