MORAGODA ON MEETING LTTE IN OSLO: GUARDED OPTIMISM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001527 SIPDIS STATE FOR SA; LONDON FOR REIDEL; NSC FOR MILLARD E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2012 TAGS: CE PGOV PINR PINS PREL PTER LTTE SUBJECT: MORAGODA ON MEETING LTTE IN OSLO: GUARDED OPTIMISM RETURNS REF: A. OSLO 1742 ¶B. OSLO 1846 ¶C. COLOMBO 1319 Classified By: Ambassador E. Ashley Wills; reasons 1.5 (b and d) SUMMARY: PEACE TALKS MOMENTUM ¶1. (C) GSL Minister Moragoda appeared to have regained a bit of optimism following his Oslo meeting (reftels) with LTTE "theorist" Anton Balasingham. Moragoda said that Balasingham seems serious about getting talks going, is very sensitive to US and Indian attitudes re the LTTE, and concerned about the LTTE's overall international image. According to Moragoda, Balasingham has an understanding of GSL political difficulties and appears willing to try not to add to them unnecessarily. The long-stagnant "peace process" looks to have regained its momentum. At the same time, Moragoda expressed concerns over Balasingham's health, the potentially complicating role of Muslim political leader Rauff Hakeem, and the Byzantine nature of Sri Lankan politics, most notably the very strained relationship between President Kumaratunga and Prime Minister Wickremesinghe. END SUMMARY ¶2. (C) Moragoda met the Ambassador and DCM on August 19 to provide a read-out on the "peace process" in the wake of the PM's visit to Washington and Moragoda's meetings with Balasingham in Europe. Much of what Moragoda told us is contained in reftels and we won't repeat. He did, however, relate a few noteworthy items. ¶3. (C) Moragoda expressed a renewed sense of reserved optimism that the long-stagnant "peace process" seems to have picked up some steam and has begun moving in a positive direction. Although Moragoda thought there was confusion within the LTTE on how exactly to proceed, he said Balasingham seems genuine in wanting to get the talks underway. Balasingham told Moragoda that the LTTE was not ready to discuss substance. Moragoda responded by saying that the two sides would start "in the baby pool" and proceed later to greater depths. For this reason, the first phase of the talks will deal with practical issues of development and commercial activity and will seek to establish the framework for subsequent formal peace negotiations. Both sides are under pressure to show the long-suffering population in the north and east some immediate results in the development area. Moragoda pressed Balasingham re the Scandinavian monitors' reports of over fifty kidnappings/forcible recruitments since the ceasefire. Balasingham, while not necessarily accepting that number as accurate, recognized that the LTTE has a problem with cadres leaving their units and going home; he implied that the "kidnappings" were the LTTE's bringing soldiers back to their units -- he tacitly admitted that "peace" has created a desertion problem for the LTTE. Balasingham promised that the LTTE would look into the reported incidents. ¶4. (C) Moragoda said GSL spokesman and fellow Minister G.L. Peiris had made a mistake by announcing publicly that Muslim politician Rauff Hakeem would form part of the GSL negotiating team. Moragoda said the announcement was premature as the rest of the team has not yet been selected. Moragoda said that Balasingham did not seem too happy about Hakeem's being at the negotiations and questioned Hakeem's ability to deliver Sri Lanka's Muslims, especially in the East. Moragoda acknowledged that he, too, shared those concerns and worried about what role Hakeem would play and how Hakeem could be handled. ¶5. (C) Moragoda's greatest concern remained the complex, at times bizarre politics of the Sinhalese south. He said hardliners within the PM's UNF coalition are determined to bring down President Kumaratunga. These hardliners are not satisfied with getting a constitutional amendment passed that would restrict the President's ability to dissolve parliament -- they want Kumaratunga impeached and out of office. Moragoda said that he and the Prime Minister recognize that the UNF does not have the numbers to remove Kumaratunga, and at most they will be able to pass the constitutional amendment. Kumaratunga, Moragoda said, will remain a force to be reckoned with for the next three years of her term. Given the very poor state of relations between the President and the Prime Minister, those three years are going to be rocky ones and could affect the peace negotiations. Fortunately, he said, Balasingham seems to appreciate the GSL's internal difficulties and vowed not to make life any more difficult than necessary for the GSL. The announcement of peace talks for September reflects the LTTE's attempt to help the PM. In fact, Balasingham apparently agreed to the September announcement without first going to Sri Lanka to consult LTTE Supremo Prabhakaran. ¶6. (C) Moragoda expressed serious concern over the state of Balasingham's health and whether he would be able to see the process through. Moragoda said Balasingham is the LTTE's eyes and ears on the world. Balasingham understands the importance of the LTTE's cleaning up its international image and has a healthy respect for the positions of India and especially the U.S. Balasingham would be hard to replace. ¶7. (C) COMMENT: The negotiations are going to be tough and Sri Lanka will undoubtedly experience some tense moments in the months ahead, particularly if the politics of the Sinhalese South do not stabilize. In addition, no one knows what exactly is going on within the LTTE and whether Balasingham's more moderate stance can carry the day. There are no guarantees. That said, the overall state of affairs in Sri Lanka has experienced a dramatic turn for the better over the past few months. Sri Lanka is a very different country today than it was eight months ago. If the GSL can keep the LTTE focused on practical issues of development, money, and patronage, even without a final political settlement in the near future, it would be difficult (though not impossible) for the bad old days to return. Wills