TURKEY: PRESIDENT'S VETO CLOUDS ERDOGAN'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 009073 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2012 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS TU SUBJECT: TURKEY: PRESIDENT'S VETO CLOUDS ERDOGAN'S POLITICAL FUTURE REF: A. ANKARA 8165 ¶B. ANKARA 8252 Classified by Acting Political Counselor Nicholas S. Kass. Reasons: 1.5 (b)(d) ¶1. (C) Summary: President Sezer Dec. 19 vetoed a constitutional amendment package (including changes to Articles 67, 76, and 78 -- ref A) designed to reinstate AK Leader Erdogan's political rights and clear the way for his entry into Parliament and the Government. Contacts across the spectrum say that Sezer is playing politics, risking not only his reputation for even-handedness but complicating government operations at a time when clarity and decisive action are needed. End summary. -------------- What Happened: the Politics -------------- ¶2. (C) Sezer claimed the constitution "could not be changed for one man." For his part, Erdogan publicly challenged the President to submit the amendments -- and by implication, Sezer's political reputation -- to a popular referendum. His lawyer charged that, while the constitutional amendment package "is not personal, Sezer's veto is." ¶3. (C) The package had passed Parliamentary muster Dec. 13 with 440 of 465 votes cast, including a minimum of some 80 from the Establishmentarian, opposition Republican People's Party (CHP). This sizable figure represents nearly 45 percent of the entire CHP caucus. Deniz Baykal, the CHP leader, reportedly had been anxious to bring the popular Erdogan into Parliament and Government, partly to make AK an easier target by saddling Erdogan -- rather than P.M. Abdullah Gul, AK's No. 2 man -- directly with any AK Government missteps. ¶4. (C) Contacts across the political spectrum are questioning the President's motives, criticizing his action as a purely political vice legal decision -- by a man who promotes a reputation as a disinterested, "by the book" former Constitutional Court Chief. -- CHP has publicly indicated that it disagrees with Sezer's reasoning. Nevertheless, senior CHP deputy Bulent Tanla told poloff Dec. 20 that the party will now "carefully review" Sezer's ruling. "With all of the important issues on Turkey's agenda, it would be wrong to hurry through the process," he said. -- Senior AK officials are even more direct, asserting to us that by vetoing the package Sezer "is serving the political interests of Turkey's Deep State" (ref B). The Parliamentary Bureau Chief of the semi-official Anatolian News Agency (A.A.) volunteered that behind Sezer stands a collection of State bureaucratic and other institutions intent on keeping the heat on Erdogan. -- The owner/CEO of a TV-newspaper conglomerate told D/Polcouns Dec. 20 that Sezer is working with elements of the military, the judiciary, and with CHP to promote discord in government operations -- suggesting that despite CHP's earlier support for the package, it wants to keep AK twisting in the wind. He asserted that TGS Chief Gen. Hilmi Ozkok personally wants to stay out of the fray and is even trying to limit military meddling in politics, but faces resistance from senior commanders who take a different tack. (Note: Some general officers are pleasantly surprised by AK and do not, in fact, want it undercut -- yet. End note.) -------------- The Mechanics -------------- ¶5. (C) The draft must now pass through Parliament as though it were a new proposal -- beginning with deliberations in the Constitutional Committee before moving a floor vote by the entire Assembly. As it did the first time around, Parliament will then vote on he amendments twice -- with a 48-hour interval between votes. As a result, the earliest Parliament can adopt the legislation for Sezer's review would be Dec. 27, according to the mainstream press. ¶6. (C) The AK-controlled Parliament is likely to try pushing through and resubmitting to Sezer an unchanged package. If so, Sezer would have three options: 1) he can accept the package, having made public his concerns; 2) he can apply to the Constitutional Court for an annulment of the changes; or 3) he may submit all or part of the package to referendum. For most pieces of legislation, the president has at most 15 days to reach a decision. For changes to the constitution, however, there is no formal time limit, but Sezer would be expected to produce a decision by mid-January (assuming late-December legislative passage). Should Sezer decide to take the matter to the voters, the action shifts to the Supreme Election Board (YSK),which is charged with establishing the conditions and calendar under which the referendum would be held. In this regard, the YSK apparently has considerable lattitude. -------------- Comment: Playing Chicken -------------- ¶7. (C) Our AK sources and other contacts say Erdogan's level of irritation with Sezer is high and growing. This, together with what we know about AK and Erdogan's personality, suggest that at a minimum, tension between the AK Party/Government and Sezer will smolder, and could flare up when Erdogan assumes formal power -- which contacts of all political stripes assume is a virtual certainty sooner or later. ¶8. (C) In contrast to his most recent predecessors, Sezer has tried to nurture a reputation as an apolitical Head of State. Nevertheless, over time he has let his political slip show in ever increasing increments; for example a senior Constitutional Court Justice charges that Sezer has in fact abandoned neutrality in favor of supporting a narrow Establishmentarian, status-quo-oriented political agenda. While a referendum would entail risks on all sides, Sezer -- and a Presidency whose powers depend more on public approval than on specific constitutional provisions -- would stand to lose the most by: 1) appearing to thwart the popular will; and 2) perpetuating the current, unwieldy situation regarding Erdogan, AK, and the Government -- created in the first instance by legal restrictions on the AK leader that appear increasingly without merit in the public eye. PEARSON