C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 009073

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2012
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: PRESIDENT'S VETO CLOUDS ERDOGAN'S
POLITICAL FUTURE

REF: A. ANKARA 8165

B. ANKARA 8252


Classified by Acting Political Counselor Nicholas S. Kass.
Reasons: 1.5 (b)(d)



1. (C) Summary: President Sezer Dec. 19 vetoed a
constitutional amendment package (including changes to
Articles 67, 76, and 78 -- ref A) designed to reinstate AK
Leader Erdogan's political rights and clear the way for his
entry into Parliament and the Government. Contacts across the
spectrum say that Sezer is playing politics, risking not only
his reputation for even-handedness but complicating
government operations at a time when clarity and decisive
action are needed. End summary.


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What Happened: the Politics
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2. (C) Sezer claimed the constitution "could not be changed
for one man." For his part, Erdogan publicly challenged the
President to submit the amendments -- and by implication,
Sezer's political reputation -- to a popular referendum. His
lawyer charged that, while the constitutional amendment
package "is not personal, Sezer's veto is."



3. (C) The package had passed Parliamentary muster Dec. 13
with 440 of 465 votes cast, including a minimum of some 80
from the Establishmentarian, opposition Republican People's
Party (CHP). This sizable figure represents nearly 45
percent of the entire CHP caucus. Deniz Baykal, the CHP
leader, reportedly had been anxious to bring the popular
Erdogan into Parliament and Government, partly to make AK an
easier target by saddling Erdogan -- rather than P.M.
Abdullah Gul, AK's No. 2 man -- directly with any AK
Government missteps.



4. (C) Contacts across the political spectrum are questioning
the President's motives, criticizing his action as a purely
political vice legal decision -- by a man who promotes a
reputation as a disinterested, "by the book" former
Constitutional Court Chief.


-- CHP has publicly indicated that it disagrees with Sezer's
reasoning. Nevertheless, senior CHP deputy Bulent Tanla told
poloff Dec. 20 that the party will now "carefully review"
Sezer's ruling. "With all of the important issues on
Turkey's agenda, it would be wrong to hurry

through the
process," he said.


-- Senior AK officials are even more direct, asserting to us
that by vetoing the package Sezer "is serving the political
interests of Turkey's Deep State" (ref B). The Parliamentary
Bureau Chief of the semi-official Anatolian News Agency
(A.A.) volunteered that behind Sezer stands a collection of
State bureaucratic and other institutions intent on keeping
the heat on Erdogan.


-- The owner/CEO of a TV-newspaper conglomerate told
D/Polcouns Dec. 20 that Sezer is working with elements of the
military, the judiciary, and with CHP to promote discord in
government operations -- suggesting that despite CHP's
earlier support for the package, it wants to keep AK twisting
in the wind. He asserted that TGS Chief Gen. Hilmi Ozkok
personally wants to stay out of the fray and is even trying
to limit military meddling in politics, but faces resistance
from senior commanders who take a different tack. (Note:
Some general officers are pleasantly surprised by AK and do
not, in fact, want it undercut -- yet. End note.)


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The Mechanics
--------------



5. (C) The draft must now pass through Parliament as though
it were a new proposal -- beginning with deliberations in the
Constitutional Committee before moving a floor vote by the
entire Assembly. As it did the first time around, Parliament
will then vote on he amendments twice -- with a 48-hour
interval between votes. As a result, the earliest Parliament
can adopt the legislation for Sezer's review would be Dec.
27, according to the mainstream press.



6. (C) The AK-controlled Parliament is likely to try pushing
through and resubmitting to Sezer an unchanged package. If
so, Sezer would have three options: 1) he can accept the
package, having made public his concerns; 2) he can apply to
the Constitutional Court for an annulment of the changes; or
3) he may submit all or part of the package to referendum.
For most pieces of legislation, the president has at most 15
days to reach a decision. For changes to the constitution,
however, there is no formal time limit, but Sezer would be
expected to produce a decision by mid-January (assuming
late-December legislative passage). Should Sezer decide to
take the matter to the voters, the action shifts to the
Supreme Election Board (YSK), which is charged with
establishing the conditions and calendar under which the
referendum would be held. In this regard, the YSK apparently
has considerable lattitude.


--------------
Comment: Playing Chicken
--------------



7. (C) Our AK sources and other contacts say Erdogan's level
of irritation with Sezer is high and growing. This, together
with what we know about AK and Erdogan's personality, suggest
that at a minimum, tension between the AK Party/Government
and Sezer will smolder, and could flare up when Erdogan
assumes formal power -- which contacts of all political
stripes assume is a virtual certainty sooner or later.



8. (C) In contrast to his most recent predecessors, Sezer has
tried to nurture a reputation as an apolitical Head of State.
Nevertheless, over time he has let his political slip show
in ever increasing increments; for example a senior
Constitutional Court Justice charges that Sezer has in fact
abandoned neutrality in favor of supporting a narrow
Establishmentarian, status-quo-oriented political agenda.
While a referendum would entail risks on all sides, Sezer --
and a Presidency whose powers depend more on public approval
than on specific constitutional provisions -- would stand to
lose the most by: 1) appearing to thwart the popular will;
and 2) perpetuating the current, unwieldy situation regarding
Erdogan, AK, and the Government -- created in the first
instance by legal restrictions on the AK leader that appear
increasingly without merit in the public eye.
PEARSON