IRAQ AND THE TURKISH GAS MARKET

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 008863 SIPDIS STATE FOR E, EB/CBED, EB/ESC, EUR/SE, NEA/NGA STATE PASS NSC FOR QUANRUD AND BRYZA USDOC FOR 4212/ITA/MAC/OEURA/CPD/DDEFALCO USDOE FOR PUMPHREY/ROSSI E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2012 TAGS: ENRG ECON EPET ETTC AJ GG KZ TU IZ SUBJECT: IRAQ AND THE TURKISH GAS MARKET REF: A) ANKARA 8018 B) ANKARA 5216 C) ANKARA 3837 D) 2001 ANKARA 4960 Classified by DCM Robert Deutsch, Reason 1.5 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary and comment: The GOT denies recent press reports that suggest new developments on the Turkey-Iraq gas project. Although the MFA previously told us a 1997 Turkey-Iraq protocol on natural gas was null and void, BOTAS claims the protocol still exists, and was discussed as recently as July 2002. The MFA maintains that a change in Iraq would not affect the gas picture in Turkey; however, BOTAS General Manager Bildaci believes that, if Iraqi gas becomes available any time soon, it could affect Shah Deniz. As the Shah Deniz gas project continues to be delayed, and the prospect of an Iraq post-sanctions appears more conceivable to the Turks, it is likely that Iraqi gas is playing into the GOT's -- and BP's -- calculations. We believe that ultimately Turkey's commitment to the East-West Energy Corridor and to its Caspian neighbors will prevail, and it will hold up its end of the bargain on Shah Deniz. However, we would be more convinced that a change in Iraq would not affect Shah Deniz if the project were sanctioned and construction underway -- yet another reason to continue our push with all parties to move to sanction as soon as possible. End summary and comment. GOT Denies Progress on Iraq Gas Deal, Speculates on Future -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) There have been several press reports over the last few weeks quoting a "top Iraqi oil official" as saying that Iraq is seeking to become the "main gas exporter" to Turkey. MFA Deputy Director General for Energy Hakki Akil, BOTAS General Manager Bildaci, and TPAO officials have all confirmed to us that there have been no recent discussions or developments on the Turkey-Iraq gas project. (Note: Turkey and Iraq signed in May 1997 a protocol for the export of natural gas to Turkey. See paras 8-9 for a history of the project). Views differ, however, as to potential progress on this deal in an Iraq post-sanctions. ¶3. (C) MFA Deputy DG Akil told us that change in Iraq would not affect the gas picture in Turkey; in particular, he said, it would not affect the government's commitment to the Shah Deniz gas pipeline. Akil claimed that the GOT had never envisioned Iraqi gas for the Turkish market; therefore, even if it suddenly became available at a good price, it would not be competing with Shah Deniz gas. ¶4. (C) BOTAS General Manager Bildaci (strictly protect) provided a different view. Bildaci noted that Iraqi gas from an Iraq post-sanctions would be significantly cheaper than any gas Turkey is currently importing; therefore, if that gas became available in the very near future, it certainly had the potential to affect projects like Shah Deniz. A TPAO official told us that, while there had been no recent progress on talks with Iraq, they were "keeping the channels of communication open." ¶5. (C) A BP executive told econoff that Iraq is not figuring into BP's planning on Shah Deniz at this point because BP believed that Turkey 1) had no space for Iraqi gas; and 2) was committed to Shah Deniz. A February 2002 internal BP report on gas in Turkey states that "by the time Saddam Hussein goes, Turkey could be fully supplied by other gas importers . . . the about-turn on policy will come when Saddam Hussein goes and the UN embargo is lifted; there will be enormous pressure on Turkey to increase trade with Iraq by re-opening the Kirkuk-Ceyhan oil pipeline and very quickly putting gas back on the agenda, although there will be more words than action." (Note: the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline is open and being used to transport oil under the oil-for-food program). Iraqi Gas, Shah Deniz and Turkey's Supply/Demand -------------- --- ¶6. (C) Industry analysts estimate that, given Turkey's existing gas contracts (including Shah Deniz),it will need to increase gas imports starting in 2012. This estimate assumes medium demand/growth, exports to Greece of 2 bcm annually, and Turkey purchasing all contracted gas at the take-or-pay levels. Under this scenario, the Turkish government (or private companies, in a liberalized market) would not be in a position to sign new gas contracts for six to eight years. However, if inexpensive Iraqi gas became available before that, BOTAS could try to renegotiate some of its more expensive gas contracts, particularly with Russia, to lower prices or to create space for Iraqi gas. As reported in ref A, BOTAS is currently paying, or will pay, the following amounts for its imported gas. Gas Contract USD per thousand cubic meters -------------- Russia West 1 130 Russia West 2 134 Blue Stream 132 Iran 123 Shah Deniz 95.5 ¶7. (C) Assuming that Shah Deniz has been sanctioned and has entered the construction phase, BOTAS would be less likely to try to renegotiate that contract. As reported ref B, Turkey's powerful National Security Council has strongly endorsed the Shah Deniz pipeline. Senior Ministry of Energy and MFA officials recognize that construction of Shah Deniz enhances Turkey's national security by diversifying its energy supply, solidifying its role in the East-West Energy Corridor, and helping to ensure the prosperity and stability of its Caspian neighbors. Just as these officials did not try to renegotiate the Shah Deniz contract when Turkey's gas oversupply problem became apparent in early 2002 (ref c), they likely will look to other contracts first if cheap Iraqi gas becomes available. The Shah Deniz project is governed by an Intergovernmental Agreement with an important ally, will provide Turkey's cheapest gas, and is considered by many to be critical to completion of the BTC oil pipeline. If, however, Iraqi gas became available before Shah Deniz was sanctioned and construction underway, the equation could change. History of the Turkey-Iraq Natural Gas Project -------------- - ¶8. (C) BOTAS provided us the following history of the Turkey-Iraq Natural Gas Project: March '96: Turkish Ministry of Energy (MENR) and Iraqi Ministry of Oil sign a Memorandum of Understanding for the natural gas export project. May '97: Turkish and Iraqi Energy Ministers sign the "Agreement on Iraq Natural Gas Exports to Turkey." BOTAS, the Turkish Petroleum Agency (TPAO),and Tekfen, a large Turkish holding company, sign the "Agreement for a Project of Mutual Interest," creating the consortium that would develop the gas pipeline project in Turkey. June '98: Iraq-Turkey Joint Working Group agrees on a feasibility report. July '98: Presentation made to foreign companies willing to participate in the project. Gaz de France is later nominated to be the organizing company for other oil/gas companies' participation in midstream. ENI-Agip is nominated to be the organizing company for other oil/gas companies' participation in upstream. June '01: During the 13th Session of the Joint Economic Commission between Turkey and Iraq, both sides agree to hold discussions in order to reactivate the project by re-identifying new roles of the Turkish firms within the scope of the new gas market law. July '02: During the 14th Session of the Joint Economic Commission between Turkey and Iraq, both sides agree to take the necessary steps for the realization of the "Iraqi Gas Export Project to Turkey and Europe" with an "integrated project approach," and "taking into consideration the future gas demand in Turkey." ¶9. (C) Other sources claim that, according to the May 1997 agreement, Turkey would purchase 10 bcm of gas per year from Iraq for a 20 year period. MFA Deputy DG for Energy Akil told us in July 2001 (ref d) that, with the enactment of the new natural gas law in June 2001, BOTAS no longer had the authority to enter into new contractual arrangements for the import of gas. Therefore, Akil said, the GOT had informed Iraq that the 1997 protocol was null and void with the passage of the new gas law. Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) Although press reports regarding new developments on the Turkey-Iraq gas project appear to be false, progress on this deal becomes more likely with an Iraq post-sanctions. We believe that ultimately Turkey's commitment to the East-West Energy Corridor and to its Caspian neighbors will outweigh other considerations, and -- particularly once the project is sanctioned -- Turkey will hold up its end of the bargain on Shah Deniz. However, we would be more convinced that a change in Iraq would not affect Shah Deniz if the project were sanctioned and construction underway -- yet another reason to continue our push with all parties to move to sanction as soon as possible. DEUTSCH