Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
02ANKARA8777
2002-12-02 14:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:
TURKEY'S DISAFFECTED YOUTH VOTE: CAN IT BE COOPTED?
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 008777
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2012
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY'S DISAFFECTED YOUTH VOTE: CAN IT BE COOPTED?
(U) Classified by Ambassador W.R. Pearson; reasons: 1.5 (b,d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 008777
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2012
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY'S DISAFFECTED YOUTH VOTE: CAN IT BE COOPTED?
(U) Classified by Ambassador W.R. Pearson; reasons: 1.5 (b,d).
1. (C) Summary: Protest voting is an old tradition in Turkey
but showed a new twist in Nov. 3 national elections.
Motorola deadbeat and Berlusconi wannabe Cem Uzan --
emphasizing a xenophobic, nihilistic message and playing on
resentment of America -- parlayed the anger of disaffected
urban youths into a notable percentage of votes for his Genc
(Youth) Party. Whether this bloc of protest voters can be
coopted by governing AK Party or will remain to be
manipulated again at the next elections will depend on the
government's ability to address unemployment, sharply lower
standards of living, and a deep-rooted mistrust of governing
parties. End summary.
2. (C) Turks have long used the ballot box to show their
dissatisfaction with endemic corruption and feckless
leadership of politicians. In 1999, for example, the
Nationalist Action Party (MHP) capitalized on an angry
electorate to capture 18% of the national vote. Although the
concept of the "protest vote" is therefore nothing new in
Turkey, the Nov. 3 national election was noteworthy for the
strong showing of Cem Uzan's Genc (Youth) Party. Uzan's
xenophobic, nihilistic, and often anti-American rhetoric
attracted people of all ages, including many from among the
the nearly 4 million young Turks who voted for the first
time. The questions are: 1) whether these poorly educated,
unemployed youths searching for a political voice will be
coopted by the ruling AK (Justice and Development) Party,
itself embodying an anti-Establishment message, as it
wrestles with Turkey's pressing economic issues; or 2)
whether they remain a floating group that could be
manipulated, once again, by Cem Uzan or someone else playing
on similar themes.
--------------
Who voted for Genc?
--------------
3. (C) During the campaign, as Uzan's media-savvy and
manipulative campaign gathered force, many observers feared
that Uzan would get up to 15% of the vote, well beyond the
10% threshold for representation in Parliament. Uzan's poll
numbers tailed off at the close of the campaign and in the
end, mainly since AK Party had captured the aspirations of a
significant portion of voters in the greater urban sprawls,
he could not garner more than 7% of the vote. Nevertheless,
his provocative rhetoric -- supported by a massive media
campaign on the multiple Uzan-owned TV channels -- played
well with certain segments of the Turkish electorate
disgusted with the status quo.
4. (C) Local Ankara contacts explained to us recently that
Genc appealed to disaffected nationalist youths across the
political spectrum. One AK Party official in Ankara's Mamak
sub-province claimed that half of Genc's vote total came from
those who voted for MHP in the 1999 national election. Besir
Atalay -- founder of ANAR polling firm and now a State
Minister and close partisan of P.M. Abdullah Gul -- told us
Nov. 15 that a significant portion of Genc votes came from
former P.M. Bulent Ecevit's Democratic Left Party (DSP) and
his coalition partner Motherland Party (ANAP). In addition,
a local AK Party boss claimed that Genc had made inroads
among stay-at-home women voters because of its intense
television ad campaign in the run-up to Nov. 3.
5. (C) There was also a strong anti-American undercurrent to
many of Genc's campaign themes. Indeed, many of our contacts
across Turkey have noted that Genc supporters were attracted
by the fact that Uzan had defrauded Motorola, thus the U.S.,
of more than $2 billion: "If he could cheat the U.S. to such
an extent, he must be clever enough to run Turkey" is a
refrain quoted over and over to us.
6. (C) In left-leaning Izmir, where Genc drew some 18% of
votes, both a local political observer and a candidate from
center-right DYP have told us the party attracted voters from
all age groups. People who were fed up with years of
corruption and with Establishment parties in general,
including CHP, or who were fearful of losing their jobs in a
deepening of the economic downturn which had already ravaged
Izmir, were looking for a way to register their
dissatisfaction. In "infidel" Izmir -- so called because of
its staunchly secular voting tendencies -- this disaffected
group did not choose AK. Genc voters saw the party as the
only viable, secular protest party and cared very little
about the party platform, according to our contacts in the
region.
--------------
Can Genc Survive?
--------------
7. (C) Based on our discussions with local and national
politicians, whether Genc survives as an important factor
depends on: 1) the party's resources and ability to create an
infrastructure; and 2) the AK government's ability to deal
effectively with Turkey's pressing economic problems.
8. (C) Building a party largely from scratch requires more
than the deep pockets Uzan could dip into for a brief if
intense election campaign (free concerts, food, and even
handing out cash). AK's party boss in Ankara's Yenimahalle
district explained that Genc has not as yet put into place an
effective grassroots machine or invested significantly in its
own infrastructure. Genc's future, therefore, will depend in
part on how well Uzan can build a credible nation-wide party
structure.
9. (C) Genc's prospects also depends greatly on how the AK
government performs. The Mayor of Kecioren, a conservative
Ankara sub-province, explained that if AK eliminates the
underlying conditions -- perceived fecklessness of
politicians in general and a failing economy -- that gave
rise to Genc, Uzan stands little chance of surviving as a
political figure. Otherwise, with Turkey continuing to
urbanize and to need job creation at a pace to absorb its
overwhelmingly young population, the disaffected youth vote
will remain a manipulable and potentially decisive bloc the
next time around.
PEARSON
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2012
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY'S DISAFFECTED YOUTH VOTE: CAN IT BE COOPTED?
(U) Classified by Ambassador W.R. Pearson; reasons: 1.5 (b,d).
1. (C) Summary: Protest voting is an old tradition in Turkey
but showed a new twist in Nov. 3 national elections.
Motorola deadbeat and Berlusconi wannabe Cem Uzan --
emphasizing a xenophobic, nihilistic message and playing on
resentment of America -- parlayed the anger of disaffected
urban youths into a notable percentage of votes for his Genc
(Youth) Party. Whether this bloc of protest voters can be
coopted by governing AK Party or will remain to be
manipulated again at the next elections will depend on the
government's ability to address unemployment, sharply lower
standards of living, and a deep-rooted mistrust of governing
parties. End summary.
2. (C) Turks have long used the ballot box to show their
dissatisfaction with endemic corruption and feckless
leadership of politicians. In 1999, for example, the
Nationalist Action Party (MHP) capitalized on an angry
electorate to capture 18% of the national vote. Although the
concept of the "protest vote" is therefore nothing new in
Turkey, the Nov. 3 national election was noteworthy for the
strong showing of Cem Uzan's Genc (Youth) Party. Uzan's
xenophobic, nihilistic, and often anti-American rhetoric
attracted people of all ages, including many from among the
the nearly 4 million young Turks who voted for the first
time. The questions are: 1) whether these poorly educated,
unemployed youths searching for a political voice will be
coopted by the ruling AK (Justice and Development) Party,
itself embodying an anti-Establishment message, as it
wrestles with Turkey's pressing economic issues; or 2)
whether they remain a floating group that could be
manipulated, once again, by Cem Uzan or someone else playing
on similar themes.
--------------
Who voted for Genc?
--------------
3. (C) During the campaign, as Uzan's media-savvy and
manipulative campaign gathered force, many observers feared
that Uzan would get up to 15% of the vote, well beyond the
10% threshold for representation in Parliament. Uzan's poll
numbers tailed off at the close of the campaign and in the
end, mainly since AK Party had captured the aspirations of a
significant portion of voters in the greater urban sprawls,
he could not garner more than 7% of the vote. Nevertheless,
his provocative rhetoric -- supported by a massive media
campaign on the multiple Uzan-owned TV channels -- played
well with certain segments of the Turkish electorate
disgusted with the status quo.
4. (C) Local Ankara contacts explained to us recently that
Genc appealed to disaffected nationalist youths across the
political spectrum. One AK Party official in Ankara's Mamak
sub-province claimed that half of Genc's vote total came from
those who voted for MHP in the 1999 national election. Besir
Atalay -- founder of ANAR polling firm and now a State
Minister and close partisan of P.M. Abdullah Gul -- told us
Nov. 15 that a significant portion of Genc votes came from
former P.M. Bulent Ecevit's Democratic Left Party (DSP) and
his coalition partner Motherland Party (ANAP). In addition,
a local AK Party boss claimed that Genc had made inroads
among stay-at-home women voters because of its intense
television ad campaign in the run-up to Nov. 3.
5. (C) There was also a strong anti-American undercurrent to
many of Genc's campaign themes. Indeed, many of our contacts
across Turkey have noted that Genc supporters were attracted
by the fact that Uzan had defrauded Motorola, thus the U.S.,
of more than $2 billion: "If he could cheat the U.S. to such
an extent, he must be clever enough to run Turkey" is a
refrain quoted over and over to us.
6. (C) In left-leaning Izmir, where Genc drew some 18% of
votes, both a local political observer and a candidate from
center-right DYP have told us the party attracted voters from
all age groups. People who were fed up with years of
corruption and with Establishment parties in general,
including CHP, or who were fearful of losing their jobs in a
deepening of the economic downturn which had already ravaged
Izmir, were looking for a way to register their
dissatisfaction. In "infidel" Izmir -- so called because of
its staunchly secular voting tendencies -- this disaffected
group did not choose AK. Genc voters saw the party as the
only viable, secular protest party and cared very little
about the party platform, according to our contacts in the
region.
--------------
Can Genc Survive?
--------------
7. (C) Based on our discussions with local and national
politicians, whether Genc survives as an important factor
depends on: 1) the party's resources and ability to create an
infrastructure; and 2) the AK government's ability to deal
effectively with Turkey's pressing economic problems.
8. (C) Building a party largely from scratch requires more
than the deep pockets Uzan could dip into for a brief if
intense election campaign (free concerts, food, and even
handing out cash). AK's party boss in Ankara's Yenimahalle
district explained that Genc has not as yet put into place an
effective grassroots machine or invested significantly in its
own infrastructure. Genc's future, therefore, will depend in
part on how well Uzan can build a credible nation-wide party
structure.
9. (C) Genc's prospects also depends greatly on how the AK
government performs. The Mayor of Kecioren, a conservative
Ankara sub-province, explained that if AK eliminates the
underlying conditions -- perceived fecklessness of
politicians in general and a failing economy -- that gave
rise to Genc, Uzan stands little chance of surviving as a
political figure. Otherwise, with Turkey continuing to
urbanize and to need job creation at a pace to absorb its
overwhelmingly young population, the disaffected youth vote
will remain a manipulable and potentially decisive bloc the
next time around.
PEARSON