TURKEY'S SOUTHEAST: BETTER, BUT STILL BACKWARD AS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 008569

SIPDIS


DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE


E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2007
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY'S SOUTHEAST: BETTER, BUT STILL BACKWARD AS
GOT PREPARES TO LIFT STATE OF EMERGENCY

REF: ANKARA 8447


Classified by DCM Robert Deutsch; reasons 1.5 b and d.



1. (C) Summary: The GOT is expected to complete the phased
lifting of the state of emergency November 30 by allowing the
regime to expire in the last two southeastern provinces where
it continues -- Diyarbakir and Sirnak. While the regime's
demise is welcome, five longstanding problems will continue
to plague the region: underdevelopment, the village guards,
traditional tribal structures, political alienation, and
displaced persons. End Summary.



2. (U) Based on a five-province survey by Embassy Human
Rights Officer, tensions in the southeast are down
significantly from years past, but residents are concerned
about longstanding impediments to the region's economic and
social development. This cable, which builds on reftel
report from Consulate Adana, is based on November 12-16
interviews with human rights activists, security officials,
mayors, sub-governors, attorneys, and religious leaders in
Diyarbakir, Batman, Siirt, Sirnak, and Mardin provinces.



3. (U) Conditions in the southeast have improved greatly over
the past three years, following the capture of PKK leader
Abdullah Ocalan and the virtual end of armed clashes between
PKK terrorists and security forces. For example, at the
security checkpoint outside the town of Eruh, Siirt Province,
police today check IDs and keep a record of travelers. In
years past, according to Eruh Mayor Hamit Nas, police used to
thoroughly search all vehicles and passengers, and enforce
strict quotas on transported goods, a process that lasted 1-2
hours. Today, relations between the elected mayor and the
Ankara-appointed provincial governor and sub-governor are
good, Nas said. The sub-governor operates a restaurant
providing free food to 120 families, and has organized a
soccer team that includes both members of the security forces
and local residents.



4. (U) Still, Nas said, economic conditions have not improved
much since the GOT lifted the state of emergency in Siirt in
November 1999, and very few residents forced from their homes
during the height of the conflict have been able to return.
Eruh provides a reminder that eliminating the state of
emergency will have limited effect unless followed up with
other measures. By completing the phasing out of the regime,
the GOT will be shutting down the state of emergency region
Governor's Office and eliminating special powers of search,
detention and interrogation given to security officials in
state of emergency provinces. However, our contacts identify
five obstacles that will continue to block progress.


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OBSTACLE 1: UNDERDEVELOPMENT
--------------



5. (C) The region has suffered from official neglect dating
back to the founding of the republic, long before the
emergence of the PKK and the establishment of the state of
emergency. The GOT has focused on controlling, rather than
developing, the region, out of fear that the mostly Kurdish
population would separate from Turkey. Mayors and human
rights activists cite illiteracy as a major problem, and say
the education system in the region has always lagged behind
the rest of the country. They also say the GOT has recently
begun restricting fuel trade across the Habur gate on the
Iraqi border, shutting off an important source of income.
Seyhmus Diken, advisor to the Diyarbakir mayor, said the
region is unable to reap benefits from its natural resources
-- including agricultural and mineral wealth -- because of
Turkey's centrally controlled economy. The GAP dam project
is expected to provide irrigation, but has not made a
significant impact to date. Diken said a history of conflict
and lack of GOT support also prevent the southeast from
drawing tourists by exploiting its historic riches, ranging
from the ancient walls of Diyarbakir to the Syriac Christian
monasteries of Mardin. The city of Diyarbakir, fed up with
attempts to gain support from Ankara, is currently restoring
the city walls on its own. Diken said GOT officials have so
little regard for local governments in the southeast that one
Ankara bureaucrat refused to believe that Diyarbakir was nine
months away from completing the wall project, and asked for a
photograph.


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OBSTACLE 2: THE VILLAGE GUARD
--------------



6. (C) Human rights activists and local elected officials
universally condemn the village guards as a menace. The GOT
formed and armed the village guards, who number about 65,000
in the southeast, as part of its campaign against the PKK.
They are widely regarded as undisciplined and dangerous, and
have repeatedly been accused of murder, beating, rape,
corruption, drug trafficking, and other abuses. Critics of
the force say village guards across the region are living in
the homes, and farming the land, of displaced residents, and
will continue to block the return of residents forced out
during the PKK conflict. Security officials and
sub-governors admit the guards are a problem, and say they
are no longer needed to fight terrorists. But they argue
that the guards served their country in the fight against the
PKK and the GOT has no choice but to phase them out slowly.
"If we fire them, they will be an even bigger problem," said
Ugur Bulut, Sirnak deputy governor for security matters.
Hakki Uzun, state of emergency region deputy governor, said
the GOT will not hire any new guards and will gradually close
down the force as its members resign or retire.


--------------
OBSTACLE 3: TRIBAL STRUCTURE
--------------



7. (C) Traditional tribal/feudal structures, though fading,
continue in the region. Security officials cite this as a
major challenge. Ali Tatli, Batman deputy security director,
said conservative Kurdish families choose to solve problems
on their own, rather than go to the police. This, he said,
explains the continued problem of "honor killings" -- the
murder by immediate family members of women suspected of
being unchaste. Mayors and human rights activists agree, but
say the GOT exploits these ancient traditions to maintain
control. They accuse the government of providing political
and financial support to selected tribal leaders (agas),many
of whom are given positions in the village guards. Tribal
leaders exercise tight control over thousands of uneducated
followers, who work their land and vote according to their
instructions.


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OBSTACLE 4: POLITICAL ALIENATION
--------------



8. (C) The pro-Kurdish DEHAP (formerly HADEP) party won a
landslide victory in the southeast in the November 3
elections, but, as in the past, failed to pass the threshold
of 10 percent of the national vote required to enter
parliament. Though DEHAP officials say harassment of the
party has decreased, government officials still regularly
raid DEHAP offices and detain party members. As a result,
people in the region have no faith in the democratic process,
contacts agreed. To make matters worse, two independent
candidates elected to parliament from the region were
nominated by the village guards, according to human rights
activists.


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OBSTACLE 5: RETURNS
--------------



9. (C) The GOT estimates that 378,000 people were displaced
from the southeast between 1984 and 1999 due to the conflict;
human rights organizations put the number at more than one
million. The GOT claims that 51,000 displaced residents have
returned. Turkish and international human rights
organizations have consistently criticized the GOT's returns
program as inadequate and secretive. Provincial officials
say they are doing their best to assist returns. Bulut said
Sirnak officials have approved about half the return
applications of displaced residents. The other half, he
said, were turned down because their villages lack essential
services -- such as water, power, or roads -- or because
their homes are in areas that remain unsafe. Rejected
applications will be reviewed again as conditions improve.
But local representatives of the Human Rights Association and
the Immigrants Association for Social Cooperation and Culture
claim the GOT opposes large-scale returns, and that most
returnees have received little or no GOT support. They say
displaced villagers cannot receive permission to return
unless they sign a document stating that they fled their
homes because of actions taken by the PKK, not the GOT, and
that they will not seek GOT assistance for their return.


--------------
COMMENT
--------------



10. (C) The measures utilized by the GOT to fight separatism
and terrorism in the southeast have also contributed to the
region's backwardness. The virtual end of the PKK conflict
provides an opportunity for the GOT to chart a new course and
begin to close the gap between the southeast and the rest of
the country, a process one sub-governor said could take
decades. This would require considerable funding combined
with a little imagination and common sense; for example, the
village guards could be re-trained and assigned to tasks more
suitable for present conditions. Unfortunately, it appears
that GOT officials have not yet adopted a "post war" strategy
for the region.
PEARSON