Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
02ANKARA8305
2002-11-15 12:40:00
SECRET
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKEY: 2002 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

Tags:  PTER TU 
pdf how-to read a cable
P 151240Z NOV 02
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6070
INFO AMCONSUL ADANA PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 008305 

S/CT FOR REAP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2012
TAGS: PTER, TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: 2002 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

REF: STATE 201772

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 008305

S/CT FOR REAP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2012
TAGS: PTER, TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: 2002 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

REF: STATE 201772

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY DCM ROBERT S. DEUTSCH; REASONS 1.5 (B)
AND (D).

--------------
OVERVIEW
--------------

2. (U) COMBATING TERRORISM HAS LONG BEEN A PRIORITY FOR THE
GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY (GOT). IN ITS EARLY AND STRONG SUPPORT
OF THE COALITION IN THE GLOBAL WAR AGAINST TERROR AND ITS
SUBSEQUENT TAKING-OVER OF ISAF LEADERSHIP, THE GOT HAS
REAFFIRMED ITS COMMITMENT TO FIGHTING DOMESTIC AND
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. DOMESTIC AND TRANSNATIONAL
TERRORIST GROUPS HAVE TARGETED TURKS AND FOREIGNERS,
OCCASIONALLY INCLUDING USG PERSONNEL, FOR OVER 40 YEARS.
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC TERRORIST GROUPS OPERATING IN
TURKEY INCLUDE MARXIST-LENINIST, RADICAL ISLAMIST,
SEPARATIST, AND PRO-CHECHEN. IN RESPONSE TO THESE THREATS,
GOT HAS DEVELOPED BOTH STRONG DETERMINATION AND THE
CAPABILITY TO FIGHT TERRORISM. TURKEY CONTINUES TO SUPPORT
THE USG'S INTERNATIONAL, COORDINATED APPROACH.

3. (U) FOLLOWING SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, TURKEY'S INTERNAL
TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS ALTERED THEIR OPERATING PROCEDURES.
WITH THE WORLD PUBLIC OPINION STRONGLY AGAINST TERRORISM AND
THE GLOBAL COALITION INCREASING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION,
THESE ORGANIZATIONS ENTERED INTO A PERIOD OF LITTLE OR NO
ACTION. ACTING AS INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS, MANY OF THESE
GROUPS HAVE REVERTED TO RECRUITMENT OF SUPPORTERS AND
STRATEGY PLANNING.

U.S. DESIGNATED TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

4. (U) ON OCTOBER 8, 1997, THE SECRETARY OF STATE NAMED THE
SEPARATIST KURDISTAN WORKERS' PARTY (PKK) AND THE
MARXIST-LENINIST REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE'S PARTY/FRONT (DHKP/C,
FORMERLY KNOWN AS REVOLUTIONARY LEFT, DEV-SOL),MAKING THEM
SUBJECT TO THE ANTI-TERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT
OF 1996. ON OCTOBER 11, 2001, THE SECRETARY OF STATE RENEWED
THOSE DESIGNATIONS FOR ANOTHER TWO YEARS. (THE PKK HAS SINCE
CHANGED ITS NAME TO THE KURDISTAN FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY
CONGRESS, KADEK.)

MARXIST-LENINIST

5. (U) THE MAIN RADICAL-LEFT TERROR ORGANIZATION, DHKP/C,
CONDUCTS SMALL-SCALE OPERATIONS AGAINST TURKS AND FOREIGNERS
ALIKE (ARMED ATTACKS ON UNIFORMED POLICE, SUICIDE AND OTHER
BOMBINGS, ASSASSINATIONS). THIS ORGANIZATION HAS NOT
CONDUCTED ANY MAJOR EVENTS WITHIN TURKEY IN 2002, ALTHOUGH IT
CONTINUES TO ORGANIZE ITSELF, PREDOMINANTLY WITHIN EUROPE.
ACCORDING TO GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES, DHKP/C
COOPERATES WITH
OTHER GROUPS IN EUROPE BY PROVIDING SUPPORT, SHELTER, AND
ARMS TO EACH OTHER'S ORGANIZATIONS. TURKISH AUTHORITIES
SEIZED DHKP/C WEAPONS FROM A CAR AT THE KAPIKULE BORDER IN
SEPTEMBER 2002. THESE WEAPONS WERE SUPPOSED TO BE USED IN
OPERATIONS CAUSING DISTURBANCES PRIOR TO THE TURKISH NATIONAL
ELECTIONS HELD IN NOVEMBER 2002.

6. (U) OTHER FAR-LEFT TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS STILL ACTIVE
INCLUDE THE TURKISH COMMUNIST PARTY/MARXIST-LENINIST
(TKP/ML),THE TURKISH WORKERS' AND PEASANTS LIBERATION ARMY
(TIKKO),AND THE MARXIST-LENINIST COMMUNIST PARTY (MLKP).
TKP/ML AND TIKKO PRIMARILY OPERATE IN THE AREAS OF ORDU,
TOKAT, AND SAMSUN. MLKP CONDUCTS SMALL-SCALE TERRORIST
OPERATIONS, USUALLY USING PIPE BOMBS, WITHIN METROPOLITAN
AREAS.

RADICAL ISLAMIST

7. (U) THE PRIME, RADICAL ISLAMIST TERROR GROUP OF TURKEY IS
THE TURKISH HIZBULLAH. ALTHOUGH KNOWN TO FIGHT RIVALS,
NAMELY THE PKK AND OTHER RIVAL ISLAMIC GROUPS, IN FAVOR OF
CONFRONTATIONS WITH AUTHORITIES, TURKISH HIZBULLAH HAS NOT
CARRIED OUT ANY MAJOR OPERATIONS IN 2002. IT STAGED A
SPECTACULAR JANUARY 2001 AMBUSH IN DIYARBAKIR THAT TOOK THE
LIFE OF DIYARBAKIR SECURITY DIRECTOR GAFFAR OKKAN AND FIVE OF
HIS BODYGUARDS. TWO UNDERCOVER POLICE WERE KILLED IN ANOTHER
HIZBULLAH ATTACK IN OCTOBER 2001. ACCORDING TO STATE
AUTHORITIES, HIZBULLAH CONTINUES TO MAINTAIN ITS ACTIVITIES
ON A THEORETICAL BASIS.

8. (U) OTHER ISLAMIC GROUPS INCLUDE THE GREAT EASTERN
RAIDER'S FRONT (IBDA-C),FEDERAL ISLAMIC STATE OF ANATOLIA
(KAPLANCILAR),SELAM GROUP, ISLAMIC MOVEMENT ORGANIZATION
(IHO),THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS, SELEFILER, SOFULAR, AND
BEYYIAT-I EL-IMAM. BOTH IBDA-C AND BEYYIAT-I EL-IMAM ARE
KNOWN TO BE SYMPATHETIC TO AL QAIDA.

SEPARATIST

9. (U) KADEK, FORMERLY KNOWN AS THE PKK, REPRESENTS THE
LARGEST SEPARATIST ORGANIZATION GROUP IN TURKEY, THOUGH ITS
CAPABILITY TO OPERATE HAS BEEN DRASTICALLY REDUCED DUE TO
VIGOROUS AND ON-GOING COUNTER-INSURGENCY EFFORTS OF THE
TURKISH ARMED FORCES, JANDARMA, TURKISH NATIONAL POLICE
(TNP),AND VILLAGE GUARDS (A PARAMILITARY GUARD FORCE
RECRUITED FROM LOCAL VILLAGERS). THIS EFFORT ULTIMATELY LED
TO THE ARREST AND CONVICTION OF PKK LEADER ABDULLAH OCALAN IN
1999. THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) DESIGNATED THE PKK A TERRORIST
ORGANIZATION IN MAY 2002.

10. (U) IN APRIL 2002 THE GROUP UNDERWENT A RE-ORGANIZATION
AND NAME CHANGE. RENAMED THE KURDISTAN FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY
CONGRESS (KADEK),THE ORGANIZATION HAS EXPANDED ITS
OPERATIONS BY FOCUSING UPON MORE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES. KADEK
RETAINS THE SAME SYMBOL AND PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP
OF THE PKK, THOUGH IT HAS EXPANDED THIS COUNCIL TO ELEVEN
INSTEAD OF NINE MEMBERS. ACCORDING TO TURKISH GOVERNMENT
EXPERTS AND NGOS, KADEK ALSO MAINTAINS APPROXIMATELY
500-ARMED MILITANTS IN TURKEY AND UP TO 5000 ARMED MILITANTS
IN NORTHERN IRAQ. WHILE THE ORGANIZATION LARGELY CONTINUES
TO FOLLOW THE PKK'S SELF-PROCLAIMED SEPTEMBER 1, 1999,
CEASE-FIRE, IT HAS ISSUED WARNINGS VIA SUPPORTIVE NEWSPAPERS
OF FUTURE ARMED ATTACKS IF CERTAIN ACTIONS ARE NOT TAKEN.
SMALL CELLS AND SYMPATHIZERS REMAIN THROUGHOUT TURKEY, BUT
THESE HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED TO THE POINT THAT LAW ENFORCEMENT
OFFICIALS, RATHER THAN THE MILITARY, OVERSEE MOST OPERATIONS
AND INVESTIGATIONS.

CHECHENS IN TURKEY

11. (U) IN APRIL 2002, MUSTAFA YILMAZ SEIZED THE MARMARA
HOTEL IN ISTANBUL AND HELD 13 HOSTAGES FOR APPROXIMATELY
TWENTY MINUTES UNTIL HE SURRENDERED WITHOUT INCIDENT.
YILMAZ, WHO IS OF CHECHEN ORIGIN, IS BELIEVED TO HAVE STAGED
THE RAID TO PROTEST RUSSIAN ACTIONS IN CHECHNYA. HE IS
PRESENTLY IN CUSTODY AND ON TRIAL IN THE ISTANBUL BEYOGLU
SECOND HEAVY CRIMINAL COURT UNDER A VARIETY OF CHARGES,
ALTHOUGH NOT UNDER TURKEY'S TOUGH ANTI-TERROR LAW. THIS
FOLLOWS AN APRIL 22, 2001, SEIZURE OF ISTANBUL'S SWISS HOTEL
BY 13 PRO-CHECHEN TURKISH CITIZENS WHO HELD 150 HOSTAGES,
INCLUDING 37 AMERICANS, FOR APPROXIMATELY 12 HOURS. LARGE
NUMBERS OF TURKS, MANY WITH ROOTS IN THE CAUCASUS, ARE
SYMPATHETIC TO CHECHEN AMBITIONS.

12. (U) THE CAPITALIZED TITLES BELOW CORRESPOND TO REFTEL
QUESTIONS.

-------------- --------------
GOT ACTIONS SUPPORTING THE GLOBAL COALITION AGAINST TERRORISM
(A)
-------------- --------------

13. (U) TURKISH SUPPORT FOLLOWING THE ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11
CEMENTED GOT'S COMMITTED POLICY ON FIGHTING TERROR. GOT
ISSUED STRONG PUBLIC STATEMENTS CONDEMNING THE ATTACKS. IN
THE FACE OF STRONG PUBLIC OPPOSITION, PARLIAMENT, UNDER THE
LEADERSHIP OF PM ECEVIT, PASSED A RESOLUTION ALLOWING THE
GOVERNMENT TO SEND TURKISH TROOPS ABROAD AND TO PERMIT THE
STATIONING OF FOREIGN TROOPS ON TURKISH SOIL IN SUPPORT OF
OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF). TURKEY WAS ONE OF THE
FIRST COUNTRIES TO CONTRIBUTE FORCES TO ISAF AND ASSUMED THE
LEADERSHIP ROLE IN JUNE 2002.

14. (U) THE ARREST OF THREE AL QAIDA SUSPECTS IN THE
SOUTHEASTERN CITY OF VAN IN FEBRUARY 2002 AND ONE IN ISTANBUL
IN AUGUST 2002 HIGHLIGHT TURKISH NATIONAL POLICE (TNP)
EFFORTS TO COMBAT TERRORISM. FIRAS SULEYMAN, YUSUF SALIM
HUSAYN, AND AHMAD MAHMUD WERE ARRESTED AND CHARGED WITH
ENTERING TURKEY ILLEGALLY VIA IRAN IN FEBRUARY 2002. MEMBERS
OF BAYT AL-IMAM, A JORDANIAN GROUP WITH CLOSE TIES TO AL
QAIDA, THE THREE MEN WERE FOUND TO HAVE MET AND RECEIVED
MATERIAL SUPPORT FROM USAMA BIN LADEN AND HAD BEEN PLANNING
BOMBING ATTACKS ON ISRAELI AND US TARGETS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.
THESE MEN WERE RETURNED TO JORDAN IN SEPTEMBER 2002. AHMET
ABDULLAH WAS ARRESTED IN ISTANBUL IN AUGUST 2002 AFTER AN
OPERATION CONDUCTED BY THE ISTANBUL SECURITY FORCES BECAUSE
OF HIS LINKS TO BAYT AL-IMAM.

15. (U) TURKEY HAS FULLY COMPLIED WITH UN SECURITY RESOLUTION
1373, RATIFYING ALL UNITED NATIONS CONVENTIONS ON COMBATING
TERRORISM. THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS HAVE FROZEN THE ASSETS
OF THOSE TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, PERSONS, AND ENTITIES FOUND
ON UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS BY ISSUING A DECREE TO
FREEZE ALL FUNDS AND RELATED ASSETS. THE INITIAL DECREE, NO.
2001/2483, DATED DECEMBER 22, 2001, HAS BEEN UPDATED BY NO.
2002/3873, DATED MARCH 21, 2002, AND NO. 2002/4206, DATED MAY
16, 2002.

--------------
RESPONSE OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM (B)
--------------

16. (U) STATE SECURITY COURTS (DGM) IN EIGHT PROVINCES, WITH
JURISDICTION FOR ALL CRIMES THAT FALL WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF
THE ANTI-TERROR LAW, TAKE A VIGOROUS APPROACH TOWARDS
PROSECUTING TERROR-RELATED CRIMES. AVERAGE TRIAL TIMES RUN
MORE THAN A YEAR, AND DEFENDANTS ARE USUALLY INCARCERATED
DURING THEIR TRIALS.

17. (U) ABDULLAH OCALAN, THE LEADER OF THE PKK CONVICTED OF
TREASON IN JUNE 1999 AND SENTENCED TO DEATH. FOLLOWING THE
EU REFORM PACKAGE PASSED BY THE TURKISH GRAND NATIONAL
PARLIAMENT IN AUGUST 2002 OUTLAWING THE DEATH PENALTY,
OCALAN'S SENTENCE WAS CONVERTED TO LIFE IN PRISON.

--------------
EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS (C/D)
--------------

18. (U) IN 2002, THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY DID NOT SEEK THE
EXTRADITION OF ANY SUSPECTS FROM THE UNITED STATES ON
TERROR-RELATED CHARGES, NOR DID THE UNITED STATES SEEK THE
EXTRADITION OF SUCH SUSPECTS FROM TURKEY. THERE ARE NO
IMPEDIMENTS TO HOST GOVERNMENT PROSECUTION AND/OR EXTRADITION
OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS.

19. (U) IN THE PAST, TURKEY HAS FACED DIFFICULTY IN
EXTRADITING TERROR-RELATED SUSPECTS FROM EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.
ACCORDING TO GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, TURKEY HAS REQUESTED THE
EXTRADITION OF 245 HIGH LEVEL ADMINISTRATORS FOR TERRORIST
ORGANIZATIONS SINCE 1991. SYMPATHY WITH KURDISH POLITICAL
AND CULTURAL ASPIRATIONS IN SOME EUROPEAN STATES, ALLEGATIONS
OF TORTURE BY TURKISH OFFICIALS, AND TURKEY'S LEGAL PROVISION
FOR THE DEATH PENALTY HAVE ALL PROVED IMPEDIMENTS TO SUCH
EXTRADITIONS. HOWEVER, IN AUGUST 2002, AS A PART OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION REFORM PACKAGE, THE TURKISH PARLIAMENT PASSED
A LAW BANNING THE USE OF THE DEATH PENALTY.

--------------
RESPONSES OTHER THAN PROSECUTION (E)
--------------

20. (U) TURKS SEE THEMSELVES TO BE AMONG THE WORLD'S PRIMARY
VICTIMS OF TERRORISM. THEY CITE THE 15-YEAR INSURGENCY OF
THE KURDISTAN WORKERS' PARTY (PKK),AND THE WORLDWIDE
ASSASSINATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE TURKISH DIPLOMATS AND
THEIR FAMILIES BY ARMENIAN ACTIVISTS OF THE 1970S AND 1980S.
THEY HAVE LONG COMPLAINED ABOUT LIBERAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES'
HARBORING KURDISH (PKK),LEFTIST (DHKP-C) AND ISLAMIST
(HIZBOLLAH, KAPLANISTS) "TERRORISTS." THEY FEEL OTHER
NATIONS DO NOT APPRECIATE TURKEY'S SUFFERING AT THE HANDS OF
THESE PARTIES. THUS, THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT AND MEDIA WERE
QUICK TO RESPOND TO THE EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER 11. AT ALL
LEVELS, THERE WAS AN OUTPOURING OF SYMPATHY AND SOLIDARITY.
BUT THERE WAS ALWAYS THE CONSTANT REMINDER THAT NOW OTHERS
WERE BEGINNING TO EXPERIENCE WHAT TURKS HAD LIVED WITH FOR
YEARS. TURKEY'S PRE-9/11 HISTORIC COOPERATION WITH THE US IN
LAW ENFORCEMENT, MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES HAS
ONLY INCREASED IN THE LAST YEAR WITH PUBLIC COMMITMENTS OF
SUPPORT FOR THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM FROM THE PRESIDENT,
THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE MILITARY. THERE HAS BEEN VERY
VISIBLE SUPPORT FOR THE SECURITY OF AMERICANS AT OUR
MISSION'S BUILDINGS BY LOCAL POLICE. AS THE STORM BROKE ON
THE NOVEMBER 17 ARRESTS IN GREECE, THERE WAS INTENSE COVERAGE
WITH A NEW "I TOLD YOU SO" IMPLICATION IN THE GOVERNMENT
PRINT MEDIA.

21. (U) THE TURKISH STAND ON TERRORISM HAS BEEN "SOFTER" IN
THE CASE OF THE CHECHENS. CHECHENS ARE, OF COURSE, MUSLIMS
AND THERE ARE CULTURAL TIES BETWEEN TURKS AND CHECHENS AND
LONG TIME RIVALRY WITH RUSSIA. THE ARMED, BUT NOT VIOLENT,
TAKEOVERS OF A FERRYBOAT IN 1996 AND A HOTEL IN 2001 IN
ISTANBUL WERE TREATED MORE LIKE PROTESTS THAN LIKE TERRORIST
ATTACKS BY THE MEDIA. THAT CHANGED WITH THE OCTOBER 23, 2002
CAPTURE OF A THEATER IN MOSCOW WITH OVER ONE HUNDRED DEAD.
TURKEY DID CONDEMN THE HOSTAGE-TAKING, BUT WITH THE MEDIA
STILL ADDRESSING THE SUFFERING OF THE CHECHEN PEOPLE.

22. (U) TURKEY HAS A FREE PRESS. IN THE LEFTIST AND ISLAMIC
FRINGE PRESS, CHECHEN REBELS, PALESTINIAN SUICIDE BOMBERS AND
EVEN AL QAIDA MEMBERS CAN BE PORTRAYED AS "FREEDOM FIGHTERS."
TERRORISM HAS LONG BEEN AN INTEREST OF ACADEMICS AND WRITERS
IN TURKEY. IN RECENT YEARS THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL
CONFERENCES ON THE TOPIC. THOSE ORGANIZED BY INSTITUTIONS OF
THE STATE HAVE BEEN SEEN AS TOOLS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST
TERRORISM. PRIVATELY-FUNDED ACADEMIC PROGRAMS HAVE BECOME
MORE FOCUSED ON ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM AND THE
ROOT CAUSES OF TERRORISM.

--------------
MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS BY THE GOT (F)
--------------

23. (U) THE GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY CONTINUED ITS AGGRESSIVE
COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS IN 2002. FOR EXAMPLE, IN A JOINT
OPERATION, THE TURKISH CUSTOMS GUARD AND THE NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (MIT) SEIZED NINE KALASHINIKOV RIFLES AND
ONE SCORPION ASSASSINATION PISTOL WITH SILENCER FROM A CAR AT
THE KAPIKULE BORDER GATE IN SEPTEMBER 2002. THESE WEAPONS
ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN INTENDED TO BE DELIVERED TO THE
DHKP/C TO BE USED IN SUPPOSED OPERATIONS TO CREATE
DISTURBANCES PRIOR TO THE TURKISH GENERAL ELECTIONS HELD IN
NOVEMBER 2002.

24. (U) ADDITIONALLY, THE GOT APPREHENDED THREE SUSPECTED AL
QAIDA OPERATIVES NEAR THE IRANIAN BORDER (NEAR VAN). THE GOT
FOLLOWED UP BY ARRESTING DOCUMENT FORGERS ASSOCIATED WITH THE
THREE, NEAR BURSA IN NORTHWESTERN TURKEY.

25. (U) THE GOT CONTINUES ITS ACTIVE SUPPRESSION OF THE
PKK/KADEK, THOUGH ITS SECURITY OPERATIONS TEMPO HAS BEEN
SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED IN LINE WITH A REDUCTION IN THE
CONFLICT. IT CONTINUES TO MONITOR THE ORGANIZATION'S
POLITICAL MOVEMENTS IN AN EFFORT TO STEM ANY POTENTIAL
DISTURBANCES.

--------------
GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM (G)
--------------

26. (U) THE GOT CONSISTENTLY AND STRONGLY OPPOSES BOTH
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. TURKEY DOES NOT VIEW
ITS MAINTENANCE OF DIPLOMATIC OR ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL
RELATIONS WITH CUBA, IRAN, IRAQ, LIBYA, SUDAN, AND SYRIA AS
CONSTITUTING SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.

-------------- -
SUPPORT STATEMENTS FOR TERRORIST COUNTRIES (H)
-------------- -

27. (U) TURKEY SHARES BORDERS WITH, AND HAS BEEN AN HISTORIC
TRADING PARTNER OF SYRIA, IRAN AND IRAQ. IT BALANCES A
CONDEMNATION OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN THOSE COUNTRIES
(INCLUDING PROVIDING HAVENS FOR THE PKK) WITH THE NEED TO
ACCESS HISTORIC TRADE ROUTES. THUS TURKEY WILL PROVIDE BASES
FOR OPERATION NORTHERN WATCH WHILE AT THE SAME TIME SENDING
LARGE TRADE DELEGATIONS TO BAGHDAD AND TEHRAN. PUBLIC
STATEMENTS AGAINST STATE-SUPPORTED TERRORISM ARE CLEAR.

-------------- --------------
SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN ATTITUDES TOWARDS TERRORISM (I)
-------------- --------------

28. (U) SINCE THE ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, THE GOT HAS TAKEN
AN ACTIVE ROLE IN THE WORLDWIDE OPPOSITION AGAINST TERRORISM.
IN MAY 2002 THE EUROPEAN UNION PLACED THE PKK AND DHKP/C ON
ITS LIST OF TERRORIST GROUPS AFTER AN INTENSIVE PUSH BY THE
GOT FOR THE EU TO ADOPT TOUGHER MEASURES AGAINST TURKISH
TERROR GROUPS OPERATING IN EUROPE. IT CONTINUES TO PRESS THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO RECOGNIZE KADEK AS THE SUCCESSOR
OF THE PKK AND THUS A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION.

-------------- --------------
USG COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS AND INITIATIVES WITH GOT (J)
-------------- --------------

29. (U) TURKEY REMAINS A STAUNCH ALLY IN THE WAR ON
TERRORISM. IN THE FACE OF STRONG PUBLIC OPPOSITION,
PARLIAMENT, UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF PM ECEVIT, PASSED A
RESOLUTION ALLOWING THE GOVERNMENT TO SEND TURKISH TROOPS
ABROAD AND TO PERMIT THE STATIONING OF FOREIGN TROOPS ON
TURKISH SOIL TO SUPPORT OEF. AFTER THE PASSAGE OF THE
RESOLUTION, TURKEY OFFERED A 90-MAN SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIT
FOR DUTY IN AFGHANISTAN. THE TURKISH NATIONAL POLICE (TNP)
CONTINUE TO PROVIDE EXCELLENT PROTECTION OF US DIPLOMATIC AND
MILITARY FACILITIES THROUGHOUT TURKEY.

30. (U) IN 2002, TURKEY RATIFIED THE UN CONVENTION ON
SUPPRESSION OF TERRORIST FINANCING. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS
CONVENTION, TURKEY ADDS TO ITS DOMESTIC ASSET FREEZE LIST ALL
NAMES ADDED TO THE ASSET FREEZE LIST MAINTAINED BY THE UN
SANCTIONS COMMITTEE UNDER UNSCRS 1267 AND 1373.

31. (U) TURKEY IS ALSO AN ACTIVE PARTICIPANT IN THE
DEPARTMENT'S ANTI-TERRORISM ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. SINCE 1999,
THE TURKS ACCEPTED ELEVEN ATA COURSES, TO INCLUDE A SENIOR
LEVEL FINANCIAL UNDERPINNINGS OF TERRORISM SEMINAR AND A
FOLLOW-ON FINANCIAL UNDERPINNINGS OF TERRORISM SEMINAR FOR
INVESTIGATORS.

(INFORMATION FOR THE REPORT'S CLASSIFIED ANNEX)

32. (S) THE TURKISH MILITARY HAS ALSO OFFERED THE USE OF AN
ADDITIONAL AIRBASE TO LIGHTEN THE LOAD ON INCIRLIK AFB AND
EASED FLIGHT RESTRICTIONS TO EASE US SUPPORT OF FORCES
OPERATING IN AFGHANISTAN. OTHER TURKISH ACTIONS IN SUPPORT
OF OEF INCLUDE:

- ONE OF THE FIRST COUNTRIES TO AUTHORIZE DEPLOYMENT OF
TROOPS ABROAD AND STATIONING OF ADDITIONAL FOREIGN TROOPS IN
TURKEY IN SUPPORT OF THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM;

- ONE OF THE FIRST COUNTRIES TO OFFER SPECIAL OPERATIONS
FORCES (OFFER OF 90)

- ALLOWED THE US TO USE INCIRLIK AIR BASE AS THE KEY
TRANSIT POINT FOR HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER FORMS OF ASSISTANCE
(INCLUDING LETHAL MUNITIONS) TO THE NORTHERN ALLIANCE AND US
SPECIAL OPERATION FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN;

- OFFERED THE USE OF ADDITIONAL AIR BASES IN TURKEY FOR
OEF-RELATED OPERATIONS;

- AUTHORIZED THE US TO USE INCIRLIK AIR BASE TO TRANSIT
TALIBAN AND AL-QAIDA DETAINEES FROM AFGHANISTAN TO GTMO;

- STREAMLINED CUSTOM PROCEDURES AND GRANTED BLANKET
OVERFLIGHT CLEARANCES FOR US OEF-RELATED AIRCRAFT (OVER 5,000
FLIGHTS TO DATE);

- PROVIDES KC-135 TANKER SUPPORT AND BASING FOR THE WAR
ON TERRORISM. TURKEY ALREADY HAS CONTRIBUTED CLOSE TO 80
KC-135 OEF-RELATED MISSIONS FROM TURKEY.

--------------
COOPERATION-INVESTIGATION/PROSECUTION (K/1)
--------------

(INFORMATION FOR THE REPORT'S CLASSIFIED ANNEX)

33. (C) THE MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND TURKEY, WHICH ENTERED INTO FORCE IN JANUARY 1981,
GOVERNS INVESTIGATIVE COOPERATION. THE GOT HAS PROCESSED
REQUESTS FOR INVESTIGATIVE ACCESS TO EVIDENCE UNDER THIS
TREATY. HOWEVER, IN SOME CASES THE GOT HAS LEFT REQUESTS
UNANSWERED FOR OVER THREE YEARS. CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE
TURKISH MINISTRY OF JUSTICE AND UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE CONTINUE IN AN EFFORT TO STREAMLINE THE PROCESS.

--------------
COOPERATION-PREVENTION (K/2)
--------------

34. (U) THE GOT COORDINATES CLOSELY WITH THE USG ON
ANTI-TERRORIST FINANCING INITIATIVES. IN RESPONSE TO USG
REQUESTS TO FREEZE TERRORIST-RELATED FINANCIAL ASSETS, THE
GOT HAS ADDED TO ITS DOMESTIC ASSET FREEZE LIST ALL NAMES OF
INDIVIDUALS AND FIRMS RELATED TO UNSCRS 1267 AND 1373 (NAMES
RELATED TO FINANCING OF TALIBAN AND AL-QAIDA.) THE GOT
ALSO INVESTIGATES THESE NAMES AND FREEZES ASSETS FOUND IN
TURKEY. TO DATE, THESE EFFORTS HAVE RESULTED IN FREEZING
ABOUT USD 2 MILLION IN FINANCIAL ASSETS OWNED BY AN
INDIVIDUAL ON AN USG EXECUTIVE ORDER FREEZE LIST. THE GOT IS
REVIEWING THE POSSIBILITY OF AMENDING ITS LEGAL PROCESS FOR
FREEZING FINANCIAL ASSETS IN ORDER TO FACILITATE QUICK
REACTION TO NEW INFORMATION.

-------------- --------------
COOPERATION DURING PAST FIVE YEARS- PREVENTION (L)
-------------- --------------

35. (U) OVERALL, IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS, THE GOT HAS WORKED
CLOSELY WITH THE USG IN THE APPREHENSION, CONVICTION, AND
PUNISHMENT OF THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR TERRORIST ATTACKS IN
TURKEY. GOT RESPONSE IS ALWAYS IMMEDIATE AND SUBSTANTIAL
WHEN ALERTED TO THREAT OR INCIDENT INVOLVING US INTERESTS.


PEARSON