AK PARTY DYNAMICS AND U.S. INTERESTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 008139



SIPDIS





CENTCOM AND EUCOM: PLEASE PASS TO POLADS AND J-5





E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2012

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, TU, POLITICAL PARTIES

SUBJECT: AK PARTY DYNAMICS AND U.S. INTERESTS



REF: A. ANKARA 7683

B. ANKARA 7682





(U) Classified by Ambassador W. R. Pearson. Reasons: 1.5

(b,d).





1. (C) Summary: Justice and Development (AK) Party's Nov. 3

landslide election victory gives us new opportunity to

influence AK leader Erdogan, his inner circle, and huge

parliamentary majority as AK forms the new government -- at

the point of AK's peak policy flexibility and maximum

interest in establishing itself as a legitimate interlocutor

with the USG. End summary.





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The Iron At Its Hottest

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2. (C) The size of AK's election victory is bringing into

sharp focus the extent of change wrought upon the Turkish

political landscape. With a massive legislative majority

(363 of 550 seats) just four seats shy of the two-thirds

needed to amend the constitution, AK controls a Parliament

set to emerge as a key policy decision making node. AK's

legislative weight also means that elected civilians will

have a more unified, and powerful, voice in the National

Security Council (NSC) than has been the case in many years.





3. (C) AK's ability to control the bureaucracy and manage

relations with the military, which is watching AK very

closely (septel) will be influenced by several factors:





-- First, AK's leadership lacks accurate information about

issues of central concern to the U.S. and our policies. Some

in the leadership are aware of this gap. All in the

leadership are convinced that the Turkish bureaucracy will

not keep them well-informed and want steady access to

reliable information. At the same time, sharp rivalries

within Erdogan's inner circle hamper the flow of information

vertically and horizontally.





-- Second, whether they like it or not, Erdogan's advisors

know that maintaining good relations with the U.S. will help

them manage pressures from the Kemalist elements of the

State. At the same time, within the leadership -- and even

more so lower down the hierarchy -- there is limited

familiarity with the American mind and the complexities of

how the U.S. debates and determines its interests.





-- Third, AK's grass roots are distinctly ambivalent,

recognizing that American secularism and freedom give pious

Muslims in the U.S. space they do not yet have in Turkey but

deeply disturbed by what they see as anti-Muslim U.S.

policies toward Palestine and Iraq. On this latter point,

AK's grass roots do not differ from Turkish society at large,

but the feelings are more pronounced.





-- Fourth, while not beholden to Denktas, AK shares

mainstream sensitivities on Cyprus. In this context, AK vice

chairman Mercan has emphasized to us how crucial a steady

U.S.-AK exchange of ideas could be in helping AK's leadership

sell a Cyprus solution, if one emerges, to a wary public.





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What to Do

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4. (C) Given AK's lock on Parliament and approaching decision

points on Cyprus, Iraq, economic policy, and EU relations,

the time to begin a serious dialogue on specific, substantive

issues is now. On Nov. 7 we opened that dialoge when the

Amassador informed Erdogan of Embassy's willingness to engage

in such a dialogue with him and other senior AK officials, as

they deemed useful. In this transition period, we will seek

every opportunity to engage with key AK officials. We think

there is an opportunity to influence the full circle of

Erdogan advisors at a point of (1) their peak openness and

intellectual and policy flexibility, i.e., before they become

captives of a bureaucracy that is instinctively defensive and

unimaginative; and (2) their maximum interest in establishing

themselves as serious interlocutors.

PEARSON