KING ABDULLAH AND FONMIN MUASHER ADDRESS TRANSFER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 005993

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2012
TAGS: PREL PREF KPAL ISRAEL'>IS IZ JO MEPP
SUBJECT: KING ABDULLAH AND FONMIN MUASHER ADDRESS TRANSFER
FEAR: JORDAN WILL NOT ACCEPT ANY REFUGEES, FROM WEST OR EAST

REF: AMMAN 5912

Classified By: Ambassador Edward W. Gnehm. Reasons 1.5 (b,d).

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Summary
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1. (U) Foreign Minister Muasher and King Abdullah made
successive high profile public statements October 10-11
addressing growing fears in the Kingdom about a possible
large influx of Palestinian and Iraqi refugees should
military action against Iraq commence. The King's remarks
were part of a longer interview -- aired by the Middle East
Broadcasting Corporation (MBC),and also broadcast on Jordan
Television -- in which he criticized the opposition Islamic
Action Front and refuted speculation that the Hashemites have
ambitions to return to the throne in Baghdad (septel). End
Summary.

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The FM Voices Concern With ISRAEL's Non-Answer on Transfer
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2. (U) FonMin Marwan Muasher went public October 10 with
growing GOJ concerns (reftel) about the possibility that
ISRAEL could exploit U.S.-led military action against Iraq to
expel large numbers of Palestinians to Jordan. In a meeting
with foreign journalists, Muasher stated "we don't want to
see a situation where the ISRAELi government might make use
of a war in Iraq in order to transfer Palestinians to Jordan.
While the ISRAELis have privately assured us this is
contrary to their policies, we have not yet seen one public
statement by any ISRAELi official stating that the transfer
policy is contrary to ISRAELi policies. We are not reassured
by that at all."


3. (U) Muasher then restated the established GOJ position
that "we are not in a position to receive any large number of
refugees" if war with Iraq should begin: "This will be
detrimental to the interests of Jordan. This time (Note: as
compared to 1990-1991. End Note.) the preparations that we
have undertaken will make sure that these refugees, if we are
faced with a large refugee problem, are catered to but not in
a way that would also have them get inside Jordan. Jordan is
in a very delicate and difficult position. We are walking an
extremely tight rope. We already have a war going on in the
West Bank and we don't need another war going on to our east.
It is easy for outsiders to try to solve the problem from
the outside. They are not living here."

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The King Reinforces the Point
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4. (U) On October 11, a day after Muasher's remarks, King
Abdullah reinforced the GOJ's message on transfer in his MBC
interview. Framing Jordan's position in terms of support for
the Palestinians, the King stated "It is our duty to support
their (the Palestinians') steadfastness and permanence on
their lands . . . At the end, our borders will be
impenetrable in the face of compulsory transfers of our
Palestinian brethren or expelling them from their lands."


5. (U) Turning to Jordan's eastern borders, the King stated
that "Jordan will not accept any influx of Iraqi or other
refugees. We will not allow the setting up of camps for any
refugee, whether of Iraqi or any other nationality, on
Jordanian soil. If we here are considering the passage of
refugees to their homelands through Jordan, such camps should
be erected on Iraqi lands. We will not allow them to stop or
remain on Jordanian soil."

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Comment
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6. (C) As reported reftel, the specter of large-scale refugee
flows -- Iraqi, but even more so Palestinian -- into Jordan
in the event of war looms large among the public's anxieties.
The King's and FonMin Muasher's remarks on the subject were
clearly a coordinated effort by the GOJ to address those
fears. Muasher's remarks in particular betray a mounting
frustration that the ISRAELis have not taken any action to
lower the public speculation on the subject. We continue to
believe that a clear U.S. enunciation in support of Jordanian
stability, and our rejection of actions that could compromise
it, would be useful, making it easier for the Jordanians to
overcome the political obstacles to full coordination with
refugee relief organizations.
GNEHM