Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
02AMMAN5196
2002-09-11 15:14:00
SECRET
Embassy Amman
Cable title:  

GOJ PUSHES BACK AT POPULAR DISSATISFACTION

Tags:  PREL KPAL IZ XF IS JO MEPP 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 005196 

SIPDIS

WHITE HOUSE FOR TUCKER ASKEU

E.O. 12958: DECL: O9/O9/2O12
TAGS: PREL KPAL IZ XF IS JO MEPP
SUBJECT: GOJ PUSHES BACK AT POPULAR DISSATISFACTION
ON IRAQ AND DOMESTIC ISSUES

REF: A. AMMAN 4719 B. AMMAN 5131 C. STATE 1693O4

Classified By: CDA Gregory L. Berry for reasons 1.5
(B) and (D)

-------
SUMMARY
-------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 005196

SIPDIS

WHITE HOUSE FOR TUCKER ASKEU

E.O. 12958: DECL: O9/O9/2O12
TAGS: PREL KPAL IZ XF ISRAEL'>IS JO MEPP
SUBJECT: GOJ PUSHES BACK AT POPULAR DISSATISFACTION
ON IRAQ AND DOMESTIC ISSUES

REF: A. AMMAN 4719 B. AMMAN 5131 C. STATE 1693O4

Classified By: CDA Gregory L. Berry for reasons 1.5
(B) and (D)

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S) In recent weeks, the GOJ--through the King's
public address on August 15 (see Ref A),the Prime
Minister's speech to the Jordan press association on
September 2, and Royal Court Chief Fayez Tarawneh's
September 2 address to the Amman World Affairs Council
(see Ref B)--has respondcd more aggressively to public
criticism of the GOJ's stance on Iraq, the MEPP, and
other domestic issues, including its decision to
postpone elections. In doing so, the King, PM, and
other GOJ officials have put forth the idea of "Jordan
First", underscoring that Jordanian interests are its
primary concern and that GOJ policy on the issues,
particularly Iraq, will reflect this. By taking these
issues to the public, the GOJ is also beginning to
address popular frustration with an uneven record of
government communication on core issues. End Summary.

--------------
IRAQ: PREPARING THE PUBLIC
--------------


2. (S) In contrast to the GOJ's sometimes misleading
public statements on Iraq in July, the King in his
August 15 speech and PM in his September 2 interview
placed the responsibility for resolving the current
crisis on the Iraqi government. PM Abul Ragheb
emphasized that the GOJ will maintain a "balanced
relationship between Iraq and the U.S." and
underscored that both were "strategic partners of
Jordan." By placing the burden of responsibility on
Saddam Hussein and emphasizing the strategic nature of
its relationship with the U.S., the GOJ appears to be
signaling to Jordanians that it will not jeopardize
its relationship with the U.S. in the event of a
conflict with Iraq. However, recent discussions with
embassy contacts indicate the government's message so
far has had only a limited impact on the public.


3. (S) Street opinion in Jordan, while harboring no
fondness for Saddam Hussein, remains critical of
perceived U.S. efforts to impose its will on the
region. Public frustration over Iraq is one facet of

the popular consensus that the Arab world has no
influence on U.S. actions in the region. Recent high-
level U.S. public diplomacy efforts on Iraq have not
shaken the view of many here that the U.S. will use
the U.N. as nothing more than a facade, and that
consultations will be limited. As for the U.S. case
against Iraq, Jordanians persist in dismissing or
downplaying the possibility that Iraq may be harboring
CBW or WMD, despite Iraq's sordid and well-documented
history of WMD use.


4. (S) Politically sophisticated contacts worry about
the economic and political ramifications for Jordan of
any prolonged offensive against Iraq. Most caution
that public opinion will run heavily against the U.S.,
but those connected to the government believe the
security services will be able to handle popular
discontent on the streets, albeit with stretched
resources. To curb the "street", these contacts urge
the U.S. to make sure that any move against Saddam is
quick: "do not let the situation linger." The
reaction of the Iraqi people to any action will likely
affect public opinion here. If the Iraqi people were
to welcome U.S. troops as liberators, "it will diffuse
tensions."


5. (S) The potential for U.S. military action against
Iraq is inevitably linked to the Palestinian issue in
the minds of Jordanians. Criticism of U.S. policy on
Iraq is often tied to the U.S.'s "one-sided" approach
to the MEPP and the perceived reluctance to enforce a
"just" solution on the Palestinian issue. There is
widespread speculation that ISRAEL will use any action
against Iraq to transfer Palestinians from the West
Bank to Jordan while the International Community is
focused elsewhere.

-------------- --------------
DOMESTICALLY, NO APOLOGIES POR POSTPONING ELECTIONS
-------------- --------------

6. (C) While the GOJ's evolving public policy on Iraq
has yet to have much impact, the King's postponement
of elections--as announced in his August 15 speech--
continues to generate broad criticism. The PM
addressed these critics in his September 2 remarks by
warning that if elections were held now, they could
"fall under external influence." He defended the
quick tempo of temporary laws that have been passed
since the Parliament was dissolved last June, citing
their necessity for the "country's development." He
also offered unusually strong criticism of the
political role that professional associations have
assumed and encouraged the associations to stick to
addressing the concerns of their professions, not
politics. The PM also confronted criticism that the
government is outlawing demonstrations, "We did not
ban rallies and marches, but rather regulated them."


7. (C) The message on elections is a hard sell to both
sophisticated political observers and the street.
Most contacts balk at the government's defense that
regional instability is a reason to delay. "The
situation is more unstable now than when the
government first delayed elections...and it is only
growing worse!" One Parliamentarian detailed,
district by district, how the Islamists could only
gain 20-25 seats under the current electoral system--
hardly a threat to the government. (The government
response in private is that a number of "swing"
parliamentarians would ally themselves with the avowed
Islamists on key issues including Iraq, creating
management problems with the GOJ. Many contacts argue
that people need some forum for venting their growing
frustrations--protesting in Parliament is better than
protesting in the street. Even some supporters of the
government argue that a sitting Parliament with a
strong opposition voice would strengthen the King's
hand, both domestically and internationally.

--------------
SOMEONE NEEDS TO TALK TO THE PEOPLE
--------------


8. (C) The government's reluctance to defend it's
policies directly with the people--the King's mid-
August public address is only the second time he has
spoken to the nation on camera since the beginning of
the Intifada--has been a long-standing theme with our
contacts. One Circassian contact opined in July that
Jordan needs either a strong government with a Prime
Minister who can communicate with the people, or a
strong King with a natural feel for Jordanian
constituencies, but right now "we have neither-"
While it remains to be seen if the government's recent
attempts at public diplomacy will affect public
opinion, the government has at least recognized the
need to defend its often unpopular policy decisions.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


9. (C) The GOJ's recent efforts to directly address
the people is a welcome step. While many Jordanians
may not accept the government's reasoning, there is a
pressing need to prepare the populace for potential
disruptions in coming months. The issue of Iraq will
be particularly divisive here, as the public
imagination will be focused on the plight of the Iraqi
people, not their leader. We can expect zigs and zags
in the GOJ's language on Iraq as circumstances
dictate, but the government seems to have settled on a
broad outline for its public audience.
BERRY