Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
02AMMAN3549
2002-06-30 13:27:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Amman
Cable title:
ASSABEEL: UNDERSTANDING JORDAN'S PREEMINENT
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 003549
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2012
TAGS: KISL KPAO PGOV PHUM JO
SUBJECT: ASSABEEL: UNDERSTANDING JORDAN'S PREEMINENT
ISLAMIST WEEKLY
REF: AMMAN 2559
Classified By: AMBASSADOR EDWARD W. GNEHM FOR REASONS 1.5(B) AND (D).
-------
SUMMARY
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 003549
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2012
TAGS: KISL KPAO PGOV PHUM JO
SUBJECT: ASSABEEL: UNDERSTANDING JORDAN'S PREEMINENT
ISLAMIST WEEKLY
REF: AMMAN 2559
Classified By: AMBASSADOR EDWARD W. GNEHM FOR REASONS 1.5(B) AND (D).
--------------
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (C) The Islamist publication Assabeel ("the way" or "the
path") is Jordan's most important weekly newspaper. Its
circulation is small compared to that of the daily
newspapers, but it has grown recently when other Jordanian
weeklies have not. Insiders aver that the paper seeks to
convey "quality information beneficial to readers." They
style the paper as a critical opposition mouthpiece,
positively directed at supporting reform in Jordan through
conventional and democratic means. The paper, they say, is
both lauded and reviled because it stakes out strong,
principled positions on issues. Insiders at Assabeel claim
the paper is independent. Other members of the media scoff
at such claims of independence, and even suggest that
Assabeel's staff reports to Jordanian intelligence. End
summary.
--------------
HISTORY, CIRCULATION, AND READERSHIP
--------------
2. (C) Members of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) founded
Assabeel in 1993, shortly after the advent of the MB's
political arm, the Islamic Action Front (IAF). Assabeel rose
out of the ashes of an "official" MB newspaper, Al Ribat
("the tether"). According to Sa'ud Abu Mahfuz, Assabeel's
General Manager and a member of the MB, Al Ribat failed in
its second year because the MB controlled it too tightly.
Abu Mahfuz claims Assabeel is, by contrast, independent.
3. (C) Abu Mahfuz reports that the paper's circulation has
doubled to about 17,000 copies since September 2000. (Note:
A former editor ousted from Assabeel in 1996 insists it has
merely maintained circulation at 5-7000 copies over the past
two years, and was in steady decline before that.) Assabeel
employs fourteen people besides Abu Mahfuz; seven are
journalists and the other seven work as secretaries, computer
technicians, and office staff. The paper meets its operating
expenses through sales revenues.
4. (C) According to Abu Mahfuz, most copies of Assabeel are
purchased by women who take the paper home to large families.
In addition, copies placed in any of Jordan's more than 3000
mosques may be read by scores of people. For this reason,
Assabeel uses a large multiplier to extrapolate an estimated
readership of 170,000 from circulation figures. Though one
former parliamentarian surmises that Assabeel's hardcopy
readership is confined to MB members, Assabeel insiders claim
many party leaders, ministry officials, diplomats, doctors,
educators, and leaders at mosques and churches read their
paper. (Indeed, the Political and Public Affairs sections
receive Assabeel weekly.)
5. (C) Assabeel's website reportedly has 1,000,000 hits
monthly from expatriate Jordanians seeking an opposition
viewpoint on issues within Jordan, government officials, and
others in countries throughout the world. Thousands of hits
originate from the United States.
-------------- --------------
THE SECRET OF OUR SUCCESS: CREDIBILITY, FAMILY VALUES,
"NATIONAL" APPEAL, AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
-------------- --------------
6. (C) Abu Mahfuz attributes Assabeel's success to its
credibility and authenticity as a news source. He even
claims the paper presents U.S. views and positions evenly,
and promised the paper would support Bush's June 24th speech
if it turned out to be "fair." Abu Mahfuz said Assabeel's
readership appreciates its "principled" opposition to the GOJ
in instances like the sedition case of former MP Toujan
Faisal (reftel). Assabeel openly criticized Faisal's
imprisonment, even though Islamists had been the object of
Faisal's vitriol in the past. According to Abu Mahfuz, the
fundamental unfairness of Faisal's imprisonment made Faisal's
prior invective superfluous.
7. (C) Abu Mahfuz also claims readers are drawn to Assabeel
because of its conservative "family" orientation. For
example, unlike other Jordanian weeklies, Assabeel does not
publish photos of women passing for Arab-World correlatives
of Britain's "page three" girls. Assabeel bars advertising
by establishments (e.g., banks and night clubs) promoting
practices (e.g., usury and drinking) at odds with
conservative Muslim ideology.
8. (C) Abu Mahfuz points to Assabeel's breadth of coverage as
another reason for its increased popularity. A typical issue
contains several pages of news and features treating a broad
range of topics through the "eyes of Islam," whereas the
content of other weeklies is more thin. Three of nine
columnists at Assabeel are at least nominally Christian,
though the practical effect of this on the paper's content is
hard to detect. Regardless, Abu Mahfuz characterizes the
newspaper as "national" (not merely Muslim) in its appeal.
9. (C) Abu Mahfuz acknowledges that regional developments
help account for heightened sales. Circulation has generally
increased throughout the Intifada -- while other weeklies
have fizzled -- and it spikes in response to specific events
on the West Bank. For example, Abu Mahfuz says bloody
photographs depicting Palestinian suffering in Jenin during
Israel's April insurgency greatly boosted circulation. Abu
Mahfuz asserts that people are attracted to Assabeel's
coverage because it is moderate and discourages violence, yet
at the same time says some of the photographs it publishes
incite "revolutionary" sentiment. The paper has also given
positive coverage to Palestinian suicide bombers.
10. (C) Comment. Assabeel also panders to popular
anti-Israel and anti-U.S. sentiment in other subtle (and not
so subtle) ways. Assabeel stories, headlines, and captions
consistently use pejorative labels for Israeli officials,
e.g., "the criminal Peres" and "the terrorist Sharon." It
frequently runs lurid banner headlines (in red ink) calling
attention to the latest Israeli "atrocity" or Bin Laden
statement. However, Public Affairs has obtained relatively
fair and frequent coverage in Assabeel for U.S. speaker
programs and Embassy activities. End comment.
-------------- --------------
ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT: INFORMAL PRESS RESTRICTIONS, MARKET
LIMITS, AND REPORTING QUALITY
-------------- --------------
11. (C) Abu Mahfuz identifies two factors "limiting"
Assabeel. First, like all media in Jordan, there are
unwritten restrictions on Assabeel's freedom of expression,
which Assabeel observes in order to avoid "problems" with the
GOJ. Assabeel claims to support positive change through
conventional means, and does not publish material aimed at
undermining the Hashemite regime, personally attacking GOJ
officials, or exploiting societal fault-lines (e.g.,
East-Bank/West-Bank tensions and Muslim/Christian religious
differences). (Note: On a personal level, Abu Mahfuz
considers the Hashemite regime "an evil blight, forced on
Jordan by colonial powers, in an otherwise holy land.") By
observing limits, the paper retains the ability to criticize
the GOJ on human rights issues and other topics.
12. (C) Second, Abu Mahfuz notes that Assabeel cannot -- at
least in hardcopy form -- expand beyond its small Jordanian
market due to the prohibitively high transactions costs of
selling in other countries. (Note: Though Abu Mahfuz did
not mention it, political sensitivities in other countries
would also limit hardcopy distribution.)
13. (C) Sources outside Assabeel criticize its reporting.
The former Assabeel editor describes the current crop of
Assabeel journalists as bright, but young and inexperienced
(because, he says, few experienced reporters belong to the
MB). There is also a perception that Assabeel's treatment of
international issues is especially weak. Assabeel uses the
internet, releases from Hamas media offices, and
sensationalist media outlets to cover external issues. Given
Assabeel's limitations as a raw news source, one contact
explains that the paper survives only because its opinion and
editorial pieces are marginally better than those of other
weeklies.
--------------
THE QUESTION OF INDEPENDENCE
--------------
14. (C) Assabeel's General Manager claims the paper is an
independent publication, rather than "a bird crushed in the
hands of the IAF or the Muslim Brotherhood." This may be
true in the limited sense that the IAF/MB does not own
Assabeel and the paper operates out of separate offices.
Moreover, the paper criticizes the IAF on occasion. For
example, Abu Mahfuz says Assabeel blamed the IAF for weaker
than expected showings in student council elections held at
some universities. Moreover, the paper reportedly criticized
the IAF's boycott of the 1997 parliamentary elections. Abu
Mahfuz promises Assabeel will cover debate over the IAF's
participation in anticipated parliamentary elections, but
only after the GOJ commits to a date for elections.
15. (C) The former Assabeel editor agrees that Assabeel's
content is not determined by the IAF or the MB. However, he
says the content is controlled by Assabeel's founders (four
Palestinian Muslims and a Palestinian Christian),who use the
paper to air their pro-Hamas/anti-Palestinian Authority
viewpoint under the cover of an organ most associate only
with the IAF/MB. Sources note that the views expressed by
Christian writers on Assabeel's staff do not differ
appreciably from Islamist views, so that the paper does not
present a distinct Christian outlook. Members of the media
deride claims of Assabeel's independence, suggesting that
Assabeel's staff reports to Jordan's General Intelligence
Directorate.
--------------
COMMENT
--------------
16. (C) The Islamists who run Assabeel portray themselves --
and may see themselves -- as uncompromising
"uber-journalists" wrapped in a righteous cause. They seem
convinced that they conscientiously express their viewpoint
in accordance with the highest professional standards, and
appear to believe that the "truth" of their message fully
explains Assabeel's popularity. But in Jordan, where
opposition views are not always easy to air, at least in the
media, some people may gravitate towards whatever opposition
exists whether or not they accept all that the opposition
stands for. Opposition dynamics -- combined with Assabeel's
clear anti-Israel bias -- help explain why the paper is as
popular as it now is, and also why it is not embraced more
broadly.
Gnehm
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2012
TAGS: KISL KPAO PGOV PHUM JO
SUBJECT: ASSABEEL: UNDERSTANDING JORDAN'S PREEMINENT
ISLAMIST WEEKLY
REF: AMMAN 2559
Classified By: AMBASSADOR EDWARD W. GNEHM FOR REASONS 1.5(B) AND (D).
--------------
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (C) The Islamist publication Assabeel ("the way" or "the
path") is Jordan's most important weekly newspaper. Its
circulation is small compared to that of the daily
newspapers, but it has grown recently when other Jordanian
weeklies have not. Insiders aver that the paper seeks to
convey "quality information beneficial to readers." They
style the paper as a critical opposition mouthpiece,
positively directed at supporting reform in Jordan through
conventional and democratic means. The paper, they say, is
both lauded and reviled because it stakes out strong,
principled positions on issues. Insiders at Assabeel claim
the paper is independent. Other members of the media scoff
at such claims of independence, and even suggest that
Assabeel's staff reports to Jordanian intelligence. End
summary.
--------------
HISTORY, CIRCULATION, AND READERSHIP
--------------
2. (C) Members of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) founded
Assabeel in 1993, shortly after the advent of the MB's
political arm, the Islamic Action Front (IAF). Assabeel rose
out of the ashes of an "official" MB newspaper, Al Ribat
("the tether"). According to Sa'ud Abu Mahfuz, Assabeel's
General Manager and a member of the MB, Al Ribat failed in
its second year because the MB controlled it too tightly.
Abu Mahfuz claims Assabeel is, by contrast, independent.
3. (C) Abu Mahfuz reports that the paper's circulation has
doubled to about 17,000 copies since September 2000. (Note:
A former editor ousted from Assabeel in 1996 insists it has
merely maintained circulation at 5-7000 copies over the past
two years, and was in steady decline before that.) Assabeel
employs fourteen people besides Abu Mahfuz; seven are
journalists and the other seven work as secretaries, computer
technicians, and office staff. The paper meets its operating
expenses through sales revenues.
4. (C) According to Abu Mahfuz, most copies of Assabeel are
purchased by women who take the paper home to large families.
In addition, copies placed in any of Jordan's more than 3000
mosques may be read by scores of people. For this reason,
Assabeel uses a large multiplier to extrapolate an estimated
readership of 170,000 from circulation figures. Though one
former parliamentarian surmises that Assabeel's hardcopy
readership is confined to MB members, Assabeel insiders claim
many party leaders, ministry officials, diplomats, doctors,
educators, and leaders at mosques and churches read their
paper. (Indeed, the Political and Public Affairs sections
receive Assabeel weekly.)
5. (C) Assabeel's website reportedly has 1,000,000 hits
monthly from expatriate Jordanians seeking an opposition
viewpoint on issues within Jordan, government officials, and
others in countries throughout the world. Thousands of hits
originate from the United States.
-------------- --------------
THE SECRET OF OUR SUCCESS: CREDIBILITY, FAMILY VALUES,
"NATIONAL" APPEAL, AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
-------------- --------------
6. (C) Abu Mahfuz attributes Assabeel's success to its
credibility and authenticity as a news source. He even
claims the paper presents U.S. views and positions evenly,
and promised the paper would support Bush's June 24th speech
if it turned out to be "fair." Abu Mahfuz said Assabeel's
readership appreciates its "principled" opposition to the GOJ
in instances like the sedition case of former MP Toujan
Faisal (reftel). Assabeel openly criticized Faisal's
imprisonment, even though Islamists had been the object of
Faisal's vitriol in the past. According to Abu Mahfuz, the
fundamental unfairness of Faisal's imprisonment made Faisal's
prior invective superfluous.
7. (C) Abu Mahfuz also claims readers are drawn to Assabeel
because of its conservative "family" orientation. For
example, unlike other Jordanian weeklies, Assabeel does not
publish photos of women passing for Arab-World correlatives
of Britain's "page three" girls. Assabeel bars advertising
by establishments (e.g., banks and night clubs) promoting
practices (e.g., usury and drinking) at odds with
conservative Muslim ideology.
8. (C) Abu Mahfuz points to Assabeel's breadth of coverage as
another reason for its increased popularity. A typical issue
contains several pages of news and features treating a broad
range of topics through the "eyes of Islam," whereas the
content of other weeklies is more thin. Three of nine
columnists at Assabeel are at least nominally Christian,
though the practical effect of this on the paper's content is
hard to detect. Regardless, Abu Mahfuz characterizes the
newspaper as "national" (not merely Muslim) in its appeal.
9. (C) Abu Mahfuz acknowledges that regional developments
help account for heightened sales. Circulation has generally
increased throughout the Intifada -- while other weeklies
have fizzled -- and it spikes in response to specific events
on the West Bank. For example, Abu Mahfuz says bloody
photographs depicting Palestinian suffering in Jenin during
Israel's April insurgency greatly boosted circulation. Abu
Mahfuz asserts that people are attracted to Assabeel's
coverage because it is moderate and discourages violence, yet
at the same time says some of the photographs it publishes
incite "revolutionary" sentiment. The paper has also given
positive coverage to Palestinian suicide bombers.
10. (C) Comment. Assabeel also panders to popular
anti-Israel and anti-U.S. sentiment in other subtle (and not
so subtle) ways. Assabeel stories, headlines, and captions
consistently use pejorative labels for Israeli officials,
e.g., "the criminal Peres" and "the terrorist Sharon." It
frequently runs lurid banner headlines (in red ink) calling
attention to the latest Israeli "atrocity" or Bin Laden
statement. However, Public Affairs has obtained relatively
fair and frequent coverage in Assabeel for U.S. speaker
programs and Embassy activities. End comment.
-------------- --------------
ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT: INFORMAL PRESS RESTRICTIONS, MARKET
LIMITS, AND REPORTING QUALITY
-------------- --------------
11. (C) Abu Mahfuz identifies two factors "limiting"
Assabeel. First, like all media in Jordan, there are
unwritten restrictions on Assabeel's freedom of expression,
which Assabeel observes in order to avoid "problems" with the
GOJ. Assabeel claims to support positive change through
conventional means, and does not publish material aimed at
undermining the Hashemite regime, personally attacking GOJ
officials, or exploiting societal fault-lines (e.g.,
East-Bank/West-Bank tensions and Muslim/Christian religious
differences). (Note: On a personal level, Abu Mahfuz
considers the Hashemite regime "an evil blight, forced on
Jordan by colonial powers, in an otherwise holy land.") By
observing limits, the paper retains the ability to criticize
the GOJ on human rights issues and other topics.
12. (C) Second, Abu Mahfuz notes that Assabeel cannot -- at
least in hardcopy form -- expand beyond its small Jordanian
market due to the prohibitively high transactions costs of
selling in other countries. (Note: Though Abu Mahfuz did
not mention it, political sensitivities in other countries
would also limit hardcopy distribution.)
13. (C) Sources outside Assabeel criticize its reporting.
The former Assabeel editor describes the current crop of
Assabeel journalists as bright, but young and inexperienced
(because, he says, few experienced reporters belong to the
MB). There is also a perception that Assabeel's treatment of
international issues is especially weak. Assabeel uses the
internet, releases from Hamas media offices, and
sensationalist media outlets to cover external issues. Given
Assabeel's limitations as a raw news source, one contact
explains that the paper survives only because its opinion and
editorial pieces are marginally better than those of other
weeklies.
--------------
THE QUESTION OF INDEPENDENCE
--------------
14. (C) Assabeel's General Manager claims the paper is an
independent publication, rather than "a bird crushed in the
hands of the IAF or the Muslim Brotherhood." This may be
true in the limited sense that the IAF/MB does not own
Assabeel and the paper operates out of separate offices.
Moreover, the paper criticizes the IAF on occasion. For
example, Abu Mahfuz says Assabeel blamed the IAF for weaker
than expected showings in student council elections held at
some universities. Moreover, the paper reportedly criticized
the IAF's boycott of the 1997 parliamentary elections. Abu
Mahfuz promises Assabeel will cover debate over the IAF's
participation in anticipated parliamentary elections, but
only after the GOJ commits to a date for elections.
15. (C) The former Assabeel editor agrees that Assabeel's
content is not determined by the IAF or the MB. However, he
says the content is controlled by Assabeel's founders (four
Palestinian Muslims and a Palestinian Christian),who use the
paper to air their pro-Hamas/anti-Palestinian Authority
viewpoint under the cover of an organ most associate only
with the IAF/MB. Sources note that the views expressed by
Christian writers on Assabeel's staff do not differ
appreciably from Islamist views, so that the paper does not
present a distinct Christian outlook. Members of the media
deride claims of Assabeel's independence, suggesting that
Assabeel's staff reports to Jordan's General Intelligence
Directorate.
--------------
COMMENT
--------------
16. (C) The Islamists who run Assabeel portray themselves --
and may see themselves -- as uncompromising
"uber-journalists" wrapped in a righteous cause. They seem
convinced that they conscientiously express their viewpoint
in accordance with the highest professional standards, and
appear to believe that the "truth" of their message fully
explains Assabeel's popularity. But in Jordan, where
opposition views are not always easy to air, at least in the
media, some people may gravitate towards whatever opposition
exists whether or not they accept all that the opposition
stands for. Opposition dynamics -- combined with Assabeel's
clear anti-Israel bias -- help explain why the paper is as
popular as it now is, and also why it is not embraced more
broadly.
Gnehm