UNRWA'S UXO REMOVAL EFFORTS IN JENIN CAMP STYMIED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 002999

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA, PRM AND DRL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2012
TAGS: PREF PREL KPAL KWBG ISRAEL'>IS JO
SUBJECT: UNRWA'S UXO REMOVAL EFFORTS IN JENIN CAMP STYMIED
BY LACK OF EQUIPMENT AND EXPLOSIVES

REF: JERUSALEM 1271

Classified By: DCM Greg Berry, per 1.5 (b) and (d).

(U) This message was coordinated with Embassy Tel Aviv and
ConGen Jerusalem.


1. (C) Summary and Comment: UNRWA's efforts to remove
unexploded ordnance (UXO) from Jenin refugee camp remain
severely hindered by the UN agency's inability to procure the
necessary equipment and explosives. UNRWA requested ISRAELi
authorization to use the equipment and explosives verbally in
mid-April and in writing on April 23. UNRWA has not yet
received any response from the IDF. However, ISRAELi
authorities on June 5 agreed to UNRWA's long-standing request
to hold technical meetings on UXO removal during the week of
June 10. Resolution of the equipment issue is crucial.
Without the proper equipment and explosives, UNRWA can only
defuse the UXO and either leave it in place or bury it in an
undisclosed location. Both options leave the possibility
that refugees or UNRWA staff could be injured, or Palestinian
fighters could find and retrieve the UXO. Neither
possibility advances U.S. or ISRAELi interests, and both
leave UNRWA open to charges of "complicity" in terrorism.
End Summary and Comment.


2. (C) In June 4 and 5 telcons, UNRWA West Bank field
director Richard Cook briefed regional refcoord on UNRWA's
continuing, unsuccessful efforts to procure the equipment
necessary to remove unexploded ordnance (UXO) from Jenin
refugee camp. Cook reported that the situation had changed
little since mid-April, when the IDF pulled out of Jenin camp
and UNRWA first requested ISRAELi assistance. Although a
Norwegian demining team had conducted the first UXO removal
in late April (ref),and UNRWA currently has a four-person
demining team (one French UNMAS employee, and a
Swedish-funded team comprised of two British nationals with
extensive IED experience and a Swedish medic),their efforts
are severely hampered by the lack of equipment. As UNRWA had
explained previously, UXO cannot be disposed of properly
without explosives. Citing security concerns, ISRAELi
authorities have not granted UNRWA permission to procure the
explosives.


3. (C) Cook said that, without the explosives and related
equipment, UNRWA can move only slowly -- and at great risk --
to remove the UXO. The demining team is having a
particularly difficult time with improvised explosive devices
(IED's) and unidentified manufactured devices. Without the
explosives, the team can only defuse them and then either
leave them in place or bury them. As Cook noted, neither
option is attractive. Leaving the UXO in place, with no
means to control pedestrian flow over the destroyed center of
the camp, leaves refugees and UNRWA employees in danger of
injury. (UNRWA officials told refcoord and visiting
congressional staffers on May 30 that two refugees had been
killed and dozens wounded by UXO. While visiting Jenin camp,
USG officials observed that there were no barriers around the
destroyed camp center and no means of preventing refugees
from traversing the mounds of rubble. UNRWA officials noted
that the PA's ability to secure and police the camp had been
severely reduced by the IDF operations in Jenin.) Defusing
and burying the UXO -- albeit in an undisclosed location --
leaves open the possibility that Palestinian fighters could
find and use it. It also leaves UNRWA open to charges of
"complicity" in terrorism. Nevertheless, Cook said, UNRWA
has no choice but to move ahead without the equipment. It
cannot start rubble removal and reconstruction efforts until
the UXO is identified and defused.


4. (C) Cook detailed UNRWA's unsuccessful efforts to secure
ISRAELi permission to obtain the necessary explosives and
equipment. Immediately following the ISRAELi withdrawal from
Jenin, UNRWA first approached the IDF with a verbal request
to provide the equipment and explosives required for UXO
removal. The IDF informed UNRWA that it would engage in
discussions with UNRWA only if UNRWA agreed to provide the
ISRAELi government with a complete record (including
photographs) of all UXO found in the camp. UNRWA responded
that it would only turn over the record to the ISRAELi
government after all UXO recovery operations had been
completed. Cook said UNRWA did not want to put its UXO
disposal team (the Norwegian team) in any danger, as
cooperation with the IDF during the UXO removal process
would, in the eyes of Jenin camp residents, compromise
UNRWA's neutrality. UNRWA followed this verbal approach with
an April 23 written request to the IDF, to which it has not
received a response.


5. (C) UNRWA then approached an ISRAELi private company,
Goldtec, hoping to contract its services to remove the UXO.
Goldtec told UNRWA it can supply the equipment, but needs IDF
authorization to use explosives within Jenin refugee camp.
According to Cook, Goldtec has not received any response to
its initial inquiries with ISRAELi government authorities.

6. (C) Cook emphasized to refcoord that UNRWA is trying to
be reasonable, and would like to engage the ISRAELis in
discussions over its specific security concerns. For
example, UNRWA would be willing to store the explosives
outside Jenin refugee camp, under IDF control, and transport
them to and from the camp at the beginning and end of each
workday. Cook reported that the IDF had agreed on June 5 to
UNRWA's long-standing request to hold technical meetings on
UXO removal during the week of June 10. He is hopeful that
the meeting will produce results, but asked that the U.S.
raise UXO with ISRAELi authorities if the meeting is not
productive.


7. (SBU) Equipment still required by UNRWA includes:

- 1 x-ray inspector and processor
- 1 recoilless disrupter and dearmer
- 1 fiberoptic endoscope/boroscope kit
- 10 boxes of x-ray film
- 75 kg high explosives
- 400 electric detonators
- 400 m detonating cord
- 200 electrically initiated cartridges for the dearmer
- 20 m explosive cutting tape or charge linear cutting
(CLC)


8. (C) Comment: Continuation of the status quo -- slow,
dangerous UXO defusing operations without proper disposal --
serves neither U.S. nor ISRAELi interests. It also leaves
UNRWA unfairly and unnecessarily vulnerable to charges of
"complicity" in terrorism. End comment.
Gnehm