S E C R E T AMMAN 002513

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR UNDERSECRETARY BOLTON AND A/S BLOOMFIELD
FROM AMBASSADOR GNEHM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2012
TAGS: KHDP PREL MASS JO
SUBJECT: IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUED U.S. SUPPORT FOR JORDAN'S
DEMINING PROGRAM

Classified By: Ambassador Edward Gnehm. Reasons 1.5 (b,d).


1. (C) We understand that the Department may be considering
consolidating its NADR Humanitarian Demining programs and
focusing on fewer countries in the coming fiscal years. If
this is the case, we believe it is important for U.S.
political and military interests in the region -- and in OEF
-- that NADR funding for Jordan continue.


2. (S) King Abdullah has stuck his neck out for us on many
occasions this past year. In the face of 20 months of
deepening Israeli-Palestinian violence, he has maintained a
policy of moderate, constructive engagement with both parties
and with other regional players. His efforts have been
crucial in building Arab support for the Saudi (and now Arab
League) Peace Initiative. Perhaps most importantly,
immediately after 9/11, the King was the strongest Arab voice
speaking out against terror and he backed up his words with
deeds. Closely coordinating with us, he sent a Jordanian
army field hospital and a company of Jordanian deminers to
Afghanistan to support OEF. He also dispatched Jordanian
Special Forces to other locations in support of our global
war on terrorism.


3. (C) The King made these decisions in the face of
widespread and growing anti-American sentiment in the region.
He showed himself to be a friend willing to risk the anger
of many in the Arab world to take a firm stand along with us.


4. (C) Jordan's HD program, thanks to the United States'
substantial support, is making steady progress. Over 80,000
mines have been pulled from the ground, the risks to
Jordanians living near mined areas has been greatly reduced
and hundreds of acres of scarce fertile land in the Jordan
Valley have been returned to cultivation. This is a program
that works and -- we would argue -- should merit continued
support based on its own accomplishments.


5. (S) However, beyond that, we believe that a decision to
alter our traditional support for Jordan's HD program would
send a particularly bad signal at this time. First, one of
Jordan's most visible contributions to OEF is its deminers.
To reduce assistance to the very branch of the Jordanian
Armed Forces (the Royal Corps of Engineers) that is standing
with us in Afghanistan does not make political or military
sense. Beyond that, and looking ahead to future possible
objectives, we should think about what we would ask of Jordan
during or after any potential U.S. action in Iraq. One very
tangible way the Jordanians could assist us in a post-Saddam
Iraq would be to help clear the land of mines and other
ordnance. As we look to various scenarios that might take
place, we should make sure that those who have helped us in
the past and present, will have the resources they need to do
so in the future.


6. (S) We recognize that NADR HD funds are already stretched
very thin, and there are more worthy recipients than there
are resources. That said, we strongly believe that -- given
the King's and Jordan's demonstrated commitment to our shared
values and joint endeavors -- every effort should be made to
maintain our NADR HD support for Jordan at current levels for
the next several fiscal years.
Gnehm