NIGERIA: LIBERIAN RECONCILIATION CONFERENCE YIELDS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000926

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL:03/18/12
TAGS: PREL ECOWAS MOPS MASS PHUM LI NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: LIBERIAN RECONCILIATION CONFERENCE YIELDS
UNCERTAIN RESULTS


REF: MONROVIA 449


CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER. REASONS 1.5 (B)
AND (D).



1. (C) Summary: Initially set for March 14, the Liberian
reconciliation meeting finally opened March 15. The delay
was due to an unsuccessful eleventh hour attempt by ECOWAS
ExecSec Chambas to convince President Taylor to attend.
Taylor declined but sent a 27-person delegation led by
Agricultural Minister Roland Massaquoi. The LURD also refused to
participate once the meeting became billed as a preparatory
session for Taylor's July meeting in Monrovia. The Abuja
session was mostly contentious, but at times light-hearted
as old friends and foes exchanged both barbs and embraces.
Most of the two-day conference was bogged down in
procedural debates whether the conference was in
preparation for the Monrovia event and whether the Monrovia
delegation should be seated. Predictably short on specifics
but the product of much parsing, the final communique
called, inter alia, for a GOL-LURD cease-fire and an
environment conducive to fair elections (A copy has been
faxed to AF/W). Chambas has told us the LURD will visit
Abuja for discussions with ECOWAS, perhaps as early as this
weekend. Also, the ECOWAS Ministerial on Security will
discuss Liberia on March 29 in Dakar. Reftel provides a
well-written read-out of the conference from one
participant's perspective. We hope this message complements
Monrovia's by providing a sampling of participants'
comments while actually at the conference. End summary.







2. (C) For a moment it appeared the conference might
collapse before getting started. While waiting for Chambas
to return from Monrovia hopefully with Taylor in tow, the
opening was delayed from March 14 to March 15. Chambas
returned without Taylor but not completely empty-handed.
Although refusing to leave Monrovia, Taylor sent a 27
person delegation headed by Agriculture Minister Massaquoi;
the group included UPP Presidential candidate Baccus
Matthews, True Whig Party figure Rudolph Sherman, Krahn
activist Bai Gbala and other civic and religious leaders.
Whether the Taylor delegation would be allowed to
participate became the first procedural bone of contention.
Opposition figures were incensed that Chambas, after
consulting with Taylor, had downgraded the meeting to a
preparatory session, without conferring with any of them.
They were further angered when the Monrovia delegation
insisted that it did not speak for the GOL although sent by
Taylor himself. The first day of the conference was spent
trying to overcome the opposition's refusal to sit down
with the Taylor delegation; the issue was not resolved
until the early morning of March 16 when the Monrovia delegation
finally agreed that it represented the GOL.





3. (C) However, the question of whether the meeting was in
preparation for the July Monrovia meeting continued to
hover over the second day. Opposition figures, particularly
the expatriate Liberians, vigorously protested against the
notion. Massaquoui's present only reinforced their
reservations. He had organized Taylor's last
reconciliation meeting three years ago in Monrovia. That
meeting had done nothing to stop Liberia's current
troubles; they saw Massaquoi's presence as a reminder or an
omen that another Taylor-driven Monrovia meeting would be
no more productive now than three years ago. Moreover,
several claimed they would not return to Monrovia until
steps were taken to ensure their personal security. They
were not willing to take Taylor's assurances of personal
safety at face value; they wanted guarantees from ECOWAS
and the international community. This desire became a
central focus of the conference.



4. (C) The other important procedural issue was the
composition of civil society participants. While this issue
did not delay the proceedings, many opposition figures held
the perception that Chambas had been hoodwinked by Taylor
and company; they felt he had been induced to include in
the civil society complement people whose sympathies for
Taylor did not accurately reflect the civic society
mainstream. Dusty Wolokollie, an opposition politician
(LPP) who managed to insert himself in the conference after
being left off the initial roster, claimed that Chambas
worked out the list with Taylor and GOL ForMin Captan but
did not adequately consult with the political parties and
human rights groups. Chambas erred by inviting only
individuals with name recognition but not making sure all
key institutions and political parties were represented.



5. (C) Former Interim Government President Amos Sawyer was
less charitable toward Chambas, according to Conmany
Wesseh, a close Sawyer aide. During a private aside, Sawyer
chided Chambas that GOL Formin Captan did not have to
attend because Chambas was doing Captan's work for him.
According to Chambas, Sawyer's only refrain during the
conference was the imperative of forming an interim
government to prepare for eventual elections.
(Comment: Sawyer's aspersion was unfair but demonstrates
the animosity and deep feelings that divide the Liberian
polity. It probably served to remind Chambas, who has been
away from the Liberian issue for several years, about how
difficult it is to maintain good relations with both
opposition and the GOL. The minute a person is seen as
listening to one side, the other becomes gripped with
suspicious. End comment.)


--------------
A TALE OF TWO DOCUMENTS
--------------



6. (U) In the end, the conference produced two papers: 1)
The Position Statement signed by civil society leaders,
including those from the Monrovia delegation and 2) The
Final Communique agreed to by the political opposition and
the GOL delegation.







7. (C) Position Statement: In addition to criticizing
Taylor's government, the paper calls for a regional force
to guarantee security, a cease-fire between the LURD-GOL,
credible elections, including a retooled electoral
commission, restructuring of the security forces by ECOWAS
and the UN, and the investigation of human rights abuses
and war crimes by bodies established by the UN and ECOWAS.
Opposition figure Togba Na Tipoteh told Polcouns that the
getting the civic society members in the Taylor delegation
to endorse the position paper was not difficult. Tipoteh
said he and Amos Sawyer had met privately with some of the
group during the late evening of March 15 to persuade them
to back the position statement. A few conference participants
assigned much more significance to the statement than the final
communique. Civil society members pledged to present it to Taylor
and publish it widely in Liberia. Alhaji Kromah claimed Chambas
had promised to present the position paper to ECOWAS
Security Ministerial later this month in Dakar. ECOWAS
would forward the document to the UN to inform discussions
about Liberia in the Security Council, Kromah hoped.
However, others were less sanguine. Laveli Supuwood,
former Taylor Justice Minister but current Taylor foe with
ties to the LURD, said that he heard from a member of
Taylor's team that the document had already been sent to
taylor who described it and the conference as a "waste of
time."





8. (C) Final Communique: Coming up with the agreed text was
difficult. Again, the sides debated whether the Abuja
meeting would be characterized as preparatory for the July
meeting. Opposition figures were inflexible; Taylor'
people were equally adamant. The compromise was to refer
to the meeting as preparatory but not specify for what.
Thus, the communique does not mention the July meeting. The
GOL team dug in their heels when the opposition wanted
language about an international stabilization force and
other proposals from the position statement. In the end,
there was very little common ground between the sides and
no substantive breakthroughs. Consequently, the communique
basically restates the statements made by both sides but
does not reconcile or meld them. The document's
penultimate paragraph is a rather anodyne and vague
prescription for national reconciliation: (a) GOL-LURD
cease-fire, (b) physical security, (c) protection of
individual rights and respect for the rule of law and (d)
free and fair elections. However, the document mentions no
mechanisms or next steps for achieving these goals.





9. (C) During a March 17 meeting with Ambassador Jeter,
Chambas dismissed the notion of deploying ECOMOG to provide
protection for prospective participants in the July
Monrovia meeting. However, he mused about the possibility
of deploying an ECOMOG force along the Guinea/Sierra
Leone/Liberia border to prevent LURD infiltration into
Liberia. Jeter told Chambas that this idea had been
floated before; it was discarded then and it was unlikely
to be accepted now.


--------------
Chambas to Meet the LURD
--------------





10. (C) While the LURD did not participate, they are being
drawn into the discussion. During a March 17 conversation,
Chambas told Ambassador Jeter that Supuwood had furnished
names and phone numbers of the LURD hierarchy. Chambas
stated they had agreed to visit Abuja for discussions with
ECOWAS. From the names Supuwood provided, such as Jackson
Doe, the LURD seemed more Krahn-dominated than Mandingo.
This gave rise to the question of Roosevelt Johnson's
whereabouts, as he now seems to have disappeared from Jos
(Nigeria).




--------------
CONFERENCE SOUND BITES
--------------





11. (C) Here are a few telling snippets of conversations
Polcouns had on the margins, the last day of the event:




-- Tipoteh: Taylor is a con man par excellence. However,
we must expose him by making him make pledges at these
meetings then raising an outcry when he reneges. Piling
the blame for Liberia's woes at Taylor's feet will be the
only way to get the public to endorse a general strike or
take to the streets. We must build
a case against him that even he cannot sidestep.


-- Gbala: "I do not know what Amos (Amos Sawyer) was
thinking." By trying to insert the call for an interim
government and a peacekeeping force in the final
communique, it appeared that Sawyer was trying to make the
communique so odious that Taylor could do nothing but
repudiate it. Both items are bete noire for Taylor as they
either challenge his legitimacy as the elected president or
the sovereignty of Liberia itself. Instead of trying to
anger Taylor, it would be better to get him to agree to
promises that he cannot easily reject then hold his feet to
the fire when he fails to perform.




-- Blamo Nelson (Taylor's Director of Cabinet): The last
five years have been hellish. President Taylor has a real
vision for Liberia and genuinely wants reconciliation but
both have eluded us thus far. Judging by the level of
acrimony at this conference, we still have a long way to
go. In fact, the conference would have collapsed if the
GOL team had not compromised throughout. Yet, we want to
continue the process with a conference in Monrovia but many
on the other side will not attend.


-- Almost Everyone: We are tired and getting too old for
this.


--------------
COMMENT
--------------



12. (C) For a moment, it appeared the conference might
have been stillborn. Fortunately, it took place.
While there was no dramatic breakthrough, that ECOWAS
has created a framework through which the Liberians
can channel their discussion about the major issues
confronting them is a modest, but positive step.
Although the LURD did not attend, their acceptance of
the Chambas invitation to visit Abuja is a good sign.
Supuwood said that would return to Guinea to confer
with LURD and advise them to present reasonable
demands to Chambas. For real progress to be made, the
Liberians sooner or later must agree on specific
confidence-building measures that open the door to
reconciliation and create a level electoral playing
field. Ultimately, that road leads to the Executive
Mansion in Monrovia and its heretofore incorrigible
first tenant. ECOWAS and Chambas definitely have
their work cut out for them.
JETER