NIGERIA AND THE IMF HEAD FOR DIVORCE COURT?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000858

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2012
TAGS: EFIN ECON PREL NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA AND THE IMF HEAD FOR DIVORCE COURT?


REF: LAGOS 555



1. (U) Classified by CDA Andrews for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).



2. (C) Summary. After several days of consultations, the IMF
and GON agreed not to establish a new program. This
indefinite suspension is due to GON failure to meet informal
targets and to political considerations in the lead-up to the
2003 election that will make belt-tightening nigh impossible.
Trying to win points at home for "standing up to the IMF,"
the GON gave a populist spin to the suspension, stating it
turned its back on the IMF to pursue a "home-grown" economic
program more responsive to the citizenry's needs. Despite
the break, the IMF intends to retain a resident mission,
which will monitor the macroeconomy and provide
capacity-building and technical assistance. While having no
official impact, the break is one more hurdle for private
sector investors to overcome and may force donors like the
World Bank to reconsider assistance levels. End Summary.



3. (SBU) IMF Nigeria team leader Hiroyuki Hino led an
eleven-member team to Nigeria from February 28 through March
6 to conduct a 2001 year-end review and decide on a
recommended course of action for the Fund. Hino met with
Ambassador Jeter on March 3, and the team met with the donor
community on March 5. Although progress was achieved on many
fronts, Nigeria met only a few actual targets, most of them
related to privatization. Broader macroeconomic targets were
generally missed. The IMF team categorized the GON's overall
performance as unsatisfactory. The political machinations
regarding the 2002 budget and economic realities led the IMF
to conclude that the risks to a formal program were too high.



4. (SBU) The GON failed to complete agreed-upon targets on
fiscal, monetary and foreign exchange rate policies as
follows:


(a) GON fourth quarter spending exceeded targets by 0.3
percent of GDP, or N15 billion.


(b) Actual money supply growth was 36 percent compared with
the target of 20 percent.


(c) In January, the parallel market exchange rate climbed due
to the release of pension payments. The spread between
parallel and official rates remains at roughly 20 percent.


-- Progress was seen in the following areas:


(a) Inflation fell from a peak of 25 percent to 16.5 percent
(year-on-year) in December 2001;


(b) Foreign exchange reserves rose USD 1 billion on the
calendar year;


(c) Petroleum prices reached near import parity, thereby
removing consumer fuel subsidies;


(d) Money supply growth declined from a 60 percent annual
rate in 2000 to 36 percent in 2001;


(e) Fourth quarter spending was lower than the three previous
quarters. Actual 2001 spending was N200 billion lower than
the 2001 budget law;


(f) Some stability was achieved in the parallel and official
foreign exchange markets. The official rate showed increased
flexibility (the Central Bank's rate moved from 110 to 116 in
2001). The GON allowed remittances from abroad to be freely
traded and introduced foreign currency operator Thomas Cooke
to the market. Thomas Cooke is currently issuing foreign
currency-denominated travelers checks with little bureaucracy
-- customers need only show a passport and airline ticket; and


(g) Due process on capital projects was more effective than
the IMF anticipated, although a few GON agencies still
circumvented the process. Both sides agreed that reviewing
projects worth N1 million or more was cumbersome; N50 million
might be a more appropriate level.



5. (C) The spending contemplated by the 2002 budget, which
continues to languish in the National Assembly, coupled with
the National Assembly's push to complete implementation of
the 2001 budget indicate that spending this year will be
higher than in 2001. The National Assembly's investigation of
President Obasanjo's refusal to execute the 2001 budget, and
the constitutional implications of possibly turning over
greater control over spending to the legislature, was cited
by the IMF team as a factor that influenced their decision
not to press for a formal program. Given political
realities, Chief Economic Advisor Magnus Kpakol admitted
privately that government spending would likely be higher
this year than last. The House Finance Committee Chairman
commented that without an IMF program, the National Assembly
felt it has more "flexibility with government spending."
Non-official estimates predict that 25 percent of total
spending in 2002 will be deficit spending. Hino argued that
such excess spending is "imprudent" and would create
inflationary pressures, undermining the value of the Naira.
To protect the Naira's value, the Central Bank will be forced
to dip into its foreign reserves.


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Comment: Implications for the Future
--------------



6. (C) Whether this is a divorce or just a trial separation,
the IMF's withdrawal from a formal program will certainly
have implications for Nigeria's relationships with the
international financial community. In light of the IMF's
withdrawal, and in particular because of the Government of
Nigeria,s reaction, Citibank is reviewing its Nigeria
portfolio with the possibility of reducing exposure here.
The World Bank Mission in Nigeria said that macroeconomic
policy is a key factor in deciding loan levels, and that the
IMF announcement might affect future decisions on how large
the Bank program would be. Although the GON professes to
intend to complete the bilateral rescheduling agreements
pursuant to the December 2000 Paris Club Agreed Minute,
Nigeria is farther away than ever from its goal of
significant debt forgiveness.



7. (C) Few in the diplomatic community were surprised that
the GON and the IMF could not agree to a formal program. At
no point during the 2000-2001 SBA did the GON show a true
commitment to the Fund program nor did it integrate the
program into domestic policy. Nor were third parties
surprised that the Nigerian Government would see political
dividends in publicizing such a break as being unilateral.
Indeed, before the team concluded its review, and shortly
after Hino's arrival, the team leaders reported to Embassy
officers that "no agreement would be reached."



8. (C) Ironically, the official breakdown of the program may
present an opportunity for the IMF to make incremental
progress with GON economic policy makers. Neither side is
burdened with trying to follow an unrealistic script. With
an IMF Country Director in place for the first time in eight
months, the Fund can begin concentrating on technical
assistance and capacity building without the pressure of
having to stretch for politically unattainable macroeconomic
targets. It gives the new IMF team a chance to build better
relations and the GON an opportunity to announce its own
economic reforms without being accused of knuckling under IMF
pressure.



9. (C) The GON, despite its official break with the IMF, has
not abandoned efforts to restrain spending. President
Obasanjo has refused to execute prior-year budgets fully, and
the CBN has lowered liquidity by raising interest rates and,
in mid-2001, putting the brakes on borrowing by the state and
local governments. The IMF hopes that the installation of an
advisor in the Ministry of Finance will help avoid unbudgeted
spending by parastatals and government offices. From now on
the Fund will be literally on the inside (the country and
Ministry) trying to encourage reform at both policy and
implementation levels. While this is a fair distance from an
ideal relationship, it may be the best that can be hoped for
under the circumstances.


Andrews