NIGERIA TO "TARRY" BEFORE PRONOUNCING ON ZIMBABWE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000828 SIPDIS FOR AF/FO, AF/RA, AF/S AND AF/W E.O. 12958: DECL: 032/12/2012 TAGS: PREL NI ZI SUBJECT: NIGERIA TO "TARRY" BEFORE PRONOUNCING ON ZIMBABWE REF: BELLAMY/JETER EMAIL 12 March HARARE 657 CLASSIFIED BY CDA ANDREWS. REASON: 1.5(D) ¶1. (C) Summary: MFA PermSec says Nigeria will avoid a rush to judgment on the Zimbabwe election. Abuja will consult with Pretoria and Canberra, as well as various observer groups, before developing a position. The GON might even await the results of electoral challenges. DCM urged the GON, consonant with its leading regional role, to stake out a position in support of democratic principles. Nigeria's position would be "principled," Hart responded; should the elections turn out to have been fundamentally flawed, however, Nigeria would speak out, and Mugabe would not escape criticism. Comment at para 8 and action request in para 9. End Summary. ¶2. (U) President Obasanjo was out of the country in the days before the Ambassador's departure for London. FM Sule Lamido was also unavailable. ¶3. (C) DCM 12 March engaged MFA Permanent Secretary T.D. Hart on Zimbabwe. The 40-minute discussion afforded an opportunity to deploy all of ref talking points. DCM gave the Secretary's letter to Hart for onward transmission to Lamido and provided Hart with a copy of the letter. Earlier, PolCouns had delivered a copy of the letter to the National Security Adviser's Military Assistant, LTC Idris, to pass to the President. ¶4. (C) Hart provided a thorough explanation of Nigeria's approach to Zimbabwe, stating at several intervals that the GON intended to "tarry" before making any pronouncement on the election's legitimacy. Abuja would "eschew any rush to judgment." It was necessary to hear from "our observers on the ground" before even beginning to draw conclusions. The GON's principal source of information on Zimbabwe was CNN, Hart noted, commenting the CNN was "an American source" and its reporting had to be viewed in that light. ¶5. (C) DCM reiterated that the purpose of meeting with Hart was to give the GON a heads-up on the direction in which U.S. thinking was trending. No decisions had been taken and none would be until sufficient evidence was in place to draw a conclusion. Hart said that the USG had faster access to far more information than did the GON. President Obasanjo would consult with President Mbeki and PM Howard and the GON would review all information coming to its attention before drawing a conclusion about the legitimacy of the election. Hart thought Nigeria would also consult with SADC. The GON position would be built on this base and would be consistent with Harare Principles. Hart went on to discuss at some length the history of the Harare Principles, recalling Abacha-era FM Tom Ikimi's frequent remonstrations with Zimbabwe's Stan Mudenge when Nigeria's status in the Commonwealth was in question: "Tom told him to be careful about trying to use the Harare Principles for sanctions against one country because you don't know; it might be your own [country] tomorrow." ¶6. (C) DCM re-emphasized the importance of Nigeria taking a position in defense of democratic principles consistent with its role as Africa's most important state. Hart stood firm against "acting precipitously" but averred that the GON would not silently condone an illegitimate electoral outcome. Disturbingly, Hart suggested that Abuja might await the outcome of legal challenges before taking a stance. However, he insisted that, if the case was clearly made that Mugabe had stolen the election, Nigeria would say so and deny Mugabe support. While Hart did not say that Nigeria would then urge Mugabe to step aside, he did offer that President Obasanjo was increasingly frustrated with Mugabe and his tactics and that Obasanjo had made this point to Mugabe on at least one occasion. ¶7. (C) Hart did not think that Mugabe's popularity in some Nigerian quarters would preclude a firm GON stance if the evidence warranted it. It was "well-known," said Hart, that Mugabe was brutally repressive. Many years ago, when he was a Nigerian diplomat in Harare, Hart had seen Mugabe dispatch troops to violently quell such minor unrest as student strikes, with deaths a usual consequence. Mugabe "never brooked dissent," Hart commented, noting how Zimbabwe's ruler had politically vanquished Joshua Nkomo, the "father of the liberation struggle." ¶8. (C) Comment: Sufficiency of evidence is in the eye of the beholder, and the beholder may wish to wear blinders or rose-colored glasses. Nigeria's long and strong support for liberation in southern Africa and Obasanjo's personal role in establishing that support has formed a strong bond between Obasanjo and Mugabe and given Mugabe great stature among the many Nigerians who resent what they perceive as Western meddling in African affairs. Moreover, widespread fraud marred the 1999 election that brought Obasanjo to power, but most observers thought the electoral malfeasance affected Obasanjo and his opponent (Olu Falae) more or less equally; the fraud on one side cancelled out the fraud on the other, resulting in popular will being respected in the overall result if not in every part of the country. Today, an Obasanjo whose popularity seems to diminish a bit more with each passing day is clearly trying to preserve his options. His advisers, most of whom desperately want him to remain in power (in order to retain its perquisites for themselves),will likely discourage him from being forward- leaning on Zimbabwe. ¶9. (C) Recommendation: We should help those in the GON who want Nigeria to stand firmly in support of Zimbabwean democracy. Insufficiency of evidence is likely to be the basis for an eventual decision either to let others take the lead or to oppose criticizing Mugabe firmly. We ask that we be provided as much specific evidence of ZANU-PF/ GOZ rigging and malfeasance as can be released to the GON. The GON will then have a difficult time pleading ignorance of the facts or insufficiency of evidence. Such support by us will encourage the GON to do what many know must be done but find so hard to do. ANDREWS