LIBERIA: JOHNSON SIRLEAF BELIEVES LURD THREAT IS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 000622 SIPDIS AF FOR DAS PERRY, AF/W FOR BOOTH FROM JETER E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2012 TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS LI NI ECOWAS SUBJECT: LIBERIA: JOHNSON SIRLEAF BELIEVES LURD THREAT IS REAL, BUT EXAGGERATED: SEES LIBERIA RECONCILIATION MEETING IN MID-MARCH REF: A. A) PERRY/JETER 2/21 EMAIL ¶B. B) ABUJA 507 Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter. Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. During a February 22 meeting at my residence, Liberian opposition leader Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (EJS) told me the security situation in Liberia was difficult to read. While acknowledging the LURD's ability to disrupt and raid areas closer to Monrovia, she did not think the rebel group was sufficiently strong to hold territory, much less capture Monrovia, at least not in the short-term. Yet, for divergent reasons, the LURD exaggerated its strength, while Taylor inflated the threat in order to gain sympathy internationally, muzzle dissent and detain suspected fifth columnists at home. EJS characterized the LURD as an approximate reincarnation of ULIMO-J and ULIMO-K, both containing hard-line elements no less preoccupied by power than the incumbent they sought to oust. To stave off a future battle of attrition for Monrovia, EJS thought an all Liberian reconciliation conference, that included the GOL and LURD, was essential. During her previous night's conversation with President Obasanjo and ECOWAS ExecSec Chambas, it was agreed to convene the meeting on March 14-15 in Abuja. Chambas planned to fly to Monrovia and Dakar by the end of the month for consultations with Taylor and ECOWAS Chairman Wade before making a public announcement about convening the meeting. Obasanjo said he would personally extend an invitation to Taylor for the meeting, also letting Taylor know that his non-attendance would be seen as a personal affront. End Summary. -------------- -- THE FIGHTING IN LIBERIA -- MORE BARK THAN BITE? -------------- -- ¶2. (C) ESJ said it was difficult to assess the extent of the fighting and to accurately gauge the threat the LURD posed to the Taylor Government. Due to a combination of fiction, fraud and fear, both sides -- the LURD and the Government of Liberia -- as well as many Liberians were exaggerating the military state of play. ¶3. (C) In the realm of fiction, the LURD claimed victories and troop strength beyond its means. In the realm of fear, the devastation visited on the city during the civil war made Monrovia's collective psyche very fragile. There was a sense of gloom that Liberia was set to repeat the cycle of violence that brought Taylor to power. Rekindling these old nightmares was the sight of Liberians fleeing to Monrovia from western Liberia just as people once flooded the capital when Taylor began his rebellion twelve years ago. Despite Taylor's legendary braggadocio, his government often operated out of fear if not outright paranoia. Thus, Taylor was overreacting to the LURD threat to Monrovia and his government. Implying the state of emergency was unnecessary, ESJ claimed that Taylor was using the situation to detain and harass hundreds of young men with no connection to the LURD. Fraudulently, Taylor's security agents were further exploiting this ploy, turning it into a new extortion racket by refusing to release detainees unless relatives paid hefty ransoms for their freedom. While LURD operatives were in Monrovia, they were too weak and too few to militarily threaten Taylor, she maintained. -------------- WHAT IS THE LURD? -------------- ¶4. (C) When I asked about the leadership of the LURD, Ellen stated she did not know LURD Commander Konneh and some of the others who claim to command the group's front-line fighters. However, Konneh's recent public statements to the media where he demonstrated much more political ambition than acumen were troubling. According to ESJ, the LURD was basically ULIMO reincarnated. As such, it was split along Krahn/Mandingo lines, with the Mandingo and Lofa County-born elements based mainly in Guinea and the Krahn in Sierra Leone. There were various sub-factions and tendencies within each group. ESJ claimed Alhaji Kromah was passing himself off as the leader of the Mandingo wing, but his power did not extend beyond his ability to manipulate the international media. While many of his former lieutenants were active in the LURD, they no longer owed their primary loyalty to Kromah. However, Kromah symbolized a troubling element in the LURD. Labeling Kromah no more a democrat than Taylor, she felt there were other Mandingo hot-heads who wanted to seize power as well. If Kromah or another Mandingo hard-liner emerged, a LURD government would be little better than Taylor's. ¶5. (C) Ellen mentioned there were moderates in the Mandingo/Lofa camp who realized most Liberians were not ready to see "foreign" Mandingos take the helm. These moderates seemed willing to discuss a broad-based interim government and elections. ESF included non-Mandingos such as Former Taylor Justice Minister Laveli Supuwood and Abidjan-based former Interior Minister Soko Sackor in this group of moderates. Giving the impression that she was in contact with these two and others, EJS intimated that discussions about drafting the venerable Rudolph Grimes to head an interim government to prepare for elections had taken place. In that Grimes was old, honest and without Presidential ambition, all sides could more readily trust him to run things fairly and not stay in office beyond his allotted time. However, she feared these moderates in the political wing did not have the influence over the younger military commanders they might think. If the LURD achieved military victory, the commanders, after tasting power and success, could not be trusted to hand over to the politicians who had been watching the fighting from the sidelines. "We have been down that road before," she noted. ( Comment: ESJ was alluding to how Taylor ignored his political sponsors, including Ellen herself, when he hijacked undisputed leadership of the NPFL years ago. End Comment.) ¶6. (C) With regard to the Krahn element in the LURD, EJS did not have much contact or knowledge of the key players but suspected that Roosevelt Johnson, who now resided in Nigeria, might still wield influence. She believed most of the Krahns were Doe-era die-hards nostalgic for a return of that Krahn heyday. While the Mandingos received support from President Conte, ESF did not think President Kabbah was helping the Sierra Leone-based Krahn. However, the Krahn were getting help and some recruits from the CDF and Kamajors. Ellen also thought disenchanted elements of the AFL were abetting the LURD because Taylor was not paying them and was otherwise ignoring their welfare in favor of his Anti-Terrorism Unit (ATU). ¶7. (C) ESJ dismissed GOL claims that former Senator and Taylor ally Charles Brumskine was involved with the LURD. The GOL was simply trying to tarnish Brumskine because he had the temerity to challenge Taylor for the NPP's Presidential nomination. Taylor brooked no opposition, and to a certain degree, could not help but lump together in his mind Brumskine's political challenge with the LURD's military one. -------------- TAYLOR -- HE WILL RUN AWAY IF HE HAS TO -------------- ¶8. (C) Ultimately, the best thing for Liberia would be for Taylor to leave office. Saying Taylor had proven himself incapable of governing, EJS contended that Taylor's persona was one that could only thrive on chaos; thus, as long as he was in power, he would burden his people and would be a drag on the entire sub-region. "We all must work together to provide an exit for him," was Johnson-Sirleaf's solution. Taylor could not live in Liberia without being in power because his ambition and paranoia would prevent him from retiring peacefully to the Liberian countryside. After I disabused her of the notion that the U.S. might provide haven for Taylor, ESJ mentioned Morocco as a potential exile, given that Morocco was arranging a Mano River Summit at France's urging. Because of the favorable French connection, Taylor might be amenable to a permanent Moroccan vacation. Closer to home, the only country in the sub-region that could serve as an a place of exile and keep Taylor sufficiently under wraps would be Nigeria. However, she acknowledged Taylor did not feel comfortable here and would think an invitation to live in Nigeria might be a trap to imprison him later. ¶9. (C) Because of Taylor's addiction to power and money, Ellen did not think he would leave office quietly or quickly, although she had been told that Taylor was moving his most prized possessions from other parts of the country to Monrovia should a quick exit become necessary. Yet, the current level of difficulties were not enough to uproot him. Stating that he would leave if there were no other alternative, ESJ did not think Taylor would replicate Doe, hanging on even after the last hope had vanished. However, Taylor's stubbornness and willingness to fight nearly to the end could spell doom for Monrovia if the LURD ever mustered the firepower for a bona fide assault against the capital. She predicted a terrible battle of attrition and urban warfare. If Taylor felt the tide was against him that he had to retreat, he would want to destroy as much of the city as possible, believing if he could not have it no one should. If this happened, the all-out battle for Monrovia would be a humanitarian disaster. ¶10. (C) EJS also discounted the possibility of major defections within the Taylor government despite the current difficulties. Senior officials remained loyal out of fear. While thinking an open rupture within the government unlikely, she foresaw some officials finding ways to go overseas for "government business" then prolonging their stays until the dust settled. -------------- -------------- SIERRA LEONE AND REGIONAL LEADERS VIEWS ON TAYLOR -------------- -------------- ¶11. (C) As long as Taylor remained in power, the stability of Sierra Leone would be threatened. Ellen said Taylor was getting help from the RUF, who would stand beside him if Monrovia came under serious attack. RUF support not only bolstered Taylor's security; it maintained his role in Sierra Leone. The strategy of Taylor and the hard-core RUF was to wait out the international community's presence in Sierra Leone. The RUF would bide its time until the UN packed its bags. Once the blue helmets departed, the RUF, supported by Taylor, would begin to wreak havoc once more. Ellen hoped it would be harder for Taylor to execute his strategy this time around because some key friends were pulling away from him. Not wanting to be tagged with the "terrorist" stigma after September 11, both Tripoli and Ouagadougou were distancing themselves from Monrovia, with Campaore now even in the anti-Taylor camp. (Note: Ellen said that Obasanjo was of the same view regarding Campaore after a recent Abuja meeting with the Burkinabe leader. End Note.) However, claiming that a recent clandestine shipment of arms to Taylor emanated from either Bamako or Lome, Ellen noted that both the Malian President and Togolese strongman appeared to be inching closer to Taylor, probably for financial reasons. ¶12. (C) Because many of the players in the Sierra Leonean equation -- the RUF, CDF and Kamajors -- were being swept into the Liberian mix, a collapse in Liberia could have dire consequences for Sierra Leone, including the possibility of rekindling the war in that country if Monrovia came under siege. -------------- - RECONCILIATION CONFERENCE -- THE TIME HAS COME -------------- - ¶13. (C) Due to the high political anxiety the LURD presence was now causing, the reconciliation conference was needed now more than before, ESF suggested. ( Ellen commented that many Monrovians were leaving and senior GOL officials were sending their families out of the city.) Previous planning called for the conference to be focused on the creation of conditions for fair elections. Participants would have been the GOL, opposition parties, and civil society, with the LURD ultimately brought into the process down the line to preclude them from citing their exclusion as a reason to continue fighting. However, Taylor characteristically vacillated over the idea of holding the conference. When he finally turned against it (Ref B),Taylor paid members of the Coalition of Political Parties, most notably the TWP's Rudolph Sherman, to endorse his idea of a conference in Monrovia in July. ¶14. (C) Because Taylor would control the Monrovia venue, EJS dismissed its utility, claiming that Taylor conceived it in hopes of short-circuiting efforts to hold the Abuja conference. However, during her February 21 meeting with President Obasanjo and ECOWAS ExecSec Chambas, the three agreed to convene an all Liberian meeting in Abuja on March 14-15. President Obasanjo said not only would he personally invite Taylor but would let the Liberian know that his non-attendance would be considered a personal affront. 15.(C) Asserting that it was too late to draw the LURD in gradually, Ellen said the LURD leadership would be invited to this initial meeting. LURD attendance would give ECOWAS the opportunity to unambiguously tell the faction's leaders that they would face regional and international opprobrium unless they committed to free elections according to the constitutional timetable, i.e. 2003, notwithstanding the situation on the ground militarily. However, ESF feared that, during the interim between now and the conference, the LURD might become emboldened and recalcitrant should it somehow manage a significant military victory. To get Taylor's buy-in for the meeting, Chambas would fly to Monrovia before the end of the month to discuss the conference with Taylor, who would not assent if the meeting were announced before being discussed with him. The date of the conference would be publicly announced soon after Chambas talked with Taylor. ESJ stated that Obasanjo and Chambas had agreed, nonetheless, that the conference would take place with or without Taylor's participation. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶16. (C) EJS was very open and shared her views freely. While fairly confident the conference will take place, she is less sanguine about Taylor's participation and the ultimate success of the endeavor. However, given Liberia's slump toward increased fighting, the conference may be the best, albeit uncertain, diplomatic tool available to arrest the current course. Yet, if Taylor or his minions attend, they will likely fill the hall with empty promises without the intention of fulfilling any but the most inconsequential of these commitments. Ellen is convinced that Taylor is incorrigible. 17 (C) For Johnson-Sirleaf, the true purpose of the conference seems to have shifted from pressuring Taylor to hold fair elections to using the venue to apply pressure on the LURD to restrain their political ambitions to fit within a more democratic game-plan. Perhaps she thinks this approach provides the best chance to fashion the combined political/military pressure, an effective one-two punch, that will lead to her real objective -- the creation of a democratic opening that both removes Taylor yet, at the same time, prevents a similar personality from taking over. Jeter