LIBERIA: JOHNSON SIRLEAF BELIEVES LURD THREAT IS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 000622

SIPDIS


AF FOR DAS PERRY, AF/W FOR BOOTH FROM JETER


E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS LI NI ECOWAS
SUBJECT: LIBERIA: JOHNSON SIRLEAF BELIEVES LURD THREAT IS
REAL, BUT EXAGGERATED: SEES LIBERIA RECONCILIATION MEETING
IN MID-MARCH

REF: A. A) PERRY/JETER 2/21 EMAIL

B. B) ABUJA 507


Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter. Reasons 1.5 (b) and
(d).





1. (C) Summary. During a February 22 meeting at my residence,
Liberian opposition leader Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (EJS) told
me the security situation in Liberia was difficult to read.
While acknowledging the LURD's ability to disrupt and raid
areas closer to Monrovia, she did not think the rebel group
was sufficiently strong to hold territory, much less capture
Monrovia, at least not in the short-term. Yet, for divergent
reasons, the LURD exaggerated its strength, while Taylor
inflated the threat in order to gain sympathy
internationally, muzzle dissent and detain suspected fifth
columnists at home. EJS characterized the LURD as an
approximate reincarnation of ULIMO-J and ULIMO-K, both
containing hard-line elements no less preoccupied by power
than the incumbent they sought to oust. To stave off a future
battle of attrition for Monrovia, EJS thought an all Liberian
reconciliation conference, that included the GOL and LURD,
was essential. During her previous night's conversation with
President Obasanjo and ECOWAS ExecSec Chambas, it was agreed
to convene the meeting on March 14-15 in Abuja. Chambas
planned to fly to Monrovia and Dakar by the end of the month
for consultations with Taylor and ECOWAS Chairman Wade before
making a public announcement about convening the meeting.
Obasanjo said he would personally extend an invitation to
Taylor for the meeting, also letting Taylor know that his
non-attendance would be seen as a personal affront. End
Summary.




-------------- --
THE FIGHTING IN LIBERIA -- MORE BARK THAN BITE?
-------------- --



2. (C) ESJ said it was difficult to assess the extent of the
fighting and to accurately gauge the threat the LURD posed to
the Taylor Government. Due to a combination of fiction, fraud
and fear, both sides -- the LURD and the Government of
Liberia -- as well as many Liberians were exaggerating the
military state of play.





3. (C) In the realm of fiction, the LURD claimed victories
and troop strength beyond its means. In the realm of fear,
the devastation visited on the city during the civil war made
Monrovia's collective psyche very fragile. There was a sense
of gloom that Liberia was set to repeat the cycle of violence
that brought Taylor to power. Rekindling these old nightmares
was the sight of Liberians fleeing to Monrovia from western
Liberia just as people once flooded the capital when Taylor
began his rebellion twelve years ago. Despite Taylor's
legendary braggadocio, his government often operated out of
fear if not outright paranoia. Thus, Taylor was overreacting
to the LURD threat to Monrovia and his government. Implying
the state of emergency was unnecessary, ESJ claimed that
Taylor was using the situation to detain and harass hundreds
of young men with no connection to the LURD. Fraudulently,
Taylor's security agents were further exploiting this ploy,
turning it into a new extortion racket by refusing to release
detainees unless relatives paid hefty ransoms for their
freedom. While LURD operatives were in Monrovia, they were
too weak and too few to militarily threaten Taylor, she
maintained.


--------------
WHAT IS THE LURD?
--------------



4. (C) When I asked about the leadership of the LURD, Ellen
stated she did not know LURD Commander Konneh and some of the
others who claim to command the group's front-line fighters.
However, Konneh's recent public statements to the media where
he demonstrated much more political ambition than acumen were
troubling. According to ESJ, the LURD was basically ULIMO
reincarnated. As such, it was split along Krahn/Mandingo
lines, with the Mandingo and Lofa County-born elements based
mainly in Guinea and the Krahn in Sierra Leone. There were
various sub-factions and tendencies within each group. ESJ
claimed Alhaji Kromah was passing himself off as the leader
of the Mandingo wing, but his power did not extend beyond his
ability to manipulate the international media. While many of
his former lieutenants were active in the LURD, they no
longer owed their primary loyalty to Kromah. However, Kromah
symbolized a troubling element in the LURD. Labeling Kromah
no more a democrat than Taylor, she felt there were other
Mandingo hot-heads who wanted to seize power as well. If
Kromah or another Mandingo hard-liner emerged, a LURD
government would be little better than Taylor's.



5. (C) Ellen mentioned there were moderates in the
Mandingo/Lofa camp who realized most Liberians were not ready
to see "foreign" Mandingos take the helm. These moderates
seemed willing to discuss a broad-based interim government
and elections. ESF included non-Mandingos such as Former
Taylor Justice Minister Laveli Supuwood and Abidjan-based
former Interior Minister Soko Sackor in this group of
moderates. Giving the impression that she was in contact
with these two and others, EJS intimated that discussions
about drafting the venerable Rudolph Grimes to head an
interim government to prepare for elections had taken place.
In that Grimes was old, honest and without Presidential
ambition, all sides could more readily trust him to run
things fairly and not stay in office beyond his allotted
time. However, she feared these moderates in the political
wing did not have the influence over the younger military
commanders they might think. If the LURD achieved military
victory, the commanders, after tasting power and success,
could not be trusted to hand over to the politicians who had
been watching the fighting from the sidelines. "We have been
down that road before," she noted. ( Comment: ESJ was
alluding to how Taylor ignored his political sponsors,
including Ellen herself, when he hijacked undisputed
leadership of the NPFL years ago. End Comment.)



6. (C) With regard to the Krahn element in the LURD, EJS did
not have much contact or knowledge of the key players but
suspected that Roosevelt Johnson, who now resided in Nigeria,
might still wield influence. She believed most of the Krahns
were Doe-era die-hards nostalgic for a return of that Krahn
heyday. While the Mandingos received support from President
Conte, ESF did not think President Kabbah was helping the
Sierra Leone-based Krahn. However, the Krahn were getting
help and some recruits from the CDF and Kamajors. Ellen also
thought disenchanted elements of the AFL were abetting the
LURD because Taylor was not paying them and was otherwise
ignoring their welfare in favor of his Anti-Terrorism Unit
(ATU).



7. (C) ESJ dismissed GOL claims that former Senator and
Taylor ally Charles Brumskine was involved with the LURD. The
GOL was simply trying to tarnish Brumskine because he had the
temerity to challenge Taylor for the NPP's Presidential
nomination. Taylor brooked no opposition, and to a certain
degree, could not help but lump together in his mind
Brumskine's political challenge with the LURD's military one.




--------------
TAYLOR -- HE WILL RUN AWAY IF HE HAS TO
--------------





8. (C) Ultimately, the best thing for Liberia would be for
Taylor to leave office. Saying Taylor had proven himself
incapable of governing, EJS contended that Taylor's persona
was one that could only thrive on chaos; thus, as long as he
was in power, he would burden his people and would be a drag
on the entire sub-region. "We all must work together to
provide an exit for him," was Johnson-Sirleaf's solution.
Taylor could not live in Liberia without being in power
because his ambition and paranoia would prevent him from
retiring peacefully to the Liberian countryside. After I
disabused her of the notion that the U.S. might provide haven
for Taylor, ESJ mentioned Morocco as a potential exile,
given that Morocco was arranging a Mano River Summit at
France's urging. Because of the favorable French connection,
Taylor might be amenable to a permanent Moroccan vacation.
Closer to home, the only country in the sub-region that could
serve as an a place of exile and keep Taylor sufficiently
under wraps would be Nigeria. However, she acknowledged
Taylor did not feel comfortable here and would think an
invitation to live in Nigeria might be a trap to imprison him
later.





9. (C) Because of Taylor's addiction to power and money,
Ellen did not think he would leave office quietly or quickly,
although she had been told that Taylor was moving his most
prized possessions from other parts of the country to
Monrovia should a quick exit become necessary. Yet, the
current level of difficulties were not enough to uproot him.
Stating that he would leave if there were no other
alternative, ESJ did not think Taylor would replicate Doe,
hanging on even after the last hope had vanished. However,
Taylor's stubbornness and willingness to fight nearly to the
end could spell doom for Monrovia if the LURD ever mustered
the firepower for a bona fide assault against the capital.
She predicted a terrible battle of attrition and urban
warfare. If Taylor felt the tide was against him that he had
to retreat, he would want to destroy as much of the city as
possible, believing if he could not have it no one should. If
this happened, the all-out battle for Monrovia would be a
humanitarian disaster.





10. (C) EJS also discounted the possibility of major
defections within the Taylor government despite the current
difficulties. Senior officials remained loyal out of fear.
While thinking an open rupture within the government
unlikely, she foresaw some officials finding ways to go
overseas for "government business" then prolonging their
stays until the dust settled.




-------------- --------------
SIERRA LEONE AND REGIONAL LEADERS VIEWS ON TAYLOR
-------------- --------------





11. (C) As long as Taylor remained in power, the stability of
Sierra Leone would be threatened. Ellen said Taylor was
getting help from the RUF, who would stand beside him if
Monrovia came under serious attack. RUF support not only
bolstered Taylor's security; it maintained his role in Sierra
Leone. The strategy of Taylor and the hard-core RUF was to
wait out the international community's presence in Sierra
Leone. The RUF would bide its time until the UN packed its
bags. Once the blue helmets departed, the RUF, supported by
Taylor, would begin to wreak havoc once more. Ellen hoped it
would be harder for Taylor to execute his strategy this time
around because some key friends were pulling away from him.
Not wanting to be tagged with the "terrorist" stigma after
September 11, both Tripoli and Ouagadougou were distancing
themselves from Monrovia, with Campaore now even in the
anti-Taylor camp. (Note: Ellen said that Obasanjo was of the
same view regarding Campaore after a recent Abuja meeting
with the Burkinabe leader. End Note.) However, claiming that
a recent clandestine shipment of arms to Taylor emanated from
either Bamako or Lome, Ellen noted that both the Malian
President and Togolese strongman appeared to be inching
closer to Taylor, probably for financial reasons.



12. (C) Because many of the players in the Sierra Leonean
equation -- the RUF, CDF and Kamajors -- were being swept
into the Liberian mix, a collapse in Liberia could have dire
consequences for Sierra Leone, including the possibility of
rekindling the war in that country if Monrovia came under
siege.


-------------- -
RECONCILIATION CONFERENCE -- THE TIME HAS COME
-------------- -



13. (C) Due to the high political anxiety the LURD presence
was now causing, the reconciliation conference was needed now
more than before, ESF suggested. ( Ellen commented that many
Monrovians were leaving and senior GOL officials were sending
their families out of the city.) Previous planning called
for the conference to be focused on the creation of
conditions for fair elections. Participants would have been
the GOL, opposition parties, and civil society, with the LURD
ultimately brought into the process down the line to preclude
them from citing their exclusion as a reason to continue
fighting. However, Taylor characteristically vacillated over
the idea of holding the conference. When he finally turned
against it (Ref B),Taylor paid members of the Coalition of
Political Parties, most notably the TWP's Rudolph Sherman, to
endorse his idea of a conference in Monrovia in July.



14. (C) Because Taylor would control the Monrovia venue, EJS
dismissed its utility, claiming that Taylor conceived it in
hopes of short-circuiting efforts to hold the Abuja
conference. However, during her February 21 meeting with
President Obasanjo and ECOWAS ExecSec Chambas, the three
agreed to convene an all Liberian meeting in Abuja on March
14-15. President Obasanjo said not only would he personally
invite Taylor but would let the Liberian know that his
non-attendance would be considered a personal affront.


15.(C) Asserting that it was too late to draw the LURD in
gradually, Ellen said the LURD leadership would be invited to
this initial meeting. LURD attendance would give ECOWAS the
opportunity to unambiguously tell the faction's leaders that
they would face regional and international opprobrium unless
they committed to free elections according to the
constitutional timetable, i.e. 2003, notwithstanding the
situation on the ground militarily. However, ESF feared that,
during the interim between now and the conference, the LURD
might become emboldened and recalcitrant should it somehow
manage a significant military victory. To get Taylor's
buy-in for the meeting, Chambas would fly to Monrovia before
the end of the month to discuss the conference with Taylor,
who would not assent if the meeting were announced before
being discussed with him. The date of the conference would be
publicly announced soon after Chambas talked with Taylor.
ESJ stated that Obasanjo and Chambas had agreed, nonetheless,
that the conference would take place with or without Taylor's
participation.


--------------
COMMENT
--------------



16. (C) EJS was very open and shared her views freely. While
fairly confident the conference will take place, she is less
sanguine about Taylor's participation and the ultimate
success of the endeavor. However, given Liberia's slump
toward increased fighting, the conference may be the best,
albeit uncertain, diplomatic tool available to arrest the
current course. Yet, if Taylor or his minions attend, they
will likely fill the hall with empty promises without the
intention of fulfilling any but the most inconsequential of
these commitments. Ellen is convinced that Taylor is
incorrigible.


17 (C) For Johnson-Sirleaf, the true purpose of the
conference seems to have shifted from pressuring Taylor to
hold fair elections to using the venue to apply pressure on
the LURD to restrain their political ambitions to fit within
a more democratic game-plan. Perhaps she thinks this
approach provides the best chance to fashion the combined
political/military pressure, an effective one-two punch, that
will lead to her real objective -- the creation of a
democratic opening that both removes Taylor yet, at the same
time, prevents a similar personality from taking over.
Jeter