NIGERIA: POST'S RESPONSE TO V1 OF NIGERIAN HRR

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 29 ABUJA 000462 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
 
AF/W FOR PARK 
DRL FOR TOMLYANOVICH 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PREL, ELAB, NI 
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: POST'S RESPONSE TO V1 OF NIGERIAN HRR 
 
REF: A. A) STATE 15375 
 B. B) KAPLAN/PARK EMAIL 7FEB02 
 
 

/>years. Due to the inability of the police to stem severe

communal violence on repeated occasions, The Government's

reliance on the army to quell internal disorder increased

during the year. Members of the security forces, including

the police, anticrime squads, and the armed forces committed

serious human rights abuses.





The economy, which had been in decline for much of the last

three decades, recorded modest growth of 3.8 percent during

2001. Further economic growth has been impeded by the

long-standing problems of a dilapidated infrastructure,

corruption and general economic mismanagement. Most of the

population of approximately 120 million was rural and engaged

in small-scale agriculture. The agricultural sector employed

over 65 percent of the work force but accounted for only 36

percent of gross domestic product. The agriculture and

manufacturing sectors deteriorated considerably during the

oil boom decades and years of military rule. The collapse of

market agriculture contributed significantly to the country's

urbanization and increased unemployment. Recorded gross

domestic product was $285 (N31,426) but the great bulk of

economic activity is outside the formal sector. Due to

corruption, nontransparent government contracting practices

and structural inadequacies, much of the nation's wealth

continued to be concentrated in the hands of a small elite.

During the year, petroleum accounted for over 98 percent of

the country's export revenues, most of the government's

revenues, and almost all foreign investment. The country's

ports and roads are in disrepair while water and power

infrastructures are inadequate to meet demand. However, the

Federal Government and various states have begun improving

infrastructure with some success, such as the privatization

of NITEL, the auction of two GSM licenses to private

operators, the rehabilitation of power plants and the move

towards buy-operate-transfer contracts and independent power

projects (IPPs).





Chronic fuel shortages, which afflicted the country for

several years, have been mostly alleviated by the improved

operation of domestic refineries and the recent move toward

price deregulation. Food production improved during the year

due in part to record rainfalls; however, poor transportation

infrastructure and road closures resulting from an increase

in inter-communal violence caused much agricultural produce

to be lost. During 2001, the Government made progress in

reducing controls on the private sector and increased

expenditures for key social sectors. The Government moved to

deregulate the downstream oil sector, reduced its role in

private banking institutions, eliminated the

telecommunications monopoly, and deregulated the domestic

aviation industry. Also, Government budget allocations to

education increased by 13 percent and 6 percent for recurrent

and capital expenditures respectively. Allocations for

health increased by 58 percent and 178 percent for recurrent

and capital expenditures respectively. Nevertheless, a

significant percentage of the country's population lived in

poverty and many Nigerians were subject to malnutrition.





The Government's human rights record was mixed; although in

marked improvement over the record of the preceding military

regimes, there were serious problems and abuses. Civil

liberties were mostly respected and the everyday behavior of

security forces was better than under preceding military

regimes. However, there were many instances of civilian

instigated communal violence during the year. The military

was called on to restore order in several major incidents of

civil unrest or conflict-- such as Jos, Tafawa Balewa, Kano,

Warri and in the Tiv-Jukun conflict in Benue, Nasarawa and

Taraba states -- and in many other occurrences of communal

violence of lesser magnitude. While deployment of security

forces may have contained the violence and saved lives in

many of these instances, the national police, army, and

security forces committed extrajudicial killings and often

used excessive force in quelling these episodes of civil

unrest and violence. In the year's most egregious case, army

soldiers reportedly killed approximately 200 unarmed

civilians and destroyed much of the town of Zaki Biam in

Benue State in apparent retaliation for the killing of 19

soldiers. Army, police, and security force officers regularly

beat protesters, criminal suspects, detainees, and convicted

prisoners; however, there were no reports of torture of

political dissidents. The Government continued to take steps

to curb torture and beating of detainees and prisoners

Shari'a courts sentenced persons to harsh punishments

including amputations and death by stoning. Two amputation

sentences were carried out during the year. In September, two

persons, Mohammed Wada and Adamu Idi, were found guilty of

theft and sentenced to amputation by a Shari'a court in

Katagum, Bauchi State, but the sentences were not carried

out. No sentences for stoning were implemented. Prison

conditions were harsh and life threatening, and along with

the lack of food and medical treatment, contributed to the

death of numerous inmates. At different times in the year,

the Government released several hundred prisoners in an

attempt to ease prison congestion. In May 1999, the

Government repealed the State Security (Detention of Persons)

Decree of 1984 (Decree 2),which allowed arbitrary detention

without charge; however, police and security forces continued

to use arbitrary arrest and detention. Prolonged pretrial

detention remains a major problem. The judiciary is subject

to political influence, and is hampered by corruption and

inefficiency. The judicial system often was incapable of

providing a criminal suspect a speedy, fair trial. With some

exceptions, the Government respected freedom of speech and of

the press. The Government continued to relax its restrictions

on the rights of freedom of association and assembly. The

Government occasionally restricted freedom of movement,

particularly during periods and in areas of unrest. Some

state governments, restricted freedom of religion in certain

respects. Expansion of Shari'a raised tensions in several

communities and resulted in violence in some instances. In

1999 the Government established the Human Rights Violations

Investigation Panel (HRVIP),to review cases of human rights

violations since 1966; public hearings before the panel in

Abuja, Lagos, Kano, and Port Harcourt occurred during the

year and the Panel's report is due in early 2002.





Domestic violence against women remained widespread and some

forms were sanctioned by traditional, customary, or Shari'a

law. Discrimination against women remained a problem.

Female genital mutilation (FGM) remained widely practiced,

and child abuse and child prostitution were common.

Localized discrimination and violence against religious

minorities persisted. Ethnic and regional discrimination

remained widespread and interethnic, religious, and regional

tensions increased significantly. Thousands of persons were

killed in various local communal conflicts throughout the

country. In June and July, more than 200 people were killed

in inter-communal clashes in Nasarawa State over access to

land. In September, several hundred people, mostly Muslims,

were killed in Jos. Also in October, fighting in Kano state

resulted in the deaths of approximately 100 persons initially

sparked by local street thugs, the unrest in Kano later took

on ethnic and religious overtones. Some members of the Ijaw

ethnic group in the oil-producing Niger Delta region who seek

greater local autonomy continued to commit serious abuses,

including killings and kidnappings. During the year, the

Government took steps to improve worker rights; however, some

restrictions continued. Some persons, including children,

were subjected to forced labor. Overall, child labor

continued to increase. Trafficking in persons for purposes

of forced prostitution and forced labor was a problem and

allegations of government officials' involvement were

widespread. Vigilante violence increased throughout the

country, particularly in Lagos and Onitsha, where suspected

criminals were apprehended, beaten, and sometimes killed.





During 2001, the Federal Government inaugurated the National

Action Plan for Human Rights Steering Committee (including

Ministers of Justice, Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs,

Women and Youth Development, Labor, and Senate and House

Chairmen of the National Assembly Human Rights Committees)

and Coordinating Committee. As part of the National Action

Plan, the Committees will assess and report on human rights

in Nigeria, and make and implement recommendations to improve

human rights.

Respect for Human Rights

Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including

Freedom From





a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life





The Government did not use deadly force to repress

nonviolent, purely political activities; however, lethal

force was used when protests or demonstrations were perceived

as becoming violent or disruptive, or in the apprehension and

detention of suspected criminals. As a result, national

police, army, and security forces committed extrajudicial

killings and used excessive force to quell civil unrest in

several incidents during the year. State anticrime task

forces remained the most frequents human rights offenders.

However in most cases where abuses were committed, neither

the state anticrime task forces, the police, nor the armed

forces were held accountable for excessive, deadly use of

force or the death of individuals in custody. They operated

with impunity in the apprehension, illegal detention, and

sometimes execution of criminal suspects. Since taking

office, President Obasanjo has preferred to let the police

deal with civil disturbances, sending in military

reinforcements only when the police were unable to restore

order. The Government deployed the army numerous times

during the year to restore order after civil unrest. While

the army proved capable of restoring order, it was ill

trained to handle civil unrest and other related police work.

Due in part to this lack of training, the military committed

numerous abuses while performing this role. Multinational

oil companies and Nigerian oil producing companies

subcontract police and soldiers from area units particularly

to protect the oil facilities in the volatile Niger Delta

region. Freelance security forces and former security forces

accounted for a significant portion of the violent crime

during the year.





The police, military, and anticrime taskforce personnel

committed numerous extrajudicial killings in the apprehension

and detention of suspected criminals. Police used deadly

force against suspected vandals near oil pipelines in the

Niger Delta Region, against the Oodua Peoples Congress (OPC)

vigilante group in Lagos State and, allegedly, against

participants in the Jos and Kano riots that took place in

September and October, respectively.





In February police reportedly killed 10 persons and destroyed

the headquarters of the Movement for the Actualization of the

Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) in Okigwe; several MASSOB

leaders, including Ralph Uwazuruike, were arrested (see

Section 1.d.).





Also in February, outside the main mosque in Gombe state,

police killed several persons while dispersing Muslim

protesters who reportedly were attacking and damaging

buildings, such as the police barracks. There were

unconfirmed reports that police reportedly shot and killed 22

detainees who attempted to escape from Jos prison during the

September disturbances in Jos.





In December, police and members of a militant Islamic group

clashed when the police attempted to stop the group from

holding a march in Kano. Several members of the group were

killed during the confrontation.





There were only a few instances where policemen were held to

account for their abuses. For example, three policemen in

Kogi state were sentenced to death in April by hanging after

being found guilty of theft and murder. The policemen were

accused of stopping a car, killing five persons, and stealing

the passengers' money. The sentence had not been carried out

by year's end.





During the year, ethnic and religious tensions increased in

parts of Nigeria. The Government often called on the

military when the tension turned violent. The Government

deployed the army in Jos in Plateau State to quell a major

outburst of ethno-religious violence that claimed

approximately 2300 lives before it was ended, in large part

due to the presence of the military. By October, army

troops were maintaining order in Kaduna, Jos, Tafawa Balewa,

Kano, and a significant part of eastern Benue, eastern

Nasarawa and western Taraba states. There were credible

reports that in some of these deployments, soldiers used

excessive lethal force while attempting to end the unrest.

The number of total casualties resulting from the use of

excessive force by security forces is unknown but most

sources believe that far fewer lives were lost in suppressing

the violent outbreaks than were lost during the outbreaks

themselves.

However, on October 22 and 23, evidence strongly indicates

army soldiers killed approximately 200 ethnic Tiv civilians

and ransacked the town of Zaki Biam In Benue State in

retaliation for the slaying of 19 soldiers allegedly by

members of the ethnic Tiv militia. Reportedly, tens of

thousands fled the area as a result of the violence, adding

to the number of internally displaced people in that region

of the country. The Government announced the establishment of

a commission of inquiry to investigate the killings, but by

year's end the commission had not been inaugurated. Also in

October, several hours after the conclusion of a peaceful

demonstration against U.S. military action in Afghanistan,

rioting broke out in the largest marketplace in the city of

Kano. While sparked by street thugs initially, the violence

later took on religious and ethnic overtones; 100 persons

were killed and dozens of shops and cars were damaged.

Finally the army was called out to restore order. Some

citizens alleged that the army and police used excessive and

lethal force and that several deaths came at the hands of the

security forces. In November police reportedly charged more

than 200 persons in connections with the clashes.





According to Human Rights Watch, soldiers, naval personnel,

and paramilitary Mobile Police deployed in the oil and gas

regions of the Niger Delta carry out assaults and other

abuses on an ongoing basis (see Section 5). According to

Human Rights Watch, the police shot on sight suspected armed

robbers, alleged members of ethnic militia, and youths in the

Niger Delta Region accused of stealing oil and vandalizing

facilities.





Confrontations between increasingly militant "youths" (who

tend to be unemployed males between the ages of 16 and 40),

oil companies, and government authorities continued during

the year. In June in the Khana local government area, mobile

police shot and killed an allegedly unarmed Ogoni man. In

July a police officer protecting oil contractors in Bayelsa

State killed a local youth, reportedly after the youth tried

to disarm him.





Violence and lethal force at police roadblocks and

checkpoints decreased during the year; however, some

instances of such violence continued. In August, the

Abakaliki police (headquarters for Ebonyi State),killed four

members of the People's Democratic Party (PDP) at a

checkpoint. The victims included the chairman of the Ishielu

Local Government, Onyebuhi Eche, Ifeanyi Nnanji, Gbonna

Odembaigwe and Uche Frank. During the year, an upsurge in

violent crime in Lagos led to an increase in the number of

roadblocks and checkpoints at major intersections, without an

increase in police misconduct or violence (see Section 2.d.)





Harsh and life threatening prison conditions and denial of

proper medical treatment contributed to the death of numerous

inmates (see Section 1.c.) Criminal suspects died from

unnatural causes while in official custody, usually as the

result of neglect and harsh treatment. There were reports

that police killed persons suspected of belonging to the

Oodua Peoples Congress (OPC) if they found ceremonial cuts or

marking on the detainees' backs.





There were no reports of any investigation or action taken

against the police in Lagos, who reportedly killed 509

suspected armed robbers and injured 113 robbery suspects,

during the course of making 3,166 arrests; not all of those

killed were OPC members.





There were no developments in the May 2000 alleged killing by

security forces of a young woman who obstructed the motorcade

of Lagos Deputy Governor.





No action was taken against the members of the security

forces responsible for killing the persons in the following

cases from 2000: The August killing of a Nnamdi Azikiwe

University student; the July killing of 1 person when a

demonstration was dispersed forcibly; the July killing of 1

person when a strike was dispersed forcibly; the June

killings of 2 persons in Abuja; the June killings of five

persons for suspected vandalism; April and March killings of

28 Delta youths near oil flow stations.





The Human Rights Violations Investigation Panel (HRVIP),also

known as the Oputa Panel, continued hearings during the year

into 150 cases of killings by members of the security forces

(see Section 4.) The Panel's report is expected to be

released early in 2002. In 2000 the Civil Liberties

Organization (CLO) (a credible human rights organization)

filed a petition with the National Human Rights Commission

and the Oputa Panel concerning the 1999 death in detention of

Godfrey Opuoru. Sunday Aghedo, the Lagos state police

commissioner under whose command the death occurred, was

replaced by Mike Okiro in 1999. Despite an order from the

Oputa Panel to the police to reinvestigate the case, there

was no evidence they had done so by year's end.

The Government did not address the 1999 leveling of Odi in

Bayelsa State by federal troops. The Government did not hold

accountable any of the officers or soldiers involved in the

destruction of the town and the killing of several hundred

inhabitants; there were newspaper reports that some of the

soldiers were promoted. Trials against Keniwer Imo Neweigha,

Monday Diongoli, Timi Epengele, Onoriode David, Ebi Clifford

Saibu, Derioteidou Aganaba, Timinepre Keren, Joshua

Godspower, John Zitua, and Benson Odiowei for the alleged

murders of 12 policemen and 6 civilians that sparked the Odi

incident, were ongoing at year's end. When the prosecution

could not produce Odiowei for trial in 2000, the case was

postponed to a later date.





The prosecution of Hamza al-Mustapha, Mohammed Abacha,

Mohammed Rabo Lawal, Lateef Shofalan, Mohammed Aminu and

Sergeant Rogers Mshiella for the 1996 murder of Kudirat

Abiola, a prominent democracy activist and the wife of

Moshood Abiola, was adjourned repeatedly during the year;

defense lawyers for each individual had filed numerous

motions for adjournment in the Lagos High Court.





In 1999 the trial against former Army Chief of Staff Ishaya

Bamaiyi for the attempted murder in 1996 of Guardian

newspaper publisher Alex Ibru began. Hamza al-Mustapha,

former Lagos Police Commissioner James Danbaba, and Colonel

Jubrin Bala Yakubu, also were charged in the attempt on Ibru

but their trials were pending at year's end. All of the

defendants were being held at Kiri Kiri maximum-security

prison at year's end.





On August 19, unknown assailants shot and killed Rivers State

Assemblyman Monday Ndor outside his residence.





In December Osun State Lawmaker Odunayo Olagbaju was killed

in political violence.





On December 23 in Ibadan, Justice Minister Bola Ige was

killed in his home in what most believed as a politically

motivated assassination. By year's end, police reportedly

detained a 27-year-old man who confessed to being a member of

an eight-man gang that shot Ige in exchange for $8,960 (1

million naira). The suspect's mental state has been

questioned and he was released. There has been widespread

speculation that Ige and others were killed in connection

with the political dispute between the Osun State Governor,

Bisi Akanda, and Osun State Deputy Governor, Iyiola Omisore.





In Anambra State, the state government supported and paid the

vigilante group known as the Bakassi Boys. Like most

vigilante groups, the Bakassi Boys killed suspected criminals

rather than turn them over to police; however, in some cases,

the Bakassi Boys have chosen to mutilate alleged criminals,

rather than killing them outright. They also were accused of

harassing and threatening political opponents of the state

government. On May 29, the Bakassi Boys tortured and killed

between 25 and 36 suspected criminals in Onitsha. They

reportedly stabbed them with machetes and knives as

bystanders cheered; the victims' bodies were then set on

fire. In July members of the Bakassi Boys hacked to death

four suspected armed robbers in Imo state.





There also were numerous reports of street mobs apprehending

and killing suspected criminals. The practice of

"necklacing" criminals (placing a gasoline-soaked tire around

a victim's neck or torso and then igniting it, burning the

victim to death) caught in the act occurred in several

cities.





In early April in Osun State, mobs lynched approximately 12

persons accused of making genital organs disappear. In one

incident on April 6, a resident reportedly announced that his

penis had disappeared while members of an Evangelical

Christian group were preaching door-to-door; an angry mob

descended on the evangelists and burned eight of them to

death.





On October 4, 4 persons were killed and 19 were injured

critically during violent clashes between supporters of the

All People's Party (APP) and People's Democratic Party (PDP)

in Gusau, Zamfara State.





In addition to the incidences of ethno-religious violence in

Jos, Kano and Benue, Nasarawa and Taraba States, there were

other incidents were citizens lost their lives due in

communal fighting. On November 3 and 4, at least 10 persons

reportedly were killed in Gwantu, Kaduna state. In this

instance, the formal institution of a modified form of

criminal shari'a law in Kaduna State added to the tension

long present in a feud between two rival local leaders that

was the primary spark of the unrest.





In Taraba State a dispute between Fulani herders and Tiv

farmers reportedly resulted in eight deaths. In December,

competition over land use between ethnic Hausa-Fulani herders

and ethnic Birom farmers turned violent and resulted in at

least 30 and perhaps as many as 90 deaths, mainly

Hausa-Fulani.





Communal violence in the Niger Delta decreased during the

year, but ethnic rivalries and disputes between local

communities over resources still led to deadly clashes. In

July fighting between the Akaeze and Osso Edda communities in

Ebonyi State resulted in the deaths of 27 persons.





In the Kalabari region of Rivers State, between 20 and 100

persons were killed in fighting among three Ijaw communities:

the Bille and Krakrama.





In the east, violent border disputes between Cross River and

Akwa Ibom states continued during the year.





In Lagos State, the vigilante group known as the OPC clashed

repeatedly with the police over their protection of Yoruba

neighborhoods and over political issues. The OPC continued to

function as a vigilante anti-crime force despite President

Obasanjo's "shoot-on-sight" order issued against them in

1999. During the year, there were fewer OPC vigilante

killings than in previous years, but OPC-related violence did

occur. On August 16, the OPC reportedly beheaded four

suspected robbers and set their bodies on fire in Lagos

state. The OPC also reportedly crucified a man in the

Surelere district of Lagos





In August Ganiyu Adams, a leader of the OPC, was arrested and

charged in Lagos state with murder and robbery; Adams had

been wanted by the police since 1999 riots sparked by the

OPC. In September, the OPC announced that it would stop its

vigilante activities. In October, Adams again was arrested

and charged with murder, stealing, robbery, and illegal

possession of firearms; on October 30, he was released on $85

(20,000 naira) bail.





During the year, members of student organizations, commonly

known as cults, occasionally killed students from rival

organizations.





Killings carried out by organized gangs of armed robbers

remained commonplace throughout the year. A gang of at least

30 armed robbers reportedly killed 22 residents in the town

of Awkuzu on July 28, allegedly in retaliation for the

executions of suspected criminals by the Bakassi Boys earlier

in the year.









b. Disappearance





There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances

during the year; however, in 2000 the OPC charged that the

police were responsible for the disappearance of at least two

of its members.





Members of minority ethnic groups in the oil-producing areas

kidnapped foreign and local oil company employees to press

their demands for more redistribution of wealth generated by

joint ventures with the state-controlled petroleum

corporation and for specific projects in their areas. In all

instances the victims were released unharmed after

negotiations between the captors and the oil firms; the firms

usually paid ransoms and promised improved conditions.





In addition to the political rationale for kidnapping, there

were numerous instances of strictly criminal kidnapping, in

which the perpetrators' sole objective was ransom for the

release of the victims. During the year, there were a

greater number of kidnappings by criminals to extort money

than for "political" reasons. Some kidnappings, particularly

in the Delta, appear to have been part of longstanding ethnic

disputes over resources. Due to limited manpower and

resources, the police and armed forces rarely were able to

confront the perpetrators of these acts, especially in the

volatile Delta region. A lack of resources prevented

judicial investigations from taking place so that kidnappings

routinely were left uninvestigated.





c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment

or Punishment





The Constitution prohibits such abuses, and the law provides

for punishment for such abuses; however, during the year,

army, police, and security force officers regularly beat

protesters, criminal suspects, detainees, and convicted

prisoners. Police regularly physically mistreated civilians

in attempts to extort money from them. The law prohibits the

introduction into trials of evidence obtained through torture.





Different versions of criminal Islamic Shari'a law were in

place in 12 northern states by year's end (see Section 1.e.).

Shari'a courts delivered "hadd" sentences such as amputation

for theft, caning for fornication and public drunkenness, and

death by stoning. Appellate courts have yet to decide

whether any of these punishments constituted "torture or...

inhuman or degrading treatment" as stipulated in the

Constitution. Caning as a punishment under Nigerian common

law, the Northern Nigerian Penal Code, and Shari'a law has

not been challenged successfully in the court system prior to

the introduction of Shari'a law as a violation of the cruel

and inhuman punishment clause in the Constitution. Stoning

and amputation also have not been challenged under the

Constitution. There were two amputations carried out during

the year despite a larger number of sentences. Shari'a

courts handed down their first death sentences during the

year. As with the common law criminal courts, indigent

persons without legal representation were more likely to have

their sentences carried out immediately upon being sentenced

(there is a period of appeal granted to all accused). The

Federal Government has instituted a panel of legal scholars

to draft a uniform Shari'a criminal statute to replace

divergent Shari'a statutes adopted by the states.





In September an Islamic court in Kebbi state sentenced a man

to be stoned to death for sodomizing a 7-year-old boy (see

Section 5). The sentence has not been carried out and he is

still in custody.





On May 3, Lawal Isa had his right hand amputated in Zamfara

for stealing three bicycles. On July 6, the right hand of

Umaru Aliyu was amputated in Sokoto for the theft of a goat.

In July a Shari'a court in Kebbi state sentenced a

15-year-old boy to amputation of one of his hands for

stealing $286 (32,000 naira) from a businessman. In August a

Shari'a court in Zamfara state sentenced Amina Abdullahi to

100 lashes for having an extramarital affair.





Bariya Ibrahim Magazu, a 17-year-old girl, was given 100 cane

strokes in January, following her September 2000 conviction

of fornication and slander. She also was sentenced to an

additional 80 lashes for naming in court but not being able

to prove paternity of the child; however, the additional 80

lashes were not administered. Prior to the execution of the

sentence, Baobab, a Nigerian human rights NGO, filed an

appeal on her behalf.





In Sokoto, Safiya Husseini was convicted of adultery in

September by a local Shari'a court which found her pregnancy

to be conclusive proof of adultery. She was not married at

the time of her pregnancy. Husseini was sentenced to death

by stoning, but the sentence was not executed by year's end

and has been stayed pending the appeal she filed challenging

the legal basis for the decision under Islamic law. Two

domestic human rights organizations condemned the death

sentence, and an international NGO asked President Obasanjo

to intercede in the matter.





Shari'a criminal law does not provide for amputation as the

punishment for persons convicted of misappropriating public

funds. Rather, the faithful are called upon to ostracize

persons so convicted.

Hamza Al Mustapha, Muhammed Rabo Lawal, Lateef Shofolahan,

Mohammed Aminu, Col. Yakubu, Ishaya Bamaiyi, James Danbaba

and Rogers Mshiella were detained and charged with the 1996

attempted murder of Guardian newspaper publisher Alex Ibru;

however, the case was postponed during most of 2001 after

Bamaiyi and Mustapha were summoned to appear before the

HRVIP.





No action was taken against army personnel responsible for

rapes and other abuses in Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers states as

reported in 1999.





After the November 1999 release of Jerry Needam, Editor of

the Ogoni Star newspaper, the Government representatives

failed to appear in court for any hearings relating to his

case. Police reportedly beat Needam, forced him to sign a

confession, and did not allow him access to medical treatment

during his detention in 1999.





In a few instances during the year, Security forces beat and

detained journalists who made unfavorable news reports. (see

Section 2.a.).





In the numerous ethnic clashes that occurred throughout the

year (see Sections 1.a. and 5),thousands of persons were

beaten or injured severely. Police and security forces,

failing to respond to these and most other criminal acts in a

timely manner, were slow to protect civilians caught in

unrest in Plateau, Kaduna, Kano, Benue states and in other

areas of Nigeria. Generally, the police lacked the resources

and training to control criminals and mobs that fomented

civil unrest. (see Sections 1.a. and 1.b.)





On January 1, an Islamic vigilante group known as Hisbah

reportedly caned in public a Christian trader 80 times after

he was found with a bottle of gin.





The HRVIP or the Oputa Panel heard several cases during the

year (see Sections 1.a. and 4).





On January 26, seven women of the Ogoni ethnic minority

appeared before the HRVIP and accused soldiers of the Rivers

State Internal Security of raping them in 1993 and 1994.





In February Ohaneze Ndigbo, an Igbo cultural organization,

asked the HRVIP to investigate atrocities, including pogroms,

genocide, mistreatment of refugees and war prisoners, and

bombing of civilian targets, allegedly committed against

Igbos between 1966 and 1970.





Prison and detention conditions remained harsh and life

threatening. Most prisons were built 70 to 80 years ago and

lack functioning basic facilities. Lack of potable water,

inadequate sewage facilities, and severe overcrowding

resulted in unhealthy and dangerous sanitary conditions.

Many prisons held 200 to 300 percent more persons than they

were designed to hold. The Government acknowledged the

problem of overcrowding as the main cause of the harsh

conditions common in the prison system. According to

government sources, approximately 45,000 inmates were held in

a system of 148 prisons (and 83 satellite prisons) with a

maximum designed capacity of 33,348 prisoners. Some human

rights groups estimate a higher number of inmates*-perhaps

as many as 47,000 (see Section 1.d.). Several times in 2000

authorities attempted to ease congestion in some smaller

prisons. For example, in honor of the Eid-El-Kabir in March

2000, the Governor of Kano State released 159 prisoners, 52

of whom were pretrial detainees held without charge. Those

released also were provided with travel funds to return to

their homes. In 2001, the Governor of Kaduna State, on the

recommendation of a state court judge, made a similar release

of prisoners. During March 2001, the Chairman of the

National Human Rights Commission visited Owerri Prison in Imo

State. According to NHRC reporting, 90 percent of those in

prison were awaiting trial. Multiple adjournments in some

cases had led to serious delays. The NHRC urged the courts,

Ministry of Justice and the police to hasten the expedition

of the cases awaiting trial.





In December, five teenagers were released from Suleja prison,

in Niger State, through the help of local NGOs.





Disease was pervasive in the cramped, poorly ventilated

facilities, and chronic shortages of medical supplies were

reported. Prison inmates were allowed outside their cells

for recreation or exercise only irregularly, and many inmates

had to provide their own food. Only those with money or

whose relatives brought food regularly had sufficient food;

petty corruption among prison officials made it difficult for

money provided for food to reach prisoners. Poor inmates

often relied on handouts from others to survive. Beds or

mattresses were not provided to many inmates, forcing them to

sleep on concrete floors, often without a blanket. Prison

officials, police, and security forces often denied inmates

food and medical treatment as a form of punishment or to

extort money from them. Harsh conditions and denial of

proper medical treatment contributed to the deaths of

numerous prisoners. A reputable human rights organization

estimated in 1999 that at least one inmate died per day in

the Kiri Kiri prison in Lagos alone. According to the

Prisoners Rehabilitation and Welfare Action (PRAWA) a

nongovernmental organization (NGO),dead inmates promptly are

buried on the prison compounds, usually without notifying

their families. A nationwide estimate of the number of

inmates who die daily in the country's prisons is difficult

to obtain because of poor record keeping by prison officials.

PRAWA and other NGO's alleged that prison conditions were

worse in rural areas than in urban districts.





In practice women and juveniles are held with male prisoners,

especially in rural areas. The extent of abuse in these

conditions is unknown. In most case, women who commit minor

offenses are released on bail, while women who commit major

offenses are detained. There is no formalized procedure

regarding the separation of detainees and convicted

prisoners. Rather the method of confinement depends wholly

on the capacity of the facility. Therefore, due to space

constraints detainees are often housed with convicted

prisoners.





In 2000 President Obasanjo directed the Ministry of Justice

to create a judicial administration committee to address the

questions of overcrowding, prison conditions, and

rehabilitation.





In 2001, the National Human Rights Commission began working

with the Ministry of Justice and the Legal Resources

Consortium to draft a new Prisons Bill to conform with

minimum standard rules of prisons practice and provisions of

the United Nations. The NHRC has also urged the Federal

Government and police against detaining persons in civil

cases.





During the year, the Government allowed international and

domestic NGO's, including PRAWA and the International

Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),regular access to prisons;

however, it did not allow them continuous access to all

prisons. PRAWA and the ICRC publish newsletters on their

work. The Government admits that there are problems with its

incarceration and rehabilitation programs and worked with

groups such as these to address those problems. However,

groups such as Rotary International report difficulties at

the local level in gaining access to prisons and jails to do

rehabilitation programs.





In August local media reported that the Inspector General of

the police decided to transfer all current members of the

Lagos-based Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) known as the

"Scorpions." Reportedly there had been numerous allegations

against SARS officers for corruption, including aiding and

abetting crime groups.









d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile





The Constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention;

however, security forces generally did not observe these

prohibitions. Police and security forces continued to use

arbitrary arrest and detention.





Police and security forces were empowered to make arrests

without warrants if they believed that there was reason to

suspect that a person had committed an offense; they often

abused this power. Under the Fundamental Rights Enforcement

Procedures Rules of the Constitution, police may arrest and

detain persons for 24 hours before charging them with an

offense. The law requires an arresting officer to inform the

accused of charges at the time of arrest and to take the

accused persons to a station for processing within a

reasonable amount of time. By law police must provide

suspects with the opportunity to engage counsel and post

bail. However, police generally did not adhere to legally

mandated procedures. Suspects routinely were detained

without being informed of the charges, denied access to

counsel and family members, and denied the opportunity to

post bail for bailable offenses. Detainees often were kept

incommunicado for long periods of time. The provision of

bail was often arbitrary or subject to extra-judicial

influence. In many parts of the country, there was no

functioning system of bail, resulting in many suspects being

held in investigative detention for sustained periods.

Numerous suspects alleged that police demanded payment before

they were taken to court to have their cases heard. If

family members attend court proceedings, an additional

payment often is demanded by police.





In August, security agents arrested and detained for 27 days

without charge Sheik Yakubu Musa, a Katsina-based Islamic

scholar; the Abuja High Court later ordered his release.





Human Rights Watch reported that the police arrested hundreds

of MASSOB and detained many without charge; MASSOB leader

Ralph Uwazuruike was arrested several times during the year.

In 2000 the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights

reported that 302 OPC members were arrested following clashes

with the police in Lagos. Of those detainees, 95 were

released in 2000. The remaining detainees were not able to

obtain legal representation and either could not make bail or

were not eligible for bail due to the charges brought against

them.





Security forces temporarily detained journalists in a few

instances during the year. (see Section 2.a.).





Students in general are no longer singled out for arrest

because of political activities; however, many students were

detained during the year for allegedly taking part in cult or

criminal activities on university campuses.





No information was available during the year about the Ogoni

activists who were arrested in 2000.





On March 23, police in Gombe arrested 19 reportedly peaceful

persons for unlawful assembly (see Section 2.c.)





Lengthy pretrial detention remained a serious problem.

According to the Constitution, persons charged with offenses

have the right to an expeditious trial; however, in practice

this right was not respected. Serious backlogs, endemic

corruption, and undue political influence continued to hamper

the judicial system (see Section 1.e.). The

Controller-General of prisons estimated that two-thirds of

prisoners are detainees awaiting trial who have not been

charged (see Section 1.c.). In January the Minister of State

for Internal Affairs reportedly said that there were 45,000

inmates in the Nigerian prison system, 75 percent of who were

awaiting trial. Many of the pretrial detainees held without

charge had been detained for periods far longer than the

maximum allowable sentence for the crimes for which they were

being held. Police cited their inability to securely

transport detainees to trial on scheduled trial dates as one

reason why so many detainees were denied trial.





Persons who happen to be in the vicinity of a crime when

committed are at times held for interrogation for periods

ranging from a few hours to several months. After their

release, those detained frequently are asked to return

repeatedly for further questioning. Police continued the

practice of placing relatives and friends of wanted suspects

in detention without criminal charge to induce suspects to

surrender to arrest. There were reports that Imo state prison

officials work with some pretrial detainees to blackmail

those who knowingly or unknowingly purchased stolen goods

from the detainees. These persons, usually prominent

individuals residing in larger cities such as Abuja and

Lagos, are remanded to Imo state custody and told that they

also will be prosecuted for the transfer of stolen goods;

however, if they pay a bribe, they are released as is the

pretrial detainee who colluded with the prison officials.





There were no reports of political detainees during the year.





In 2000, Ismaila Gwarzo, the national security advisor to

former Head of State General Sani Abacha, was placed under

house arrest without any charges being brought.





The Constitution prohibits the expulsion of citizens, and the

Government does not use forced exile. Many citizens who had

lived abroad due to fear of persecution under previous

military regimes continued to return to the country during

the year.









e. Denial of Fair Public Trial





The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary;

however, in practice, the judiciary remained subject to

executive and legislative branch pressure, was influenced by

political leaders at both the state and federal levels, and

suffered from corruption and inefficiency. Understaffing,

underfunding, inefficiency, and corruption continued to

prevent the judiciary from functioning adequately. Citizens

encountered long delays and frequent requests from judicial

officials for small bribes in order to expedite cases.





Under the Constitution, the regular court system is composed

of federal and state trial courts, state appeals courts, the

Federal Court of Appeal, and the Federal Supreme Court.

There also are Shari'a (Islamic) and customary (traditional)

courts of appeal for each state and for the Federal Capital

Territory (Abuja). Courts of the first instance include

magistrate or district courts, customary or traditional

courts, Shari'a courts, and for some specified cases, the

state high courts. The nature of the case usually determines

which court has jurisdiction. In principle customary and

Shari'a courts have jurisdiction only if both plaintiff and

defendant agree. However, in practice, preference, fear of

legal costs, delays, and distance to alternative venues

encouraged many litigants to choose the customary and Shari'a

courts over the regular venues. Shari'a courts, which have

begun to function in 12 northern states, carried out two

amputations during the year (see Section 1.c.)





Criminal justice procedures call for trial within 3 months of

arraignment for most categories of crimes. Understaffing of

the judiciary, inefficient administrative procedures, petty

extortion, bureaucratic inertia, poor communication between

police and prison officials, and inadequate transportation

continued to result in considerable delays, often stretching

to several years, in bringing suspects to trial (see Section

1.d.).





Trials in the regular court system are public and generally

respect constitutionally protected individual rights in

criminal cases, including a presumption of innocence, the

right to be present, to confront witnesses, to present

evidence, and to be represented by legal counsel. However,

there is a widespread perception that judges easily are

bribed or "settled," and that litigants cannot rely on the

courts to render impartial judgements. Most prisoners are

poor and cannot afford to pay the costs associated with

moving their trials forward, and as a result they remain in

prison. Wealthier defendants employ numerous delaying

tactics and in many cases used financial inducements to

persuade judges to grant numerous continuances. This, and

similar practices, clogged the court calendar and prevented

trials from starting.





Many courts are understaffed, and personnel underpaid.

Judges frequently fail to appear for trials, often because

they are pursuing other means of income. In addition court

officials often lack the proper equipment, training, and

motivation to perform their duties, again due in no small

part to their inadequate compensation.





There are no legal provisions barring women or other groups

from testifying in civil court or giving their testimony less

weight; however, the testimony of women and non-Muslims

usually is accorded less weight in Shari'a courts (see

Section 5).





The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) and

the Saro-Wiwa family continued to petition President

Obasanjo, the Minister of Justice, and the Oputa Human Rights

panel to reverse the verdict of the Auta Tribunal that

convicted Saro-Wiwa and the Ogoni-9 in October 1995. At

year's end, the Government had not responded to the two year

old appeal to clear the names of Saro-wiwa and the Ogoni

activists, who were executed by the regime of Sani Abacha in

November 1995.





There were no reports of political prisoners.









f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or

Correspondence





The Constitution prohibits such actions; however, although

government authorities generally respect these prohibitions,

authorities continued at times to infringe on these rights.





Police and security forces continued the practice of placing

relatives and friends of wanted suspects in detention without

criminal charge to induce suspects to surrender to arrest.

There were calls by human rights groups for the police to end

the practice.





Although the expanded Shari'a laws technically do not apply

to Christians, the Christian minority, especially in Zamfara

and Sokoto states, was subjected to many of the social

provisions of the law, such as the separation of the sexes in

public transportation vehicles (a law that was repealed after

only 2 weeks),and in health facilities, the segregation by

gender of school children, and bans on the selling of alcohol

(see Section 2.c.). At least on Christian was punished for

violating Shari'a laws (see Section 1.c.)





Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:





a. Freedom of Speech and Press





The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and of the

press, and the Government generally respected these rights;

however, there were problems in some areas.

The Government owns and controls some publications; however,

there is a large and vibrant private domestic press that

frequently is critical of the Government. There are two

national, government-owned daily newspapers in English, the

New Nigerian and the Daily Times. The New Nigerian publishes

an additional Hausa edition. Several states own daily or

weekly newspapers that also are published in English. They

tend to be produced poorly, have limited circulation, and

require large state subsidies to continue operating. By the

end of 2000, five major daily newspapers, one newsmagazine,

and several sensational evening newspapers and tabloid

publications had begun publication. Two new newspapers

began publication in 2001.





On May 26, 1999, in the last days of Abubakar regime, Decree

60 was signed into law and created the Nigerian Press

Council, which was charged with the enforcement of

professional ethics and the sanctioning of journalists who

violated these ethics. The decree, which virtually made

members of the council employees of the Government, also

contained a number of provisions inimical to the operation of

a free press. Among other provisions, Decree 60 gave the

Press Council the power to accredit and register journalists

and the power to suspend journalists from practicing. Decree

60 required that publications be registered by the Council

annually through a system entitled "Documentation of

Newspapers." The penalties for practicing without meeting the

Council's standards were a fine of $2,200 (250,000 Naira) or

imprisonment for a term not to exceed 3 years. The decree

also empowered the Council to approve a code of professional

and ethical conduct to guide the press and to ensure

compliance by journalists. Under the decree, publishers were

expected to send a report of the performance of their

publications to the Council; failure to do so was an offense

that carried a fine of $900 (100,000 naira). The Nigerian

Press Council opened an office and hired staff in Abuja;

however, it did not take any official action during the year.

Many journalists believe that the existence of the decree

and the Council are significant limitations on freedom of the

press.





Editors report that government security officers sometimes

visit or call to demand information about a story or source;

however, journalists and editors no longer fear suspension or

imprisonment for their editorial decisions for failing to

comply with such demands. State broadcasters and journalists

remain important tools for civilian governors; these

officials use the state-owned media to showcase the state's

accomplishments and to promote their own political fortunes.





During the year, there were a few cases of threats against

and attacks on the press. In April, police beat a

photographer and destroyed the film in his camera when he

attempted to photograph a suspect leaving the Lagos High

Court.





In May, Imo State security personnel raided newsstands where

they seized and burned publications that carried stories on

activities of MASSOB, a group advocating revival of the

Biafran Republic.





In June police arrested, detained, and charged with libel

Nnamdi Onyeuma, editor of weekly magazine Glamour Trends, in

connection with a story alleging that President Obasanjo

received a $1 million allowance for each of his many foreign

trips. Onyeuma was released on bail awaiting court action at

year's end.





During the year, governors from Kano, Imo, and Zamfara states

were involved in disputes with journalists and publicly

threatened the media. State governments also have threatened

and detained journalists who have criticized their policies.

For example, a journalist temporarily lost his accreditation

to cover the State House in Imo State because of an article

critical of the Governor's wife.

Because newspapers and television are relatively expensive

and literacy levels are low, radio remains the most important

medium of mass communication and information. There is a

national radio broadcaster, the Federal Radio Corporation of

Nigeria, which broadcasts in English, Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo,

and other languages; 51 state radio stations broadcast in

English and local languages. There were six private radio

stations operating during the year. No new private radio

licenses were issued during the year by the National

Broadcasting Commission (NBC),the body responsible for the

deregulation and monitoring of the broadcast media. Ten

applications pending from 1999 still were awaiting NBC

approval at year's end.

International broadcasters, principally the Voice of America

(VOA) and British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC),as well as

Deutsche Welle and others, broadcast in English and Hausa and

are an important source of news in the country.





In January police beat, arrested and detained Igha Oghole, a

journalist with Radio Benue, Makurdi, after he insisted on

conducting a scheduled interview with the police commissioner

rather than interviewing his subordinate.





The National Television Station, NTA, is federally owned,

while 30 states also operate television stations. There are

nine privately owned television stations that broadcast

domestic news and political commentary. There are two

private satellite television services. The law requires

local television stations to limit programming from other

countries to 40 percent and restricts the foreign content of

satellite broadcasting to 20 percent, but the Government does

not restrict access to, or reception of, international cable

or satellite television.





The NBC threatened to take private television and radio

stations off the air when the stations refused to pay 2.5

percent of their gross income to the NBC; the Independent

Broadcasters Association of Nigeria (IBAN) challenged the

fees in court. In October the Federal Government set the

annual fee for the broadcasters at $1,300 (N150,000). During

the year, the NBC also prevented the commissioning of the

Here and There television station in Oyo State, ruling that

the original license had expired. The NBC also challenged

expansion plans by African Independent Television (AIT),a

part of Daar Communications, claiming that AIT's global and

terrestrial licenses do not allow them to act as a network.





While private television and radio broadcasters remained

economically viable on advertising revenues alone, despite

the restrictions that the Government imposed on them,

government-sponsored broadcasters complained that government

funding and advertising were inadequate for their needs.





Since the 1999 elections, foreign journalists who sought to

enter the country to cover political developments generally

have been able to obtain visas, and many of the obstacles

that previously frustrated foreign journalists were removed.

Officials within the Ministry of Information became more

accommodating to requests from foreign journalists.





The Government did not restrict Internet access, although

unreliable and costly telephone service limited access and

hindered service providers. NITEL, the Nigerian PTT,

competed with dozens of privately owned Internet service

providers (ISP's). All other ISP's were owned privately.





The Government continued to take concrete steps to address

the problems in the education sector and to restore academic

freedom. In 1999 Obasanjo approved the establishment of four

new private universities, but the quality of secondary

education generally remained low. Student groups alleged that

numerous strikes, inadequate facilities, and the rise of

cultism (or gangs) on campuses continue to hamper educational

progress. On several occasions during the year, protests by

students resulted in harassment and arrest by police forces.

(See Section 1.d.)













b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association





The Constitution provides for freedom of assembly, and the

Government generally respected this right, although some

limits remained.





The Government continued to nominally require organizers of

outdoor public functions to apply for permits, although both

government authorities and those assembling often ignored

this requirement. The Government retained legal provisions

banning gatherings whose political, ethnic, or religious

content might lead to unrest. Open-air religious services

away from places of worship remained prohibited in many

states due to religious tensions in these parts of the

country. For example, various northern states, including

Plateau, Kano, Zamfara, and Kaduna, banned public gatherings

immediately following periods of unrest, but they did so in

consultation with a number of religious and traditional

groups, and local governments in order to prevent a

recurrence of unrest. In September Kaduna state government

extended its ban on processions, rallies, demonstrations, and

meetings in public places in order to prevent repetition of

the violence that followed the announcement of the enactment

of Shari'a law in 2000 (see Sections 1.a. and 2.c.)





In September a political rally in Zamfara State turned

violent, prompting a temporary ban on public political

rallies in the state. On October 31, the Ondo state

government banned open-air religious meetings by both

Christians and Muslims in a bid to prevent religious violence

(see Section 5). In October, a security forces committee

banned all political, cultural, and religious meetings in

Plateau state following ethno-religious clashes in the Jos,

the state capital (see Section 5).





In December in Rivers State, police dispersed a rally of the

National Youth Council of Ogoni People because the group

reportedly had not received authorization to hold the

demonstration. In October the police banned for security

reasons a PDP rally scheduled to take place in Sokoto on

October 4 and 5. In July the police banned the meeting of a

group known as the Fourth Dimension, led by former Vice

President Augustus Aikhomu, because of violence that occurred

at a prior meeting in Benin City. In March the Government

banned a seminar on Islamic law that was planned in Zaria. In

May police cancelled a planned meeting of southern governors

in Enugu, reportedly because the meeting was "capable of

creating disharmony." Police regularly disrupt meetings of

the OPC, and maintain a ban on the organization.





The Constitution provides for the right to associate freely

with other persons in political parties, trade unions, or

special interest associations, and the Government generally

respected this right in practice; however, there were

exceptions. Although the Constitution allows the free

formation of political parties, only three parties were

registered with the INEC. The Constitution requires parties

to have membership in two-thirds of the country's 36 states.









c. Freedom of Religion





The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, including

freedom to change one's religion or belief, and freedom to

manifest and propagate one's religion or belief in worship,

teaching, practice, and observance; however, the Government

restricted these rights in certain respects. The

implementation of an expanded version of Shari'a law in 12

northern states continued, which challenged constitutional

protections for religious freedom and occasionally sparked

inter-religious violence.





The Constitution prohibits state and local governments from

adopting an official religion; however, some Christians have

alleged that Islam has been adopted as the de facto state

religion of several northern states, given the reintroduction

of Shari'a criminal law, and the continued use of state

resources to fund the construction of mosques, the teaching

of Alkalis (Muslim judges),and pilgrimages to Mecca (Hajj).

However, state funds also are used to fund Christian

pilgrimages to Jerusalem. In general states with a clear

Christian or Muslim majority explicitly favor the majority

faith. There are 36 states in the country; governors have

autonomy in decision making but derive their resources from

the federal Government. Both the federal and state

governments are involved in religious matters, including the

regulation of mandatory religious instruction in public

schools, subsidized construction of churches and mosques,

state-sponsored participation in the Hajj, and pilgrimages to

Jerusalem. Approximately half of the population is Muslim,

about 40 percent Christian, and about 10 percent practice

traditional indigenous religion or no religion.





On November 2, Kaduna state implemented a modified version of

Shari'a law. Islamic punishments are not being incorporated

into the criminal code in Kaduna, as has happened in several

other northern states.

The Constitution provides that states may elect to use

Islamic (Shari'a) customary law and courts. Until the

reintroduction of criminal Shari'a by Zamfara State in

January 2000, the jurisdiction of Shari'a courts, which are

part of the regular court system, had been limited to family

or personal law cases involving Muslims, or to civil disputes

between Muslims who consent to the courts' jurisdiction.

However, the Constitution states that a Shari'a court of

appeal may exercise "such other jurisdiction as may be

conferred upon it by the law of the State." Some states have

interpreted this language as granting them the right to

expand the jurisdiction of existing Shari'a courts to include

criminal matters (see Section 1.e.). In October 1999,

Zamfara state passed laws establishing Shari'a courts and

courts of appeal, and another bill that constituted the

Shari'a penal code; the bills took effect on January 27,

2000. Zamfara adopted traditional Shari'a in its entirety,

with the exception that apostasy was not criminalized. After

the adoption of Shari'a in Zamfara, other northern states

began to implement forms of expanded Shari'a. By year's end

12 northern states had adopted variations of Shari'a law --

Zamfara, Sokoto, Kebbi, Niger, Kano, Katsina, Kaduna, Jigawa,

Yobe, and Bauchi, Borno and Gombe. Adherence to the new

Shari'a provisions is compulsory for Muslims in some states

and optional in others. Previously Shari'a law had been

practiced in the north in the areas of personal law, only if

both litigants agreed to settle their disputes in Shari'a

courts. Elements of Shari'a also had been present in the

northern penal code, which had been applicable in the north

since independence.





The Constitution also provides that the federal Government is

to establish a Federal Shari'a Court of Appeal and Final

Court of Appeal; however, the Government had not yet

established such courts by the end of the period covered by

this report.





Although religious belief or adherence is not required for

membership in registered political parties, in May 2001, the

Zamfara state house assembly suspended for 3 months two of

its Muslim members, Ibrahim Musa Murai and Abdullahi Majidadi

Kurya, for not supporting bills introduced by the governor.

They were accused of not showing full support for a

compulsory closing of businesses, schools, and hospitals

during Friday prayers and an enforced zakkat (alms) payment

to assist the needy.





Christian and Islamic groups planning to build new churches

or mosques are required to register with the Corporate

Affairs Commission (CAC). The law requires that such groups

name a board of trustees, place a notice of the group's

intent to organize in three nationwide newspapers, and send

trustee information to the CAC. If no objections are

received, the group can proceed with its meetings. This law

was put into effect to stem the proliferation of new

buildings in the absence of zoning laws, to resolve legal

questions arising from disputes over church ownership and

control, to provide a single registry for government

reference in the event that compensation is demanded

following civil disturbances, and to allow for legal

solemnization of marriages. The CAC did not deny

registration to any religious group during the year; however,

some religious groups experienced delays in obtaining

permission from local zoning boards to build houses of

worship.





Although distribution of religious publications remained

generally unrestricted, the Government continued to enforce

lightly a ban on published religious advertisements. There

were reports by Christians in Zamfara state that the state

government restricted the distribution of religious

(Christian) literature. Similar discrimination against the

use of state-owned media for Muslim programming was reported

in the south.





The Government continued to enforce a ban on the existence of

religious organizations on campuses of primary schools,

although individual students retain the right to practice

their religion in recognized places of worship. According to

the Constitution, students are not required to receive

instruction relating to a religion other than their own;

however, public school students throughout the country were

subjected to mandatory Islamic or Christian religious

instruction. Islamic studies are mandatory in public schools

in Zamfara and other northern states, to the exclusion of

Christianity. State authorities claim that students are

permitted to decline to attend these classes or to request a

teacher of their own religion to provide alternative

instruction; however, in practice the dominant religion of

the state is taught in the school, and students cannot use

these other mechanisms. There are reports that Christianity

is taught in the same manner in Enugu and Edo states, and

that Muslim students cannot access Koranic teaching in the

public schools. During the period covered by this report,

Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) leaders volunteered to

place teachers of Christianity in Zamfara and Sokoto state

schools, where students alleged that they were being forced

to take courses in Islamic religious knowledge in order to

graduate. Governors of both states accepted the offer of

assistance and stated that they had not been aware of the

problem; however, CAN did not provide any teachers in either

state during the year. They indicated that schools in rural

areas may not have qualified teachers of Biblical or

Christian education classes, and that students in such

schools have a right to opt out of Koranic knowledge classes,

which otherwise would be required.





The law prohibits religious discrimination; however, reports

were common that government officials discriminated against

persons practicing a religion different from their own,

notably in hiring or awarding contracts.





Christians in the predominantly Muslim northern states also

alleged that local government officials used zoning

regulations to stop or slow the establishment of new

Christian churches. Officials have responded that many of

these new churches are being formed in traditionally

residential neighborhoods that were not zoned for religious

purposes. The Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) offices

in Zamfara and Sokoto states alleged that local authorities

there delayed or denied to Christians certificates of

occupancy (CO's),which are required to show title to land.

For example, the Catholic Church in Zamfara state has been

unable to retake possession of a clinic that was confiscated

during a period of military rule in the 1970's. Renewal of

the CO for the church building was approved; however, the

Church has been unable to obtain a CO to reoccupy the clinic

building and the adjoining land. Zamfara and Sokoto state

officials denied that discrimination was behind the cases

cited by CAN. State officials said the certification boards

were dealing with a large backlog of cases for all persons,

regardless of religious faith.





As the result of ethnic and religious violence related to the

expansion of Shari'a criminal law in various states, (see

Section 5),several state governments banned public

proselytizing, although it is permitted by the Constitution.

The Katsina and Plateau state governments enacted and

maintained a ban on public proselytizing for security

reasons. Some states relaxed these restrictions informally

during the reporting period, and allowed some public

proselytizing by Christians and Muslims. Missionaries

reported that law enforcement officials harassed them when

they proselytized outside of their designated zones. During

the year, Kaduna maintained a ban, enacted in 2000, on all

forms of "processions, rallies, demonstrations, and meetings

in public places." Such bans were viewed as necessary public

safety measures after the deaths of thousands in

predominantly ethno-religious conflicts, sparked in part by

the expansion of Shari'a since 2000, in Kaduna, Plateau,

Kano, Gombe and Bauchi (see Section 5). On October 31, the

Ondo state government banned open-air religious meetings by

both Christians and Muslims in a bid to prevent religious

violence. However, large outdoor religious gatherings

continued to be quite common, especially in the southern part

of the country. In November, religious rioting in Osogbo,

Osun state, reportedly led to at least one death and the

destruction of several places of worship.





The Federal Government has tacitly acknowledged the ability

of states to implement criminal Shari'a. However, the

Federal Government has instituted a committee charged with

the responsibility to draft uniform Shari'a criminal and

procedural laws that could be adopted by all states, instead

of the current state-drafted statutes that differ in many

respects (see Section 1.c.).





Although the expanded Shari'a does not apply to Christians,

Christians in some states have been subjected to many of the

social provisions of the law All Muslims in states that

expanded Shari'a to criminal matters are subject to the new

Shari'a criminal codes. All cases involving only Muslims must

be heard by a Shari'a court. Other states with Shari'a law

still permit Muslims to choose common law courts for criminal

cases; however, societal pressure forces most Muslims to use

the Shari'a court system. Various human rights groups have

challenged the constitutionality of criminal Shari'a, but

these suits have failed for lack of a plaintiff with adequate

legal standing.

In March journalists covering the implementation of Shari'a

law in Bauchi state were warned by the governor, Ahmed

Mu'azu, that they would be prosecuted if they misrepresented

the Government's position on Shari'a. None were arrested for

this reason by year's end.





A number of states informally sanctioned private vigilante

Shari'a enforcement groups. In Zamfara state, Governor Ahmed

Sani vested the local vigilante group with full powers of

arrest and prosecution because he believed that the police

were not enforcing the new Shari'a laws. Governor Saminu

Turaki of Jigawa state also mobilized a statewide Shari'a

enforcement committee to arrest, detain, and prosecute Muslim

offenders. In April the Katsina Arts and Musicians

Association wrote to the Katsina House of Assembly protesting

the arrest and detention of Sirajo Mai Asharalle. Asharalle

was arrested by the state-sanctioned Rundunar Adalci

vigilante group while performing music at a local function,

but was released soon after his arrest. The performance of

music and dancing was banned under the Shari'a law introduced

by Katsina state.









d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,

Emigration, and Repatriation





The Constitution provides for these rights, and in general,

the Government respected this right; however, police

occasionally restricted this right by setting up roadblocks

and checkpoints and enforcing curfews in areas with civil

unrest. For example, in October, a dusk-to-dawn curfew was

imposed in Makurdi and Gboko, Benue state, following civil

unrest in the region. Roadblocks and checkpoints routinely

are used by law enforcement agencies to search for criminals

and to prevent the transport of bodies from areas of

conflict to other parts of the country where their presence

might instigate retaliatory violence. Security and law

enforcement officials continued to use excessive force at

checkpoints and roadblocks and engage in extortion and

violence (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). Unlike in the

previous year, there were no reports of government officials

restricting mass movements of individuals fleeing ethnic

unrest.





Violent clashes between ethnic Hausa and various non-Muslim

ethnic groups in Jos, Tafawa Balewa, and Kano resulted in the

imposition of dusk-to-dawn curfews following the deaths of

numerous persons (see Sections 1.a. and 5). In September and

October, Tiv youths set up roadblocks in eastern Benue to

harass and kill ethnic Jukuns (see Section 1.a.).





The Constitution also prohibits the denial of exit or entry

to any citizen, and the Government generally respected this

law. Some men take their wives' and children's passports and

other identification documents with them while traveling

abroad to prevent their family from leaving the country (see

Section 5). In August General Jeremiah Useni, a retired

general and former Minister of the Federal Capital

Territories under the Abacha regime, was prevented from

traveling outside Nigeria and his passport was confiscated;

the Federal Government provided no reason for this action,

but it was widely assumed to be related to allegations of

corruption.





Prominent human rights and prodemocracy activists who fled

the country during the regime of General Sani Abacha

continued to return to the country as did many economic

refugees. There were no reports that the Government denied

passports to political figures or journalists or interrogated

citizens who were issued visas to foreign countries; however,

there have been sporadic but unsubstantiated reports that

persons still were questioned upon entry or exit to the

country at Murtala Muhammed International Airport.





During periods of civil unrest, numerous persons were

displaced from their places of residence. In late June and

early July several thousand Hausa families fled Tafawa

Balewa in southern Bauchi state, following violent attacks by

the majority Sayawa ethnic group; according to the ICRC,

approximately 20,000 fled their homes, and several dozen may

have been killed. In September approximately 15,000 persons

were displaced by interethnic violence in Jos. In September

and October, thousands of persons from all ethnic groups fled

violence in Tafawa Balewa and Kano and approximately several

hundred thousand persons were displaced due to ethnic

conflict in Benue, Taraba and Nasarawa States (see Section

2.c.) In October following civil unrest in Kano, many Igbo

and Yoruba residents sent their families south. (see

Sections 1.a. and 5). Many persons fleeing civil unrest

first shelter and safety at military barracks, police

compounds, and other public places. Some were still living

in such government buildings at the end of 2001. Thousands of

persons, both Christian and Muslim, were displaced internally

following the Kaduna riots in 2000; most returned to their

homes during the year.





Many returnees remained apprehensive about continuing to work

in these areas, with some returning only to finish business

contracts or to sell their homes in order to arrange a more

permanent departure.





A few hundred residents of the Odi village, razed by soldiers

in 1999, have returned to the area; however the Federal

Government has not provided them with assistance to

reconstruct their village (see Section 1.a.).

The law provides for the granting of refugee and asylum

status in accordance with the 1951 UN Convention Relating to

the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government

cooperated with the Lagos office of the UN High Commissioner

for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian agencies in

assisting refugees through the National Commission for

Refugees and its Federal Commissioner. The Eligibility

Committee, which governs the granting of refugee status,

asylum, and resettlement, reviews refugee and resettlement

applications. A representative from the UNHCR participates

in this committee. The issue of the provision of first

asylum has not arisen since the establishment of the National

Commission for Refugees under Decree 52.





At year's end, there were 6,933 recognized refugees: 13 from

Angola; 23 from Benin; 4 from Cameroon; 1,703 from Sierra

Leone; 3,194 from Chad; 74 from Sudan; 1,561 from Liberia; 69

from Cote d'Ivoire; and 292 from other countries. The

Government also resettled in the country 3 Cameroonians, 3

Chadians, 5 Sudanese, 13 Liberians, and 17 persons from other

countries.





There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a

country where they feared persecution.









Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens

to Change Their Government





The Constitution provides citizens the right to change their

government peacefully through periodic, free, and fair

elections held on the basis of universal suffrage. Citizens

exercised this right in national elections for president and

the National Assembly in February 1999. The President, Vice

President, and other national and state officials serve

4-year terms. The next state and national elections are

scheduled for 2003, while local government elections are

scheduled for 2002. However, the local government elections

may move to 2003 due to the passage of a controversial

electoral law in December. The INEC is working with several

international electoral assistance organizations to help

improve the process in 2003. No INEC officials have faced

disciplinary action as result of their alleged involvement in

corrupt activities that marred the 1999 elections.





The Constitution outlaws the seizure of the Government by

force and contains provisions for the removal of the

President, Vice President, ministers, legislators, and state

government officials for gross misconduct or medical reasons.

Early in the year, there was an unsuccessful attempt to

remove Speaker Ghali Na'abba allegedly led by members of the

executive branch. Evidence of widespread fraud and corruption

in the attempt to buy votes for the removal of Na'abba forced

the abandonment of the effort to remove the speaker.





The political system remains in transition. The three

branches of the Government acted somewhat independently.

Despite his party's substantial majority in the legislature,

the President was not able to exercise authority without

legislative oversight and inclusiveness. The Senate and the

House of Representatives took legislative responsibilities

such as budget review and oversight, the election reform

initiative, and resource allocation seriously. Obasanjo

created several commissions to investigate past government

contracts and human rights abuses, which were overwhelmed

with applications to present evidence of wrongdoing (see

Section 4). However, the judicial branch remained weakened

by years of neglect and politicization (see Section 1.e.)





The Constitution was promulgated on May 5, 1999. The

constitution-writing process was criticized for not being

open to enough participants and for not being subjected to

wider debate on the country's federal structure, revenue

allocation and power-sharing formulas, and minority ethnic

groups' rights. Complaints about the Constitution persisted

and there were continued calls for a national conference to

reexamine the constitutional and political structure of

Nigeria. While there were many different conceptions of what

such a conference would involve, those in the southwest

tended to favor a "sovereign" national conference, which

would modify the existing constitution to implement a more

decentralized structure.





In early December the President signed an electoral law that

moved local elections from 2002 to 2003. This provision was

contested by the state governors and state assemblies as an

infringement on the states constitutional powers to control

local government. While allowing new political parties to

participate in local elections in 2003, the act prohibited

them from from participation in state and national elections

until 2007. After weeks of public debate, both Houses of

the National Assembly repealed the prohibition against new

parties participating in the 2003 national and state

elections. The constitutionality of the law and how it was

amended was also the subject of a suit before the Supreme

Court.





The percentage of women in government and politics does not

correspond to their percentage of the population; however,

there were no legal impediments to political participation or

voting by women. Men continued to dominate the political

arena and NGO's continued to protest the limited

representation of women in the political process. Out of

more than 500 ministerial and National Assembly positions,

there are only six female ministers, three female Senators

and 12 female Representatives. Women's rights groups lobbied

local, state, and the Federal Government (and local levels as

well) to adopt a 30 percent affirmative action program;

however, these efforts were unsuccessful.





There are no legal impediments to participation in government

by members of any ethnic group. The Constitution requires

that government appointments reflect the country's "federal

character." However, there are more than 250 ethnic groups,

and it is difficult to insure representation of every group

in the Government (see Section 5). The federal- and

state-level ministers generally are selected to represent the

country's and state's regional, ethnic, and religious makeup.

President Obasanjo has attempted to create an ethnically

inclusive Government. Despite this effort, many groups

complained of insufficient representation.





Middle-belt and Christian officers dominate the military

hierarchy. In 1999 Obasanjo retired all military officers

who held political office, which meant that a

disproportionate number of northern Hausa officers--who

dominated the upper ranks under the previous military

regimes--left the service. In 2000 there were few military

retirements, and although they appear to reflect an ethnic or

religious bias, some in the north believe that the northern

Hausa are underrepresented in the military.









Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and

Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged

Violations

of Human Rights





A number of domestic and international human rights groups

generally operate without government restriction,

investigating and publishing their findings on human rights

cases. Government officials are generally cooperative and

responsive to their views. Criticisms of the Government's

past human rights record were abundant in various media.

High-level government officials noted that the human rights

community assisted in the advancement of democracy. However,

in 2001, human rights activists complained that President

Obasanjo and members of his government did not meet with them

as frequently as in the previous year.





The Catholic Secretariat, a local faith-based interest group,

continued to hold a monthly open forum in Lagos on various

subjects relating to past and present human rights issues.

Discussion panels have included a number of NGO's, media, and

religious leaders. Each session ended with recommendations

to the Government on how best to resolve these issues. The

Government had not responded to any of these recommendations

by year's end.





In February the Kano Council of Ullamas declared Kano off

limits to NGO's after a mob set fire to a truck that hisbah

(Islamic law enforcers) prevented from entering Kano (see

Section 2.d.). The Ulamas lack secular authority, and NGOs

continue to operate freely in Kano.





On October 29, the CRP called on President Obasanjo to take

responsibility for recent retaliatory attacks by the army

against Tiv communities in central Benue State (see Section

1.a.). A number of groups spoke out against the events in

Benue, and called for full investigations.





The ICRC is active, with offices in Abuja and Lagos under the

direction of a regional delegate. Its primary human rights

activities during the year involved the training of prison

officials on human rights, sanitation, and prisoner health

(see Section 1.c.).





The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) is tasked with

monitoring and protecting human rights in the country,

enjoyed greater recognition by and coordination with NGO's,

and worked hard to establish its credibility as an

independent monitoring body. The NHRC is chaired by retired

Justice Uche Omo and includes 15 other members. The NHRC was

establishing zonal affiliates in each of the countries six

political regions during the year. The NHRC is supposed to

work closely with NGO's that are devoted to human rights

issues. Since its inception, the NHRC has been denied

adequate funding to do its job properly. At year's end, the

NHRC had created a strategic work plan through 2002,

inaugurated steering and coordinating committees for the

national action plan. During the year, it assisted in

appealing a number of Shari'a verdicts in the north (see

Sections 1.c. and 1.e.)





The HRVIP, commonly known as the Oputa panel, is a one-time

panel that was established in 1999 by President Obasanjo to

investigate human rights abuses dating back to 1966 and the

time of the first military coup. The Oputa Panel can

recommend courses of action to the justice system for

perpetrators of past abuses, something the NHRC does not do.

According to Justice Oputa, the chair, the panel's primary

goal is to provide the country with a systematic examination

of past human rights abuses to develop a national consensus

on the boundaries of acceptable behavior by government

entities as well as individuals. The panel heard cases

throughout the year, mostly involving allegations of unlawful

arrest, detention, and torture as far back as the 1966

Biafran War (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.) The panel also

heard cases in which the rights of groups were violated. The

Oputa Panel held extensive hearings in Lagos, Abuja, Port

Harcourt, and Kano during the year, and has taken evidence in

the claims of more than 10,000 petitioners.





On January 20, according to newspaper reports, HRVIP Chairman

Justice Chukwudifu Oputa apologized to the Ogoni ethnic

minority on behalf of the Government for events in recent

years.





In September President Obasanjo appeared before the panel to

explain his role in army actions during his tenure as

military head of state in the late 1970's. The family of

late musician Fela Kuti claimed that Obasanjo was involved in

a 1979 army raid in which Kuti's mother was killed.





During the year, former Heads of State, General Ibrahim

Babangida, General Abdulsalami Abubakar, and General

Muhammadu Buhari refused to appear to answer questions about

human rights abuses under their respective regimes. The Panel

concluded its hearings and began drafting a report of its

findings, expected to be released in early 2002.









Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,

Disability, Language, or Social Status





The Constitution provides citizens with the right to freedom

from discrimination based on "community, place of origin,

ethnic group, sex, religion, or political opinion." However,

customary and religious discrimination against women

persisted, occasional religious violence was a problem,

social discrimination on the basis of both religion and

ethnicity remained widespread, and ethnic and regional

tensions continued to contribute to serious violence both

between groups of citizens and between citizens and the

security forces.





Women





Domestic violence is a problem. Reports of spousal abuse are

common, especially wife beating. Police normally do not

intervene in domestic disputes, which seldom are discussed

publicly. The Penal Code permits husbands to use physical

means to chastise their wives as long as it does not result

in "grievous harm," which is defined as loss of sight,

hearing, power of speech, facial disfigurement, or other life

threatening injuries. A women's rights group has estimated

that spousal abuse occurs in 20 percent of adult

relationships. In more traditional areas of the country,

courts and police are reluctant to intervene to protect women

who accuse their husbands formally if the level of alleged

abuse does not exceed customary norms in the areas. Rape and

sexual harassment continue to be problems.





The Federal Government publicly opposes female genital

mutilation (FGM),which is condemned widely by international

health experts as damaging to both physical and psychological

health; however, it has taken no legal action to curb the

practice. There was a bill to ban FGM before the National

Assembly at year's end. Because of the considerable problems

that anti-FGM groups faced at the federal level, most are

refocusing their energies to combat FGM at the state and

local government area (LGA) level. In 2000 Edo, Ogun, Cross

River, Osun, Rivers, and Bayelsa states banned FGM. In Edo

state, the punishment for FGM is a $10 (1,000 naira) fine and

6 months imprisonment, which is a significant amount in rural

Nigeria. In addition once a state legislature criminalizes

FGM, NGO's have found that they must convince the LGA

authorities that state laws are applicable in their

districts.





The Women's Centre for Peace and Development (WOPED)

estimated that at least 50 percent of women undergo FGM.

Studies conducted by the U.N. Development Systems and the

World Health Organization estimated the FGM rate at

approximately 60 percent among the nation's female

population. However, according to local experts, the actual

prevalence may be as high as 100 percent in some ethnic

conclaves in the south. While practiced in all parts of the

country, FGM is more predominant in the southern and eastern

zones. Women from northern states are less likely to undergo

FGM; however, those affected are more likely to undergo the

severe type of FGM known as infibulation. WOPED believes

that the practice is perpetuated because of a cultural belief

that uncircumcised women are promiscuous, unclean, unsuitable

for marriage, physically undesirable, or potential health

risks to themselves and their children, especially during

childbirth. The National Association of Nigerian Nurses and

Midwives, The Nigerian Women's Association, and the Nigerian

Medical Association worked to eradicate the practice and to

train health care workers on the medical effects of FGM;

however, contact with health care workers remains limited.

Nevertheless, most observers agree that the number of women

and girls who are undergoing FGM is declining each year.





Indigenous forms of FGM vary from the simple removal of the

clitoral hood or labia minora to excision of the clitoris and

the most dangerous form, infibulation. The age at which

women and girls are subjected to the practice varies from the

first week of life until after a woman delivers her first

child. The Ministry of Health, women's groups, and many

NGO's sponsored public awareness projects to educate

communities about the health hazards of FGM. The press

repeatedly criticized the practice.





Prostitution is rampant, particularly in urban areas. A

number of states have begun to enforce existing laws or to

introduce new laws to combat prostitution. All states that

have adopted Shari'a have criminalized prostitution (see

Section 2.c.),and this prohibition is enforced with varying

degrees of success. Prostitution is not illegal in Lagos

state; however, authorities can use statutes that outlaw

pandering as a justification for arresting prostitutes. The

adoption of Shari'a-based legal systems by northern states

also has led to the strong enforcement of laws against child

prostitution (see Section 2.c.). Southern states, like Edo,

also are criminalizing prostitution and raising the legal age

for marriage from 16 to 18.





There is an active market for trafficking in women to Europe,

and elsewhere (see Section 6.f.).





In some parts of the country, women continue to be harassed

for social and religious reasons. Purdah, the Islamic

practice of keeping girls and women in seclusion from men

outside the family, continued in parts of the far north.





Women also experience considerable discrimination. There are

no laws barring women from particular fields of employment;

however, women often experience discrimination because the

Government tolerates customary and religious practices that

adversely affect them. The Nigerian NGO's Coalition

expressed concern about continued discrimination against

women in the private sector, particularly in access to

employment, promotion to higher professional positions, and

in salary inequality. There are credible reports that

several businesses operate with a "get pregnant, get fired"

policy. Women remain underrepresented in the formal sector

but play an active and vital role in the country's important

informal economy. While the number of women employed in the

business sector increases every year, women do not receive

equal pay for equal work and often find it extremely

difficult to acquire commercial credit or to obtain tax

deductions or rebates as heads of households. Unmarried

women in particular endure many forms of discrimination.





While some women have made considerable individual progress,

both in the academic and business world, women remain

underprivileged. Although women are not barred legally from

owning land, under some customary land tenure systems only

men can own land, and women can gain access to land only

through marriage or family. In addition many customary

practices do not recognize a women's right to inherit her

husband's property, and many widows were rendered destitute

when their in-laws took virtually all of the deceased

husband's property. Widows are subjected to unfavorable

conditions as a result of discriminatory traditional customs

and economic deprivation. "Confinement" is the most common

rite of deprivation to which widows are subjected, and it

occurs predominately in eastern Nigeria. Confined widows are

under restrictions for as long as 1 year and usually are

required to shave their heads and dress in black. In other

areas, a widow is considered a part of her husband's

property, to be "inherited" by his family. Shari'a personal

law protects widows property rights. Polygamy continues to be

practiced widely among all ethnic groups and among Christians

as well as Muslims and practitioners of traditional

persuasions. Women are required by law to obtain permission

from a male family member to get a passport (see Section

2.d.). The testimony of women is not equal to that of men in

criminal courts (see Section 1.e.).





Women have been affected to varying degrees by the adoption

of various forms of Shari'a law in 12 northern states. In

Zamfara state, local governments instituted laws requiring

the separation of Muslim men and women in transportation and

health care. In apparent violation of traditional Shari'a

jurisprudence, some Alkalis judges denied Shari'a criminal

protections to women that they provide to men. For example,

a few women were subjected to harsh punishments for

fornication or adultery based upon the fact of pregnancy,

while men were not convicted without the requisite number of

witnesses (see Sections 1.c. and 1.e.).A coalition of women's

rights NGOs in 1998-1999 found inaccurate the Government's

positive portrayal of its implementation of the CEDAW; there

reportedly was not much progress during 2001 towards

rectifying the deficiencies identified.





On April 4, President Obasanjo initiated a national policy to

stop all discrimination against women.





Children





While the Government increased spending on children's health

in recent years, it seldom enforced laws designed to protect

the rights of children. Public schools continued to be

inadequate, and limited facilities precluded access to

education for many children. The Constitution calls for the

Government, "when practical," to provide free, compulsory,

and universal primary education; however, despite the

President's commitment, compulsory primary education rarely

was provided. In many parts of Nigeria, girls are

discriminated against in access to education for social and

economic reasons. The literacy rate for men is 58 percent

but only 41 percent for women. Rural girls are even more

disadvantaged than their urban counterparts. Only 42 percent

of rural girls are enrolled in school compared with 72

percent of urban girls. Many families favor boys over girls

in deciding which children to enroll in secondary and

elementary schools. For the families where economic hardship

restricts the ability to send girls to school, many girls are

directed into commercial activities such as trading and

street vending.





Cases of child abuse, abandoned infants, child prostitution,

and physically harmful child labor practices remained common

throughout the country (see Sections 6.c and 6.d.). Although

the law stipulates that "no child shall be ordered to be

imprisoned," juvenile offenders are incarcerated routinely

along with adult criminals. The Government criticized child

abuse and neglect, but it did not undertake any significant

measures to stop customary practices harmful to children (see

Section 6.f.). There were credible reports that poor

families sell their daughters into marriage as a means of

supplementing their incomes. Young girls are sometimes

forced into marriage as soon as they reach puberty,

regardless of age, in order to prevent the "indecency"

associated with premarital sex.





FGM is performed commonly on girls in some areas of the

country (see Section 5, Women).





There was evidence of trafficking in children (see Section

6.f.).





Child labor, including forced child labor, remained a problem

during the year (see Sections 6.c., 6.d., and 6.f.).





Persons with Disabilities





While the Government called for private business to institute

policies that ensured fair treatment for persons with

disabilities, during 2001 it did not enact any laws requiring

greater accessibility to buildings or public transportation,

nor did if formulate any policy specifically ensuring the

right of persons with disabilities to work.





In August the Federal Government established vocational

training centers in Abuja to provide training to beggars with

disabilities.





Religious Minorities





The law prohibits religious discrimination; however, there

were some instances where officials discriminated against

people practicing religions different than their own in

hiring practices and in the awarding of state contracts.





Religious differences often correspond to regional and ethnic

differences. For example, the northern region is

predominately Muslim. Many southern ethnic groups are

predominantly Christian, although the Yoruba are roughly

fifty percent Muslim. Both Muslims and Christians are found

in large numbers in the Middle Belt. In many areas of the

Middle Belt, Muslim Fulani tend to be pastoralists while the

Muslim Hausas and most Christian ethnic groups tend more

toward farming or urban living. Consequently, it is often

difficult to distinguish religious discrimination and tension

from economic and land use competition or ethnic and regional

discrimination. Religious tensions underscored what were

predominantly ethnic confrontations throughout the year.





The crisis in Kaduna in 2000 was the first major

Muslim-Christian conflict during Obasanjo's tenure. Estimates

of the number of persons killed range from 1,000 to 1,500.

Following the 2000 violence in Kaduna (see 2000 country

report),the Government sponsored dialog among the state's

different religious and ethnic groups which helped to

significantly reduce the level of inter-religious tension and

violence in 2001. For example, in October, when two small

churches caught fire in Kaduna city, Christian and Muslim

neighbors helped extinguish the fires, and the state

government promised funds to repair them. However, in

November, several people were killed in southern Kaduna state

due to a rivalry between two local leaders that intensified

when expanded Shari'a was formally implemented in the state.





In early April in Osun State, mobs lynched 12 visiting

Evangelical Christians belonging to the Brotherhood of Christ

(see Section 1.a.).





On May 22, Christian and Muslim youths clashed in the town of

Kumo over the introduction of Shari'a law; approximately 25

persons were injured.





In June there were unconfirmed reports that Muslim youths set

four churches on fire in Dutse, Jigawa state.





In November Muslim youths reportedly vandalized eight

churches in Osogbo, Osun state, and four churches in Ilorin,

Kwara state; one person reportedly was killed in Osogbo.





In early September, 2,300 persons were killed in interethnic

violence that split along religious lines in Jos. Between

10,000 and 15,000 persons were displaced by the violence (see

Section 2.d). The appointment of an ethnic Hausa to the

chairmanship of a local Poverty Alleviation Program increased

tensions, which accompanied the earlier violence between

Christian Sayewa and Musim Hausa in Tafawa Balewa, Bauchi,

only 60 kilometers away. There also were reports of summary

executions of Hausa in outlying villages. Approximately 80

percent of the victims in Jos were Hausa Muslims, who

constitute a significant minority in Jos. The military was

able to restore order, but thousands of Hausa fled Plateau

state for Kaduna, Kano, Jigawa, and Bauchi states. This

conflict appears to have been primarily ethnic. Christians

of different ethnic groups reportedly attacked each other,

and Yoruba Muslims joined in targeting their Hausa

co-religionists.





On October 12, 600 to 1,000 Muslims peacefully demonstrated

in Kano against U.S. and allied air strikes against

Afghanistan. Several hours after the demonstration, two

small churches were burned. The following morning, a mob of

predominantly Hausa youth attacked shopkeepers and looted

shops in city's major market. During the riots, 100 persons

were killed. The military was called in to restore order.

Two churches and three mosques reportedly were burned during

the fighting. After order was restored, Governor Kwankwaso

held a series of meetings with local ethnic and religious

leaders to stem further outbreaks and to rebuild trust

between the communities.





In November youths vandalized eight churches in Osun state

and four churches in Ilorin, Kwara state.





There were no developments in the following 2000 incidents of

inter-religious violence: 18 persons were killed in the

Bambam community of southern Gombe state when Christians

attacked Muslims; approximately 200 persons were killed in

Nayari, Kaduna state, when Christians rioted after finding

the body of a person whom they believed to have been a

Christian killed by Muslims; 1 person was killed in Borno

state following an argument over the location of a church; 1

church was burned and 2 were vandalized in Sokoto following a

pro-Shari'a rally by university students.





National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities





The country's population is ethnically diverse, and consists

of more than 250 groups, many of which speak distinct primary

languages and are concentrated geographically. There is no

majority ethnic group. The four largest ethnic groups are

the Hausa and Fulani of the north, the Yoruba of the

southwest, and the Igbos of the southeast. The Ijaw of the

South Delta area are the fifth largest group, followed by the

Kanuri in the far northeast and Tiv in the Middle Belt.





The Constitution prohibits ethnic discrimination by the

Government. In addition the Constitution mandates that the

composition of the federal, state, and local governments and

their agencies, as well as the conduct of their affairs,

reflect the diverse character of the country in order to

promote national unity and loyalty. This provision was

designed as a safeguard against domination of the Government

by persons from a few states or ethnic and sectional groups.

These provisions were included in response to previous

domination of the Government and the armed forces by

northerners and Muslims. The Government is an example of

this diversity. Obasanjo is a Yoruba from the southwest, the

Vice President is a northerner, and the Senate President is

an Igbo. The Government attempted to balance key positions

and deputy positions among the different regions and ethnic

groups. The Senate used its oversight role to reject many of

Obasanjo's ambassadorial appointments and insisted on three

nominees from each state for each appointment. The political

parties also engaged in "zoning," the practice of rotating

positions within the party among the different regions and

ethnicities to ensure that each region and ethnicity is given

adequate representation. Nonetheless, claims of

marginalization by members of southern minority groups and

Igbos continued. The ethnic groups of the Niger Delta, in

particular, continued their calls for high-level

representation on petroleum issues and within the security

forces. Northern Muslims, who lost previously held positions

within the military hierarchy, accused the Government of

favoring Christians from the Middle Belt for those positions.

Traditional linkages continued to impose considerable

pressure on individual government officials to favor their

own ethnic groups for important positions and patronage.





Societal discrimination on the basis of ethnicity is

practiced widely by members of all ethnic groups and is

evident in private sector hiring patterns, de facto ethnic

segregation of urban neighborhoods, and a continuing paucity

of marriages across major ethnic and regional lines. There

is a long history of tension among the diverse ethnic groups

(see Sections 1.a. and 2.c.)





There were significant interethnic clashes in Delta, Anambra,

Bauchi, Plateau, Nassarawa, Rivers, Benue, Bayelsa, Akwa

Ibom, Cross River, and Ebonyi States during the year. Often

the competition was between local "indigene" and "immigrant"

ethnic groups. Thousands of people were killed and injured

during such fighting (see Sections 1.a.)





Section 6 Worker Rights





The Right of Association





The Constitution provides all citizens with the right to

assemble freely and associate with other persons, and to form

or belong to any trade union or other association for the

protection of their interests; however, several statutory

restrictions on the right of association and on trade unions

remained in effect despite repeals of parts of the

military-era antilabor decrees. Only a single central labor

federation, the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) is legally

permitted, and the Government recognizes only 29 trade

unions. Trade unions must be registered formally by the

Federal Government, and a minimum of 50 workers is required

to form a trade union. Nonmanagement senior staff are

prevented from joining trade unions, and senior staff

associations are denied a seat on the National Labor Advisory

Council (NLAC). The ILO Committee of Experts repeatedly has

cited several of these restrictions. The Government has not

amended the laws, but it has conducted discussions with

senior staff associations concerning formal recognition and

their accession to the NLAC.

Workers, except members of the armed forces and employees

designated as essential by the Government, may join trade

unions. Essential workers include members of the armed

forces and government employees in the police, customs,

immigration, prisons, federal mint, central bank, and

telecommunications sectors. Employees working in a

designated export processing zone (EPZ) may not join a union

until 10 years after the start-up of the enterprise (see

Section 6.b.).





According to figures provided by the NLC, total union

membership is approximately 4 million. Less than 10 percent

of the total work force is organized. With the exception of

a small number of workers engaged in commercial food

processing, the agricultural sector, which employs the bulk

of the work force, is not organized. The informal sector,

and small and medium enterprises, largely remain unorganized.





Since 1978 the Government has mandated a single trade union

structure with service and industrial unions grouped under

the NLC. The trade union movement is composed of two groups

consisting of junior and senior staff workers. The single

trade union structure and segregation of junior from senior

staff were intended to dilute the bargaining strength of

workers. Junior staff workers--primarily blue-collar

workers--are organized into the 29 industrial unions, which

are affiliated with the NLC; 21 associations make up the

Senior Staff Associations of Nigeria (SESCAN),which renamed

themselves the Trade Union Congress (TUC). The TUC has a

claimed membership of approximately 400,000 to 600,000. The

TUC, composed primarily of white-collar workers, has not been

sanctioned officially by the Government, and is prohibited by

statute from affiliating with the NLC. While the TUC lacks a

seat on the NLAC, the Government allowed the TUC to operate

openly. However, in 1999 SESCAN, now the TUC, began to lay

the legal and political groundwork to achieve government

recognition, which will require formal action by the National

Assembly.





In August 2000, the Government decertified the maritime

workers union on the grounds that the union had not scheduled

internal elections in accordance with its charter's

requirement. The Government then issued directives requiring

maritime workers to register with specific contracting firms.

As a result this historically powerful union was weakened;

however, it continued to challenge the Government's action

during the year.





Workers have the right to strike; however, certain essential

workers are required to provide advance notice of a strike.

There were several strikes by such personnel during the year.

In May and June, both doctors and university professors went

on strike over wages, working conditions, and government

investment in infrastructure. Both strikes were resolved

following lengthy negotiations with government ministries.

During the year, the Government committed itself to budgeting

greater funds for development of the nation's health and

education infrastructures.





During the year, there were smaller strikes over the

increased use of contract labor and the lack of indigenous

workers in management positions in the oil sector,

particularly in the Niger Delta. The National Union of

Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) and its senior

staff counterpart Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff

Association of Nigeria (PENGASSAN) particularly are concerned

about the increasing use of contract labor and the number of

indigenous workers in management positions.





In 2000 Lagos public sector workers went on strike to protest

the state government's refusal to pay a higher minimum wage.

A compromise package offered by the state was accepted by the

workers; however, the local union leadership continued to

press for more pay at year's end.





There are no laws prohibiting retribution against strikers

and strike leaders, but strikers who believe that they are

victims of unfair retribution may submit their cases to the

industrial arbitration panel (IAP),with the approval of the

Labor Ministry. Lagos State Government terminated an

important local union leader in Lagos, ostensibly for

nonperformance, following an extended strike by state

government workers. The IAP's decisions are binding on

parties but may be appealed to the Nigerian Industrial Court

(NIC). In practice the decisions of these bodies

infrequently carry the force of law. Union representatives

describe the arbitration process as cumbersome and

time-consuming, and an ineffective deterrent to retribution

against strikers.





The ILO cited a number of restrictions on freedom of

association. These include: Requiring all registered labor

unions to affiliate with a single central labor federation

(the Nigerian Labor Congress); establishing a minimum of 50

workers to form a trade union; providing for the possibility

of compulsory arbitration; giving the registrar broad powers

to supervise trade union accounts; and giving the Government

discretionary power to revoke the certification of a trade

union due to overriding public interest.





The NLC and labor unions are free to affiliate with

international bodies; however, prior approval from the

Minister is required. The NLC has affiliated with the

Organization of African Trade Unions.





b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively





The labor laws provide for both the right to organize and the

right to bargain collectively between management and trade

unions. Collective bargaining occurs throughout the public

sector and the organized private sector. Complaints of

antiunion discrimination may be brought to the Ministry of

Labor for mediation, conciliation, and resolution. The Labor

Minister may refer unresolved disputes to the IAP and the NIC

(see Section 6.a.). Union officials have questioned the

effectiveness and independence of the NIC in view of its

refusal in previous years to resolve various disputes

stemming from the Government's failure to fulfill contract

provisions for public sector employees. The NIC was

reconstituted this year with several new members, including a

formerly imprisoned trade unionist, Milton Dabibi. Union

leaders have criticized the arbitration system's dependence

on the Labor Minister's referrals. The Labor Minister

typically makes few referrals to the IAP. The IAP and NIC

were active following the Government's appointment of new

members; however, both suffered from a lack of resources.





A worker under a collective bargaining agreement may not

participate in a strike unless his union complied with the

requirements of the law, which include provisions for

mandatory mediation and for referral of the dispute to the

Government. The law allows the Government discretion to

refer the matter to a labor conciliator, arbitration panel,

board of inquiry, or the National Industrial Court. The law

forbids any employer from granting a general wage increase to

its workers without prior government approval. However, in

practice the law does not appear to be enforced effectively;

strikes, including in the public sector, are widespread (see

Section 1.a) and private sector wage increases generally are

not submitted to the Government for prior approval.





The Government retains broad legal authority over labor

matters and often intervenes in disputes seen to challenge

key political or economic objectives. However, the labor

movement is increasingly active on issues affecting workers.

During the year, the NLC spoke out on economic reform, fuel

price deregulation, privatization, globalization, tariffs,

corruption, contract workers, and political issues.





The Government directed each state administration to

establish its own salary structure based on its ability to

pay and in accord with the national minimum wage (see Section

6.e.). During the year, many state governments found it

difficult to pay the approximately $60 (6,500 naira) monthly

minimum wage to their employees, without massive layoffs or

the elimination of "ghost workers" who appear on the

employment rolls but not on the job.

An EPZ remains under development in Calabar, Cross River

State, and a second EPZ is planned for Port Harcourt, Rivers

State. Workers and employers in such zones are subject to

national labor laws, which provide for a 10-year amnesty on

trade unions from the startup of an enterprise. The law

provides that there shall be no strikes or lockouts for a

period of 10 years following the commencement of operations

within a zone. In addition the law allows the Export

Processing Zones Authority to handle the resolution of

disputes between employers and employees instead of workers'

organizations or unions. The 1992 Export Processing Zones

Decree has been criticized by The ILO has criticized the law

for not allowing any unauthorized person to enter any EPZ.

c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor





The law prohibits forced or compulsory labor; however,

trafficking in women and children for purposes of

prostitution and forced labor is a problem (see Section

6.f.),and enforcement of the law is not effective.





The Government does not specifically prohibit forced and

bonded labor by children; however, the law prohibits forced

or compulsory labor, a prohibition that extends to children.

Employment of persons under 18 years of age generally is

prohibited, except for agriculture and domestic work. ,

There were occasional reports of forced child labor,

including child slavery rings operating between Nigeria and

neighboring countries where children are trafficked to work

as domestic servants (see Sections 5 and 6.f). The reports

suggest that Nigerian children are trafficked to other

African countries for domestic and agricultural work.

Children from neighboring countries also are trafficked to

Nigeria for work as domestic servants.





d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for

Employment





The law prohibits employment of children less than 15 years

of age in commerce and industry and restricts other child

labor to home-based agricultural or domestic work. The law

states that children may not be employed in agricultural or

domestic work for more than 8 hours per day. The Decree

allows the apprenticeship of youths at the age of 13 under

specific conditions.





Economic hardship leads high numbers of children in

commercial activities aimed at enhancing meager family

income. The ILO estimates that upward of 12 million children

between the ages 10 and 14 (25 percent of all children) are

employed in some capacity. Children frequently are employed

as beggars, hawkers, and bus conductors in urban areas. The

use of children as domestic servants is common.





Private and government initiatives to stem the growing

incidence of child employment continue but have been

ineffective. UNICEF operates programs that remove young

girls from the street hawking trade and relocate them to

informal educational settings. UNICEF reported that despite

the narrow focus on young girls, the program only began to

address the problem during the year. In conjunction with the

ILO, the Government formulated a national program of action

in support of child rights, survival, protection,

development, and participation. In August a formal agreement

establishing the program was signed by the ILO and the Labor

Ministry; however, the program had not shown any results by

year's end due to logistical problems and changing personnel

in the Ministry. On October 16 and 17, the Senate Committee

on Women's Affairs and Youth held public hearings to

investigate child labor, sex trading, and other forms of

exploitation to which minors are subjected.





The Labor Ministry has an inspections department whose major

responsibilities include enforcement of legal provisions

relating to conditions of work and protection of workers.

However, there are less than 50 inspectors for the entire

country, and the Ministry conducts inspections only in the

formal business sector, in which the incidence of child labor

is not significant.





According to an ILO statement in 1998, and data from UNICEF,

the incidence of trafficking in children for prostitution is

growing (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).





e. Acceptable Conditions of Work





The law sets a minimum wage, which is reviewed infrequently.

Private sector minimum wages increased during the year to

match the 2000 increase in the public sector wage scale;

however, real private sector wages greatly exceed the minimum

wage. In the first half of the year, the national police

were not paid for several months.





In 2000 the minimum wage increased to $75 (7,500 naira) per

month for federal workers and to $55 to $65 (5,000 to 6,500

naira) per month for state employees. Private employers in

the formal sector track the public sector wage scale. Along

with the many allowances that are paid, the increase appears

sufficient to support a decent standard of living. However,

many government agencies were slow to pay the new wage scale,

and all federal salaries were frozen for 3 months during the

summer, pending a census of government employees. Ghost

workers (who appear on the employment rolls but not on the

job) remained a significant problem that was not addressed

fully during the year. The Government increased federal

salaries in 2000 without adequate consultations with state

governments, whose employees demanded similar wages; as a

result, several state governments maintained that they could

not afford to pay this wage (see Section 6.b.). The issue of

the minimum wage caused several labor disruptions throughout

the year, and remains unresolved in several states.





The law calls for a 40-hour workweek, 2 to 4 weeks annual

leave, and overtime and holiday pay. There is no law

prohibiting excessive compulsory overtime. The law also

establishes general health and safety provisions, some of

which are aimed specifically at young or female workers. It

requires that the factory division of the Ministry of Labor

and Employment inspect factories for compliance with health

and safety standards; however, this agency is greatly, lacks

basic resources and training, and consequently neglects

safety oversight of many enterprises, particularly

construction sites and other nonfactory work. The Ministry

often fails to reimburse inspectors for expenses incurred in

traveling to inspection sites, and safety oversight of many

enterprises often is neglected. The law requires employers

to compensate injured workers and dependent survivors of

those killed in industrial accidents. The Labor Ministry,

which is charged with enforcement of these laws, has been

ineffective in identifying violators. The Government has

failed to act on various ILO recommendations since 1991 to

update its program on inspection and accident reporting. The

Labor Decree does not provide workers with the right to

remove themselves from dangerous work situations without loss

of employment.









f. Trafficking in Persons





No law makes trafficking in persons a crime. There is an

active and growing market for trafficking in women and

children within the region and to Europe. The country is a

source, transit, and destination country.





The full nature and scope of the trade remained unknown, but

immigration and police officials throughout Europe continued

to report a steady flow of Nigerian women lured and sold into

prostitution in Europe, particularly Italy, the Netherlands,

Spain, and the Czech Republic. Italian authorities deported

several hundred sex workers to Nigeria during the year. Other

European countries deported smaller numbers of Nigerian

trafficking victims. Nigerian Interpol claimed that some

women entered the sex trade independently, were not

controlled by syndicates, and were economically motivated.

However, Human Rights Watch reported that according women's

rights organizations, hundreds of women migrated to Europe in

response to job offers as domestic workers or waitresses.

Upon arrival many were forced into prostitution in order to

pay off debts. In addition there is evidence that Nigerian

crime syndicates may use indebtedness, threats of beatings

and rape, physical injury to the victim's family, arrest, and

deportation to persuade those forced into sex work from

attempting to escape or from contacting police and NGO's for

assistance.





In January there were reports that hundreds of Nigerian girls

are sold into sexual slavery and trafficked through England.

The girls reportedly request asylum at British airports and

are taken into the care of social services or foster care. A

few weeks later the girls disappear and reportedly are

trafficked to European countries, in particular Italy, where

they are forced into prostitution.





During the year, there was at least one documented case of

trafficking in children reported in Lagos; however, incidents

of trafficking in Lagos and other major Nigerian cities are

suspected to be commonplace. Child traffickers receive a

monthly payment from the employer, part of which is to be

remitted to the parents of the indentured child servant.

Traffickers take advantage of a cultural tradition of

"fostering," under which it is acceptable to send a child to

live and work with a more prosperous family in an urban

center in return for educational and vocational advancement.

Often the children in these situations only work and do not

get any formal education; however, families who employ

children as domestic servants also pay their school fees.

They are forced to serve as domestics or to become street

hawkers selling nuts, fruits, or other items. There were

credible reports that poor families sell their daughters into

marriage as a means of supplementing their income (see

Section 5).

According to ILO reports, there is an active and extensive

trade in child laborers, some of whom are trafficked to

Cameroon, Gabon, Benin, and Equatorial Guinea to work in

agricultural enterprises. Other children are coerced into

prostitution (see Section 5). Authorities also have

identified a trade route for traffickers of children for

labor through Katsina and Sokoto to the Middle East and East

Africa. The eastern part of Nigeria and some southern states

such as Cross Rivers and Akwa Ibom have been the sites of

trafficking of children for labor and, in some cases, human

sacrifice. The country remains a destination for the

trafficking of Togolese children.





According to the Women Trafficking and Child Labor

Eradication Foundation, an average of 60 Nigerian girls and

women are repatriated every month. According to Titi

Abubakar, the founder of WOTCLEF, many trafficking victims

were involved in commercial sex, begging, menial jobs, or

forced marriages





The Government has conducted few investigations into the

alleged involvement of government officials in trafficking;

however, allegations of such involvement is widespread. Some

returnees have alleged that immigration officials actively

connive with syndicates; however, there were no arrests of

immigration officials for trafficking offenses during the

year.





Draft legislation was under review in the National Assembly

that would make trafficking a crime; however, no action was

taken on it by year's end. There is government and societal

acknowledgement that trafficking in women is a continuing

problem, particularly to Europe. Police attempts to stem the

trafficking of persons are inadequate and frequently focus on

the victims of trafficking, who often are subjected to

lengthy detention and public humiliation upon repatriation.

Traffickers were identified and punished in only a few cases.

Awareness campaigns, often conducted by spouses of prominent

politicians or NGO's, only recently have begun to garner

widespread attention. There are few statistics available to

determine the success of antitrafficking campaigns. The

development of a reliable statistical base for assessing the

child trafficking problem began under ILO auspices. The

Nigerian national program of the ILO-IPEC's regional

trafficking program began in earnest in November 2001, after

the ILO-IPEC completed an assessment of trafficking in

Nigeria. The regional and Nigeria programs are funded

completely by the U.S. Department of Labor.





In one of the few cases of prosecution for trafficking, Bisi

Dan Musa, a prominent Lagos businesswoman and wife of a

former presidential candidate, was arrested and charged with

19 counts of "child stealing" and "slave dealing;" 16

children between the ages of 1 and 4 reportedly were found in

her custody. Her trial is ongoing.





In August 33 Nigerian women and children were repatriated

from Conakry, Guinea, following the personal intervention of

President Obasanjo. According to U.N. officials, trafficking

agents offered the women between $184 and $1,802 (20,000 to

200,000 naira) and promised good jobs. Guinean authorities

reportedly arrested 15 Nigerian trafficking suspects in the

case, including a former police commissioner of Edo State; at

year's end, the they were extradited to Nigeria in October

and at year's end were being tried by the Federal High Court.





On August 12, a Nigerian man was detained in Sokoto state for

the alleged trafficking of 10 girls between the ages of 10

and 16. One of the girls reportedly said the man was taking

them to work abroad in hairdressing salons.

Jeter