NIGERIA: TERRORIST LIST 9

S E C R E T ABUJA 000418 SIPDIS FOR EB/ESC/ESP (GLASS),AF/EPS AND AF/W E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2012 TAGS: PREL PINS EFIN ECON TU NI SUBJECT: NIGERIA: TERRORIST LIST 9 REF: (A) STATE 10592 (B) ABUJA 187 (C) ANDREWS-EPSTEIN EMAIL 02/06/02 ¶1. (U) Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). ¶2. (S) Mission officers met on February 6, per Ref C, to discuss possible scenarios to lessen the negative impact of freezing the assets of NASCO Nigeria and its affiliated subsidiaries. We found no way to separate the NASCO holding company in Turkey from its Nigerian subsidiaries, which employ more than 1500 Nigerians directly and several times that indirectly. Without entering into discussions with the GON, we cannot begin to determine whether it would be possible or feasible to stop funds generated in Nigeria from reaching the Turkish holding company. We know very little about NASCO's corporate structure. ¶3. (S) Ref B described Mission perspectives on the impact of freezing NASCO's assets on the local Jos community in Plateau State and on U.S. relations with Nigeria's Islamic population. Since then, the political situation has deteriorated. Last week,s explosion of the Lagos armory, the President,s perceived insensitivity, however unjustified, to the plight of more than a thousand killed and injured and more than 12,000 displaced, and government incompetence in rescue and clean up of the unexploded ordinance have wounded the President seriously. This week's attacks on northern Muslim Hausa by Yoruba vigilantes in Lagos is being portrayed as ðnic cleansing8 on northern Nigerian radio programs. Northern Muslims, who supported Obasanjo in 1999, see him incapable of protecting them in Lagos. Even mainstream northern politicians are speaking of the inevitability of retaliatory attacks on Christians in Kano and Kaduna. Nigerians with a historical perspective remember that such attacks in Kano in 1966 were used as a justification for the Igbo East to declare independence, the act that led to the bloody Civil War. We do not expect widespread conflict to break out here, but applying sanctions at this time on NASCO -- a major manufacturing company and employer -- could be used as further ammunition by Obasanjo's detractors, worsening his already difficult position. In short, it would be a very inopportune moment for the USG to add to tensions in Nigeria, and applying sanctions to NASCO would be seen as destabilizing. ¶4. (S) This Mission is not privy to the links between NASCO and international terrorism. While most Nigerians roundly condemn al-Qaeda, there is considerable support for Hamas -- not for its suicide bombers, but for its clinics and schools. That support extends beyond the Muslim community (Nigerian and expatriate alike) to the left-leaning intelligentsia centered in Lagos. If, despite the information in paras one to three (above) and ref B, a decision is made to list NASCO, the Mission must have talking points for both public and private use. If NASCO's links are to Hamas rather than al-Qaeda or Abu Sayyaf, or the like, we and the GON would be in for a very rough ride. Jeter