NIGERIA: UN CHR-59 COUNTRY PROFILE

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 003381 SIPDIS FOR IO, AF/RA AND AF/C E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2012 TAGS: PHUM PREL KPAO NI UNHRC SUBJECT: NIGERIA: UN CHR-59 COUNTRY PROFILE REF: STATE 252917 Classified by CDA: ANDREWS: Reason: 1.5(d) OVERVIEW -------------- ¶1. (C) Nigeria's interests in the Human Rights Commission are conflicting. Nigeria wants to maintain a position of leadership among the developing nations. It is very sensitive to the G-77 views and most especially those of the Africa Group. In this vein, another Nigerian tradition has been to oppose country-specific resolutions on human rights. Given expected flaws in the conduct of the 2003 elections, the negative attention caused by Sharia and the lack of accountability for the killings at Odi and Zaki Biam, Nigeria will be very hesitant to support strong country-specific resolutions out of fear that it also might someday be a target of such a resolution. While Nigeria's adherence to these positions is usually very strong, it is not completely unshakeable. Nigeria realizes that the level of Western donor support for NePAD hinges on good governance and human rights. ¶2. (C) NePAD notwithstanding, Nigerian diplomacy will tend to hew its traditional line. A change in course on a major issue would require a decision by President Obasanjo. While some issues might be worked through the Foreign Ministry, Foreign Minister Sule Lamido and his pugnacious Number Two, Minister of State Dubem Onyia, are less flexible than the Presidency regarding GON adherence to G-77 and African solidarity. On matters that Nigeria believes it can vote with us but not risk its leadership position in Africa, it may exercise greater flexibility and USG intervention could possibly be persuasive in pushing Nigeria to abstain on a vote it ordinarily would not have supported. However, on hot-button issues such as Zimbabwe, Nigeria is unlikely to deviate from the Africa/G-77 norm, no matter how hard we push. The Nigerian line on Cuba will be that Cuba, like the U.S., is a "friendly" country with which Nigeria has long enjoyed good relations. In fact, a strong USG push on some issues, particularly Zimb abwe, could be counterproductive, encouraging Nigeria to engage actively in opposition to the U.S. in order to demonstrate its "independence" from "Western interference." RESPONSES -------------- ¶3. (C) The answers to questions in para four of reftel follow: a) The Nigerian representatives in Geneva make most decisions based on prior voting record and general instructions. Changes on relatively minor issues could be decided by the MFA. Any change on a major topic would be the result of a Presidential decision. b) Name and contact information: Mr. Ad'Obe Obe The President's Special Assistant for International Affairs White House, Abuja 243-9-314-0285 c) Nigeria will not want Sharia criminal punishments in Nigeria nor the Odi and Zaki Biam massacres to be raised. Nigeria will likely oppose a strong resolution against Zimbabwe. d) Our USAID program and our military assistance programs are among the largest in Africa. However, they offer little leverage on the GON in the UNHCR. On issues of cardinal importance, direct discussion between POTUS or Secretary Powell and President Obasanjo would provide the most effective chance to influence the Nigerian position. e) With the cancellation of the POTUS visit, our major opportunity for lobbying has been removed. Given that the GON will be increasingly preoccupied with the 2003 elections during the first quarter of the year, there will be very few other significant lobbying opportunities. f) As no important changes in traditional voting will occur without the President's direct authority, public diplomacy outreach within Nigeria is likely to have little effect. Quite the contrary, in certain cases (such as Zimbabwe),it would likely be counterproductive. ANDREWS ANDREWS