C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 003332

SIPDIS


NOFORN


E.O. 12958: DECL:12/18/2012
TAGS: AEMR ASEC PTER PINS CASC NI US
SUBJECT: UPDATED NIGERIA TRIP WIRES

REF: 01 ABUJA 2508


CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER. REASON: 1.5 (G).



1. (C/NF) Abuja and Lagos EACs met separately to examine
and update tripwires last reported reftel. The impetus for
these meetings was rising tensions associated with electoral
activity in Nigeria and the possibility of U.S. military
action in Iraq. This message reports tripwires for both
Posts.



2. (C/NF) Background: Nigeria is more volatile today than
a year ago. Ethnic and religious passions are evident. A
stagnant economy and high unemployment have created large
pools of disaffected youth easily persuaded to take to the
streets in some cities. Elections into local, state and
national office by law should take place in early 2003 but
are yet to be scheduled, adding to the underlying tensions.
Against this backdrop, eventual U.S. military action in Iraq
will resonate along regional and religious fault lines here,
already under stress from economic and electoral pressures.
Should the U.S. engage militarily in Iraq, significant anti-
American protests are possible in several cities, including
Abuja and Lagos.



3. (C/NF) Vulnerabilities: While GON security forces retain
the same limited capabilities they had a year ago, today
they face additional challenges. Violent demonstrations in
Abuja November 22 related to the Miss World beauty pageant
ended the aura of immunity from political violence that the
capital had previously enjoyed. Moreover, other apparently
politically-inspired violence, including assassinations, not
only degrades citizens' sense of being secure but poses
risks for democracy. Should a credible and specific threat
to their security arise, the Government of Nigeria would
seek to protect American citizens and USG facilities.
However, the Mission is less sanguine now than it was a year
ago that the GON would be able effectively to provide
security. Several Nigerian states face political
instability so serious that it may be difficult to hold
electi

ons in those states. The GON must seek to preclude
any possibility of several, nearly simultaneous outbreaks of
widespread, deadly political violence in far-flung parts of
Nigeria. Responding to that imperative spreads GON forces
out and creates new vulnerabilities in areas thought to be
relatively safe.



4. (C/NF) Different Circumstances: Trip wires for Abuja
and Lagos are not identical. Overall security conditions
and the capacity of the security forces in each city to
manage potential security challenges differ. In a nutshell,
security conditions and the GON ability to respond are
better in Abuja than in Lagos, though swift population
growth in the capital has made it less safe than it was
previously. A large demonstration around the Embassy in the
event of U.S. military action is likely, while the ability
of the GON security apparatus in Abuja to respond to such an
eventuality is uncertain. The events of November 22 showed
a GON unable to respond effectively to very credible threat
information. A week later, a massive security presence
precluded another violent episode, even though (sources say)
the number of those intending to demonstrate was larger.
Meanwhile, the security apparatus in Lagos has been
traditionally unreliable in the face of serious threats.
While the threat posed by the Oodua People's Congress, the
largest and most organized group with a sustained history of
violence against the federal government of Nigeria and the
Nigerian National Police Force, has receded, the ubiquitous,
often-violent criminal element in Lagos adds dimensions to
the challenges that confront Consulate Lagos in ways that
Embassy Abuja does not have to face.



5. (C/NF) Both Abuja and Lagos have taken numerous steps to
enhance emergency preparedness, including updating the
Emergency Action Plan (EAP), EAP briefings of all official
employees and adult family members, as well as similar
briefings for U.S. firms and private American citizens. The
Mission also recently conducted a Crisis Management Exercise
(CME). Posts have requested and received additional host
country security support and have enhanced their security
posture significantly at all official buildings and
compounds. Additionally, Lagos has taken all necessary
steps to ensure that adequate supplies of U.S. dollars are
on hand and evacuation orders prepared for all Mission
employees and family members. Abuja does not have
sufficient USD, but evacuation orders have been prepared;
efforts are underway to increase USD cash-on-hand.
Classified holdings are in the process of being reduced to
one-hour destruction time, and emergency preparedness drills
will continue to be conducted at both Posts. Consular
officers have visited various cities throughout Nigeria to
meet wardens and U.S. citizens on the topic of emergency
preparedness. Both Posts have in place special security
directives governing travel by employees to areas of
particular concern within Nigeria.



6. (C/NF) In consideration of the distinctly different
security environments of Abuja and Lagos, the respective
EACs have developed Abuja-specific and Lagos-specific
tripwires. Chief of Mission reviewed both sets of trip
wires December 18 and concurred.



7. (C/NF) One important difference between Abuja and Lagos
is the Abuja EAC's determination that "minimal" staffing is
not a viable option for the capital. The Embassy does not
have a MSG detachment, and its perimeter cannot readily be
defended. Should circumstances dictate drawdown below the
"essential" level (about 40% of normal staffing, septel),
the EAC would recommend Post closure to the COM.



8. (C/NF) Tripwires for Embassy Abuja:



A. Any of the following trip wires would trigger an EAC and
an assessment of the security environment in Nigeria:


-- There is a significant upsurge in violent crime in Abuja;
-- There are large or violent anti-U.S. demonstrations in
any Nigerian city;
-- There is scattered unrest in Nigeria as the result of a
political event (party convention or caucuses);
-- A USG installation anywhere in the world is attacked;
-- Threats of a non-specific and unverifiable nature against
American lives or property.



B. Any of the following tripwires would trigger an EAC and
consideration of whether to issue a stronger Travel Advisory
(recommending that non-essential travel be deferred) and
impose further travel restrictions on USG personnel:


-- The U.S. commences military operations in the Middle East
in support of UNSCR 1441;
-- There are large or violent anti-U.S. demonstrations in
any Nigerian city with a significant AmCit population;
-- There is a more severe disruption in delivery of
petroleum products than heretofore experienced;
-- There is an effective general strike for any reason;
-- Threats of a credible nature to American lives or
property emerge anywhere in Nigeria.



C. Any of the following tripwires would result in convening
the EAC and specific consideration of whether to request a
travel warning urging that travel to Nigeria be avoided, and
to recommend that the COM consider authorized departure:


-- There are large or violent anti-U.S. demonstrations in
any Nigerian city with American lives or property targeted;
-- There are riots or unrest in the Abuja satellite towns
and security forces are unable to restore order quickly;
-- Inter-ethnic, inter-religious or communal violence breaks
out in several parts of the country and security forces
require more than two but less than four days to restore
order;
-- Highly credible threats to American lives or property
emerge anywhere in Nigeria;
-- Fear and tension in the official American community rise
to the point that a significant number of community members
request authorized departure.



D. Any of the following trip wires would result in the
convening of an EAC to recommend that the COM consider
ordered departure of dependents and of personnel not
included on the "essential" list:


-- Large anti-American demonstrations in the vicinity of
Embassy Abuja or USAID, and security forces are unable to
control and disperse the crowds, or violent demonstrators
target a USG installation in Abuja and cannot be immediately
deterred by police;
-- Any USG installation in Nigeria is attacked;
-- Inter-ethnic, inter-religious or communal violence breaks
out in several parts of the country and security forces are
unable to restore order within four days;
-- Specific, highly credible threats are made to American
lives or property;
-- Violent anti-American demonstrations (anywhere in
Nigeria) result in major damage to American property.



9. (C/NF) The tripwires for Consulate General Lagos are:



A. Any of the following tripwires would trigger an EAC and
an assessment of the security environment in Lagos and the
Southern Nigeria Consular District, as well as a tier-one
test of the warden system.


-- No clear winners in upcoming elections. Results openly
contested. Assassination of prominent person(s).
-- Unrest during or after PDP convention.
-- Significant major natural or man-made disaster.
-- Access to transportation and telecommunications
interrupted by strikes of increasing frequency.
-- Local and state government services paralyzed at some
levels (i.e. police, electricity, fuel and water
deliveries).
-- Governors request that military assure internal security.



B. Any of the following tripwires would trigger an EAC to
consider recommending a warning to avoid non-essential
travel to Nigeria, further restrictions on the movements of
USG personnel and their dependents, and possible suspension
of visa operations.


-- Credible reporting that situation deteriorating quickly.
Random sustained violence outside the greater Lagos and
surrounding area (the regions just beyond the limits of
Lagos, Ikoyi, and Victoria islands, as well as neighboring
mainland Lagos areas) increases to the point that the police
and security forces have difficulty controlling this
violence.
-- Instability adversely affects public utilities and
provokes severe shortages of some essential items.
Replenishment of basic foodstuffs and water increasingly
difficult. Unfettered transport of children to the American
and British schools no longer assured.
-- Rising number of Nigerian elite send relatives on
"vacation" outside Nigeria.
-- Capital flight increases and oil revenue inflows
problematical.
-- Political leaders unable to come to grips with situation
and show no inclination to compromise.
-- Shakeup in military hierarchy. Certain commanders
relieved.



C. Any of the following tripwires would trigger an EAC to
consider requesting a warning to avoid all travel to
Nigeria, suspension of visa operations, and recommending
that the COM consider authorized departure for dependents
and persons not on the "essential" list:


-- Credible reporting that situation continues to
deteriorate. Random violence encroaching on Lagos area;
police and other security forces unable to control this
violence.
-- Instability adversely affecting public utilities;
shortages of essential items worsening. Transport to the
American and British schools no longer reasonably safe.
-- Rising number of Nigerian elite send relatives on
"vacation" outside Nigeria.
-- Large-scale shakeup in military hierarchy. Commanders of
critical formations relieved.



D. Any of the following tripwires would result in the
convening of an EAC to recommend that the COM consider
ordered departure of all personnel not on the "essential"
list and suspension of all but emergency ACS:


-- Substantial and occasionally sustained violence reaches
areas close to the Lagos islands and cannot be controlled or
such violence cuts off access to the Lagos airport for more
than 24 hours. Police and security forces on the defensive.
Curfew imposed; military on the streets.
-- Severe shortages of basic goods and sustained
interruptions of essential services set in.
-- Civil disturbances in oil-producing areas endanger
company operations. Crude oil deliveries sharply reduced.


JETER