NIGERIA: NOVEMBER 25 "FRIENDS GROUP" MEETING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 003303 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2012 TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL NI SUBJECT: NIGERIA: NOVEMBER 25 "FRIENDS GROUP" MEETING REF: A. ABUJA 2831 ¶B. ABUJA 3033 Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter. Reasons 1.5 (B & D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador Jeter hosted the third meeting of Chiefs of Mission of Germany, France, Canada, and the U.K. Deputy High Commissioner on November 25 to discuss upcoming Nigerian elections. The November 25 meeting concentrated on the need for uniform standards by which to judge Nigeria's 2003 elections, local elections monitors, international observers, and the need for a political party Code of Conduct. The group agreed to a list of actions to be taken by mid-December in order to move the electoral process forward. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Ambassador Jeter invited the Chiefs of Mission of Germany, France, Canada and the U.K. to continue discussions (reftels) November 25. The group identified four important issues to address: -- international observers; -- support for local NGOs' observation efforts; -- a political "Code of Conduct;" and -- INEC's continued logistical shortcomings. ¶3. (C) The group began by discussing acceptable parameters for Nigeria's 2003 election. Ambassador Jeter commented that the most important issue was acceptance by the Nigerian electorate, although the international community should continue to push for an improvement on the 1999 elections performance. German Ambassador Dietmar Kreusel said that the European Union (EU) Heads of Mission in Abuja are preparing a report on the status of elections preparation and prospects for a successful exercise, which he promised to share with the "Friends Group" when completed. He then noted that the EU saw little prospect for free and fair elections, so finding acceptable alternative criteria would be important. (COMMENT: There was general agreement that a strict "free and fair" test would doom Nigeria to failure. An agreed defensible alternative test that Nigeria might reasonably be expected to pass could not be formulated during the meeting. The U.K. held out for 1999 or better, a criterion most others questioned Nigeria's likelihood of satisfying. END COMMENT.) ¶4. (C) Turning to the issue of elections monitors, the group reported some confusion on the Nigerian side about the process by which the international community would be allowed to monitor elections. While officials in the Presidency and INEC indicated support for the idea, no entity clearly had the lead. Ambassador Jeter reported that MFA was acutely reticent to step in before holding discussions with INEC and knowing such fundamentals as timing, elections sequencing, etc. The MFA has noted the "sensitivity" of the 2003 elections, and the need for Nigerians to work out the modalities for the way forward. Kreusel said that an EU team had been told the GON "would categorically not" issue invitations, but will entertain "requests for permission" to observe. He warned that it would be logistically impossible to mobilize the approximately 100 EU observers on short notice. British Deputy High Commissioner Charles Bird said he had been told that the "State Security Service needs to approve all observers" so a list of candidates should be submitted in time for the appropriate security checks. The group discussed the merits of accrediting local diplomats as official observers, and tentatively agreed that arguments for and against this practice suggested a combined approach. They suggested that some diplomats might be accredited, while others should observe elections merely as diplomats accredited to Nigeria. ¶5. (C) Ambassador Jeter recommended coordinating international support to domestic monitoring groups, pointing to USAID support for the TMG in the 1999 elections as a model. Bird said that, from the British perspective, TMG lacked the capabilities it had in 1999. All agreed on the need to support local monitors and on the importance of identifying credible groups. They also agreed that most of the current groups involved in the monitoring process were dominated by southerners and highlighted the importance of recruiting northern NGOs to participate in 2003. ¶6. (C) Ambassador Jeter stressed the importance of convincing INEC and the political parties to adopt a "Code of Conduct" for elections activities. The other members of the group asked for copies of the INEC-produced draft from earlier in 2002. This issue will be taken up at the next meeting of the Friends Group, with discussion of how a credible and workable Code can be achieved. ¶7. (C) Canadian High Commissioner Howard Strauss said that the flawed registration process appeared no closer to resolution. Bird maintained that INEC Chairman Dr. Abel Guobadia was put in place "to deliver Obasanjo;" thus, INEC instinctively opposed observers or any type of electoral support that would interfere with ensuring Obasanjo's reelection. He warned that by investing in INEC, the international community could be put in the position of validating a flawed process. The group agreed that INEC had yet to provide enough information to evaluate its chances of (or interest in) success. ¶8. (C) The group reached consensus on four specific actions: -- send diplomatic notes individually to MFA and the Presidency requesting information about the guidelines for observer accreditation; -- identify potential northern groups to serve as elections monitors; -- push INEC and the parties to adopt a "Code of Conduct;" and -- maintain pressure on INEC, individually and collectively, to respond to concerns arising from the flawed registration process and INEC's lack of progress in preparing for credible elections. ¶9. (U) The "Friends Group" will meet again following the upcoming holidays. JETER