Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
02ABUJA2933
2002-10-25 18:45:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:
NIGERIA: MOD DANJUMA DENIES PARIS AGREEMENT ON
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 002933
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/12
TAGS: PBTS MOPS PGOV PREL PREF EPET NI CM
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: MOD DANJUMA DENIES PARIS AGREEMENT ON
BAKASSI
Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter; reasons 1.5 (B)
and (D)
C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 002933
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/12
TAGS: PBTS MOPS PGOV PREL PREF EPET NI CM
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: MOD DANJUMA DENIES PARIS AGREEMENT ON
BAKASSI
Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter; reasons 1.5 (B)
and (D)
1. (C) SUMMARY: During an October 25 meeting with
Ambassador Jeter, Nigerian Minister of Defense Lieutenant
General (ret.) Theophilus Y. Danjuma discussed the GON's
position on the ICJ's Bakassi decision. While Danjuma
denied the GON had agreed to abide by the ICJ's ruling at
the September 5 Paris meeting, he said Nigeria had no plans
to take offensive action and was hopeful that a negotiated
political settlement could be reached with Cameroon. END
SUMMARY.
2. (C) During an October 25 conversation with Nigerian
Minister of Defense Danjuma, Ambassador Jeter asked about
the GON's "rejection" of the ICJ's ruling on the Bakassi.
Ambassador said that we were somewhat taken aback by the
declaration since the Nigerian and Cameroonian Heads of
State had agreed at the September 5 bilateral meeting in
Paris to abide by the ICJ judgement. Stating emphatically
that he was present throughout the Presidential meeting,
Danjuma denied President Obasanjo had promised to honor the
ICJ's decision during the Paris talks with President Biya.
Danjuma said the GON had authorized the UNSG to make a
statement on the talks, but was unaware of the statement's
content before it was released. Danjuma went on to explain
that it would not have made sense for Nigeria to agree to
abide by a ruling from which there was no appeal without
having a clear idea of what that ruling would be. COMMENT:
The GON line that Obasanjo never promised to abide by the
ICJ ruling seems to be disingenuous if not duplicitous.
That the GON did not seek to correct the UN's apparent
misunderstanding of such an important issue is unexpected,
to say the least. END COMMENT.
3. (C) When asked about Nigeria's plans, Danjuma said
since the GON did not recognize the ICJ's ruling, Nigeria
would not remove its soldiers, police or administrators
from the Bakassi. Danjuma said the GON had no offensive
designs against Cameroon, but would use force if its troops
in the Bakassi were attacked. COMMENT: Although Danjuma
may be correct in saying the GON is not planning to mount
an offensive against Cameroon, there are signs of a
military build-up which could mean that the Nigerians have
not taken this unfortunate option completely off the table.
END COMMENT.
4. (C) Explaining U.S. policy on the Bakassi, Ambassador
urged Danjuma to find a political solution to the problem
and to avoid, at all costs, any resort to the use of force.
There were any number of modalities that could be conceived
so that there are no real losers on Bakassi, including
joint administration and resource sharing. Danjuma said
that Abuja had always advocated a political settlement, but
Yaounde had been recalcitrant and insisted that the issue
be taken to the ICJ. Nevertheless, and in spite of the ICJ
ruling, Nigeria remained hopeful that a political
settlement could still be reached.
JETER
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/12
TAGS: PBTS MOPS PGOV PREL PREF EPET NI CM
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: MOD DANJUMA DENIES PARIS AGREEMENT ON
BAKASSI
Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter; reasons 1.5 (B)
and (D)
1. (C) SUMMARY: During an October 25 meeting with
Ambassador Jeter, Nigerian Minister of Defense Lieutenant
General (ret.) Theophilus Y. Danjuma discussed the GON's
position on the ICJ's Bakassi decision. While Danjuma
denied the GON had agreed to abide by the ICJ's ruling at
the September 5 Paris meeting, he said Nigeria had no plans
to take offensive action and was hopeful that a negotiated
political settlement could be reached with Cameroon. END
SUMMARY.
2. (C) During an October 25 conversation with Nigerian
Minister of Defense Danjuma, Ambassador Jeter asked about
the GON's "rejection" of the ICJ's ruling on the Bakassi.
Ambassador said that we were somewhat taken aback by the
declaration since the Nigerian and Cameroonian Heads of
State had agreed at the September 5 bilateral meeting in
Paris to abide by the ICJ judgement. Stating emphatically
that he was present throughout the Presidential meeting,
Danjuma denied President Obasanjo had promised to honor the
ICJ's decision during the Paris talks with President Biya.
Danjuma said the GON had authorized the UNSG to make a
statement on the talks, but was unaware of the statement's
content before it was released. Danjuma went on to explain
that it would not have made sense for Nigeria to agree to
abide by a ruling from which there was no appeal without
having a clear idea of what that ruling would be. COMMENT:
The GON line that Obasanjo never promised to abide by the
ICJ ruling seems to be disingenuous if not duplicitous.
That the GON did not seek to correct the UN's apparent
misunderstanding of such an important issue is unexpected,
to say the least. END COMMENT.
3. (C) When asked about Nigeria's plans, Danjuma said
since the GON did not recognize the ICJ's ruling, Nigeria
would not remove its soldiers, police or administrators
from the Bakassi. Danjuma said the GON had no offensive
designs against Cameroon, but would use force if its troops
in the Bakassi were attacked. COMMENT: Although Danjuma
may be correct in saying the GON is not planning to mount
an offensive against Cameroon, there are signs of a
military build-up which could mean that the Nigerians have
not taken this unfortunate option completely off the table.
END COMMENT.
4. (C) Explaining U.S. policy on the Bakassi, Ambassador
urged Danjuma to find a political solution to the problem
and to avoid, at all costs, any resort to the use of force.
There were any number of modalities that could be conceived
so that there are no real losers on Bakassi, including
joint administration and resource sharing. Danjuma said
that Abuja had always advocated a political settlement, but
Yaounde had been recalcitrant and insisted that the issue
be taken to the ICJ. Nevertheless, and in spite of the ICJ
ruling, Nigeria remained hopeful that a political
settlement could still be reached.
JETER